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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation explores the creation of the Houston Astrodome, the first domed 
stadium built in the United States, from its earliest history of planning in the late 1950s to its 
construction and completion in the mid-1960s. It is during the time frame of 1957 to 1967,1 
argue, that we can see an example of the change in Houston and American society from one 
of an era of optimism and prosperity to one of pessimism and scarcity. By examining the 
arguments of stadium supporters and opponents, the alterations in design, the selection of 
certain technologies, and the changing opinion of what the stadium was to various 
individuals, we can obtain a clearer picture not just of Houston or Texas, but also of the 
United States. Although the histories of baseball and football are important to the story, the 
Astrodome was conceived as more than just a sports stadium. In an era of ebullient optimism, 
Houston leaders championed a multiple purpose stadium that could house an almost infinite 
number of civic events. Even better to these stadium enthusiasts, a domed stadium would 
symbolize the vigor of Houston and obliterate the perceived stigma of the city as merely an 
oil town. 
As America emerged from World War H, it entered into a new era of confidence and 
optimism. Historian Carl N. Degler stated that the postwar years in America were an "era of 
greatest abundance."  ^Never before in its history had the United States witnessed such 
abundance, growth and prosperity. As wartime demand stimulated the nation's industrial 
production, America emerged wealthier and prepared for postwar reconstruction. With the 
1 Carl N. Degler, Abundance and Anxiety: America, J945-1960 (Wcstport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), 124-
148, quotes 147; David Q. Vaigt, Baseball: An Illustrated History (University Park: The Pennsylvania State 
2 
devastation of both Europe and Asia, America's gross national product ballooned 250 
percent from 1945 to 1960. Individually, Americans witnessed the growth of their personal 
income too, from $3,083 to $5,657, and were "better off than at any time in the nation's 
history." Although returning soldiers threatened the miniscule unemployment rate, the G. I. 
Bill of Rights enticed many men into America's colleges and universities while helping 
subsidize their housing. With greater earning potential and more money, they could spend 
their wealth on consumer products like private homes, television sets, and automobiles. With 
more money in their pockets and more time on their hands, Americans in the Fifties could 
pursue more activities in a "leisure society." Historian W. J. Rorabaugh agreed with Degler's 
opinion of the postwar years and asserted that this "was a promising time," and Americans, 
in general, were "hopeful and optimistic." After perceiving that they won the war, Americans 
could welcome and relish the "peace abroad and prosperity at home," complete with "future 
national bounty that accommodated both private luxury and public expenditure."  ^
Similarly, Americans perceived that their science and technology won the war. 
America's victory "reaffirmed America's technological strength." Historian Thomas P. 
Hughes labeled this perception "technological enthusiasm." This faith in America's science 
and technology did not end with the war, but continued into the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Despite the apparent advances of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Cold War, American 
science, technology, and industry promised to tackle and defeat the spread of communism. 
The federal government extended contracts to private industry and universities that would 
University Press. 1987), 219-223; Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second 
World War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 201-216. 
2 W. J. Rorabaugh, Kennedy and the Promise of the Sixties (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), ix; J. Ronald Oakley, God's Coimfry; America in f&g fï/Wes (New York: Dembner Books, 1986), 228-
229. Oakley also provides a brief account of leisure pursuits, 249-266. 
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prevent the spread of communism by creating "a worldwide era of plenty" and transform "the 
world in the United States' image." Essentially, the United State would "engineer a new 
world order" that it would also guided 
The "space race" between the Soviet Union and the United States demonstrated the 
America's optimism in its science and technology. After the Soviets launched /on 4 
October 1957 (and 7/ a month later), the popular perception was that all of America 
became anxious, fearful, and depressed as their faith in American superiority was shaken. 
President John F. Kennedy's decision to send a man on the moon, announced to Congress on 
25 May 1961, affirmed his faith that the US could accomplish the difficult task of a lunar 
landing, despite the financial costs. During his "second inaugural," Kennedy announced to 
the members of Congress, "I believe we possess all the resources and talents necessary" to 
take more active measures for the exploration of space, particularly a manned space flight to 
the moon and back. Kennedy explained that the work and financial cost would be great for 
the nation. But Kennedy also affirmed his faith and confidence that America would achieve 
space success and lead the entire world. Besides, the President would add later, the hard work 
and cost of sending a man to the moon would only benefit the nation in terms of increasing 
international prestige, advancing science and technology, strengthening the economy, and 
even increasing the standard of living. Other proponents used a similar argument to support 
the space program on its potential "spill-over" effect. This "spin-off" or technology transfer 
3 Alan I Marcus and Howard Segal, Technology in America: A Brief History (Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace 
College Publishers, 1999), 253-260; Thomas P. Hughes, American Gewjw. A CenAffy qf/mwUion and 
Technological Enthusiasm (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 1-12. Hughes, however, failed to delve deeper 
into this decline. One study takes Hughes to task for this inadequacy. See Lester Louis Poehner, Jr., The future's 
not what it used to he: The decline of technological enthusiasm in America, 1957-1970 (Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa 
State University, 2000). I disagree with Poehncr's assessment that this decline began in the late 1950s, but see it 
occurring during the mid 1960s. 
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would strengthen the economy, solve social ailments, and generate general progress. Dr. 
Hugh L. Dryden, the Deputy Administrator of NASA, expressed his confidence that science 
and technology would spill-over from the space program to the rest of society. "The 
influence of the technical progress," he told the members of the Senate's Appropriation 
Committee in 1961, "will be felt throughout or economy..." and "will be adaptable to a host 
of other uses." This almost inevitable "technological progress" would permeate throughout 
American society from new technological applications in industry to new goods for the 
average American/ 
During the war, Houston had played a vital role in the national defense, aided by the 
massive influx of federal money. This economic stimulus expanded the city's established 
industries like petroleum, steel, and transportation and stimulated the growth of newer ones 
in rubber, petrochemicals, natural gas, and ship building. The six railroads in Houston, for 
example, increased their tonnage 128 percent from 1940 to 1945. Oil refiners moved their 
operations from Beaumont and Port Arthur to the banks of Houston's ship channel to take 
advantage of the facilities already built in Houston. The number of refineries multiplied that, 
in turn, increased overall production to satisfy military demand. The infant petrochemical 
industry grew to conserve and convert gases into useful end products. Aided by an 
4 Pochncr. 17-41; Marcus and Segal, 296-297; Robert A. Devine, "Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of 
Space," in Robert A Divine, The Johnson Years, Volume Two: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), 228-232; John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: 
frq/ecf ApoWo and f&e Mzfionaf /nferesf (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1970), 109-121,123-130; 
Roger D. Launius, NASA: A History of the U.S. Civil Space Program (Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1994), 60-66; Mark E. Byrnes, Politics and Space: Image Making by NASA (Westport, Connecticut 
and London: Pracgcr, 1994), 39-40; James L. Kauffman, Selling Outer Space: Kennedy, the Media, and 
Funding for Project Apollo, 1961-1963 (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1994), 20-
29; Vernon Van Dyke, Pride and Power: The Rationale of the Space Program (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1964), 104; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations, 
1962, Hearings...on H. Res. 7445, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 649, quoted in Van Dyke, 104. 
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interconnected pipeline, the petrochemical industry increased its overall production and 
efficiency/ 
The city of Houston, like other major metropolitan areas in Texas and the Sunbelt 
witnessed tremendous postwar growth. Houston's population swelled after the war. In the 
1940 census, Houston totaled 384,514 inhabitants (the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(SMS A) was 510,397). By the end of the decade, this number increased fifty-five percent to 
596,163 (SMSA 806,701) and would continue to increase to 1,139,678 (SMSA l,243,168)at 
the start of the Sixties. In comparison, the population of Dallas-Forth Worth (using only the 
SMSA) was 584,225 in 1950,976,052 in 1950, and 1,656,816 in 1960. The population 
increase triggered an economic boom that helped secure an optimistic outlook for the future. 
WWQ provided "both investment and human capital that had been previously lacking." 
Houston also benefited from low taxes, cheap labor, a million consumers, and a "positive 
attitude towards business and industry." Houston, however, did not seem daunted by this 
rapid growth, but instead, seemed to relish it. With the city's reliance upon petroleum and its 
related industries, Houston seemed immune from any economic downturn and contributed to 
the nation's insatiable demand for energy. Additionally, the "entrepreneurial elite" that 
guided the city advocated physical and economic growth of Houston. For these individuals, 
5 Marvin Hurley, Decisive Years for Houston (Houston: Houston Chamber of Commerce, 1966), 71-72, 86; 
Robert D. Thomas and Richard W. Murray, frogroMA Pofidcj. CAange and Governance in #ow#on (Berkley: 
The Regents of the University of California, 1991), 46-48; Gerald D. Nash, The Federal Landscape: An 
Economic History of the Twentieth Century West (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1999), 41-75; John 
M. Findlay, Magic land?.- Wesfem Cifyacapa? and /Unencan Cidfwre A/kr 7940 (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1992), 15-16. John B. Boles, The South Through Time: A History of an American Region 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1995), 451-455. New Dealer Jesse H. Jones almost single 
handedly brought about the creation of Houston's petrochemical and synthetic rubber industries during WWII. 
See Jesse H. Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars: My thirteen Years with the RFC (New York: Macmillan, 1951. On the 
ship channel, see William D. Angel, Jr., "To Make a City: Entrepreneurship on the Sunbelt Frontier," in The 
Rise if the Sunbelt Cities, ed. David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins (Beverly Hills: Sage publications, 1977), 
116-123. 
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the future of Houston would continue to grow and expand. Houston was definitely without 
any type of limits/ 
Houston's leaders also responded to the postwar "rapid growth" by building 
infrastructure the city required for the future. In 1949, mayor Oscar Holcombe announced the 
construction of a modem airport. The completion of the new international airport in 1954 
promised to handle the increasing number of national and international airline flights. When 
the new airport seemed unable to satisfy the new jet airplanes and the ever-increasing traffic, 
construction on an even larger airport commenced in 1962. Houston leaders did not neglect 
the city's ship channel, which was enlarged to accommodate increasing ship traffic. In 1957, 
Houstonians approved bonds to expand the port's facilities and amenities to handle more and 
more business. By 1967, Houston ranked third in the nation for tonnage handled, trailing 
only New York and New Orleans/ 
The final element of Houston's transportation system was its roads and highways. In 
addition to paving and planning city streets, the city planning commission attempted to 
rationalize traffic flow inside the city limits. These men emphasized private automobile 
usage, which greatly expanded the city's physical growth, ensuring that public transportation 
would never be a practical solution. "For Houstonians, the automobile was almost a necessity 
of life," noted historian David G. McComb. Any new commercial building, for example, 
6 United States Census Bureau, Census of Population: 1950, vol. 2, part 43, (Washington, DC.: United States 
Government Printing Office (USGPO). 1952), 55; United States Census Bureau, Census of Population: 1960, 
vol. 1, part 45, (Washington, D C.: USGPO, 1962), 55; Bradley R. Rice and Richard M Bernard, 
"Introduction," in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World 
War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 8; Carl Abbott, Urban American in the Modern Age, 1920 to 
the Present (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson. Inc.: 1987), 56; James C. Cobb, The Industrialization 
and Southern Society, 1877-1984 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 63-67; Barry J. Kaplan, 
"Houston: The Golden Buckle of the Sunbelt," in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, Sunbelt Cities: 
foMca and GrowfA Since WorM War//(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 196-202; Oakley, 229-230. 
7 David G. McComb, Houston: The Bayou City (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), 171-177. 
7 
necessitated ample parking spaces. Because Houstonians placed the city's transportation 
future on the auto, they made a commitment to proliferating expenses that came with it For 
example, the Gulf Freeway when completed in 1952 cost the federal government the state of 
Texas, Houston, and Galveston $28,000,000. (Cost of construction in Houston was 
$1,600,000 a mile.) Another plan for Houston entailed a 244-mile four-lane highway project 
that would encircle the downtown area and cost over $100,000,000/ 
These transportation facilities helped bring NASA's space research laboratory to 
Houston in September 1961. NASA selected Houston over twenty other cities like New 
Orleans, Los Angeles, Boston, and Dallas. Surely one reason was that influential Texans like 
Houstonian Albert Thomas who chaired the House Appropriations Committee and vice 
president Lyndon B. Johnson were in important political positions to influence for Houston. 
But even more than these political allies, Houston fulfilled the various requirements that 
NASA demanded for its research lab. The most important of these was Houston's 
transportation facilities. The ship channel and related port facilities provided access to the 
Intracoastal Waterway and the Gulf of Mexico, connecting the manned spacecraft center to 
the other essential cities for Project Apollo. The railroads provided more than adequate 
freight service for NASA's needs. The two airports guaranteed that Houston would remain 
the hub of jet operations in the southwest. And the investment in the freeways in and around 
the city provided excellent service to all parts of the country. Other industries also relocated 
corporate headquarters to Houston to take advantage of the city's "expanding transportation 
networks of aviation and highway systems" and renewed commitment to higher education. 
8 McComb, 178-182; Oakley, 244-246. 
8 
According to historian Stephen B. Oates, NASA's decision "portended new dimensions in 
scientific and technological growth" for Houston.* 
Houston's growth was not atypical of other Sunbelt cities during and after the war, 
asserted historian Robert Fisher. For Fisher, the main feature of Houston's growth has been 
the petroleum industry.'" In 1946, nineteen counties that surrounded Houston contained over 
100 oil fields and more than 7,000 oil wells. On average, each well produced 65 barrels a day 
(the state of Texas averaged 21 a day). These oil fields produced 20% of the state's 
production of crude oil and 40% of petroleum refining (593,990 barrels a day). A network of 
pipelines that increased overall efficiency and production as the by-products for one plant 
became the raw material for another connected all the oil wells, gasoline and cycling plants, 
and refineries. The "Spaghetti Bowl" pipeline system moved 527,000 barrels a day into 
Houston and 370,000 out. It was no wonder that Houston's petrochemical industry flourished 
since it was within pipeline reach of two-thirds of the nation's oil and natural gas reserves. 
Despite the national recession in 1957 and 1958 (that hit the petroleum industry particularly 
hard), Houston's vast industrial and commercial network allowed it to withstand the recession 
" James Stafford, "Behind the NASA Move to Houston," Texar BwaingM /kview 36 (April 1962): 90-91; 
Stephen B. Oates, "NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 
67 (January 1964): 354-356; Edward F. Haas, "The Southern Metropolis, 1940-1976," in Blaine A. Brownell 
and David R. GoldGeld (eds.) 77# C;fy in SbwfAem ffirfor}'. TTie GrowfA of ZMxm Cnv&zofion in fAe SowfA 
(Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1977), 172-179. 
10 Robert Fisher, "Urban Policy in Houston, Texas," Urban Studies 26 (February 1989), 145. Arguing what 
exactly is the Sunbelt is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. For my purpose, I will agree with a 
geographical definition of the Sunbelt by Bradley R. Rice and Richard M. Bernard that uses the southern border 
of Kansas as the line of demarcation. States south of this imaginary line are considered "Sunbelt." See their 
"Introduction," in Sunbelt Cities, cd. Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1983), 1-30. 
9 
of 1957 and 1958. The dominance of petroleum industries in Houston's economy allowed 
those outside of Texas to label Houston the "Oil Town."" 
Once the war ended, Houston's economic boom did not. The feeling of "boundless 
optimism and affluence" pervaded throughout the city." Houston's economy did not slow 
down but actually accelerated. Its industries did not close after the war, but remained busy as 
they tried to meet the demands from America's growing population and global reconstruction 
needs. Many, like the synthetic rubber and steel plants, did not require massive reconversion 
for peacetime demands. In this way, Houston did not experience a disastrous unemployment 
or a postwar economic depression. Economically, Houston merely augmented its wartime 
gains.13 
The economic expansion Houston experienced was aided and abetted by its 
increasing population. "The key to the Sunbelt South's economic takeoff was its population 
growth," wrote James C. Cobb." In Houston this was also true. At the beginning of the 
1950s, Houston's population was 596,000 and Harris County's was 806,701. By 1960, 
Houston's population nearly doubled to 938,000, a growth greater than fifty percent during 
the decade. Harris County tallied 1,243,158 people, also an increase of more than fifty 
percent. The city boundaries also increased by 1,773 square miles, almost completely 
" McComb, 185-186; Hurley, 85-86,104-105,160-161; George Fuermann, ffourfon. 7%g Once and Fwfwe 
City (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), 33-34; Douglas T. Miller and Marion 
Nowak," The Fifties: The Way We Really Were (Garden City. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1977), 
17. 
12 W. J. Rorabaugh. Kennedy and the Promise of the Sixties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
xxi. 
"Hurley, 68, 84,158. 
14 James C. Cobb, The Industrialization and Southern Society, 1877-1984 (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1984), 51-67. 
10 
engulfing Harris County." The number of registered automobiles, building permits, and 
bank deposits all doubled during the 1950s. The city's consumption of electricity tripled, and 
the number of customers doubled. Houston Chamber of Commerce President Marvin Hurley 
proudly cited the investment in Houston's infrastructure as testimony to the city's remarkable 
growth. Houston's "swelling statistics" included almost $500 million of commercial and 
residential construction, $200 million in public works, $97 million for public schools, and 
$38 million for churches occurred between 1948 and 1955. The city grew physically too. 
After the city annexed 140-square miles in 1956, Houston became the second largest 
American city/* 
Aided by cheap labor, low taxes, raw materials, consumers and "the region's positive 
attitude towards business and industry,Houston's spectacular postwar growth could also 
be attributed to its leadership. Much like the entrepreneurs who backed the creation of the 
Ship Channel, the businessmen of the 1950s retained close, intimate relationships with 
politicians.18 The business leaders, so-called self-made men, found allies in other self-made 
men. Houston's entrepreneurs have been labeled as tenacious, " aggressive," and 
opportunistic in their efforts to obtain public money to aid their private investments and 
expand their city. The vast railroad network and the Ship Channel are pre-WWII examples of 
this nexus. After the war, this would be seen in federal money for flood control programs, 
highway expansion, home loans, and NASA. This pro-growth coalition of wealthy 
businessmen and political leaders was created not just to expand the city's economy, but also 
^ Michael C. D. Macdonald, American Cifiea. A Rgxwf on f&e MyfA of f/rbzn .Renaissance (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1984), 94; Hurley, 100, 205. Houston's growth rate was 57.4% and Harris County's was 54.1%. 
"Hurley, 159,162. 
" Cobb, 66. 
11 
as a means to laud its increased wealth. But more than just wealth, Houston's continual 
growth became an "unquestioned good in and of itself," a "civic virtue," a means to obtain 
international recognition. What was good for the economic elite, therefore, was good for the 
city. Opposing their consensus meant one opposed what was good for Houston. These 
nonconformists and their ideas, therefore, could be marginalized as out of step or out of 
touch with reality/* 
Kirkpatrick Sale noted the tremendous expansion that occurred in post-war Houston. 
In his book fower S/w/f, he labeled Houston "the pluperfect mid-century metropolis" because 
it dominated the six pillars of industry: agribusiness, military-defense, advanced technology, 
petroleum and natural gas, real estate, and leisure. For Sale, the Houston's functional central 
business district made it "so choice." Since no one actually resided in downtown Houston, 
the city was surrounded by suburbs and served by large, multi-lane freeways. Downtown 
Houston, "devoid of character," was all about business and making money. This "spirit" of 
money-making, Sale concluded, permeated throughout the city and its history.*" All of this 
postwar activity and remarkable urban growth seemed to necessitate a concrete mark of 
Houston's greatness and pledge of unlimited expansion. Houston needed to prove that it was 
a "big league" city and not just a mere oil-town. A professional sports franchise with a large 
sports stadium would accomplish this goal and much more. 
The postwar coalition of Houston consisted of business elites and politicians was 
exemplified in the "8F Crowd." The 8F Crowd received its name from George Brown's suite 
18 William D. Angel, Jr., "To Make a City: Entreprencurship on the Sunbelt Frontier." in The Rise of the Sunbelt 
Cities, ed. David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), 116-123. 
19 Thomas and Murray, 14-16, 85-88; Miller and Nowak, 11. 
20 Kirkpatrick Sale, Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment 
(New York: Random House, 1975), 51-53. 
12 
in the Lamar Hotel. Brown, cofounder of Brown and Root, was often joined by Howjfon 
C&rowcZe owner Jesse H. Jones, ffowafo» owner and former governor William Hobby, 
James Ellis of First National City Bank, and Gus Wortham, a life insurance executive. They 
would meet at Brown's suite to play cards, drink, exchange stories, and determine the course 
of Houston's future. These men held similar ideas, opinions, and objectives for the future of 
their city. What was good for their business ventures coincided with the best interests of the 
entire city. Their power, however, waned in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as members of 
the 8F Crowd passed away. This did not mean that their vision died with them. Houston's 
Chamber of Commerce filled some of the void as did other business and political leaders.^  
Some of these businessmen eventually created an organization to effect a certain 
change in Houston. The result was the creation of Houston Sports Association (HSA) in 
1958. As the name implied, the HSA was created to bring big league sports to Houston. Led 
by former sports writer George Kirksey and backed by banker William Kirkland and oilman 
Craig Cullman, Jr., the HSA realized that it needed to differentiate Houston from other cities 
in the nation. They needed a way that Houston could flaunt its spectacular growth and prove 
that it was no longer a mere Oil Town. This could be done by obtaining a major league 
baseball franchise, a status symbol, as "something deep and intensely dear that is finally 
possessed." By becoming "big league," Houston would differentiate itself from other Texas 
cities and demonstrate its "coming of age." Easterners would be able to distinguish Houston 
21 Carl Abbott, Urban America, 81 : Wendell M. Bedicheck and Neal Tannahill, Public Policy in Texas 
(Glenview. Illinois: Scott, Foresmann. and Company, 1982), 276-277; George Lipsitz, "Sports Stadia and 
Urban Development," Journal of Sports and Social Issues 8 (Summer/Fall 1984): 10; Fuermann, 14. 
13 
from San Antonio and Dallas. Houston would overcome its inferiority complex plus lure 
additional businesses and corporations.^  
Major league baseball would not be the sole determiner of Houston's big league 
status. A new sports stadium would do it too. But not just any average stadium, which would 
defeat the purpose of flaunting Houston's greatness. Instead, the HSA wanted a stadium that 
would take advantage of the most modem technology and demonstrate Houston's 
grandiosity. A domed stadium would do this. It would "display human technological 
achievement never remotely approximated in human history," allowing man to overcome 
nature, and prove Houston's ascendancy in the nation.^  
The HSA's domed stadium not only represented the goal of this small group of 
influential Houston businessmen, the stadium also pointed to the city's politicians and 
residents determined effort to take advantage of a seemingly endless opportunity in the US. 
Houston seemed to have a limitless future that would only get better as the city grew and 
matured. Houston had grown in many ways after World War Two. The city expanded its 
infrastructure constructing new freeways, widening the ship channel, and planning a modem 
jet airport. A city that had grown culturally and physically needed a symbol of this era in its 
history. Other American cities had constructed massive monuments that testified to a city's 
greatness. New York City had the Empire State Building, St. Louis had the Arch, and Los 
Angeles had Disneyland. City boosters hoped that a modem domed stadium, the largest in 
the world, would certify Houston's "metropolitan status, create a positive attitude for tourism 
22 George Lipsitz, "Sports Stadia and Urban Development: A Tale of Three Cities," Journal of Sports and Social 
Issues 8 (Summer/Fall 1984), 11 ; William Barry Furlong, "That 'Big League' Yearning," The New York Times 
A&zgazzne (16 June 1957), 14. 
23 Alan Gowans, Images of American Living: Four Centuries of Architecture and Furniture as Cultural 
Expression (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 450; Lipsitz, 11. 
14 
and commerce, and enhance (its) own civic image." The city had the money, the location, 
and the will to build the largest domed stadium in the world.** 
The period from around the mid-1950s to the later 1960s witnessed a profound 
change in American society. The optimism of the 1950s began to wane during the 1960s. In 
its place arose feelings of finitude, doubt, pessimism, and cynicism. These feelings infiltrated 
Houston as well and would alter the way Houstonians viewed the Astrodome. Although the 
stadium never received total support from every resident of Houston and Harris County, they 
generally viewed it as something that would benefit the area in every facet that could be 
imagined, from economics to stature. The nation's sixth largest city finally proved to its 
detractors and skeptics that Houston "made it" and was "progressive." The large 
entertainment complex would host major league sports and cultural events, something 
lacking in the rough, unlettered "Oil Town." The stadium would incorporate only the latest 
technology while demonstrating the scientific expertise of Houston. The splendor of the 
Astrodome would not last long. 
24 Steven A. Reiss, City Games: The Evolution of American Urban Society and the Rise of Sports, (Urbana: 
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CHAPTER 2: THE NEXT MAJOR LEAGUE CITY 
In late 1950s, the people of Houston and Harris County could view their future with 
optimism and rightly so. Houston was "big league in population, in business handled, in bank 
deposits and bank clearings, in number of automobiles, telephones, radios and TV sets."  ^
This optimistic attitude, faith in technology, and belief in a better future pervaded Houston. 
But Houston in the late 1950s, however, was not "big time" in professional sports. Houston 
hosted its share of prizefights, but the sport of boxing did not make a city "big league." What 
Houston did have was a storied minor league franchise that had been a member of the Texas 
League since the late 1880s. The Buffaloes or Buffs became a farm team of the professional 
Saint Louis Cardinals in 1922. Even though the Buffs brought home the Texas League 
championship in 1956 and 1957, it was not a world championship. "Houston: home of a 
minor league championship team" was hardly a moniker that Houstonians would want to use 
to define their up and coming city. "Houston: home of the world champions" sounded more 
respectable/ 
After the war, major league baseball remained as popular as ever. Fans had more 
disposable income to spend and the increasing number of night games contributed to 
baseball's recovery. Attendance in 1948, for example, was 20.8 million, up one million from 
the year before/ But trouble was on the horizon for major league baseball. Attendance 
' Frederick G. Lieb, "Kiiksey Heads Houston's Drive For Big-Time Birth," 77# jjpoflzyig AWa (SYV), 15 
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throughout the nation began to decline in the 1950s, even though the economy remained 
strong. Owners scurried about looking for explanations. One answer was found in changing 
leisure habits of Americans. More Americans chose to spend their leisure time away from the 
ballpark and instead driving to visit family and friends or participating in sporting events, for 
example. A second explanation was the proliferation of radio and television. Instead of 
traveling to the aging downtown ballpark, fans could remain in the comfort of their own 
homes in suburbia to watch or listen to the game. "Yet another explanation," posited baseball 
historian David Q. Voigt, "faulted baseball's hidebound, traditional fifty-year old format for 
failing to keep up with changing population trends." Owners took note and tried to rectify the 
curious decl ine. They determined that most cities could not support two franchises, that new 
ballparks were needed, and most importantly, that new markets in the West and South should 
be tapped to the fullest potential/ 
The situation in major league baseball provided a slim possibility that Houston could 
become a big league city and throw off its bush league reputation. In July 1951, the House 
Subcommittee on Monopoly Power investigated the operation of major league baseball and 
the power of franchise owners. Although the House Subcommittee resolved not to act against 
the owners, notice was served to the owners that their power could be challenged. On the 
heels of the hearings, owners altered the agreement concerning the transfer of franchises. 
Previously, any owner who wanted to move his club needed the unanimous vote of the other 
owners. Under the new rule, the owner need only the undivided consent of his league. If the 
148. During the 1920s, attendance averaged 7,351, declining to 6,578 in the 1930s, and rebounding to an all 
time high 16,027 in 1949. 
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club from one league asked to move into a city occupied by a team from the other league, 
there was nothing to stop the established team from preventing it. The owner of the 
transferring club only had to pay an indemnity to the minor league and the affected franchise. 
Thus, an owner needed only the votes of seven owners instead of fifteen to move from one 
city to another.  ^
In 1953, Boston Braves owner Louis R. Perini asked for, and received, the permission 
of other National League owners to move from Boston to Milwaukee where he owned the 
minor league Brewers team. Instead of allowing Perini to go bankrupt, the owners authorized 
the transfer of the Braves to Milwaukee beginning later that year. Milwaukee county officials 
authorized the construction of a $6.6 million county-owned stadium that tempted Perini's 
desire for relocation. This was the first franchise transfer since 1903.* 
The result was dubbed the "Milwaukee Miracle." Perini's Braves, no longer 
competing with the more popular Red Sox in Boston, attracted 1.8 million fans in the first 
year of operation. Their final year in Boston, the Braves had drawn 280,000. According to 
the Milwaukee Association of Commerce, the Braves generated $25.3 million "in new 
business" during the team's first four years. The survey claimed that "the average out-of-
town fan," (which was every one-out-of-three) spent almost $11 during each trip to 
Milwaukee. The Braves added at least $7,000,000 to the local economy. The biggest winners 
were transportation companies and hotel and motel owners. Local non-baseball related 
merchants, however, complained that this money was not spent at their stores, but mainly 
inside the county stadium. A Milwaukee movie theater owner lamented that he actually lost 
5 Elihu Lowenfish. "A Tale of Many Cities: The Westward Expansion of Major League Baseball in the 1950's 
(sic)," Journal of the West 17 (July 1978): 73-74. 
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money since the arrival of the Braves. "I realize the Braves are good for Milwaukee," he said, 
"but as far as I'm concerned they can go back to Boston tomorrow." The real winners, of 
course, were the Perini brothers who watched their Braves average more than two million 
spectators since their arrival from Boston in 1953. Another franchise, the St. Louis Browns, 
saw a jump in their attendance figures from almost 300,000 to over one million when they 
became the Baltimore Orioles in 1954. A final franchise, the Athletics, abandoned 
Philadelphia in 1955 for greener pastures in Kansas City. The Athletics witnessed an 
attendance in Kansas City of 1.4 million, while their final year in Philadelphia the drew 
290,000. These moves began the alteration in the map of major league baseball and forced 
the owners to "become more amenable to change."7 
Although the general map of major league baseball changed a bit, the teams were still 
located in the Northeast. It seemed as if baseball dared not extend its western reach beyond 
Missouri. This did not satisfy native Texan George Kirksey. A sportswriter who began a 
public relations firm, Kirksey clamored for a major league team for Houston. He argued that 
the city's population of 1.2 million (sixth largest in the US) would more than support a major 
league franchise. After an aborted attempt to buy the St. Louis Cardinals, Kirksey keenly 
watched the events unfold in Milwaukee, Kansas City, and Baltimore. In late 1956, Kirksey 
secured the help of William Kirkland, chairman of the board at First City National Bank and 
baseball fan, to bring big league baseball to Houston. Understanding that they could not do it 
by themselves, Kirksey and Kirkland met with other like-minded Houston businessmen who 
6 George Kirksey, "Houston: the Next Major League City," Baseball Digest 18 (March 1959): 21; Lowenfish: 
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wanted their city to become "big league." One important member was Craig Cullman, Jr., 
grandson of Texaco founder Joseph S. Cullinan. Kirkland invited Cullman to make a more 
prominent role in the effort to make Houston "big league." At a 4 January 1957 meeting, 
Kirksey, Kirkland, and Cullinan decided to create an organization whose raison d'être was to 
make Houston "big league."* 
The syndicate eventually became known as the Houston Sports Association (HSA). A 
member of the syndicate could purchase a share, and not more than seven, of the HSA with a 
$500 down payment for each share. With this small down payment, an investor was betting 
that the HSA would bring major league baseball to Houston. Once the HSA obtained fifteen 
pledges, the contract would become binding upon, an event that occurred on 14 July 1958. 
Eventually, twenty-seven men purchased the thirty shares of HSA stock. Meanwhile, Kirksey 
and Cullinan traveled across the country meeting with baseball owners, introducing 
themselves and their cause of a "big league" Houston. In an interview twenty years later, 
Cullinan said baseball owners told the HSA reps that they needed a stadium before getting a 
franchise. However, back in Houston, the HSA heard just the opposite. City and county 
officials informed Cullinan to first get a professional team. Only after obtaining a franchise 
would city and county governments start the work towards a stadium/ 
This new large stadium was the Harris County Domed Stadium or the Astrodome. It 
has commonly been assumed that the entire stadium idea came from Roy Hofheinz/° "The 
boy wonder of Texas politics," Hofheinz studied law at the Houston Law School and 
managed Lyndon Johnson's first senate bid. He won election to the Texas Legislature in 1934 
8 Frederick G. Lieb, "Kirksey Heads Houston's Drive For Big-Time Birth," SN, 15 January 1958, 6; Nealon, et 
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and two years later, at age twenty-four, the judge of Harris County. After a brief retirement, 
Hofheinz returned to public life when he became Houston's mayor in 1952. He immediately 
clashed with his council and soon was branded as "arrogant and domineering, a dictator in an 
elective office." When council members boycotted meetings to defeat one of Hofheinz's bond 
issues, he threatened to arrest them using a mayoral "bench warrant." The council responded 
with a threat of impeachment. Despite his abrasive personality and concerted attack from 
former supporters, he won reelection in 1954. His luck, however, abandoned him in 1955 as 
he was removed in a special election that revolved around Hofheinz's power struggle with the 
city council.11 But the notion of a massive arena, stadium, or entertainment complex in 
Houston was discussed and debated amongst government leaders and businessmen before 
Hofheinz entered the scene in the early 1960s. Stadium fever even appeared before major 
league baseball announced its plans to expand in 1960. Although intimately intertwined with 
professional athletics, the original stadium concept anticipated dozens of diverse events at 
one city location, not just baseball. Early stadium enthusiasts envisioned a system that could 
accommodate almost any event at almost any time. This system was apropos for Houston of 
the late 1950s. The city was still riding the wartime economic boom. While other cities 
across the country began to experience the effects of the coming recession, Houston 
continued to grow physically and expand financially. A massive, expensive entertainment 
9 Nealon, et al: 11-13. 
10 Lipsitz, 13. Ray, 260-266. 
11 Gary Cartwright, "A Barnum Named Hofheinz; a Big Top Called Astrodome," New York Times Magazine, 21 
July 1968,15-18; Roy Terrell, "Fast Man With a .45," /WwjfroW, 26 March 1962,34-35; Marshall 
Frady, "Hofheinz and the Astrodome," Holiday 45 (May 1969): 44. 
21 
complex would most assuredly confirm Houston's worth and prove its vitality to all skeptics 
and critics of "Oil Town."" 
Before the HSA began its organized bid for professional sports and a stadium, other 
Houstonians pondered ideas and models of large stadia. One serious proposal came from 
oilman Glenn McCarthy who revealed his model of a football stadium that had a paneled 
roof that could slide open and closed." Houston politicians also entertained the feasibility of 
a sports stadium. Councilman Matt Wilson brought the issue of a stadium to his fellow city 
council members on 4 June 1957. Wilson showed that Houston's population rank of 14* in 
1950 had climbed to place it 8* in 1957. Based merely on population, Wilson advocated that 
Houston was already a big league city, but needed to become recognized as one too. He 
proposed a $5 million bond issue, subject to voter approval, that would "finance construction 
of a municipally-owned baseball stadium." This stadium, he hoped, would attract a major 
league baseball team.* 
More importantly, the stadium would be a symbol of Houston "making it," a 
testimony of the city's past and future greatness. Dynamic cities, the argument went, were 
building stadiums to lure baseball franchises from older, tired, less-progressive cities. The 
most recent example, the city of Milwaukee had financed its own county stadium that lured 
the Braves away from Boston. Following this recipe, Minneapolis and San Francisco already 
had begun construction projects in the hope of obtaining similar results. "The people of 
Houston could demonstrate by an overwhelming vote in favor of the bond issue that they 
12 David John Kammer asserted a similar idea about Houston justifying a large stadium. For Kammer. the 
stadium would symbolize not just Houston's desire for greatness, but also "it would stand for the city itself." See 
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want and will support big league baseball," said Councilman Wilson. With a promise of a 
public-financed stadium, Wilson contended that "some Houston millionaires" might make a 
more determined effort to bring big league professional sports to the community. Since the 
Houston millionaires would be spending their money on getting a franchise started, city 
members would be doing their part in making the city big league. He concluded, "It seems 
that we're in a better position now than ever before to get big league baseball here." Under 
his plan, the city would lease the stadium to the baseball franchise. But the future stadium 
would be more than merely a limited baseball park. Unlike outdated parks that only allowed 
baseball, the future Houston stadium would house dozens of sporting events like football, the 
Olympics, boxing, polo, and others, taking advantage of limitless possibilities. A multiple 
purpose stadium, allowing flexibility for the diversity of entertainment was supposed to 
guarantee continual and almost infinite revenue for Houston." 
As historian Steven Riess argued, city officials and leaders, like Wilson, desired 
major league franchises because these boosters "hoped to certify their city's metropolitan 
status, create a positive attitude for tourism and commerce, and enhance their own civic 
image."  ^As Riess also determined, several cities vied for a finite number of franchises. In 
this respect Houston was no different than any other hopeful "minor league" city. To entice 
an owner to a particular city, several amenities were needed to make a particular city stand 
out among numerous rivals. The requirement, then, was for Houston to make itself more 
appealing than its rivals like Dallas-Ft. Worth, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Buffalo, Montreal, or 
Toronto. Houston's leaders needed to appeal to the unique, individual characteristics of 
14 Ernest Bailey, "New Stadium Might Get Us Major Team," Houston Press, 4 June 1957, pp. 1, 2. 
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Houston to differentiate it from other challengers. Therefore, the Houston stadium had to be 
much different than any other conceived. In effect, Houston boosters needed to demonstrate 
the uniqueness of the Bayou City, its amenities, and its stadium among all other big league 
competitors. 
In 1957, the plight of the HSA received a boost from Brooklyn Dodgers owner 
Walter O'Malley. O'Malley was fed up with Ebbets Field, the Dodgers home field since 
1913, and the Brooklyn fans who failed to fill the aging stadium to his satisfaction. Even 
though the "Bums" captured the NL pennant in 1955 and 1956, the Dodgers only drew an 
average of 16,000 spectators a game. The disgruntled O'Malley professed that the 1957 
Dodger season would be the last in rickety Ebbets Field. On 21 February, the O'Malley (as he 
preferred to be called) declared that he and Walter Wrigley had swapped minor league 
franchises, an ominous portent of things to come. O'Malley secured the Los Angeles Angels 
of the Pacific Coast League and Wrigley Field in exchange for the Fort Worth Texans of the 
Texas League. Unable to cajole a new stadium from Robert Moses and New York City 
mayor Robert Wagner, O'Malley entered into negotiations with Los Angeles mayor Norris 
Poulson to secure a location for a stadium. In May, NL owners told the O'Malley he could 
flee to the West Coast if he could persuade another franchise to follow. O'Malley enticed 
New York Giants owner Horace Stoneham to move his team to San Francisco. Stoneham, 
whose Giants also experienced lackluster attendance competing against the Yankees in New 
York, secured the promise of a new stadium from the San Francisco government. Stoneham 
announced his departure in August 1957 while O'Malley waited until the end of the season in 
October. When major league baseball began its 1958 season, it finally reached coast to coast. 
"Riess, 239. 
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But as Kirksey noted, a large chunk of the US was still lacking big league status. This was 
the Southwest and Texas, but in particular Houston." 
After the Dodgers and Giants relocated to California, NL president Warren Giles 
asserted that expansion would be the only method for cities to obtain teams, "not additional 
franchise transfers." At first this was exciting news. Expansion had been rumored at meetings 
since the Braves moved to Milwaukee. Giles, however, did not foresee immediate expansion 
for either the National or the American League. At best, Giles predicted a four year 
intermission before any expansion talk would resume/* Despite Giles's dour forecast, 
Kirksey and Cullinan remained upbeat. They said that if Houston ever were to obtain a major 
league baseball franchise, the city must be proactive. Kirksey and Cullinan urged the city to 
begin the steps towards building a 40,000-seat stadium with parking facilities for at least 
15,000 automobiles. Once the city formulated and authorized a stadium plan, they argued, 
then the problem of obtaining a team could be tackled. 
Kirksey came back from Milwaukee more determined than ever. "Big league baseball 
in our comer of Texas could be a repetition of the Milwaukee Braves," chortled Kirksey, but 
on a grander scale. But behind the silver lining, Kirksey saw some gray clouds. He knew that 
boosters in Minneapolis, Dallas, Toronto, and Montreal were actively seeking a big league 
franchise. Although these cities did have amenable qualities, according to Kirksey, Houston 
was the clear leader over these cities in two key areas. First and foremost, Houston had a 
larger population base. In 1959, Houston could count 1.195 million inhabitants. This made 
Houston the fifth largest city in the US (and the largest city without a professional sports 
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team). If trends continued, Houston's population would be 1.5 million in 1965 and 2.3 
million in 1975. And second, Houston had the money to bring in a team, backed by the deep 
pockets of wealthy oil tycoons. Alone these two factors would guarantee success well into 
the future. The one category that Houston did not lead, however, was that of a stadium. In 
this matter, Minneapolis led the others and could be viewed as Houston's greatest threat 
Minneapolis had already constructed a stadium to lure a franchise to the Twin Cities. But that 
was where its advantage abruptly ended. Minneapolis-St. Paul's bid was jeopardized by its 
proximity to Milwaukee and Chicago. Owners in Milwaukee and Chicago would not want to 
face greater competition for fans in an already full plate. On the other hand, Houston boasted 
a population much greater than that of its rivals, especially the Twin Cities. Unlike 
Minneapolis which was so close to other big league cities, Houston "would be out here on the 
Texas prairie, with no club closer than St. Louis or Kansas City" remarked Kirksey. The 
problem, however, was that Dallas could use the same arguments that Kirksey was using for 
Houston. Kirksey, however, dismissed Dallas due to the rivalry Dallas had with its neighbor 
Forth Worth. Kirksey refused to accept that leaders in Dallas and Fort Worth could put their 
differences aside for the good of both cities. Only Houston, it appeared, would be able the 
next great city to become big league/* 
Kirksey met with Harris County Judge Bob Casey in 1957 to discuss the role the 
county government could play in helping Houston land a big league franchise. Kirksey asked 
Casey if county funds could be used to help build the stadium and other related facilities. 
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This would mirror the situation that occurred in Milwaukee, in which Milwaukee County had 
financed stadium construction. Kirksey argued that by following the pattern of the 
"Milwaukee Miracle," Harris County would experience even greater enthusiasm among its 
residents for big league baseball. Kirksey had no doubt that the Harris County government 
could finance construction and its residents as support a major league baseball team. The 
government would reap large dividends upon its small investment, just as Milwaukee County 
had. Judge Casey informed Kirksey that Harris County could not legally perform the task 
under the Texas Constitution. It would take a new state law to authorize such a project. 
Fortunately, Kirksey knew Texas State Senator Searcy Bracewell. Kirksey had performed 
some advertising work for Bracewell's political campaigns and other personal work. 
Bracewell took Kirksey's plea to his fellow senators. On Thursday, 10 October 1957 
Bracewell introduced Senate Bill Number 23, a bill in the state's special session that 
authorized Harris County the power to issue revenue bonds for a sports stadium. One month 
later, it was passed and signed into law.* 
With the approval of the state legislature, Bracewell, Kirkland, and Kirksey implored 
Harris County's five-member Commissioners Court to create a special committee for the 
express purpose to research and study the feasibility of a stadium built with county revenue 
bonds. Bracewell answered legal questions from the Court while Kirksey presented the plans 
for obtaining a major league baseball team. The Court voted unanimously to appoint a seven-
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man stadium research team. Once the Court received the committee's report and 
recommendation, Judge Casey promised to "take immediate action."  ^
The Houston City Council also started its effort to inform the public about the 
stadium, its potential benefits and to explore all means to pay for the revenue bonds. On 
Monday, 20 November 1957, the Trice Production Company erected an oil well on the 331-
acre city prison farm. Since this was public land, and since Houston already received 
royalties from eleven oil wells at a garbage dump, Councilman Shirley Brakefield wondered 
if revenue bonds from the prison farm oil well could be used to build a stadium and a 
recreation center on the site. Brakefield said that the oil wells could be constructed around 
the stadium and the parking lots. This public land would, thus, "serve as a doubly beneficial 
piece of property for the community." The City Council asked for a legal opinion on this 
matter in November 1957. The royalties would not have to be spent on stadium construction, 
but, instead, used as collateral to obtain a lower interest rate for the revenue bonds. Even if 
BrakeGeld's plan proved unlawful, the state legislature had another plan that authorized the 
Harris County judge to establish a seven-person park commission "to build and operate the 
stadium." The Legislature's plan required public approval because it also utilized revenue 
bonds to finance stadium construction. Both planning mechanisms reassured city interests by 
promising that the people of Houston would own the stadium, not some sports franchise 
owner.^  
The Commissioners Court created a park commission (or park board) in February 
1958 to act as a "fact-finding body" pertaining to the myriad phases concerning the stadium. 
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Once the board made its report to Harris County court and assured that "sufficient revenue" 
was available, the court then would decide whether to issue revenue bonds. Even before the 
special park board was named, stadium boosters named several potential sources of revenue: 
professional sporting events, the Houston Fat Stock Show (later renamed the Houston 
Livestock and Rodeo Show), religious meetings, music concerts, and political gatherings. 
Kirkland, who represented Houston entrepreneurs, Kirksey, and oilman Craig Cullinan 
argued for a prohibition on tapping county tax revenue to retire the stadium bonds. This 
would assure that future tax rates could not be raised to pay for the stadium and thus, the men 
hoped, lessen potential opposition to their project. Houston and Harris County taxpayers, 
therefore, would not be financially burdened if the stadium failed, as the bondholders would 
take control over the stadium. Kirkland, Kirksey, and Cullinan, by publicly affirming this 
notion, intended to demonstrate that stadium boosters were indeed working for all of 
Houston, not themselves.23 
The seven-man commission contained five men from Houston and two from 
neighboring communities. The Houstonians were William Kirkland who made his fortune in 
insurance and former Houston Buff player Eddie Dyer, former Houston Livestock Show and 
Rodeo president Archer Romero, Hubert Allen, and oilman Corbin Robertson. Civic engineer 
E. B. Mansfield from Pasadena and Wilton Roper, a banker from Baytown rounded out the 
commission. Starting immediately, the County Park Commission planned to tour other 
metropolitan areas that built or planned to build a large sports stadium, including Milwaukee, 
Baltimore, and Louisville. Kirkland and his colleagues needed to answer three questions 
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concerning the proposed stadium: was it needed for Harris County, who would use the 
stadium, and what would be the stadium's annual revenue? By viewing how other 
metropolitan areas answered these questions the park commission hoped to determine what 
would be the best course of action for Houston. The commission could report what worked in 
one city, what failed in another, and determine an individual recipe for the Bayou City's 
success.^  
Eventually, the county park commission traveled to twenty American cities. Working 
"quietly but thoroughly," they discovered that no city had begun construction planning to 
accommodate both football and baseball. By May 1958, the group released to the public 
preliminary drawings of a multi-purpose stadium that combined the playing fields of both 
baseball and football, but could also allow other events. The board's preliminary plans 
envisioned seats that would be easily moved to allow the spectators to have the best view at 
both events. Some of the stands would be movable to allow for greater flexibility for 
different events. For example, the stands on the first and third base sides for a baseball game 
would extend the length of the football field and bring the spectators closer to the event. This 
mechanism insured that the dirt infield would never interfere during football games. The 
results would be fewer player injuries and a decrease in the damage to the playing surface. 
Even though the Commission purposefully ignored questions about location to avoid any 
unnecessary controversy at this early stage, it focused on the stadium's potentially low price 
tag. A multi-purpose stadium would, supposedly, be cheaper than single-purpose stadiums, 
maintenance money would come from rental fees, and it would not increase taxes. As Dick 
23 Dick Freeman, "Many Stadium Hurdles Left," Chronicle, 7 February 1958, sec. B, p. 2. 
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Peebles, sports editor for the Howafom CArowck, wrote, "From a cost point, the committee 
said the modem design eliminates the necessity for duplicating plumbing, wiring, rest rooms, 
parking, concession stands, storage and numerous other facilities." But the park board was 
going to consider all types of designs during this phase and not just focus on one at the cost 
of excluding another.^  
The multi-purpose design garnered the most attention from the park board and the 
average Houstonian. This was the first time that any city or any individual planned a stadium 
for both sports.^  All other existing stadiums either had been designed as a baseball park or a 
football arena. All of these sports arenas represented the era when each was planned and 
built. For example, Pasadena's Rose Bowl, the Los Angeles Coliseum, Municipal Stadium of 
Baltimore, and Chicago's Soldier Field were built during the 1920s mainly for football or 
track and field events, while Yankee Stadium and Ebbets Field, also built in the 1920s, 
housed baseball games. Generally, when these playing fields were planned municipalities 
had the money to lavish on large and prestigious stadiums. These stadiums, however, were 
constructed before both sports began to dominate professional athletics and adapted poorly to 
them. The more recent sports arenas of the late 1950s, Chavez Ravine in Los Angeles and 
San Francisco's Candlestick Park, were designed and built solely for baseball. The Houston 
design, on the other hand, attempted to incorporate the needs for both major professional 
sports. Houston's plan was truly multi-purpose and a celebration of the Bayou City's 
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individuality.^  This was typical of the 1950s and of Houston in general. In an era of 
optimism, anything could be constructed. Robert E. Fischer, associate editor of .ArcAzfecfMmZ 
ifecord wrote, "There are hardly any physical limits to the engineering possibilities in 
buildings, whether of height and span of structure, indoor 'climate,' or any of the other 
aspects of building technology." "This technology," he continued, "has opened up endless 
opportunities through new concepts, methods, materials and applications which have to be 
understood and evaluated in order to be properly used."* 
A design to take advantage of the multi-purpose form was called a "rounded 
triangular." This form incorporated four movable stand sections that allowed greater 
flexibility for the holding of different events. Whatever the mechanism chosen to move the 
stands, pneumatic tires, rails, or tractors, the rapid "convertibility" of the stadium meant that 
baseball could be played in the afternoon and a football game later that evening. 
Additionally, by implementing movable stands, football games could be played on the 
baseball outfield, not the dirt infield like other arenas, lessening the damage to the playing 
surface and to athletes/* These preliminary proposals were not received without criticism. 
First, by placing the movable sections in front of other seats, some of the stadium's seats 
would not be used for football. Second, the portable stands would be moved across the dirt 
infield, subjecting the surface to as much potential damage as any sporting event.* The 
committee also recognized that to fill the stadium and make it a paying venture, parking 
spaces for cars and buses needed to be placed around the stadium. The initial number of cars 
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30 Rule, "Sidelights," Press, 26 May 1958, p. 16. 
32 
was estimated at 20,000, which would require at least 200-acres for the entire stadium 
project. This would consume a large amount of available land within Harris County for all 
stadium facilities.^  
Armed with mountains of material and data,^  the park board gathered in mid-June to 
review its findings. The members agreed that the idea for constructing large multi-purpose, 
multiple building facility was indeed "practical" and "desirable" for the people of Harris 
County. The park board determined that a $20 million revenue bond issue could allow for the 
"development, in good time," of a "multi-purpose sports, recreation, cultural and exhibition 
park worthy of Harris County." A "modem stadium" could be used for baseball and football 
games, religious events, and "large industrial exhibitions." An adjoining indoor coliseum 
could house additional events like oil shows, conventions, and music festivals. By combining 
a stadium and a coliseum, the county could reduce its construction and maintenance costs 
while housing major league baseball, professional football, the Fat Stock Show, and almost 
every type of indoor and outdoor event possible. The bonds would fund the purchase of 400-
to 500-acres of land, the construction of the sports stadium, erection of a separate "large 
modem A/C coliseum" for indoor events, and "adequate parking facilities" for the entire 
project. They then presented their findings to the members of the Court Commissioners on 
June 22. Chairman Kirkland expressed his opinion of the meeting's atmosphere. "I felt that 
the report was enthusiastically received by the court," he said. The report, he continued, was 
^ Rule, "Sidelights," Press, 5 May 1958, p. 10. 
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"the first step toward realization of the dream of major league sports for Houston and 
surrounding territory." W. B. Morgan would later add that the sports complex would provide 
"badly" needed "wholesome recreation and amusement" and make Houston a "Mecca for 
visitors and tourists" from all around the state, country, and world. All that remained was a 
sound commitment from potential tenants to assure a future source of revenue, thus creating 
a self-supporting facility.^  
The park commission also recommended that the July 26 Democratic primary 
elections be the date for the decision of the bond issue, a mere five weeks away. 
Commissioner Phil Sayers expressed a concern whether the county could arrange this so 
quickly. Kirkland's response was that the county must act as quickly as possible or face two 
problematic scenarios. First, any delay in the date might reduce or eliminate a source of 
revenue. The faster they constructed the stadium, the faster large conventions, like the 
national political conventions, could plan meetings in Houston. The second danger focused 
on the continual flux that appeared in professional athletics, especially major league baseball 
and football. Both commissioners from major league baseball and professional football 
broached the possible expansion of their leagues into untapped areas. Furthermore, 
dissatisfied individuals across the nation were toying with the possibility of creating rival 
leagues to compete with those already established. Either way, Houston needed to have a 
source of revenue for a future stadium in place to make it that more attractive than other 
cities. Cullinan, who was also present at the meeting, echoed Kirkland's sentiments. The 
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actions that Harris County had taken in the past several months, according to Cullinan, 
proved that concerted actions and valiant decisions to get professional sports and a stadium 
for Houston were being made. Cullinan remarked that Houston was "getting (its) house in 
order to attract either an existing major league franchise or to obtain a new franchise, if and 
when the major leagues expand." Cullinan remained cautiously optimistic, however. He 
wanted everyone to understand that merely discussing a proposal or even building stadium 
would not guarantee a professional baseball franchise.* 
Thus, Houston taxpayers would vote for or against a $20,000,000 revenue bond issue 
in the Democrat primary on July 26. Due to the nonpartisanship of Houston's municipal 
elections, every citizen could cast a ballot on July 26. The funds from the bond would be 
used to buy 400 to 500 acres of land, facilities for a 45,000-seat stadium, and a coliseum for 
the Fat Stock Show "and other events." The committee also recommended that Houston be 
prepared to start construction of the stadium once the city landed a major league sports team. 
With voter approval in July, Kirkland was confident that Houston increased its chances of 
obtaining a professional sports team.^  
The stadium committee arrived at the $20 million estimate by basing the cost of the 
stadium at $6 million, the coliseum also at $6 million, $3 million for parking, $2 million for 
the livestock facility, $1 million for land, and $2 million for other miscellaneous 
expenditures. The $20 million preliminary price tag seemed to be high, especially when 
many considered that it was only a sports stadium being considered. Milwaukee had 
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constructed a $6.6 million stadium Ave years previous and Kansas City upgraded its baseball 
park for only $3 million.* How could Houston justify a stadium costing almost three times as 
much as the most recent baseball stadium? The stadium committee responded to these 
concerns by focusing on the major difference between the Milwaukee ballpark and the 
Houston stadium. The Houston facility would be much more than a limited-use ball yard. 
According to the report, "The commission visualizes buildings combining many new and 
original ideas which would give the people of Harris County perhaps the finest sports center 
and exhibition park in the United States." These multiple purpose facilities would generate at 
least $683,994 per year to amortize the $20 million bonds, the report concluded.^  
The informal acceptance of the park board report gave the people of Houston the 
power to determine the future of their city. They would decide if Houston was indeed worthy 
of big league sports and a stadium. County officials could have easily issued the revenue 
bonds without a vote from the public, but the county stadium bill passed earlier in the year 
demanded that any future stadium issue had to be placed before the public. "This was not 
necessarily inspired by the patriotism of the men involved" but instead to prove to those 
involved with professional sports that a large number of people in Houston were in favor of a 
big league team. The boosters of the bond issue needed to reassure the voters of Houston that 
building the stadium would not cost the county a dime, but instead that the bonds would be 
amortized with revenue the stadium generated from the events it held.* 
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Even though the Commissioners Court enthusiastically supported the park board's 
report, the revenue bond issue still needed ratification by the Democrat party to allow the 
issue in its primary. After a three hour debate and a vote of two-to-one, the Harris County 
Democratic Executive Board agreed to place the bond issue on the primary ballot. The bond 
issue joined an already "crowded" primary with other issues like funding for a charity 
hospital and an increase in the school tax. Upon hearing the news, Cullinan and Kirksey 
could barely contain their excitement. Kirksey chortled, "This is the biggest victory we have 
scored in our campaign." Cullinan said, "We're well on our way to getting Houston's house 
in order" for professional sports. Kirksey realized that even though this was a big victory, the 
battle was far from over. The HSA still needed the voters to approve the bond issue in a 
month. To this end, the HSA had to convince a majority of voters that the tax rate would not 
be increased. The syndicate also had to assuage fears that its intentions were noble and that 
they were not going to fleece the public. "We're going to put on a campaign to tell the people 
of Harris County that this won't cost them a penny," Kirksey promised. Instead of being 
burdened with the costs of the stadium, forced upon them by a small group of influential and 
rich businessmen, the people of Houston would have the final say in the future of the stadium 
and major league sports.^  
The Fat Stock Show's executive committee announced its support for the bond issue, 
with a pledge of 230 acres of Stock Show land at South Main Street for the stadium location. 
Archer Romero recommended the land offer to his colleagues because the Stock Show was 
experiencing "increasing handicaps" brought about by its antiquated and increasingly 
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inadequate facilities. The Stock Show had recently been forced to spend about $100,000 
annually to build and take down temporary facilities at the Sam Houston Coliseum. "For that 
reason," Romero continued, the executive committee "will give this land and all its oil and 
gas rights to the county if the provisions as set forth are met." Under this arrangement, the 
Stock Show parcel need not be the future location of the stadium. It could be sold or traded if 
there was another location that the park board found suitable. The only stipulations were that 
the Fat Stock Show approve the plans for the future facilities with generous parking facilities 
and an "acceptable lease" be made.* 
The importance of the Stock Show's offer should not be underestimated. First, the 
Houston Fat Stock and Livestock Exhibition (it eventually was renamed the Houston 
Livestock and Rodeo Show) was one of the oldest and most prestigious events for Houston 
and Texas. Begun in the 1930s, the Stock Show was a week-long fair, rodeo, and livestock 
exhibition that promoted education and family entertainment. Second, the men involved with 
the Stock Show were also some of the wealthiest, most powerful, and politically connected in 
Houston history. Third, the prospect of intertwining the future of the Stock Show with that of 
the stadium suggested a broadening of support into non-sport groups. Fourth, a donation of 
land would significantly reduce the cost of the project. 
The support from the Stock Show, "one of Houston's strongest and soundest 
organizations behind this project," provided a tremendous boost in the fight for the stadium. 
The Show's offer was the first concrete financial asset that could be used to support the 
backing of the revenue bonds. For ffowafon Pa# sports editor Clark Nealon, the 
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1,5. 
38 
announcement was "a meeting of the minds between Houston's older leadership and its 
younger leaders.'*" A Pa# editorial termed the overture of 230-acres "prospectively one of 
the greatest bargains offered.'*  ^ffowjfon Press sports editor Bob Rule labeled Stock Show 
action as the "most significant" in the early stages of the county stadium. The Stock Show 
would not offer its land if it did not intend on using the facilities every year. Annual rent 
from the Stock Show would help amortize the bonds. Just as important, "Houston's very 
finest citizens" could now be viewed as stadium backers. The land the Stock Show offered, 
in the general area of South Main near Playland Park, provided a site that was considered 
"ideal" by stadium supporters. The South Main location, according to Rule, allowed for easy 
access anywhere in Harris County and assured the space for all buildings and parking 
facilities.^  
To bolster citizen support and enthusiasm, Judge Casey created the "Non-Partisan 
Citizens' Committee" to actively campaign throughout Harris County. Casey chose "three of 
Houston's outstanding leaders to head up the campaign," Gus Wortham (president of 
American General Insurance Company), R. E. Smith (oil man and rancher), and L. F. 
McCollum (president of the Continental Oil Company). These men, in turn, created separate 
canvassing committees for the entire area. R. E. Smith understood the importance of the issue 
not just for Houston and Harris County but the entire "Gulf Coast area." Nealon said that 
these three civic leaders were asking all voters "to launch a business proposition" that meant 
"the best facilities for the best of sports and other activities at no price other than the cost of a 
seat." Within two weeks, Wortham, Smith, and McCollum added twenty-five former 
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professional baseball players to their ranks and the 46-man Houston Chamber of Commerce 
Athletic Committee to rally support.* 
Opponents of the bond issue or those who did not think the city needed a big league 
baseball team pointed to the Buffs dwindling attendance. If Houston baseball fans did not 
support one team already, the argument went, why did boosters think these same fans would 
attend a different team? Indeed, the argument continued, the Buffs had won the Texas 
League championship the previous two seasons, and yet attendance continued to fall. Nealon 
countered that "enthusiasm for major league baseball and enthusiasm for Texas League 
baseball are two different things." The Buffs, he continued, were not a factor in the 1958 race 
since the St. Louis parent club raided its farm affiliate of its best players. Also, St. Louis 
feared that the Texas League was going to fold and therefore offered only minimal financial 
support to the Buffs. Nealon asserted his contention that Houston sports fans would turn out 
in droves once a big league franchise was secured. Only by voting for the bond issue in July, 
he concluded, could the Gulf Coast prove that it would "hold its own with any area in the 
country in attendance for major league baseball.'*" 
The HSA invited Ray Weisbrod, executive vice president of the Milwaukee 
Association of Commerce, to explain the benefits that major league baseball had brought to 
his city. Speaking at the Downtown Rotary Club on 16 July 1958, Weisbrod testified to the 
financial bonanza baseball bestowed upon Milwaukee. It infused the local economy with a 
total of "seven or eight million dollars" since the Braves arrived in 1955, he claimed. It 
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provided the people with a "wholesome," family-oriented social outlet But even more than 
the money, Weisbrod affirmed, major league baseball "gives us world renown." "Major 
league baseball can do the same thing for Houston it did for Milwaukee," he added. "The 
baseball club has been good for, and to, the community," Weisbrod continued, "but it is more 
than just a business proposition because the presence of the Braves has generated a spirit of 
civic enthusiasm in Milwaukee far greater than any strictly-business enterprise could ever 
hope to accomplish." Weisbrod finished by saying, "It is a spirit which has carried over into 
other activities and brought success to civic enterprises which in other years have failed 
miserably." Bob Rule, concurring with the substance of Weisbrod's speech, added, "I am 
absolutely certain that major league baseball will drastically and completely change 
Houston's way of life-and just as certain that it will transform Houston into one of the great 
sports cities of the country.'"* 
Weisbrod also conveyed a word of warning or advice from Braves owner Lou Perini. 
Major league baseball faced inevitable expansion and it would need an intermediate stop 
from the coast to coast airplane ride. A reason why baseball seemed in a state of transition 
was the current state of most ballparks and stadiums. "Major league baseball has centered in 
antiquated parks in run-down neighborhoods, and that is the reason for the exodus of these 
other teams," he said. Stadium supporters could not have said it any better than Weisbrod. 
Expansion was going to happen. Cities that located large and modem stadiums in good 
sections had the best chance to land a team. This was what Houston was trying to achieve.^  
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As the election date neared, Dick Peebles continued his earnest pitch for the revenue 
bond issue. Peebles averred the need for a large multiple-purpose stadium for Harris County. 
If there was not one, he continued, would the Commissioners Court have created a seven-
man committee to study the feasibility of such a stadium? Additionally, Houston was the 
largest city in the United States that did not have a major league baseball team. As the 
population of Houston and Harris County continued to grow and as metro area commercial 
and industrial bases expand, the city would also need to increase its entertainment and 
recreational facilities. The stadium would be a major impetus for additional entertainment for 
the region. The facilities already in Houston (Rice University's 70,000-seat football stadium, 
22,000-seat Jeppesen Stadium, the 12,000-seat high school Delmar Stadium, and 11,499-seat 
Busch Stadium, the home of the AA Houston Buffs) were all inadequate for professional 
baseball and football, according to Peebles. Busch Stadium, although a fine minor league 
baseball park, did not have the seating capacity or the parking facilities for a major league 
team. Enlarging the stadium's facilities for major league sports would be impractical and too 
expensive. On the other hand, a new multi-purpose stadium would be able to accommodate 
more events than just football and baseball, ensuring continual use throughout the year/* 
For Peebles, the location of the stadium was more important than its size. The 
stadium "must be easily accessible from all directions" and have ample parking facilities. 
Peebles recognized that those who would attend the events at the stadium would not come 
solely from Harris County. He speculated that spectators would come from a radius of 300 
miles from Houston. Thousands of visitors from across Texas and the South would travel to 
48 Peebles, "Facts Show That Stadium Is Needed," Chronicle, 14 July 1958, sec. B, p. I ; Peebles, "Plenty of 
Uses For County Stadium." Chronicle, 15 July 1958, sec. B, p. 1. 
42 
Houston to see an event, across the state's highways in their cars. Therefore, the stadium 
needed to be accessible from the roads and have plenty of space to park the autos. These 
visitors would also bring money to spend in Houston, not just at the stadium. Peebles 
promised that a financial boom would erupt when Houston obtained major league status.** 
Four days before the primary, Joe Brown and Kenny Land met in the Sam Houston 
Coliseum for the lightweight boxing championship. The subsequent discussion amongst 
boxing fans did not center on the fact that Brown successfully defended his title, but featured 
complaints that the coliseum proved inadequate for the match. An hour before the fight, fans 
had gobbled up all "relatively close" parking spaces near the coliseum. Even worse, Nealon 
reported, was the problem that many fight fans were turned away due to a lack of available 
seating. With an estimated crowd approaching between 3,000 and 5,000 spectators, 400 
standing-room-only tickets were sold. All these fans ended up getting stuck in the lobby 
before the fight in a virtual melee.* 
On the election day, Peebles wrote that approving the bond vote "could start a chain 
reaction that would be felt from coast to coast and which could shake the foundations of 
major league baseball and professional football." Even though there were groups of Houston 
businessmen prepared to obtain a baseball and football teams, Houston needed to have a 
stadium ready for the teams. For Peebles, there was just no question that Houston would 
obtain multiple sports franchises in the near future. Houston residents and sports fans, he 
argued, could not lose because these taxpayers would not be held financially responsible; 
only those individuals who bought the bonds were taking a gamble. With 'the eyes of the 
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entire sports world" upon Houston, overwhelming support, averred Peebles, would vault the 
city in front of other contenders. But only if Houstonians voted. Peebles finished by catering 
to a pleasing and possible baseball future. "Just think," he concluded, "Houston may be the 
team that will crack the Yankees' dynasty in the American League." '^ 
The initial issue of the Saturday election concerned the funding of a new hospital. 
The Harris County Medical Society did not want $6 million of hospital bonds to finance a 
new hospital in the Texas Medical Center. They advocated that city money be spent at the 
Jefferson Davis location, thus averting new construction. Even though this was an important 
issue, the revenue bond issue garnered the most attention. City and county voters "gave an 
enthusiastic 'go ahead' signal for revenue bonds" with a 3-to-l ratio in favor. The number of 
those who approved was 81,403 or 77% with 24,395 voting against the bond issue. With this 
mandate from the voters, the HSA intended to proceed as quickly as possible to obtain a big 
league franchise for the city. In the words of HSA chairman and Hofheinz business associate 
R. E. Smith, "The size of the majority clearly shown that Houston sports fans want the best." 
Smith pledged that the HSA would deliver "the best sports center in the United States" to the 
deserving people of Houston. Kirkland promised that the park board would continue its duty 
"to work to develop a master plan for the most modem facilities for major spectator sports 
with all the trimmings necessary for the entertainment and comfort of the public, including, 
of course, ample parking facilities." Cullinan viewed the election "victory" as "a giant step 
forward" for the entire community. First and foremost, Cullinan opined, the stadium would 
"supply needed recreation and relaxation for people of Harris County." Secondly, the 
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Houston Fat Stock Show would have the facilities it desperately deserved. Thirdly, the 
stadium would attract hundreds of thousands of "visitors and tourists" to Texas from across 
the county and the globe. Cullinan predicted that the new stadium "could mean more to 
Harris County than anything that has happened since the port of Houston was opened in the 
World War I era." With the election over, the County could initiate a search for the best 
available location and make Houston "the sports capital of the South. 
The HSA started its own phase of stadium planning. Cullinan wanted the HSA and 
the Park Board to work together as close as possible. Collaboration between the two groups 
would assure "one of the finest athletic plants ever built in the United States." Only though 
tight collaboration, he argued, would construction of the stadium occur after the eventual 
granting of a big league baseball franchise. But Cullinan warned that a franchise would come 
to Houston only if the County and the HSA maintained a "united front" and avoided 
"controversies over site, (and) size." Cullinan demanded that the stadium plans incorporated 
a "permanent movable seat idea" which would allow for many diverse events. Cullinan also 
wanted to remind William Kirkland that the stadium was for the people of Houston and it 
must provide them with the comforts and conveniences to keep them satisfied. To this end, 
Cullinan advised Kirkland to find a location that was accessible to visitors and Houston 
residents and included parking facilities for at least 20,000 autos.^  
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The election results reverberated all the way to New York, home of three major 
league baseball franchises. Sports writer Jack Cuddy expressed his optimistic view that 
Houston would eventually win a big league baseball team and much more. In Cuddy's 
opinion, Houston was "rich," populous ("the largest American city that has no major league 
baseball club"), and understood to have a tremendous "sports enthusiasm" It had already 
become the "western mecca of professional boxing" in only a few years, now Houston had its 
eyes set on the professional leagues of baseball, football, and basketball. The election results 
demonstrated that Houston was now prepared, organized, and a force to be reckoned with. 
"The oil city, the industrial city" was not going to remain idle and watch other lesser cities 
enjoy the accoutrements of being big league. The overwhelming support for the bond issued 
seemed to prove this big league desire. "Watch Houston," Cuddy warned, because "It has the 
people, the dough and the enthusiasm to become very 'big time' in sports."* 
After receiving voter approval, the challenge of making "orderly progress" towards 
fulfilling the goal of a sports center and major league franchises remained. This road to 
"progress" would include selling the revenue bonds, selecting the stadium site, designing the 
physical plant, finding tenants for the facilities, and obtaining sports franchises.^  The first 
victory for a large sports complex had been achieved with relative ease. The triumph seemed 
to promise that construction and big league status was just on the horizon. 
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CHAPTER 3: FINDING THE "CRACKER JACK" LOCATION 
The passage of the bond issue ushered in a new era of Houston and Harris County 
history. The town defined by its Ship Channel, petroleum industry, and the wealth of its 
citizens, voted to alter its image. The people of Houston took their first steps to change the 
city's status as a second-rate sports and third-rate cultural town. Houstonians chose to try and 
make their city the epicenter of big league sports, cultural events, and tourism in the Texas 
and the entire Southwest. The revenue bond election seemed to guarantee the funds for this 
complex without burdening the taxpayers. With the bond issue settled, the next task that 
lacing the Harris County Commissioners Court, the Harris County park board, and the 
Houston Sports Association (HSA) was to find a "cracker jack" location. 
Finding this "cracker jack" location sounded easier than it was. During his visits to 
big league ballparks across the county, HSA chairman Craig Cullinan realized that a huge 
parcel of land, 400 to 500 acres for the stadium and parking space for 20,000 automobiles, 
would be essential. This HSA request was problematic. Although the County and the HSA 
could obtain additional money, either through more bonds or private donation, both sides 
wanted to acquire the land as cheaply and expediently as possible. A site that already had 
some type of development, houses, buildings, etc., meant that construction costs would 
increase. Hence, any undeveloped location would receive the greatest attention from the park 
commission. Having more people involved in negotiations would complicate the process 
involving more demands, more conditions, more haggling, and more delay. The HSA's 
provisions did have an upside, however, by seeming to eliminate a location in downtown 
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Houston. Some advocates would still fight for a downtown location to save the central 
business district. Others looked towards Houston's growing and abundant suburbs/ 
To this end, like-minded Houstonians either banded together into new alliances or 
exploited the resources of present, cohesive groups, that each claimed to have the best 
intentions for the citizens of Harris County. These individual groups proffered their own 
locations to try and land the future jewel of Houston. The stadium would not just bring 
prestige and economic benefits the city and the county, but especially to the individual area 
or community within Harris County. What resulted was a serious and at times Gerce 
competition for the impending stadium site. The stadium, then, was no longer a means to 
promote unity for the entire city that had united for the common goal to pass the bonds and 
make the city "big league.-' It began to become a divisive issue that threatened the cohesive 
fabric of the city and county. This did not meant the Houston's feeling of optimism had 
vanished. Instead, the problems signaled the coming pessimism. 
The first offer to land the stadium site came from a group of businessmen north of 
Houston. The North Harris County Chamber of Commerce (NHCCC) wanted the future 
facility built on the 2,546-acre site intended for the new jet airport. This "newly formed" 
group argued that the land would be too small for a modem jet airport. They did not want to 
spend resources on an obsolete airport when the land could best be utilized for a modem 
stadium. Since the city had already marked the land for the airport, it already had major 
highway access, a "key factor," according to NHCCC members. Maurice Bums, the 
temporary chairman of the NHCCC, said his group favored the stadium instead of an airport, 
1 Reiss, 240-241. The usual stadium-building formula, according to Reiss, was mustering support, finding a 
location, and then obtaining the money. In Houston, the location came after the money was obtained. 
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but provided no additional reasons other than his opinion that a small jet airport would 
become obsolete before it was finished. It could be surmised that Bums and bis coterie 
agreed with the sentiments of the Aldine Taxpayers Association who also opposed this 
seemingly inadequate airport. (Aldine was located ten miles north of Houston.) Bums was 
eventually proved correct. The airport's small runways could not accommodate the 
requirements for the newer jet airplanes.^  
This group suggested that constructing the stadium north of Houston, to borrow a 
baseball term, was a "home run," for several reasons. Firstly, they pointed out that thanks to 
the Gulf of Mexico, more towns were located north of Houston within a 200-mile radius. 
These municipalities contained over two million people whereas a population of only 
500,000 resided south of Harris County. Thus, the stadium would be closer to a larger pool of 
spectators who might be "very reluctant" to travel through Houston and its heavy, 
increasingly dangerous traffic. Secondly, more potential sites were available in north 
Houston than south. With most of the available land north of the city, county leaders could 
place the stadium in many possible locations providing greater flexibility for the entire 
project.. Thirdly, because this land was undeveloped, it would be cheaper than anything 
purchasable south of Houston or near downtown. This would result in a total lower cost. 
Fourthly, six highways fed into north Houston and Harris County while only two supported 
the southern part. More highway arteries would lessen congestion, allowing more visitors 
simpler access and making an easier approach for those first-time travelers trying to navigate 
2 
"Northside Site Is Proposed For $20 Million Stadium, Center," Post, 7 August 1958, sec. 4, pp. 1, 4; "Another 
Site for Sports Center Proposed," Post, 9 August 1958, sec. 2, p. 4; "North Site For Stadium Urged," Chronicle, 
7 August 1958, sec. E, p. 1. 
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the already choked downtown traffic. And, Anally, the stadium would be closer to the 
proposed jet airport/ 
The opposite end of Harris County also found its champion. The president of the 
Galveston Chamber of Commerce, James W. Lain, congratulated the park board on the 
proposed stadium. Lain also hoped the southern part of Harris County would receive due 
consideration. These facilities, Lain wrote, would provide the "Gulf Coast Area" much 
needed recreational and entertainment opportunities. The 125,000 residents of Galveston 
County, Lain continued, were as sports minded as their northern neighbors in Harris County. 
Speaking for these enthusiasts, Lain wanted the Park Board to consider a location near the 
Gulf Freeway, which would benefit both the residents of Harris and Galveston Counties as 
well as the two million tourists who traveled to Galveston each year. By locating the site 
between Houston and Galveston, he asserted, both cities would receive the benefits from the 
stadium. The stadium, Lain envisioned, could be the first step between greater cooperation 
between Houston and Galveston and possibly the creation of a metroplex/ 
Other proposals suggested locating the stadium all across Harris County. Hans C. 
Katz from the realty firm Lionel J. Ellis and Company offered two large locations on Gulf 
Freeway. J. Edwin Swift proffered a 2,900-acre tract of land owned by William A. Fraser. 
The land, located at Jones Road and Jack Rabbit Road, granted easy accessibility with the 
^ Bob Rule, "Sidelights," Press, 30 July 1958, p. 10; "North Side Fans Seek New Athletic Stadium," CArorwck, 
31 July 1958, sec. 6, p. 3; Letter from Roy C. Hohl to William Kirkland, 3 August 1958, Minchew Collection, 
94-275/2. 
4 Letter from James W. Lain to Mansfield, 26 November 1958, Minchew Collection, 94-275/2. Lain did not use 
the term "metroplex." The term "metroplex" was not coined until the 1970s. I use the term here in a similar way 
that Harvee Chapman and others used it, as a way to promote the alliance, albeit uneasy, between Dallas and 
Fort Worth. Like the airport for Dallas and Forth Worth, the stadium could have been the facility to link 
Houston and Galveston. See Robert B. Fairbanks, "Responding to the Airplane: Urban Rivalry, Metropolitan 
Regionalism, and Airport Development in Dallas, 1927-1965," in Technical Knowledge in American Culture: 
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completion of the highway out of Hempstead. Swift promised that the County could purchase 
Eraser's land at the low price tag of $l,500-an-acre. Louis H. Rubin from Gelta Realty 
Corporation suggested a 514-acres site in southeast Houston, 10.5 miles from downtown/ 
The first series of offers came from those who wanted to locate the stadium on Houston's 
periphery, not the choked downtown area. Whatever the location, it was generally understood 
that adequate access from highways and other roads needed to be available. 
While all types of offers arrived at City Hall, the Commissioners Court office, and 
HSA headquarters, city and county officials already had started their own investigation 
immediately following the election. Houston Mayor Lewis Cutrer, a friend of R. E. Smith 
and one time attorney for Roy Hofheinz, discussed a few of the early rumors that swirled 
around these government officials. One rumored location was on 500 of the 1500 acres of 
Memorial Park, "Houston's largest wooded playground." Cutrer liked this initial proposal, 
and said, "I think it would be a cracker-jack location," but only if the design would not 
interfere with the rest of the park.* 
Memorial Park, however, was not just some piece of Texas prairie with a few trees 
and shrubs. The history of this park went back to William Hogg. Hogg, a son of James S. 
Hogg a former Texas governor, acting as an agent for then mayor Oscar Holcombe 
purchased the land in 1924. Hogg hoped to preserve the land as Houston continued to grow. 
Hogg sold the 1503 acres to the city at the price he paid, about $433/acre or $650,147. Mayor 
Science, TecAw/ogy, owf Medicine Since f&e Eorfy 7800a, ed. Alan I Marcus, Hamilton Cravens, and David M. 
Katzman (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1996), 187-188. 
5 Letter from Hans C. Katz to Seth Irwin [Morris?], 4 December 1958, Minchew Collection, 94-275/2; Letter 
from J. Edwin Swift to the HSA and Commissioner Lyons, 12 November 1958, Minchew Collection, 94-275/2; 
Letter from Louis H. Rubin, 12 November 1958, Minchew Collection, 94-275/2. 
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Holcombe allowed Hogg to insert a restriction on the deed: the land could only be used for 
park purposes. Under the terms of the sale, the city was required to obtain consent from a 
Hogg family member before any aspect of the park was touched. Other aspects discouraged 
Memorial Park location. One was cost. The HSA would have to buy some additional land 
adjacent to the Park. The land was estimated at $30,000 an acre, which meant the HSA 
would have to spend almost $9,000,000 for the land. That price tag left only $11,000,000 to 
build the stadium and coliseum/ 
Thomas E. Willier, a traffic and business consultant for Houston, performed an 
analysis of Memorial Park for Harris County to determine its worthiness as the site for the 
sports complex. Willier considered Memorial Park in its relation to the rest of the metro area 
especially in regard to population trends and distribution, accessibility, driving times, and 
proximal land use. In his five-page report, Willier anointed Memorial Park as the best site in 
Harris County. Memorial Park, he claimed, provided the most efficient access via current 
state highways and city roads. Just as critical, future city growth would surround Memorial 
Park, assuring the site would adequately fulfill anticipated entertainment requirements. The 
stadium, therefore, would not be located at a great distance from downtown Houston or 
hidden in a suburb. The stadium would be close to the downtown business district, but not 
too close/ 
Despite Willier's report and Mayor Cutter's endorsement, some who heard of the 
proposal announced their disapproval of the decision. Gus Haycock, director of Houston city 
6 Mel Young, "Major League Stadium In Memorial Discussed," Chronicle, 28 July 1958, sec. A, pp. 1, 2; 
Kenneth E. Gray, A Report on the Politics of Houston (Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, 1960), s. II, 23-33. 
7 
"Opposition To Stadium in Park Area Mounts," Chronicle, 8 November 1958, sec. A, pp. 1,4. 
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parks and recreation, warned that a large stadium would destroy the park and turn it into a 
"circus." E. B. Mansfield, secretary of the Harris County Park Commission, also admonished 
against such a senseless and reckless finding. Mansfield did not like Memorial Park because 
of its location in the heart of city, near jammed downtown Houston. The roads that served the 
Park were already overcrowded with traffic. Any additional traffic from sporting events 
would only make the situation worse. Logistically, he protested, placing a stadium this close 
to the central business district would be foolish.9 
In early November 1958, three months after the election, the park board held an 
"informal" meeting with city and county officials at the Lamar Hotel to discuss the 
possibility of locating the stadium in Memorial Park despite the criticisms of that site. 
According to park board commissioners Kirkland and Romero, initial surveys of Memorial 
Park concluded it was "superior" to more than a dozen other locations within the city and 
throughout the county. Officials of the Fat Stock Show said that Memorial Park was 
acceptable for their future needs as well. Judge Casey, however, warned of the potential 
firestorm this could create. Any effort to alter Memorial Park in such a fashion, Casey began, 
required the authorization of city voters, which would not be an easy task despite the 
overwhelming voter approval of the revenue bonds and enthusiasm for a major league sports 
franchise. Houstonians would not support defacing the largest and most popular park in the 
city. But even more difficult, members of the Hogg family would have to approve the 
measure. The Hogg estate had rejected a plan submitted by the Museum of Natural History 
for an arboretum and botanical gardens only months earlier. In addition to Hogg approval, 
8 Thomas E. Willier, "A Sport Center For Harris County, Evaluation of Potential Site, Memorial Park," 
Minchew Collection, 94-274/2. 
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the HSA would have to pay the city the appraised value of the land, which meant that most, if 
not all, of the $20 million bonds would be used/" 
The Howafo» C&rowcZe printed an op-ed on November 10 attacking the proposition of 
using Memorial Park as the stadium location. The C&romc/e said that it would not have 
supported the bond issue if the plans of destroying Memorial Park had been revealed before 
the vote. The paper's editors affirmed that by considering this site, the park commissioners 
were at best "breaking faith" with the public. "Tammany Hall in its worst days never dared 
lay its hands on Central Park," but the park board's actions demonstrated a willingness to 
ignore public opinion and destroy the last remaining virgin land inside the city. It not only 
was Houston's largest public park, but it was the only one even remotely close to downtown 
Houston. "Today it is impossible to gather up anything like that in acreage within reasonable 
distance," so it must be preserved at all cost, even the cost of a stadium. "Such a park 
becomes more valuable daily for recreation purposes," the C&rowcZe lamented, "as vacant 
land in the county is fenced in and posted." If the park board was unwilling to listen to this 
argument, the editorial wanted the park board to consider their decision's effect upon 
Houston's already congested downtown traffic. The traffic leaving the stadium in Memorial 
Park and spilling onto the dangerously overcrowded Memorial Drive and Post Oak Road 
would only make a bad situation worse." 
Once the Memorial Park scheme and related stories ran in the newspapers, the public 
started attacking the misguided proposal. Houstonians generally agreed that Houston needed 
more public parks and open spaces, not less. The parks that Houston already had should be 
9 Young, "Major League Stadium In Memorial Discussed." Chronicle, 28 July 1958, sec. A, pp. 1,2. 
10 
"Stadium Site In Memorial Park Just One of 14," Post, 1 November 1958, sec. 1, pp. 1, 6. 
rigorously preserved at all costs instead of defaced and destroyed. Kenneth Franzheim, city 
architect, said the proposal "would be the biggest crime ever committed," making Memorial 
Park into a large parking lot. Charles Hamilton, former president of the Houston Parks and 
Recreation Association, asserted the importance of park land to Houston and Harris County . 
Already "way down" in park area, Hamilton said Houston needed to add more "breathing 
spaces" as the city continued to grow, not reduce its meager acreage. "We need to keep that 
park there so we can have the great city we are destined to be," he concluded, because 
"Memorial Park will one day be to Houston as Central Park is to New York." These leaders 
were not attacking the idea of a stadium, but rather complaining about one of the possible 
sites for its construction.^  
In the face of growing opposition, park board secretary Mansfield explained that the 
commission's primary concern in determining the best location was a "site where the 
maximum number of people have the most accessibility to the stadium." A larger percentage 
of the county's population, over 500,000 Houstonians, resided within a 25-minute drive from 
the Park, as opposed to other potential sites in Harris County. The second advantage of 
Memorial Park, according to Mansfield, concerned the future freeway system. As planned, 
the Houston Loop (highway 610) would nearly abut the stadium on its western flank while 
the Southwest Freeway was located very near the site, allowing easier and faster access to all 
Harris County residents, Texans, and out-of-state visitors. In his opinion, then, Memorial 
Park satisfied these criteria. Thirdly, Memorial Park already contained water pipes, sewer 
lines, and other aspects of physical plants, which would save construction time and money. 
11 
"Keep Center Out Of Memorial Park," Chronicle, 10 November 1958, sec. A, p. 1. 
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And finally, it would be at the center of Houston's future population. What this meant, he 
concluded, was an immediate savings of time and materials. But Mansfield did not mention 
the cost of buying the land. Conservatively, the value of Memorial Park land was estimated 
at $40,000 per acre. If the park board decided on purchasing 300-acres of land, it would cost 
$12 million. This meant that only $8 million of the $20 million would remain of the revenue 
bonds, hardly enough for a first-class facility let alone a multi-purpose stadium. Mansfield 
also affirmed that the park board did not want to create a "hassle" over the selection of the 
site, which would disrupt future stadium workings. With this in mind, however, the park 
board unanimously approved Memorial Park as the future home of the stadium. Former 
mayor Oscar Holcombe, under whose mayoral leadership the city had purchased the land for 
the park in 1924, affirmed the limited use of the land. But, Holcombe also attested that a 
county stadium "might fit the bill" as a recreational facility. If Memorial Park was rejected, 
the park board warned, Harris County needed to look for a location that offered at least 500 
undeveloped acres." 
Immediately, a group of Houston women promised the park board and City Council a 
fight if Memorial Park was violated. Even though they were women, said the group's leader 
Sue Bamett, they were "influential" and "not to be taken lightly." The most influential 
woman in Houston, Ima Hogg, rejected any attempt to locate the stadium within Memorial 
Park. In a letter to Mayor Cutrer, Hogg expressed her confidence that her sister-in-law Mrs. 
Alice Nicholson Hanszen, formerly Mrs. Mike Hogg, and Mrs. Margaret Wells Hogg in 
12 
"Civic Leaders Oppose Park Site." Chronicle, 11 November 1958, sec. A, pp. 1, 2. The total number of acres 
of Houston's park system was 3,963. Ellifrit claimed that the city required 8,000 acres to satisfy the needs of the 
city's 910,000 people. 
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opposing the site would join her. Hogg wrote, "Such proposed use for a sports stadium, even 
though of a very worthy nature, would be in direct violation to the expressed provision 
contained in the conveyance under which the city acquired the land comprising Memorial 
Park—namely, that it would be used for park purposes only." Hogg confirmed that she voted 
for the bond issue and wanted a stadium to be built, "but not in Memorial Park." Unwilling to 
challenge Ima Hogg's decision, commissioner court members, park board commissioners, 
and city councilmen affirmed their commitment to her wishes. Additionally, they also 
questioned the feasibility of Memorial Park. Garth Bates said, "I do want to do everything we 
can to preserve our parks for park purposes and to acquire more." City Planning Director 
Ralph Ellifrit viewed the situation as "a matter of destroying one value to get another rather 
than supplementing one value with another." Locating the stadium in Memorial Park, he 
cautioned, meant that additional land would be eliminated for parking and highway access. 
"If we rid our meager park resources every time some good project comes up, we will soon 
have lost them forever," Ellifrit warned. Kirkland and Romero apologized for the "tempest in 
a teapot" that erupted when news leaked over Memorial Park, starting the controversy. 
Mayor Cutrer and other individuals involved with the project concluded that the issue was 
now closed, that it was time for everyone to move on, and continue the search.'* 
13 Jack Mohler, "Stadium Site In Memorial Park Studied." Press, 8 November 1958, pp. 1, 5; Garvin Berry, 
"Why Stadium Men Picked Memorial," Press, 10 November 1958, pp. 1, 9; "Oppose Stadium In Memorial 
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The "storm of protest"  ^the Memorial Park issue panicked some members of the 
HSA. They tried their best to distance themselves from the firestorm, claiming the HSA body 
had never considered Memorial Park as a location for the stadium. HSA president Craig 
Cullinan explained that the HSA was not present at the meeting between the Harris County 
Board of Park Commissioners, County Commissioners, and city council members. Therefore, 
the HSA could not be held responsible for submitting the Memorial Park site. The HSA was 
only concerned at the moment with accessibility and parking space of any potential location, 
Cullinan continued, and "never advocated or recommended any particular site." Cullinan 
wanted the controversy to be solved as soon as possible, because controversy "might have an 
adverse affect" in the HSA's effort to obtain major league baseball and professional football. 
Park board chairman, William Kirkland and vice-chairman Archer Romero attempted to 
quell the furor by insisting in a written statement that the "informal" meeting was solely 
"exploratory." Assisted by "technically trained personnel," the Park Board had surveyed 
fourteen locations in Harris County, trying to determine the best suitable locations. 
According to the park board, Memorial Park proved to be "superior" to all other sites 
available. The meeting's goal was "essentially to investigate the availability of Memorial 
Park property and the legal problems involved." Kirkland and Romero wanted Houstonians 
to know that no Anal decisions had been made. Kirkland insisted that park commission 
officials had not even considered Memorial Park before the July election and that they were 
merely doing the job to which they were appointed.^  
15 In addition to the protest of government officials, two public petitions were also circulated protesting the 
encroachment upon Memorial Park. See, "Two Petitions Protest Stadium in Memorial," Chronicle, 10 
November 1958, sec. A, p. 1. 
16 
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City Council members also wanted to distance themselves from all possible negative 
publicity. Council members pledged a future "hands off policy" in stadium site selection. The 
City Council pointed out that Harris County had the responsibility to select a site, not the 
city. Therefore, the Council should be absolved of all malice created by the County's 
Memorial Park decision. The park commissioners, the Council vowed, would remain the 
only body to investigate and select a site for the stadium. Members of the City Council 
reaffirmed that they were just an advisory body for the County in this matter. Mayor Cutrer 
wished county leaders well and confirmed the stadium was the county's "responsibility," not 
the city's.17 
Now that the supposedly optimal site had been summarily dismissed, other viable 
locations received more attention from the Commissioners. One of these sites was the land 
owned by the Fat Stock Show near South Main and Old Spanish Trail. " Bob Rule called this 
area an "ideal" spot for the future stadium, for many important reasons. One, the land owned 
by the Stock Show totaled 230-acres of unobstructed land, large enough for a county stadium 
and other supporting buildings. Second, the Show's leaders were willing to trade or donate 
this land to the County. Rule also pointed out that if it additional land seemed necessary for 
construction, adjacent property could be purchased. Just as important, Rule added, a South 
Main location could be readily accessed throughout Harris County and especially downtown 
Houston. For Rule, the South Main location appeared to be close to selection in early 1959, 
despite the seeming inactivity of the park board. ^  
17 
"City Officials Pledge Neutral Stadium Policy." Chronicle, 13 November 1958, sec. B, p. 1. 
18 Omstead, "Stock Show's Decision May Swing Stadium.'" Post, 28 February 1959, sec. 1, pp. 1, 11. 
19 Rule, "Sidelights," Press, 6 January 1959. p. 12. 
Even though he remained optimistic, Rule understood the critical "crossroads" that 
Houston faced. Voters had passed the revenue bond issue, but nothing else had been 
accomplished regarding the stadium. The big leagues were allegedly looking for suitable 
cities for possible expansion. Those cities that were prepared would become the exclusive 
members of professional sports leagues. Even a hint of dissension, not to mention inadequate 
facilities, could suggest that a city was not ready for the big leagues. The Kellogg Company, 
the sponsors a football clinic, had recently selected Dallas's Memorial Auditorium for their 
event instead of any Houston facility. Kellogg chose Dallas because they felt it had "the most 
modem convention facilities in the Southwest," complete with ample parking. "While the 
clinic itself was nothing in particular to fight over," explained Rule, "that explanation of why 
Dallas got it, to me, carries a somber warning for Houston—be ready or be by-passed."*" 
Rule feared that Houston's perceived disarray could cost it not only big league sports, 
but also many large conventions and meetings. According to Rule, immediate construction at 
the South Main location should begin in earnest, regardless of the city landing a major league 
franchise. Continued delay, he warned, meant that city and county officials would not be 
prepared for the eventual call up to the big leagues. These officials needed to get ready for 
the future when, not if, major league baseball came calling. Other tenants were already 
available, like the Stock Show and the University of Houston, for example, Rule continued, 
that would provide the capital for the amortization of the revenue bonds until the HSA landed 
a franchise. The entire stadium did not need to be completely constructed, he added, nor all 
the $20 million spent. He worried that the once unified stadium effort had lost the harmony 
20 Rule. "Sidelights," Press, 16 February 1959, p. 14. 
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needed to see the project come to fruition. There seemed to be a lack of optimism and an 
increase in pessimism,^  
As Rule and others hinted at a waning optimism for Houston's proposed stadium, 
several disgruntled baseball enthusiasts had already started the game plan to force major 
league baseball owners to expand their ranks. As previously noted, the first efforts of postwar 
expansion were merely relocation. O'Malley and Stoneham altered the original formula by 
resettling in California. After O'Malley's strong-armed tactics, Brooklyn's congressman 
Emanuel Celler initiated congressional hearings to question major league baseball's exempt 
status from anti-trust legislation. Although baseball owners retained their exempt status, the 
1957 hearings prompted New York Mayor Robert Wagner to search for a means to return big 
league baseball to Brooklyn. His attempts to lure the Reds and then the Pirates failed. 
Wagner asked attorney William Shea to start a new major league baseball circuit Shea's 
efforts resulted in the formation of the Continental League of Professional Baseball Clubs. 
Shea asked aging baseball icon Branch Rickey in 1958 to advise and eventually preside over 
the new circuit.^  
Rickey, an ex-Dodger general manager, immediately took action. He invited several 
wealthy men who wanted to own and operate baseball teams to New York to discuss the 
plans for expansion. Rickey met with Cullinan about the HSA representing Houston. 
Cullinan accepted Rickey's offer. The CL also received support from groups representing 
Atlanta, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Toronto. Upon hearing the news of the HSA's entry, civic 
leaders in Houston expressed their excitement and enthusiasm. When the news of Houston's 
* Aid. 
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entry into the CL, Mayor Cutrer reacted, "I'm very happy." Cutrer also said that Houston 
would prove the decision to include Houston would be a good one. James M. Delmar, former 
president of the Houston Amateur Baseball Federation, said he was "delighted" about this 
"wonderful thing." Now that Houston was on course to be a big league city in baseball, Judge 
Elliott wanted the stadium to be ready in 1961 
On 18 August 1959, Rickey, Shea, and other CL owners met with Commissioner 
Ford Frick, National League president Warren Giles, American League president Joe Cronin, 
and a handful of owners to discuss the new league and its eventual integration into the major 
league ranks. Major league owners expressed their delight in a new league and pledged 
support. Rickey and Shea remained skeptical of MLB's goodwill, but enthusiastic that the CL 
would become a third major circuit* 
They could remain optimistic because they found an ally in the US Senate in Estes 
Kefauver. The Tennessee senator chaired the Senate Antitrust Committee. Kefauver began 
hearings on major league expansion in 1959 and 1960. Again, baseball's anti-trust exemption 
status and control over the minor leagues were other issues. Rickey and Shea informed 
senators of the state of major league baseball at that time. These owners, they wrote, "have a 
total lack of loyalty to the communities which support their enterprises." The owners were 
businessmen, pure and simple. If a better deal came along, Rickey and Shea continued, the 
22 Murray Polner, Branch Rickey: A Biography (New York: Atheneum, 1982), 255-257; James Edward Miller, 
The Baseball Business: Pursuing Pennants and Profits in Baltimore (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1990), 78-81. 
^ Herskowitz, "Houston Included in Continental League," CAronick, 28 July 1959, s. 4, pp. 1,6; "Houston 
Baseball Assured in I960," Post, 28 July 1959. s. 4, p. 4; Dan Daniel, "Big League Expansion Set! Houston Has 
Top Priority," Press, 23 July 1959, p. 9; Rule, "We Have the Franchise, Stadium Next Big Goal," Press, 28 July 
1959, p. 10. 
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owners would move their teams to wherever they wanted to go to increase their profits. The 
Continental League owners, on the other hand, were "local, civic-minded, financially sound 
baseball fans of excellent reputation." All the CL owners wanted was a chance to bring 
baseball to their cities.^  
The enthusiasm did not wane in Houston despite the fact that the HSA did not control 
the Houston territory. Under the rules of major league baseball, an owners was required to 
obtain the territorial rights to a city. In Houston's case, the HSA had to purchase the 
territorial rights from Buffs owner Marty Marion. Cullinan said that discussions with Marion 
were underway to get the territory. Cullinan said that he did not think there would be any 
snags during the negotiations. He was confidant that the HSA would get control quickly and 
painlessly. Within a week in late July and early August 1959, Houston became a big league 
city twice. After the announcement of the HSA's entry into the Continental League, HSA 
member K. S. (Bud) Adams announced his entry in Lamar Hunt's American Football 
League. The park board hastened its activity since both the HSA and Adams expressed 
interest in leasing the county stadium.^  
Houston had finally become big league in baseball and football. But the optimism 
surrounding the baseball negotiations evaporated. Despite several attempts by the HSA to 
either buy the Buffs or merge groups, a baseball war erupted in Houston, resulting in a 
cloudy future for the stadium. Marion refused to be bullied by the HSA. The HSA refused to 
* Polner, 257-260; Miller, 82-83. 
^ Herskowitz, "Houston Included in Continental League," forf, 28 July 1959, s. 4, pp. 1,6; "Houston 
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submit to Marion's outrageous price. Marion remained steadfast in his terms and began 
negotiations with individuals from the American League. Without a settlement, officials from 
both major leagues began to reconsider Houston.^  
A year after the bond vote, it appeared that Houston was no closer to a stadium than it 
was before the bonds were approved. The park commission's initial foray appeared to be a 
fiasco with no agreement on the horizon. Even though the county had commissioned 
architects for the stadium's design, no plans had been completed. It appeared that the 
commission had failed in its work. Adding to this perception of failure, Kirkland disclosed 
that the board was now focusing on a coliseum, rather than a stadium. With no major league 
baseball franchise, the stadium lacked its primary tenant and primary source of revenue. 
Marty Marion offered to lease the stadium for his AAA Buffs, but received a cold reception 
from the park board. Instead, the only viable group at the moment, the Fat Stock Show, 
necessitated a large coliseum, not a stadium. "We've got to go the coliseum route in the 
beginning and in planning along those lines it is necessary to seek a location closer to town," 
said Kirkland. Since the Stock Show donated its own land for the project, the Park Board 
hoped to build the coliseum to compensate its generosity.* 
At the annual meeting of Fat Stock Show directors and members in May 1959, 
Romero, speaking as a member of the Park Board not as chairman of the Fat Stock Show, 
said, "Our traffic experts and other authorities have advised us that the South Main Street 
area is the best location" for stadium facilities. The Park Board, he continued, met with R. E. 
Smith and Conrad Hilton, both of whom owned land adjacent to the proposed location. 
27 Rule. "Sidelights," Press, 23 July 1959, p. 9; Rule. "Sidelights," Press, 19 August 1959. p. 10 
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Romero remained optimistic that a favorable agreement would be made soon between the 
county and the three landholders on South Main in an effort to create a building site with a 
total of 350-acres. When the Park Board obtained the land, then it could begin the process of 
building the first structure in the complex, a coliseum for the Fat Stock Show. Then, Romero 
affirmed, the county could start searching for potential coliseum tenants, which would, in 
turn, facilitate the selling of the revenue bonds and the planning of future facilities at South 
Main.* 
A "gravely concerned" Judge Elliott feared Houston was not only losing its chances 
for big league sports franchises, but also for constructing its sports stadium. In separate 
meetings with the Commissioners Court and Archer Romero, Elliott learned that the more 
lessees that could be found for the stadium, the more attractive the bonds to buyers. In effect, 
the more sources of potential revenue, the greater the chances that the stadium could be 
constructed. According to Elliott, the interest rates on the revenue bonds had already 
increased three-quarters of one percent since the vote in 1958, with a serious threat of further 
increases in a "tight-money" American economy.* 
The park commissioners also started wavering on the original plan of a multipurpose 
stadium. Instead of one stadium, the commissioners began to consider a facility with multiple 
buildings, each serving a specific purpose. Under this new idea, there would be a baseball 
stadium, a football stadium, and a building for the Fat Stock Show. The commissioners 
decided to focus on a baseball stadium first and foremost. "We started on this thing talking 
about major league baseball and our stadium will be designed with baseball in mind," said 
* Nealon, "Post Time," fa#, 13 February 1959, s. 5, p. 1; Rule, "Sidelights," 14 April 1959, p. 10; 
"Action Expected Soon On New Stadium Here," Post, 28 July 1959, s. 4, p. 4. 
65 
William Kirkland. Asked whether the stadium would be "multipurpose," Kirkland responded 
saying, "It will be multipurpose stadium in the same sense that Busch Stadium (St. Louis) is 
multipurpose." Busch Stadium could accommodate both football and baseball games without 
requiring movable stands or bleacher seats. For Kirkland and the commissioners, the 
stadium's first priority was to allow baseball. Football and other events would have to wait 
for their own separate lodgings/' 
Many Houstonians did not agree with this change in outlook. Although separate 
facilities for each event would have been a great luxury, the question was whether Harris 
County could afford it. Dick Peebles, executive sports editor for the Howjfon C/irowck, 
challenged the Park Board's reasoning. Using statistics from the Park Commissioner's 1958 
report, baseball revenue ($326,414 annually) alone could not amortize $6,000,000 in bonds. 
According to that report, $390,600 would be needed annually to pay the bond debt. 
Therefore, he concluded, baseball revenue alone could not provide the needed revenue for 
the payments. Thus, finding any brave soul to buy the bonds was going to be difficult, 
because there was zero chance of getting a decent financial return. Even worse, the Harris 
County voters who approved of the $20,000,000 revenue bonds were going to be upset, "and 
rightfully so," if a single purpose stadium plan was approved instead of the multipurpose 
stadium.^  
The gloomy stadium situation became worse in February 1960. Members of the Fat 
Stock Show contemplated backing away from the previous commitment to the HSA and the 
proposed construction. Stock Show committee members investigated building their 
29 Nealon. "Post Time," Post, 27 May 1959, sec. 4, p. 1,2. 
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exposition center site nearer the central business district instead of placing it adjacent to the 
stadium. This generated some concern about the future location of the stadium, because the 
Stock Show owned $2.5 million of land on South Main that was going to be traded to the 
park commission for the land that the exposition center and stadium site were to occupy. If 
the Stock Show reneged on its previous verbal commitment, the HSA, the county, and the 
city could do nothing about it. Without the Stock Show's land, the Park Board would be 
forced to ponder yet another location within the county for the sports complex. Furthermore, 
the stadium would be minus one major tenant and the much desired revenue it could promise. 
Stock Show president, Douglas Marshall, confirmed that his group would donate its land and 
its building fund to anyone who offered to build a coliseum in an approved location in 
Houston. For Marshall, the sports stadium and the Stock Show's exposition center did not 
necessarily have to be in the same location within Houston. He hinted at the real possibility 
that the Show would locate its new facilities near the downtown, "everything else being 
equal." According to Marshall, there was a "50-50 chance" that the coliseum could be built 
on its property on South Main or near downtown Houston. Mayor Cutrer approached 
Marshall about changing the Stock Show's plans to build south of downtown Houston. 
Cutrer wanted the coliseum downtown, regardless of the immediate consequences.^  
Mayor Cutrer continued to push his idea of locating the stadium downtown. After 
talking to Marshall about the downtown location, Cutrer authorized a city survey for the 
location west of Houston Avenue between Memorial Drive and Washington Avenue. Even 
though he claimed he was not trying to gain support for a second auditorium, his actions 
^ Peebles, "Football May Be Frozen Out," CAronick, 9 August 1959, sec. 5, p. 3. 
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seemed suspicious, especially since Kirkland affirmed that the park board was close to 
finalizing the South Main location. The mayor asked that the board give this site "careful 
consideration" before acting. Cutrer preferred the downtown to South Main because, in the 
mayor's opinion, it would best for the city. Councilman W. H. Jones concurred with Cutrer, 
but confessed that he worried that Harris County would be unable to afford the new stadium. 
Jones endorsed building a smaller 25,000-seat coliseum at the Cutrer's site, because several 
hotel and motel chains planned to build in downtown Houston. Building the coliseum would 
also "do away with a rapidly deteriorating area" within Houston, while also satisfying the 
need for a larger music hall. Jones also dismissed the notion that a downtown coliseum 
would worsen the traffic situation. Placing the coliseum next to the stadium at South Main, 
on the other hand, he warned, would definitely choke the highways while costing $9,000 a 
day (which included interest, maintenance, and bond retirement). "In short, we are in very 
bad need of a 25,000-seat coliseum, we cannot afford a $20 million stadium," Jones 
concluded.* 
Mayor Cutrer proposed a downtown exhibition-auditorium to rival the stadium. He 
met with Stock Show officials Archer Romero and Doug Marshall to inform these men of his 
plan. Cutrer said that he was not attempting to dissuade the Stock Show officials from 
moving their facilities south of the downtown area. On the contrary, Cutrer claimed, he was 
just informing the men that the Houston Avenue site was an "exceptionally fine place" for a 
large auditorium.^  As Cutrer turned up the heat on Stock Show and Country officials, Judge 
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Elliott announced that the park board selected South Main as the future site for the county 
stadium and coliseum. After months of negotiating with R. E. Smith, Conrad Hilton, and the 
Herman Estate, the three other owners of land adjacent to the Stock Show's property, the 
county exchanged other holdings of "comparable acreage" with each these groups. Elliott 
also confirmed that the coliseum received top construction priority over the stadium. One 
reason was the war between Marty Marion, owner of the minor league Houston Buffs, and 
the HSA. The other was to keep Stock Show officials from considering Cutrer's proposal.36 
The Stock Show's executive committee called a special meeting to discuss potential 
locations for its expanded facilities. Now that the park board had decided in favor of South 
Main, the next move was the Stock Show's. Stock Show president Doug Marshall read his 
speech that favored the mayor's downtown location. R. E. Smith, although not a member of 
the executive committee but who attended at the meeting as a guest of Archer Romero, rose 
from his seat to oppose Marshall's speech. In a impassioned plea to committee members, 
Smith said that he sold his land to the Stock Show to expand its facilities at South Main. 
Smith hoped that "an inadequate site would not tempt the Stock Show" but that the group 
would still fulfill its promise to Smith. Even though Smith avowed that he did not care about 
the stadium site, he did want it to be at an convenient spot for "most." Marshall reaffirmed to 
Smith that Stock Show representatives would decide what would be best for the Show. 
Oilman Glenn McCarthy said that he supported his friend Smith's stance on the issue. Both 
Smith and McCarthy previously owned the land at South Main and offered it to the Stock 
36 Rule, "Stadium Set For So. Main," Press, 10 February 1960, p. 14; Rule, "Sidelights," Press, 11 February 
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Show in the late 1940s. The downtown location, both Smith and McCarthy agreed, would 
only exacerbate already congested traffic.^  
Fellow city councilmen Walter Jones and Bob Webb agreed with the mayor that 
downtown Houston was the optimal location for the Stock Show's coliseum and the stadium. 
Webb said, "It's completely silly to put major facilities such as this on the outskirts of the 
city." Jones focused on the crucial financial reality of the situation. He favored a downtown 
coliseum as a cheaper option to the large and undecided stadium. "We are in very bad need 
of a 25,000-seat coliseum, but we cannot afford a $20 million stadium," Jones argued. The 
city, he concluded, could not afford both a sports stadium and a large coliseum. Cutrer 
confirmed his desire for the coliseum downtown, whatever the Stock Show decided.38 Bob 
Rule responded to Cutrer and his cadres desire to split the facilities into two locations. "How 
Lewis Cutrer could oppose this acreage as a site for the Coliseum is a complete mystery to 
me," he wrote, "To want a crowded downtown location in preference to this is absolutely 
unbelievable." According to Rule, "What was needed was complete support from all, not 
division." For the mayor and "the desperate efforts of big downtown interests" to come out 
with this "bombshell" at this critical juncture just added more damage to major league sports 
and stalled the stadium efforts. These individuals did not have the city's interests at heart, he 
said. Cracks in the once unified Houston front began to branch out in many directions, 
threatening to hurt the big league cause.* 
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Judge Elliott refused to consider the downtown location for the stadium. He said that 
he and the rest of the Commissioners Court would support the park board's decision. "The 
board didn't just draw the location out of a hat," he proclaimed, but had surveyed the entire 
county at a cost of $10,000. The Board reported that the vast size of the South Main site 
could accommodate a vast array of events, unlike some of the others, especially Cutrer's 
downtown proposition that boasted a mere thirty-three acres. Not only was the size of the 
downtown location inadequate, but also the county would have to buy additional land from 
private citizens and businesses to get enough for even a modest facility, Elliott warned. No 
one could speculate on how much the final price tag would cost.* 
As the stadium issue became murkier, Councilman Walter Jones demanded that all 
the interested groups present all their information, so each side could know what the other 
did. More importantly, the public would finally be informed instead of kept in the dark. 
"Open meetings and open discussion will either get the county stadium off to a start—within 
a few months—or it will show we can't do it at all," Jones said. Since the decision involved 
public money, they should be informed of everything surrounding it.'" 
Just when it seemed that the Park Board would make the South Main location the 
official stadium site, the Texas Highway Department located a future highway interchange at 
the South Freeway and South Loop nexus. In an effort to avoid any problems, the Highway 
Department agreed to move the interchange location 200-yards to the west. The mayor's 
downtown location doubled as the exposition site and slum clearance. Cutrer then sent a 
description of this location, complete with ideas for a "$9.5 million exhibition hall, a three-
40 Tom Omstead, '"Harris Officials To Back Park Board Stadium Site," Post, 24 February 1960, sec. 1, p. 1. 
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story exhibition building, and parking lots capable of handling 2,500 cars," to Leopold 
Meyer, chairman of building and grounds committee. To achieve this, the mayor pondered 
three scenarios. The city would construct the coliseum, the city and county would enter into a 
joint agreement for financing, construction, and operation, or sell the land to Hams County 
and allow the county to reap the "profits from rental and concession contracts." To complete 
his plans, the mayor theorized, would take only a year and only $3 million, faster and 
cheaper than the current state of affairs. Cutrer maintained that he was not attempting to erect 
a building that would compete with the larger stadium, but a facility that could compliment 
the needs of the city with events at the stadium.42 
On the heels of the announced merger, the Houston Urban Renewal Commission 
backed Cutrer's downtown auditorium plan. John L. Andrews, chairman of the Commission, 
volunteered a 100-acre location slum for the mayor's auditorium. Since the land was only 
"occupied by low income Negro units," federal funds could become available to eliminate 
this blighted area from Houston's downtown. Thus, Houston could expulse an eyesore far 
more cheaply than originally envisioned by Cutrer in a win-win situation for all involved.^  
Mayor Cutrer continued to add further devices to the stadium location debate. To gain 
additional support, Cutrer speculated on the infusion of federal money to aid the construction 
of a coliseum for the central business district. A large underground parking facility and large 
exhibition building might be able to attract Civil Defense funds, thus, reducing the financial 
obligation of local residents. In addition to this ploy, Cutrer also contemplated a monorail 
line to link the central business district to the Houston Avenue exhibition site. This would 
42 Omstcad, "Stock Show's Decision May Swing Stadium." Post, 28 February 1960, sec. 1, pp. 1, 11. 
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fully maximize the coliseum's parking facility: when no events were being held, local 
residents could park and ride. Cutrer defended his actions in terms of bettering Houston by 
creating "a strong central city." Many other US cities, concluded the mayor, located new 
coliseums and exhibition halls near their central business districts and maybe Houston should 
do the same.* 
Stock Show officials invited Houston and Harris County leaders to tour the Show's 
current facilities at the Sam Houston Coliseum and the two disputed stadium locations. After 
viewing the competing sites, Councilman Jones became even more adamant about Cutrer's 
alternative. Speaking of South Main, Jones said, "We simply must be realistic about this site" 
and consider the advantages of the downtown alternative. The South Main location, he 
continued, would cost the city millions of dollars to prepare the location with utilities and 
roads, adding to the cost of construction* "The necessary drainage, access streets and water 
and sewer lines would run into millions of dollars of expense to the city," Jones said.* 
Roy C. Hohl, owner of a car dealership located just north of downtown Houston, 
formed the Sports Center North committee in an effort to get noticed by the HSA. Kirkland 
replied to the new committee by saying that the park commission had already "gone too far 
with the South Main Street site to consider anything else." Kirkland, however, did promise 
Hohl that if the Stock Show decided to build a coliseum downtown, the park commission 
would immediately get in touch with the Sports Center North committee/" Sensing an 
opening, the Sports Center North Committee asked the Park Board to reconsider and move 
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the site north of Houston. Roy Hohl, its president, referred to the same statistics they had 
cited months earlier.* Hohl was joined by another delegation of North Side residents who 
submitted a petition to the City Council. The petition contained over 14,000 signatures and 
demanded that the stadium's location be moved north of Buffalo Bayou "in the interest of the 
public." The North Side group argued that this central county location "would benefit the 
area as a whole better and would guarantee attendance at sporting events." Petitioners asked 
to locate the stadium at the center of Harris County in an effort for "more complete 
community service" and, in their words, a even distribution of the city's public 
improvements and infrastructure. The South Main site was too close to the Fort Bend County 
line, they said.49 Hohl's group decided to raise the stadium stakes by offering the Park Board 
"bodies of land equal in size" to the South Main site for the stadium. Hohl hinted at the 
possibility of getting "a larger area" than the 230-acres the Stock Show made available. 
Kirkland promised to "look very seriously" at the donation offer from Hohl.™ Undaunted by 
Kirkland's initial lack of enthusiasm, Hohl presented two more sites a few weeks later. The 
North Committee, however, designated these new locations, as "free sites". In effect, Hohl's 
group would give their land holdings to the County in return for the stadium complex.^  
Another group expressed their dissatisfaction with a South Main stadium site. 
Members of the Boating Trades Association of Metropolitan Houston backed the mayor's 
request to study a downtown location. Glen T. Bundick, the group's senior vice-president, 
said that the Boating Trades Association was "the second largest" user of the Sam Houston 
Coliseum, which was too small for the annual boat shows. Bundick said that he did favor a 
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new stadium for Houston and a new coliseum in the central business district "if there is 
room." If the mayor's survey demonstrated that the stadium could not be built there, Bundick 
at least wanted a new auditorium to remain downtown or to have the Coliseum enlarged.^  
Cutrer could point to opinions of city councilmen, petitions from north Harris County 
residents, and a large convention that were unhappy with South Main. All these differing 
opinions created an air of cynicism and doubt in Houston. 
Inviting all "interested groups" (representatives from the Stock Show, the park board, 
the North Side stadium group, and John L. Andrew of Urban Renewal), the new county judge 
Bill Elliott (who had replaced Casey in the 1959 election) called a "clear the air" parley on 
22 March 1960 concerning the stadium location. Commissioner Kyle Chapman wanted this 
meeting to eliminate some of the confusion surrounding various aspects of the stadium. 
Mayor Cutrer concurred and added that such a meeting would hasten stadium construction 
because the Park Board would finally obtain all materials and make the most informed 
decisions. "It is a good thing for various groups to get together and express themselves, to 
present all available information for study so that whatever decision is made can be made 
after due deliberation," he said. Cutrer launched into a defense of his downtown idea. 
Locating the facilities near downtown Houston, he asserted, meant that the area's hotels and 
stores would provide the "greatest convenience to the greatest number." For the mayor, this 
was "the best place for an auditorium and coliseum" and maybe the entire sports complex, 
with the possible addition of another forty acres. Commissioner "Squatty" Lyons charged 
that the mayor circumvented the park commission with his scheme. "I and many others are 
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surprised and upset that the mayor took such action since during the bond issue you and the 
city council passed a resolution supporting us in promises that a site of at least 400 acres with 
ample parking would be acquired," Lyons said. Cutrer told those assembled that he discussed 
his information with Romero and other Stock Show officials. Lyons was even more outraged, 
"Why didn't you tell us about this downtown site 'way back after Memorial Park was 
considered in '58?" Cutrer responded by warning everyone that putting everything at South 
Main "would hurt the city."  ^
Even though the two-hour conference produced no immediate compromises, the 
mayor received a major defeat from the Urban Renewal Commission. Andrew reassessed the 
Houston Avenue site in terms of a stadium. Houston Avenue would not be the best site for a 
stadium nor an exhibition hall because it was a "terrible bottleneck," said Andrew. Without 
Andrew's support, Cutrer lost an important means of financing the coliseum. Kirkland 
reaffirmed that the South Main location was the only "logical one" in the county because its 
vast size would accommodate a stadium, parking facilities, and accessibility. He also wanted 
to impress upon everyone present that the stadium would not get built without the 
participation of the Stock Show, who remained undecided about their future coliseum.* 
By May 1960, nearly two years after the bond election, there had been no progress 
concerning the stadium. It left John Bamhill of the ffowa&wi frg&r to wonder, "Will Houston 
ever get that stadium?" Apparently, the members of the park board were waiting for the 
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Stock Show's decision on its future facilities, which would come in June.^  During the 
meeting, two locations, a downtown site and the South Main location, garnered most of the 
attention for the Stock Show's director. Leopold Meyer, the head of the buildings and 
grounds committee, announced to the Show's directors that his group favored South Main. 
After he was finished, the Show's executive committee and board of directors erupted into 
applause and immediately and "unanimously approved" the recommendation. This 
"definite" and yet "unofficial" pronouncement meant that the county park could take this 
decision to the commissioners court for further action.56 The report also affirmed the Show's 
allegiance to a stadium at the same location. The executive committee also wanted the county 
to honor two conditions of this agreement. First, Stock Show officials wanted to reserve the 
right to approve or reject any structure at the building site. Second, the Stock Show wanted to 
retain the receipts from the sale of such things as concessions and parking.^  
With the approval of the Stock Show, the County Commissioners and the park board 
finally started the remaining processes for the stadium. The Stock Show allowed the county 
to construct a stadium or stadiums on its land, in return for the right to approve the facility 
design and the means for continued successful operation.* These officials also recommended 
an alternative proposal to use tax bonds to help pay for the stadium and exposition center. 
The tax bonds differed from the revenue bonds in that the revenue bonds depended on the 
stadium generating money from events, while the income from the tax bonds would come 
directly from a tax on Houston citizens. Harris County commissioners and the county judge, 
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however, opposed "saddling" Houstonians or Harris County residents with such a plan.* 
Along with the mayor, Ave councilmen flatly refused any such thing. Councilman Frank 
Mann promised to oppose any such mechanism Voters had been promised that the stadium 
complex would not the public a dime, Mann said. Councilman Walter Jones preferred that 
the city focus its attention and money on more pressing concerns such as paving streets, 
extending sewer lines, and other infrastructure.*" 
About the only individual who was not enthusiastic was Mayor Cutrer, who refused 
to comment on the recommendation. Cutrer simply opposed the Stock Show's decision. He 
still hoped he could get a coliseum at Houston Avenue. He offered a compromise to the 
Stock Show, Harris County, and the HSA. The Stock Show could still have its facility at 
South Main, as it wanted. But this coliseum would be a "less expensive but attractive 
building designed solely for rodeo and livestock display purposes." A second facility, an "all 
purpose elaborate coliseum," would then be built in downtown Houston. For the mayor, this 
made perfect sense. "We must not lose sight of the fact that expensive facilities are not 
designed for the use of one show alone," the mayor continued, but "to be of benefit to the 
public, they must be able for use for a wide range of attractions." The city remained in a "pall 
of confusion," partly in due to the definition of coliseum, auditorium, and stadium." 
Instead of elation over the Stock Show's pronouncement, Kirkland feared that the 
stadium was dead because the city did not have a major league baseball franchise. Kirkland 
lamented that he did not know "how we can get the project off the ground," without a 
guaranteed source of money that a baseball team could assure. Essentially, the bonds could 
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not be sold unless Houston became big league. The result was continued delay and indecision 
from the park board. The board wanted a professional baseball franchise for the city before 
they acted on the stadium. The problem with the board's stance was that a team would be 
granted only if the city had adequate facilities. Kirkland promised that once a baseball team 
was granted to Houston, "the board will attempt to sell bonds to get the money to buy a site 
and build a building." Kirkland wanted to reiterate that the city needed a tenant and the 
money it would generate to retire the revenue bonds. "We don't have any money. We don't 
have a place to go for he money unless we get a franchise," he said.^  
At the 28th All-Star Game held in Kansas City in July 1960, rumors about both 
leagues expanding its numbers to ten eclipsed the game itself. On receipt of this news, 
Kirkland promised a stadium if Houston received one of the future expansion slots. "If the 
major leagues expand and grant Houston a franchise, we'll find a way to build a stadium," he 
said, by securing a paying tenant A single tenant, in turn, would make the revenue bonds 
more attractive to potential buyers. Judge Elliott echoed Kirkland's sentiments that a baseball 
franchise would help "justify" stadium construction. Once blessed by the major leagues, 
Elliott vowed that Harris County would provide "complete co-operation... in the 
construction of a stadium." For Kirkland and Elliott, Houston was long overdue for a big 
league franchise. They avowed that the city and its people would support big-time 
professional sports. Elliott pledged, "When the day comes that we get a major league 
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franchise, you can be assured that we will build a type of stadium that is second to none in 
the country."  ^
Kefauver's hearings lasted until June 1960. The established owners won a victory; 
Kefauver's bill went down in defeat, as congressman expressed a reluctance to become 
involved in the operations of private businesses. Even though Shea and Rickey lost the battle, 
they won the war. On the heels of the congressional vote, major league owners co-opted the 
CL's expansion plans. The AL and NL announced they would eventually expand to ten 
teams apiece. That August in Chicago, the CL relinquished its claim to four of its cities, New 
York, Houston, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Toronto (eventually replaced by Los Angeles).* 
Cutrer's tenacity to get his downtown coliseum, however, proved to be counter-
productive. Even though the Stock Show agreed to build at South Main, the Stock Show had 
reached no definite plan. The Show's representative Leopold Meyer explained the position of 
his organization. "The Fat Stock Show is definitely of the opinion that it wants its facilities 
located on the South Main Street property owned by the Fat Stock Show regardless of 
whether negotiations are made for financing through revenue bonds, general obligation bonds 
or private capital," he stated. He expressed his determination to meet with members of the 
Park Board to determine the final location of the stadium and the Stock Show facilities. Posf 
sports writer Nealon wanted to demonstrate to all stadium and major league sports supporters 
that Houston needed to act as soon as possible or risk losing out to Dallas-Fort Worth.^  
Cutrer was willing to hire a research team from New York to determine once and for 
all the exhibition needs of Houston, where the facilities should be located within the city, and 
63 Art Casper, "Give Houston a Franchise, We'll Build the Stadium!" Press, 11 July 1960, p. 10. 
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how the city should finance it. "I feel that we should find out what kind of program this area 
needs, adopt one, and get behind it," Cutrer said. The mayor wanted a definite and immediate 
answer, he claimed, so the city would not lose additional ground to other American cities. 
Houston had already lost the Junior Chamber of Commerce meeting to rival Dallas, Cutrer 
lamented. "Counting about 7,3000 delegates and 3,000 wives, that group would spend $1 
million in Houston," asserted the mayor. The longer the city and the county delayed its 
stadium decision, "we're losing a big opportunity to advertise and promote our community." 
If an auditorium was not included in the stadium plans at South Main, Cutrer concluded, 
Houston should seriously consider remodeling the Sam Houston Coliseum to locate visitors 
in the downtown.66 
Radio personality Fred Nahas wrote that he was "speak(ing) for the sports fan—the 
little guy who foots the bill." According to Nahas, "The little guy is sick and tired of all the 
buck passing and selfish ambitions and political squabbling which could keep Houston from 
getting a major league franchise." Houston could get bypassed, he continued, "if we don't get 
to work quickly and build the necessary stadium." Dallas-FL Worth seemed poised to take 
what Houston considered rightfully theirs. While arguing that city officials should invite the 
Chamber of Commerce to all future meetings in an effort to get "new, impartial, non-political 
leadership to enter the picture," Nahas concluded "Wouldn't it be sickening if Dallas-Fort 
Worth got a big league franchise and Houston DID NOTT  ^
"That Houston is the No. 1 city in expansion picture next to New York is not at all 
surprising in the light of the recent census count," according to Rule. "Major league baseball 
65 Nealon, "Post Time," Post, 4 August 1960, sec. 4. pp. 1,3. 
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people look at population more than anything else, for they don't worry about baseball 
interest as long as population is there," Rule continued. Rule speculated that the Dallas-Ft. 
Worth story was just that: a fabrication to compel Houston's factions to reach an agreement. 
With the sale of Playland Park, near the South Main stadium site, Rule speculated that 
Houston was going to see more of R. E. Smith and his business partner Roy Hofheinz 
involved in the fight to win major league baseball and to get the stadium built.* 
Smith, who played a prominent role in the passage of the revenue bonds, became a 
HSA stockholder in 1959. Smith made his personal fortune in petroleum and parlayed it into 
real estate speculation (it has been rumored that he owned two percent of Harris County in 
the 1950s). Kirksey met Smith in 1958 and told the oil tycoon about the plan to bring major 
league baseball to Houston. Smith promised to do what he could to help the cause, but 
refused to force himself and his ideas into the fray. He wanted to stay out of the limelight. 
His business partner, however, never promised to stay behind the scenes. Roy Hofheinz 
became business partners with Smith after losing his mayoral reelection bid in 1955. 
Hofheinz met Cullinan and Kirksey in the summer of 1959 and became a member of the 
HSA. He embroiled himself in the baseball campaign and eventually the stadium design.** 
Rumors of the park commission "moving rapidly" after the news of expansion 
appeared were confirmed by Kirkland. It appeared that the HSA would receive a big league 
franchise, so Kirkland tried to assuage fear that Harris County could not sell the $20 million 
of bonds. Baseball and football revenue, he argued, would easily retire the bonds. In fact, he 
continued, the county would only sell enough bonds to cover the construction, which might 
67 Fred Nahas, "Let's Stop Buck-Passing and Land Major-League Franchise Here," Press, 4 August 1960, p. 3. 
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be less than the $20 million authorized. Kirkland hinted that the primary blueprints of the 
stadium accommodated baseball and football games, provided at least 35,000 seats, and 
allowed for plenty of parking. Echoing popular sentiments among Houston sports writers, 
Kirkland said, "I do think it's time to move along rapidly, to make sure a site is available to 
construct the stadium when we provide ourselves with money from the revenue bonds." The 
only remaining obstacle, according to Kirkland, was the decision of the Stock Show to swap 
its South Main holdings for other Harris County land.*" 
As the talks for a possible baseball team continued among the major league owners, 
the park board announced its program for the new stadium. Chairman William Kirkland said 
that his group was thinking about a 35,000 to 40,000-seat stadium that could host both 
baseball and football games. Editors of the C&rowck announced that this initial 
proposal was too small. "This isn't a big enough stadium for the nation's sixth largest city," 
the editors wrote. What they envisioned, instead, was at least a 50,000 seat stadium that 
allowed for enlargement if needed in the future. Houston would continue to grow almost 
without limit, the C&romck continued. "In construction of its public structures, Houston has 
been plagued by small thinking. It has been our history that buildings are outgrown almost by 
the time they are finished." Houston could not afford to continually make these egregious 
blunders. "It is time for our planners to start thinking big," it added. These planners needed to 
think about the future of the city. This future, the article seemed to say, was limitless and 
boundless. Therefore, city planners needed to have a boundless vision of what the city and 
the stadium should be. And since South Texas was "football-minded," the larger the stadium, 
69 Nealon, et al., 23-25. 
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the more spectators could witness the event. Jeppesen Stadium, the high school stadium and 
the current home to the Oilers, had a capacity of 34,000, only 6,000 fewer than Kirkland's 
proposal. The 69,000-seat Rice Stadium was almost always filled to capacity for college 
football games. The stadium needed to signify the city's status as "one of the nation's major 
sports centers." A puny, undersized stadium would not do this. "It would be a sad mistake to 
build the stadium too small. A sad mistake, and a costly one" because the city would have to 
enlarge it after the construction was completed. Houston was now a major league city, the 
C&romck concluded, it deserved "major league facilities."  ^
Almost on the heels of the recommendation of the C&rowc/e, Judge Elliott and 
members of the Commissioners Court, and park commission chairman Kirkland, jointly 
announced the plans for the proposed stadium on Saturday, 21 August 1960. Commending 
the "determination of Elliott and the Commissioners Court," Kirkland announced the 
commissions' satisfaction with everyone's tireless effort to make the stadium a "reality." The 
announcement culminated two years of work much of it "done behind the scenes" by the 
park board. The stadium plan called for the first of its kind in the world," "a unique, dome-
covered multi-purpose sports stadium," on a 259-acre location on South Main. Construction 
on the "all-weather stadium with a plastic dome" was scheduled to begin in January 1961, 
require only twelve months to finish, and be ready for the 1962 baseball season. The city's 
future "show piece and tourist attraction" planned to seat 45,000 for baseball and 50,000 for 
football. Craig Cullinan announced the HSA's readiness to sign a thirty-year lease with the 
County, providing the stadium with its first tenant and revenue source. Cullinan hoped that 
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by signing the lease as quickly as possible, construction on the stadium would speed forward. 
Along these lines, the HSA offered a plan to generate equity and entice buyer interest in the 
revenue bonds by selling seat options to the public. According to Cullinan and the HSA, the 
announcement of the stadium plans was the Anal piece of the baseball puzzle. Since the 
major leagues endorsed its plans for expansion earlier that fall, the HSA was waiting for its 
Houston entry. The stadium promised to eliminate "the weather as a hazard to scheduling." 
The stadium's dimensions included the dome height of 230 feet, an outside diameter of 720-
feet, and an interior diameter of 650-feeL The geodesic dome would be constructed of a 
translucent plastic that allowed sunlight into the stadium to grow grass. The remaining details 
to be ironed out in the next several months included legal, engineering, and financial matters. 
Once these questions were answered, the construction of the stadium could begin, hopefully 
in 1961/: 
Bud Adams assured that his Oiler team would be a tenant of the new stadium on one 
condition. "If the stadium is built so that there are 30,000 seats between the goal lines," his 
Oilers would play its home games at the stadium. According to Adams, his organization had 
lost some fans that could not get a good seat at Jeppesen Stadium. "We already have found 
that football fans just won't buy tickets unless they are good seats," Adams said.^  The 
financial questions that remained for Harris County depended on a constant "sufficient 
rental" to pay the interest and amortize the revenue bonds. Judge Elliott envisioned a cost of 
$700,000 to $800,000 to achieve this. The HSA promised to sign a lease with the county, 
perform maintenance on the structure, and sub-lease the stadium to others. Along with 
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Adams's Oilers, the County could guarantee two lessees, but still desired the annual Stock 
Show as a tenant/* Stock Show president Masterson still planned on building its facilities at 
South Main too. Some Houston councilmen remained opposed to the stadium location and 
wanted a downtown auditorium. These opponents expressed their reluctance to spend 
millions of dollars to build roads and extend utilities to the future stadium. They argued that 
the money would be better spent in the downtown area.^  
Sports enthusiasts and stadium boosters argued that the stadium plans almost 
certainly assured Houston of a professional baseball franchise. The domed stadium "would 
be a showplace that would draw the curious and the sightseers from all over the country" in 
addition to the baseball fan. For the tourist, the all-weather stadium meant all travel plans 
would be a certainty, no matter what event was held under the dome. "Such plant would be a 
source of civic pride, unique and the largest such structure of its kind in the world," wrote 
Nealon. Houston Chamber of Commerce president Leon Jaworski predicted the stadium 
"will further establish Houston as the dominant city of the South."  ^
Five City Councilmen endorsed (three opposed) the "revolutionary all-weather," 
dome-covered stadium plans. HSA and Harris County required the Council's approval, 
because of required road improvements and drainage. Preliminary reports set construction to 
begin in January 1962 and to be completed in one year in preparation for the 1963 season. If 
the city began road and drainage work, the proposed construction schedule was sure to be 
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met. The park board received an agreement from Hilton Hotel Corporation and R. E. Smith 
to solidify land holdings at South Main.^  
The editor of the ffowa&wi Presr, George Carmack, told his readers that the city faced 
a "key play" in its young history. The stadium project, "a symbol of our becoming a big 
city," required all of Houston and the Gulf Coast, from the mayor and Stock Show officials 
to the residents in North Houston, "to pull together" for a common cause that wold benefit 
all. If Cutrer, city and county officials, and stock show leaders "hem and haw," the "chance 
of a lifetime" and big league sports would most certainly bypass the city and keep it "stuck in 
the minors."  ^The domed stadium signaled that the city necessarily deserved big league 
recognition. The stadium would demonstrate Houston's commitment to big league sports and 
"everything else, from championship prize fights to giant church gatherings and cultural 
offerings." When completed, the stadium promised to make the "Weather Man" unnecessary. 
"When we do that here, watch every other city of the nation follow suit as fast as it can." The 
stadium could even "help everyone in Houston—and its neighbors for many miles 
around—to enjoy life more." The revenue bonds were tax exempt and potentially attracted 
more buyers than regular bonds backed by private funds. "It is a grand constructive program. 
It has private vision yet public prudence. It is worthy of the nation's most spectacularly 
successful city. "7* 
All supporters like Carmack had to do was point to the rapid, and dangerous, 
developments in Dallas-Fort Worth. To prove their intent on becoming big league, the Joint 
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Board of Park Commissioners of Dallas and Tarrant Counties had unveiled a design for their 
own domed, air-conditioned stadium. The 31,000-seat arena could be enlarged to 60,000 with 
the addition of a 150-feet dome. Arena architects averred that the entire stadium project 
would fall within the proposed $9.5 million of revenue bonds by using "pre-cast concrete and 
lightweight materials." Implementing these materials allowed architects to insert a "supper 
club" while eliminating obstructions from view. This "supper club" would permit spectators 
to dine while they watched the game. The architects, Broad and Nelson of Dallas and Preston 
M. Green of Ft. Worth, insisted that construction could be finished before the 1961 baseball 
season, with the domed roof and the air conditioning added later. Houston's position was 
precarious at best, it appeared. Dallas and Fort Worth were willing to put their differences 
aside for the best interests of both cities. Did Houston want to languish as a third-rate city 
while Dallas and Fort Worth moved ahead?* 
Armed with this stadium plan, the HSA filed its NL entry application for the 1962 
baseball season on 11 October. Although the application required six votes of approval, Giles 
remarked that Houston would be accepted." Even Del Webb was purported as saying, 
"Houston is number one in our plans."  ^At the Chicago meetings, Hofheinz presented the 
stadium design, parking facilities, highway accessibility, and financing to Giles. Giles then 
met with the owners to discuss if Houston was worthy of a franchise.^  After presenting their 
case to the National League baseball owners, Hofheinz, Kirksey, and Cullinan retired to their 
hotel suite. After waiting for Milwaukee owner Lou Perini to arrive, the owners unanimously 
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voted to award franchises to Houston and New York. Later that evening, the HSA 
representatives received a phone call from a sportswiiter who said, "You're in." Immediately 
after that phone call, a representative of the NL called the suite to tell them that the 
commissioner Giles wanted to see them.* The next day, Giles made the formal, public 
announcement of the owners' decision to award franchises to Houston and New York. 
Speaking of the work the HSA achieved to that point, Giles said, "Personally, I think the 
Houston Sports Association has made the most progress than any other applicant in major 
league membership." Speaking for the entire NL, Giles continued, "We're glad to have 
Houston. We're satisfied."  ^
On 18 October, the triumphant Hofheinz, Cullinan, and Kirksey boarded their 
airplane for the flight from Chicago to Houston. After flying through a storm, they landed at 
the airport and were met by a throng of jubilant Houstonians, including a marching band 
playing "Take Me Out to the Ball Game." Cullinan expressed his astonishment at the number 
of well-wishers who greeted he and his associates in the inclement weather. "I had no idea 
anyone would be here," he said, "This is wonderful." With a NL franchise in the hands of the 
HSA, the park board needed "to provide the stadium." Judge Elliott said, "With the plans 
we've seen, we're ready to push forward." Now that the HSA had received the baseball 
franchise, he continued, all doubts concerning a tenant for the stadium were erased. Judge 
Elliott said the major league franchise was "One of the greatest things that's happened to 
Harris County in a long, long time. This will have an impact on the economy of the area for 
250 miles. Now the people of New Orleans and San Antonio will be coming here for week 
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ends instead of the other way around." The next step, all agreed, was to get the stadium ball 
rolling.* 
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CHAPTER 4: MORE MONEY, MORE BONDS 
After the Harris County park commission and the Houston Sports Association 
unveiled the design for the domed stadium, Houston's future seemed as bright as ever. The 
earlier skepticism that surrounded the stadium project ebbed at the beginning of 1961, but did 
not completely fade. Big league boosters and stadium supporters struggled to reestablish the 
feeling of ebullient optimism in Houston. These optimists, aided by the reality Houston 
Anally becoming a big league metropolis, demonstrated that their city's future again seemed 
bright and unlimited. Porter Parris, vice president and chairman of the Shamrock Hilton, 
complimented those Houstonians who had recently brought the city notoriety and prestige: 
Bud Adams for his American Football League Oilers (champions in the inaugural season of 
play), the directors of the collegiate postseason football Bluebonnet Bowl, and the men of the 
HSA. Viewed previously as egotistical and selfish, these Houston businessmen were now 
considered heroes of the city who continued to fight for the best interests of the community. 
But the HSA and Harris County leaders could not rest on their laurels. Much work needed to 
be accomplished. The next "giant step" for the city, according to Parris, was the domed 
covered stadium that would be Houston's "second greatest asset," second to the Houston 
Ship Channel. Parris pointed to some economic facts he received from officials from the San 
Francisco Giants. The Giants, Parris reported, had added $20 million to the Bay Area's 
economy in 1960. Parris predicted that Houston would "easily become the retail capital of 
the Southwest," thanks to the drawing power of the dome/ 
1 Paul Hochuli, "Don't Underestimate Stadium; The Whole Area Stands to Gain," Press, 2 January 1961, p. 7. 
ffowjfo/% frgM sports editor Bob Rule focused on a better future for Houston that 
would appear because of the domed stadium "It will be a show place, a conversation place, a 
tourist attraction, a facility over which proud Houston will bust its proud buttons," wrote 
Rule. "When it's finished," he predicted, "it will contain more innovations, more 
conveniences, more plush accommodations than any other sports facility ever erected on this 
earth." The city that had landed the manned space center, proof of Houston's lead in science 
and technology, would further demonstrate its lead in these areas with the construction of a 
revolutionary domed stadium. But Rule was not finished predicting what the stadium would 
bring, and do, to Houston. "And it will set off an era of sports never before dreamed of for 
the great Southwest," he concluded, while "plac(ing) the stamp of big time on this city from 
now on." Although Rule's opinion could be attributed to typical sports reporter hyperbole, to 
dismiss it as just a sports opinion would be unwise. Rule's opinion echoed the sentiments of 
Houston and Harris County residents in general. These Houstonians desired the same type of 
recognition that the newspapers sports editors and reporters wanted as well: big league status 
in sports and cultural events/ 
Not everyone in Houston, of course, was going to be as electrified about the stadium 
as sports reporters, sports fans, and HSA members. "A noticeable lack of enthusiasm" 
emanated from City Hall, according to the editors of the ffowafon Pr&M. This editorial 
blasted the City Council for delaying improvements of Holmes Road, an important artery 
near the stadium. The Council's blatant indifference in upgrading Holmes Road seemed to be 
a concerted "slow-down" by City officials. Were these officials still upset that the stadium 
was going to be built at South Main and not downtown? The City Council said that it did not 
2 Bob Rule, "Sidelights," Press, 10 January 1961, p. 8. 
have enough money to work on the road. Public Works director Gene Maier defended the 
delay, pointing to the cost of this drainage work; money that the city just did not have for this 
project. The wondered why Maier refused to use the remaining $6.4 million of bond 
money for sewer and drainage improvements. The importance of the stadium and its related 
projects necessitated immediate action in all relevant areas. It appeared, according to the 
Prg&p, that this was just another example of a dissatisfied, disgruntled City Hall members 
who were putting their own individual self interest before the public's welfare. With the 
continual growth of the city, this area would eventually require the road and drainage 
improvements. By taking the initiative now, there would be no need for future, and possibly 
costlier, work. The editorial labeled stadium proponents as "most progressive, public-spirited 
and unbiased." Those who did not support the stadium, on the other hand, could be perceived 
as selfish and regressive/ 
The Commissioners Court did not want any further delays to the stadium project. 
And yet, the members of the Court supported new legislation that would empower Harris 
County to issue "tax-supported stadium bonds without a public election." Judge Bill Elliott 
assured the public that the previous $20 million of revenue bonds, which were to finance 
only the construction of the stadium, would "not be disturbed in the least" with this new 
financing plan. County Auditor S. B .Bruce warned the Judge and the Court that this action 
threatened the future sale of the earlier bonds. The Court dismissed Bruce's warning. They 
supported the new tax bonds because it guaranteed the future of the stadium. If the HSA 
failed to generate enough yearly revenue to retire the bonds, tax bonds protected the County 
from default and destruction of its credit rating. In addition to safeguarding the county, the 
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tax bonds carried a lower interest rate (3.7%) than the revenue bonds (6.0%), saving the 
county money. Judge Elliott said that switching from revenue to tax bonds, Harris County 
would save Harris County $414,000 each year on $18 million worth of bonds. Houston 
taxpayers, it was argued, would not be responsible to amortize the bonds through additional 
taxes, although Elliott confessed that the county would be obligated. The tax bonds would 
cover not only construction of the stadium, but also acquisition of land and other 
improvements needed to the South Main site. Even though the proposed bill had not been 
finished, Elliott wanted to stress the importance of it to his fellow Houstonians. The faster the 
bill was passed, the quicker the bonds could be sold and construction begun. This meant that 
the people would have a domed stadium in 1962. If the state legislature passed a special bill 
that allowed Harris County to do this, Elliott indicated that a contract with the HSA would be 
the next priority. The Court prepared to switch the mechanism without the approval of the 
public, based on an established precedent/ 
The HSA's guarantee of annual rental payments protected county property owners 
from additional taxes. Along with maintaining, cleaning, and repairing the stadium, the HSA 
assumed the cost of the stadium throughout the life of the bonds. County auditor S. B. Bruce 
believed that the county could save at least $15 million by switching the financing 
mechanism as articulated by Judge Elliott. Bruce warned that the HSA would have to pay its 
rent every July before the Harris County set its tax-rate. The other option required the HSA 
to pay at least part of its rent, guaranteeing the bonds. The funds had to be deposited in the 
4 Rule, "Tax Bonds Will Save On Interest," Press, 10 January 1961, p. 1, 2; Verniaud, "Court Asks Tax Bonds 
On Stadium," Post, 11 January 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1, 5. 
bank and available for county use, Bruce said, or the county would have to "levy a tax to 
cover them."  ^
Although Elliott made a persuasive case, Harris County state legislators were not 
completely convinced. They met with Judge Elliott to explain their disapproval of Elliott's 
plan. Instead of Gat, the legislators wanted the public to vote on the alterations because, in 
the words of Bob Baker, "we're talking about millions of dollars, I think it best to let the 
people express their opinions." Elliott protested. He feared this would only delay the opening 
of the stadium for the 1962 baseball season, a requirement by major league baseball officials. 
Elliott wanted the legislators to understand the gravity of the situation. The HSA had fought 
tooth and nail to win a franchise. While waiting for an election, he warned, MLB (major 
league baseball) might pull out of Houston and award a franchise elsewhere. Elliott refused 
to allow that to happen to his city. In a prepared statement, the HSA said it understood the 
County legislators' reasoning, but planned on presenting them with the facts concerning 
urgent action.* Representative Don Shipley desired the vote of taxpayers on the issue. "They 
approved revenue bonds, not general obligation bonds," said Shipley. If the voters gave it 
their approval, then that would be fine with Shipley, but not until the taxpayers sanctioned 
the change/ 
The main editorials from the CAromc/e and the that explained the opinions of 
their respective editors came out in support of the financing alteration plan. According to the 
editors of the Pre.», "time is too short to wait on a stadium bond election." The Pr&M 
equated building the stadium to the development of the Ship Channel and Medical Center. "It 
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is not only a great opportunity," the editorial continued, but "by far our greatest single civic 
investment to date." The Chronicle urged the alteration because it was "not too big a risk" 
and "no greater risk.. .than if the revenue bonds were issued." The other new ball parks in 
San Francisco, New York, Washington, Kansas City, and Milwaukee, it continued, had been 
financed by the taxpayers in those cities. The Houston situation was different because the 
HSA was assuming the risk of bringing big league sports, renting the stadium, and 
maintaining it. "The benefits that would accrue to Houston by having a big league team and 
coliseum suitable for the largest conventions and expositions would be tremendous and 
would more than compensate for any contribution the county might be called upon to make 
toward paying off the bonds," the Chronicle argued.8 
Opposition to the tax bonds was as evident as the support. Leopold Meyer, influential 
member of the Stock Show, did not offer an enthusiastic response to the tax-backed bond 
scheme. Meyer, a supporter of Cutrer's downtown plan, promised that he and the members of 
the Fat Stock Show's building and grounds committee would meet to "reorganize our 
thinking" on their previous decision to locate future facilities at South Main. He and his 
fellow committee members, Meyer revealed, had been "reflecting on the wisdom of going 
out there on account of the relative value of the land and the cost factors involved-drainage, 
entry, exit, and all those things." Stock Show officials planned to wait on the outcome of the 
new bond proposal before making a final decision. If the state legislature approved tax-
backed bonds for the stadium, Meyer wondered if the Stock Show could get the same type of 
deal to construct its own, separate facilities, because "the cattle industry is more important 
6 Carl Freund, "4 Solons Cool to Stadium Plan," Press, 11 January 1961, pp. 1,11. 
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than baseball and football."* Meyer's response was not a reaction to the Commissioners 
Court for excluding the Stock Show in stadium design. According to Neill Masterson, neither 
he nor any other Stock Show official was upset at the Court for excluding their input about 
stadium designs T 
Some opponents feared that a lawsuit would eliminate the tax-backed bond plan. 
Judge Elliott said that he appreciated taxpayer concern, but affirmed the duty of public 
officials to realize "new economic benefits to Houston." Elliott also mentioned the 
opposition by some individuals to the expansion of the Ship Channel and stressed that the 
new bonds would actually save the taxpayer money. Hofheinz wanted to emphasize that no 
new taxes would come from the new bond ploy. He also pointed out that the HSA thus far 
had spent the money to formulate a stadium plan and bring baseball to Houston. "The entire 
risk and entire burden of getting major league baseball to Houston will be bome by (the 
HSA)," said Hofheinz, a situation that was "not true in any other major league city." Both 
Hofheinz and Elliot emphasized the need for immediate action. "If we're to be in the big 
leagues in 1962, we've got to start moving dirt by the first of February," said Hofheinz, 
"That's exactly 19 days away." Meyer promised that the Fat Stock Show would only build 
facilities, which it could afford." 
The County Commissioners arranged a meeting with state legislators and members of 
the HSA to "iron out differences," after "a wave of protests from citizens" and public 
opposition from four of the nine Houston legislators erupted.^  Representative Henry C. 
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9 Harold Scarlett, "Fat Stock Show Site Up in Air," Post, 12 January 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1, 16. 
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Grover, a proponent of voter approval, received a letter signed by ten angry Houstonians 
against changing the financing plan without voter consent." They met on 14 January to 
determine the immediate future of the tax-rate bonds and the start of stadium construction. 
The legislators said that their offices had been inundated with written and telephone appeals 
for the stadium but against the measure to switch funding mechanisms without voter 
approval/" 
The meeting lasted from 11 am to 1:30 in the afternoon and had to be moved from the 
Commissioners Court chambers to the larger criminal district court because of the large 
number of citizens interested in the debate. Despite pleas from Judge Elliott and Roy 
Hofheinz, county legislators refused to take the issue to the Texas State Legislature by a vote 
of six-to-one. Legislators expressed a concern about removing the voice of the public in the 
financing phase of the stadium. They also rejected the idea of taking the issue to the state 
legislature because it would take too long to organize. Once the Commissioners assured the 
legislators that a "speedy" election could be legally established, the Court authorized a 
January 31 election date to vote on $22 million in general obligation bonds. The 
Commissioners Court then met with county attorney Joe Resweber to instruct him how to 
word the election order to safeguard against a legal challenge. Resweber and an assistant then 
took three hours to perform the work that usually took weeks to complete. After the Saturday 
parley, county officials needed to print the necessary public notices that were to be posted 
throughout the county's 266 precincts. As established by Texas law, these notices were 
required to be posted fifteen days before the election. The election contained two provisions. 
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The first was an $18 million bond for the stadium itself; the second was for $4 million for 
access roads and bridges. Even though the legislators rejected the plan, they asked voters to 
approve the new tax-backed bonds." 
Elliott warned that if the tax bonds went down in defeat, "There will be shouting in 
the streets of Dallas, because it would mean that Houston would lose its franchise." Elliott 
announced that the stadium's construction would cost much more than the $20 million 
revenue bonds. Commissioner E. A. (Squatty) Lyons confirmed Elliott's declaration, saying 
that in 1958 the stadium had four potential tenants: baseball, football, the University of 
Houston, and the Stock Show. On the eve of the meeting, however, the University and the 
Stock Show decided not to back their original consent.16 Without these valuable lessees, the 
HSA faced limited revenue and possibly an inability to pay its rent. Always the optimist, 
Hofheinz promised, whatever the outcome of the election, that "dirt's going to be flying on 
the next day, February 1."" 
Only one legislator concurred with Elliott. J. Charles Whitfield did not think another 
vote was necessary for the tax-rate bonds. For Whitfield, the 1958 vote had already 
demonstrated voter approval. He said, "I interpret the vote of the people as wanting to get 
this thing accomplished, I don't think the average man cares what type of bond is used." 
Unfortunately, those in favor of immediate action were outnumbered in the Texas state 
legislature. Many of these legislators, in general, supported the stadium, but also affirmed 
" "Stadium Tax Bond Vote Called Jan. 31," CAronick, 11 January 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1,5; Scarlett, "Stadium 
Bond Vote Ordered Here Jan 31," Post, 15 January 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1,4; Nealon, "Houston Voters Ballot on 
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that the people should give approval of the different financing mechanism initiative, not the 
Harris County government/* 
All five County Commissioners publicly lauded the County legislators' decision. 
Each professed a belief in the self determination of the voters and expressed confidence that 
the public would vote in the affirmative. Hofheinz was unusually cautious. Although he said 
he was "convinced the voters will vote for this," a two-week campaign to rally public support 
for the switch in financing mechanisms began in earnest Hofheinz pledged that the HSA 
"won't leave any stone unturned" on the "opportunity of a lifetime" to get the stadium built. 
Houston voters "have everything to gain and nothing to lose," bawled Hofheinz, because the 
HSA guaranteed the payment of the bonds, including the interest every year. This would be 
about one million dollars of HSA money, and not a cent from the taxpayer.'* 
Not surprisingly, the Houston newspapers supported and defended the move by 
Elliott and the Court. It made sense to alter the financing mechanism and save everyone 
money. The switch, however, was more important than just a means to save hundreds of 
thousands of dollars for the taxpayers. It signified the decreasing optimism in Houston and 
even among stadium supporters. Elliott voiced his concern that the HSA just might be unable 
to generate enough revenue to uphold its end of the agreement. With two potential tenants 
already out, the HSA would have to work harder to find lessees. Elliott could hedge the 
County's bet through the use of tax bonds, just in case something went awry. Even though 
the members of the Commissioners Court like Judge Elliott vociferously endorsed the domed 
stadium, the skepticism in the Hofheinz's ability to pay the annual rent began to creep into 
18 Scarlett, "Fat Stock Show Site Up in Air," Post, 12 January 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1,16. 
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the actions of County officials. They began to reconsider their unquestioned faith in the 
project. 
Unsure about the future of the bond issue, Judge Elliott formed a committee to 
stimulate public support. Elliott appointed Leon Jaworski (former Chamber of Commerce 
president and 8F Crowd protégé) and William A. Smith (president of the Greater Houston 
Bowl Association) to lead this ten-day campaign (or as some called it the "crusade" or 
"proposition for progress") for the passage of the new bond measure. Both Jaworski and 
Smith affirmed that passage of the bonds was important for the future of the city. Jaworski 
and Smith called the stadium the "biggest bargain" in the city's history. "What other cities" 
like Milwaukee and Baltimore "spend millions to subsidize, Houston will get without a 
penny's cost to the taxpayer," they added. Hofheinz denied any involvement in the creation 
of this "Citizen's Committee," which he boasted had spontaneously "formed itself." At the 
Pasadena's Taxpayers Association meeting, Judge Elliott spoke in favor of the tax bonds and 
asked for backing. Elliott equated stadium opponents to those who protested the purchases of 
Louisiana and Alaska and the construction of Houston's Ship Channel.* 
After the parley, sports reporters from the Houston newspapers dutifully remained 
optimistic about the stadium The January 31 election, Clark Nealon of the Howafo/z Poaf 
wrote, would prove whether or not a majority of voters truly desired "a worldwide tourist 
attraction to house major league sports and events in all fields." Anyone who votes against it, 
Nealon continued, was opposed not just to the future of major league sports, but a voice of 
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opposition to the very future of the city/' The ffowafon CAromck's Dick Peebles predicted 
dire consequences if the new bond issue failed. It would "set back sports in Houston at least 
10 and probably 20 years," he wrote, and solidify the city's reputation as a "hick town." The 
stadium stood to "provide an entertainment headquarters that would be a wonder of the 
world" and a economic "shot in the arm" for the entire community. ^  Finally, Bob Rule of 
the Howjfofi Prg&y agreed with Peebles. The results of the new election, according to Rule, 
would "prove to a doubting United States that Houston really can build the world's first 
domed stadium." This "world showpiece" would differentiate Houston from other common 
cities across the globe. It would confirm that the people of Houston coveted "big league" 
status.^  
In a major victory for the new bond issue, Stock Show's directors publicly affirmed 
their support for the new measure of financing the stadium. This reversed the previous 
warning from Leopold Meyer. Since one of the stipulations of the $22 million tax-backed 
bonds was for access roads, Stock Show officials began to rethink their previous idea of 
building their own facilities, a measure that they admitted they could not afford. Stock Show 
officials indicated that if the County paid for the needed infrastructure, they would reconsider 
relocating to the South Main location.** 
Another victory for the tax bond effort involved the Houston Buffs. Even with the 
stadium's future cloudy, the HSA clarified the baseball issue by buying outright the Houston 
Buffs and with it the Houston territory. The HSA planned on Gelding a minor league team 
for 1961 while preparing for a 1962 major league debut. Thus, Houston's "baseball war" had 
21 Nealon, "Post Time," Post, 15 January 1961, sec. 5, pp. 1, 2. 
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officially ended and the final obstacle was removed. Now "a united baseball front" 
materialized for the upcoming election, something the HSA hoped would reduce any 
potential question marks. Cullman announced that both baseball groups "can all work 
together now to pass the bond issue and give Houston the finest stadium in the world. 
The same individuals and groups who backed the 1958 bond issue again lined up 
behind the new bond issue. The directors of the Chamber of Commerce implored voter 
approval citing both the economic benefits and the prestige the stadium promised to bring to 
the city. The Chamber's president, P. H. Robinson said, "Without question it will be a great 
asset to the community," that would prove a powerful magnet to attracting all types of events 
to the city. Park board president Kirkland called the tax-supported bonds "the biggest bargain 
in Houston's history" (echoing statements of Smith and Jaworski) because the stadium would 
be built without raising county and city taxes.* 
Hofheinz asked Mayor Cutrer to include adjacent street extensions in the 1961 
timetable of public works. Cutrer, however, refused to acquiesce to Hofheinz's demand. "The 
city will not go ahead with construction on any of these projects until financing of the bonds 
is approved," said Cutrer. The mayor, as always looking out for the city, wanted bonds sold 
and construction begun before he authorized costly street extensions and drainage systems.^  
Hofheinz then paid a personal visit to the mayor's office to ask that the city help defray some 
of the stadium costs. Instead of arguing with Hofheinz, Cutrer said that he would be willing 
^ Rule, "Sidelights," fr&M, 16 January 1961, p. 16. 
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to spend no more than $750,000 "to help out the stadium project" but not to help in the 
construction of the stadium itself. The Houston City Council, then, decided to make 
$750,000 ready for the construction of access roads and extension of sewer lines. The city 
funds would widen Buffalo Speedway to the stadium site and extend it to the south to 
connect with the South Loop. Kirby Drive, the western boundary of the stadium, would be 
extended from South Braeswood Blvd. to Old Spanish Trail. Greenbriar Drive would be 
extended to the south and connect with Fannin Drive to form the stadium's eastern boundary. 
These three street extensions were in accord with the city's "master plan of future 
development." The final access road would be built from Main to the stadium. City Planning 
Director Ralph F.llifrit explained to the council members that these designs were the "best" 
available for the city and the stadium site. It appeared that Cutrer was finally on board with 
the stadium.^  
Support for the $22 million obligation bond issue continued to "snowball" as the 
election date neared. The Knights of Columbus, Houston Board of Realtors, and the 
Downtown Optimist Club, and the AFL-CIO all championed the proposal.* Prominent 
Houstonians also expressed their approval of the bond issue. State Representative and former 
county judge Bob Casey endorsed the bond issue from Washington, D.C. Casey wired, "It is 
perfectly plausible and sound business to shift to county bonds in order to get the lower 
interest rate." W. N. Michels, secretary of Houston's Property Owners Association, spoke for 
the opposition. "We don't think a county should, in effect, subsidize a private corporation." 
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Michels pointed to the economic recession as proof that the county could not afford another 
bond issue. If city and county governments could not help the poor and infirm, how could the 
officials justify the funds for a stadium? "Amid our hardships, we taxpayers are asked to vote 
a $22 million bond issue to provide a stadium for private interests to operate," Michels said. 
If the stadium was such a good investment, he questioned, the HSA should not need county 
investment. Michels was confidant that even if the bond issue passed, it would be eventually 
ruled unconstitutional by the courts.30 
Former stadium opponent and current city councilman Walter H. Jones announced his 
support for the bonds. "I wasn't too happy with the location or with the plan to lease the 
stadium to a private group, but even so I think the people should go ahead and build it," he 
said. Jones stopped endorsing a downtown location after conversations he had with Houston 
public works employees. These city workers told Jones that any infrastructure at South Main 
would eventually have to be completed in the near future anyway and that trying to buy land 
downtown would be nearly impossible. Jones preferred that the County remain the only 
owner of the stadium, not the HSA nor any other private firm/' 
To counter arguments that the HSA stood to gain at the expense of Houston and 
Harris County, Kirksey reported that his organization stood to spend at least $2.5 million of 
their own money. This included the aborted CL foray that had already cost the syndicate 
$250,000 in 1959 and 1960.^  Cullinan revealed that the Braves had only paid $25,000 to 
Milwaukee for the first year to rent the county stadium. Over the last few years, he 
continued, Milwaukee received about $400,000 a year from the Braves. The Giants paid at 
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least $125,000 yearly for the $15 million Candlestick Park. The HSA, on the other hand, 
guaranteed at least $750,000 a year to lease the stadium. Using such a comparison, the rent 
that the HSA promised was not only greater than that paid by other baseball organizations, 
but the stadium was grander as well.^  
For F. M. Law, the domed stadium "will be so unique and so practical that sports 
writers in papers all over the country will come to see it and write it up in their sports pages" 
achieving "publicity money cannot buy." A problem that opponents continually focused upon 
was the immediate cost of the facility to the immediate public. Law understood the concern 
for present expenses. But, he continued, "We must think not only in terms of 1962, but we 
must also think of what Houston and its needs will be in 10, 20, 50 years from now." Law 
typified the optimistic thinking of stadium boosters. Individuals like Law asserted their hope 
and belief that Houston's future was without limits. It was easy to look at the current 
situation, according to Law, and react against the proposed change. But, he continued, an 
impulsive reaction would hurt the future of the city. If Houston continued to grow at its 
current pace, the city and its people would require a magnificent stadium. Law was arguing 
that the people not view the future myopically, which was dangerous. Houstonians needed to 
remain mindful and upbeat of their city's future.* 
Elliott attempted to dispel rumors that he would sign a contract with the HSA before 
the bonds were sold. Some individuals speculated that the county was simply giving the HSA 
a "blank check" to do with as they pleased. Elliott promised that he would do no such thing. 
The verbal agreement from the HSA, he said, was not enough to sell the bonds. Elliott did 
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not want the county to be obligated to pay millions of dollars worth of bonds if the HSA lost 
its MLB franchise. The county would still hold considerable control over the stadium, but 
necessarily would give the HSA, as the renter, authority to schedule other events in the 
stadium, since the HSA was taking a huge risk to maintain and operate the facility. 
Therefore, in the words of the park board, the HSA "must be free to benefit from every 
possible source of revenue consistent with public policy." But Harris County would retain "a 
healthy measure of control over sub-leases and the maximum rentals to be charged to other 
users of this County owned facility," Elliott insisted. This was the best available financial 
plan for Harris County, he maintained, because tax money alone could not get the stadium 
funded, built, and operated. Only the HSA was willing to try this arrangement, and therefore, 
he said, it should be given every opportunity to succeed. In defending the HSA's nearly 
complete control of the stadium, Elliott argued that Harris County could not afford to build it. 
This seemed incongruous with his assertion that it the stadium would pay for itself and the 
opinion that financially Harris County was growing and expanding. In justifying the HSA's 
control, Elliott said that Harris County actually faced economic hard times.^  
Editors of the Press wanted to remind stadium supporters to go vote for the bond 
issue. The Press also wanted to assuage fears that Houston voters would be saddled with 
millions of dollars of future expenses if the HSA failed to pay for any of the construction and 
the county did not make a profit With the city's population at 1.25 million and the cost of the 
stadium at $15 million, the worst-case scenario would see each Houstonian "taking on a debt 
of $15," hardly a "life or death financial matter." On the other hand, the stadium would 
34 F. M. Law, "It Would Not Be Like Houston for Us to Fail.Press, 25 January 1961, p. I. 
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immediately mean more jobs for the city, directly for construction and operation of the 
stadium and the franchise and indirectly to the service sector. The stadium also provided 
psychological strength to Houston, not just for the present but also for the city's future. The 
stadium, "a structure so unusual that it could symbolize the progressive spirit of Houston 
throughout the nation," would demonstrate the forward-thinking of all who resided in Harris 
County, a beacon of technological know-how and can-do attitude.* 
The opinion of the Press was joined by "an 1 l*-hour statement" from Jaworski who 
warned that a defeat of the bonds "would harm our community irreparably." Stadium 
opponents, he charged, could not deny that its construction would spur the city's "future 
growth and development." "The greatest challenge" to Houston since the Ship Channel 
would be a shining example of the individual "greatness" of Houston. Despite the 
"imperfections" in the stadium plan, Jaworski wanted each Houstonian to know that its 
benefits far outdistanced its flaws. Perfection, he said, was impossible to achieve. The 
proposed stadium plan was as reasonable as could ever be hoped. Jaworski's plea, instead of 
highlighting the optimistic attitude surrounding the stadium, hinted that some of the 
skepticism of the stadium was true.^  
As the election date neared, "a small but active group of citizens., .the Citizens 
Committee Against Stadium Tax Bonds" hastened its own campaign. Walter T. Keith, Jr. 
charged that the County officials had conspired with the HSA to give that private company 
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the first chance to be the stadium's chief tenant.* Other opponents began expressing their 
opinions in the form of editorials to the Houston newspapers. Thomas J. Morris wondered 
why the HSA was not privately financing the stadium, since boosters claimed it was "such a 
good money maker." Morris also questioned the real reason why the bonds were being 
changed from revenue to tax bonds." Could it be that no one wanted to buy the revenue 
bonds?," speculated Morris. Morris also said that the stadium was not safe for two specific 
reasons. He disapproved of the plastic roof, arguing that it would not withstand Houston's 
weather. Morris also questioned the artificial environment under the domed roof. If the 
smoke, humidity, or heat did not threaten a spectator, then it would be the stadium's air-
conditioning system.39 
Much of the opposition questioned the need for tax bonds in lieu of revenue bonds. J. 
P. Rembert doubted whether the new mechanism saved money. The HSA, he argued, either 
could not find any buyers for the revenue bonds or realized that they could not afford the 
stadium For tax bond opponents like Rembert, the millionaires of the HSA needed to assume 
more financial responsibility than the tax paying public. If the HSA defaulted, these 
individuals asserted, the average Houstonian would be footing the bill for the stadium.* 
Others just vented against a project they felt was unsound and unnecessary. Lee D. Parkinson 
asked, "Why the last minute rush to brainwash the taxpayers?" Parkinson worried that the 
stadium would not prove such a "lucrative venture" as its proponents boasted. "If this is such 
a lucrative venture, why is it not built with improvement funds?" Parkinson queried. 
Parkinson also questioned the idea of using plastic in the roof. "The plastic I have seen sure 
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doesn't improve with age," Parkinson affirmed. Why the need for a climate controlled 
stadium, he continued, "Are the people getting too much fresh air and sunshine?" Any way 
Parkinson and others viewed it, the stadium was a bad investment for the people of 
Houston/' 
George W. Eddy denounced the stadium, the tax-bond issue, and the HSA in his 21 
January editorial to the Posf. According to Eddy, the upcoming election was the most 
"shameful" event he had witnessed in Houston since he arrived in 1927. The HSA, he 
continued, would be the only winners in the election. For Eddy, the HSA represented the 
businessman of the times, "all profit and no risk." In Eddy's opinion, the HSA should be 
responsible for building the stadium, not the county. It was nonsensical, Eddy argued, for 
Harris County to own the stadium, because it would be unable to generate revenue from a 
property tax on the land. He also declared, "A pox on the newspapers for supporting this 
scheme.'*" Phillip M. Blair asked why the HSA and county officials wanted the earliest 
election date possible. "What's the hurry?," he queried, "Are they afraid that if they give us a 
little more time we'll start thinking of all of the roads and schools that this money would 
buy...?" The actions, not only of the HSA, but county officials seemed suspect to these 
doubters. These individuals questioned the use of public funds for a building that did not, and 
would not, improve the lives of the people. These individuals argued against the optimistic 
future of Houston. For them, there was a finite amount of public money available for the 
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various needs of Houston. Public money, they argued, should be spent on tangible needs like 
roads, schools, and hospitals not some frivolous and spurious stadium/" 
Other individuals began their own campaign to defeat the new bond issue. In her 
editorial to the Pcwf, Mrs. David W. Meyerson wrote that she and people like her had voted 
for the bonds in 1958 for a general improvement to the county's recreational and park 
facilities. Harris County, she opined, should construct new public swimming pools and fund 
new programs for the elderly, instead of ingratiating wealthy "businessmen who are seeking 
to use $22 Million (sic) of county funds to construct a fantastically expensive, air conditioned 
baseball and football stadium to be used for their personal profit." Harris County, she 
continued, should not use public money to finance the wants of a private group. She wanted 
the HSA to build its own stadium, with its own money. Edward J. Walichowski saw the HSA 
and tax-bond boosters involved in a "tax grab." The county, he added, should share in the 
profits of the HSA if it was going "to shoulder all risks." These people wondered why and 
how public money could be justified to build a stadium that would be leased by a private 
Arm. In reality, the county remained the owner of the stadium, but sacrificed some of its 
authority to the HSA.* 
Four organized groups opposed the stadium (as compared to nearly four dozen in 
favor). The leaders of Citizens' Committee Against Stadium Tax Bonds, the Pasadena 
Taxpayers Association, the Constitution Party of Harris County, and the Houston Property 
Owners Association, Incorporated were determined to let their opinions be heard before the 
election. Walter T. Keith, chairman of the Citizens' Committee, accused the HSA and county 
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officials of conspiring to thwart the Texas Constitution. According to Keith the constitution 
read that "No city, county or municipality will contract donate or extend credit to any private 
enterprise." In Keith's opinion, Harris County "is giving the (HSA) priority on the stadium as 
a tenant" that, in effect, made the HSA the sole owner of the stadium. Dr. Robert Q. Holland, 
chairman of the Constitution Party, added, "Since private enterprise would have full control 
of the facilities, it is evident that private capital should finance the revenue bonds for the 
stadium's construction." Former Houston city councilman W. Gail Reeves opined, "Our 
present county bond debt is 466,235,000 and $6,800,00 will have to be spent this year on 
retiring that debt." "We are already at the ceiling of bond that tax revenues can justify," 
Reeves continued, "Even if we increase our county debt by one-third there are many 
challenging needs that would have to be turned down."  ^Houston Property Owners' (HPO) 
president Paul C. Roemer charged that the Commissioners Court had "violated their public 
trust in attempting to saddle the taxpayers with a $22 million tax bond issue to finance a 
private enterprise." The HSA "persuaded our county bosses" to vote for "their pocketbooks 
and not their conscience."* HPO secretary W. N. Michels objected to the perceived 
"steamroll(ing)" of the bond issue and the perceived public underwriting of a private firm/' 
Charles R. Evans, Jr., the president of the Pasadena group, invited members of the 
Commissioners Court and the HSA to a radio debate on the election's eve. Judge Elliott 
declined the invitation, citing a hectic schedule, and saying, "I discussed all the aspects of the 
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stadium with Evans' group last week." With one opposition group taking to the radio, Reeves 
went on the television expounding his views.'* 
The Pcwf dutifully printed the "facts and figures" of the domed stadium, "a structure 
unique in sports" and "the only one of its kind in the World." This was not just another bond 
issue for all of Houston the paper suggested. The vote was not for more sewer lines, an 
extension of a county road, or even a new hospital. Such projects would be important to the 
metro area, but the stakes of the January 31 outcome were much greater and farther 
reaching.* The stadium, the paper asserted, meant "prestige and profits" to Houston. The 
location was selected for two reasons. The first was that it was the largest, undeveloped area 
near downtown Houston. Second, only two groups owned the land, Hilton Corporation and 
R. E. Smith, which simplified and speeded up negotiations. The County paid about $10,000-
an-acre for the land or $3 million, a fair price, according to two respected Houston realtors. 
Problems with the drainage of the land, a reason why it was undeveloped, would be solved 
by building a large storm sewer on the northeast comer of the site that connected to the city's 
120-inch sewer pipe at the intersection of Fannin and OST. An additional sewer ditch, 
located at the southern edge of the site, would reduce the effect of the land's natural slope to 
the north.* 
The Pa# affirmed its position, declaring that the stadium would be a monument to the 
dynamic, growing region" of Houston and also be a testament "to the vision of its leaders as 
to its resources." The stadium, it continued, would serve Houston in much the same way as 
the Ship Channel had already done. The city had financed the construction and expansion of 
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the channel, thus supporting the growth and prestige of Houston. The stadium would have the 
same positive effect as the Ship Channel. Even if the HSA could not generate the revenue to 
amortize the interest, the bond issue was a worthy risk for the city, the farf insisted. "As the 
nation's seventh city, as a key city in relations with Latin-America and as a forward-looking 
metropolis aspiring to events of world-wide significance, Houston needs a 'house' to 
exemplify leadership, to attract interest and to keep pace with its ever-expanding role." "The 
'big league' label means something to Houston. Apart from sports, the rank of Number 7 in 
the country, and the obvious growth toward higher status, can be exemplified in this 
undertaking. The citizens of Houston and Harris County can spotlight themsel ves again as 
'do-ers,' not talkers." The Posf warned that the defeat of the bond issue would mean disaster 
for Houston. The city, it warned, would be stuck with the negative label of backward, not 
forward, looking. Its citizens would prove that they were unwilling to provide for future 
expansion of city facilities, causing future companies to avoid Houston/' 
HSA vice president and general manager Gabe Paul professed that big league cities 
attracted more industry. "Industry leans to cities with major league baseball because it 
provides the type of clean, healthy recreation they like to have their employees enjoy, and it 
also makes it easier to attract new personnel," according to Paul. Kirksey affirmed that 
Houston was now "the envy of the South" because of its baseball franchise. "We must 
complete the job and provide a stadium which will make Houston a household word because 
of its major league team and the world's first air-conditioned and domed stadium."  ^
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At a public rally, Hermon Lloyd of Lloyd and Morgan (one of the architectural firms 
that was in line to win a stadium contract), said the stadium "will be by far the largest thing 
of its kind that has ever been tried." He assured those in attendance at the Rice Hotel and 
those watching the television broadcasts, "We know it can be built. We have engaged the 
best engineering firms all over the world." Hofheinz opened the public rally in typical 
Hofheinz hyperbole. "This stadium takes its place alongside the Eiffel Tower and the great 
wonders of the world in construction," he declared.^  
To illustrate the benefits such a facility as the stadium might bring, the fa#, pointed 
to the 187-acre Texas State Fairgrounds, located two miles from downtown Dallas. The 
fairgrounds incorporated the Cotton Bowl stadium with several air-conditioned auditoriums 
and buildings. These facilities were used throughout the year, not solely for the sixteen days 
of the state fair in October or sports events inside the Cotton Bowl in the fall and winter. The 
attendance for the state fair had never dipped below the two million mark since 1949. The 
point of the article was to emphasize that visitors from across Texas and the South traveled to 
Dallas for dozens of events each year. Economic benefits and civic pride were just two 
benefits for Dallas. Dallas owned the land but leased it to the Fair Association every year. 
This covenant eliminated the burden on the taxpayers, because of the ability to lease the 
facilities for various events.* 
Before the election, Mayor Cutrer interviewed the mayors of five other big league 
cities to learn how these men responded to the various demands of big league baseball teams. 
Cutrer telephoned Baltimore mayor J. Harold Grady, George Christopher from San 
^ Doug Freelancer, "New Stadium Adventure In Design, Planner Says," forf, 27 January 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1,9. 
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Francisco, Noms Poulson of Los Angeles, Milwaukee's Henry W. Maier, H. Roe Bartle of 
Kansas City, and Raymond Tucker from St. Louis. Cutrer learned that each city had "spent 
considerably less than what is contemplated here." Baltimore had voted for a $2.5 million 
bond issue in 1947 to expand Memorial Stadium. The city owned the stadium and leased it to 
the Colts and Orioles. The cost of renting the stadium offset operating expenses but not the 
"sinking fund and interest cost of the bond debt. " This meant that the city of Baltimore was 
forced to cover the remaining annual cost of the stadium. The situation in Los Angeles was 
different than the others. O'Malley financed Dodger Stadium himself, but the city and 
Orange County contributed $3 million and $4 million, respectively, for the roads and utilities. 
In San Francisco, a private company, created by California state law, issued revenue bonds 
for $11 million. Candlestick Park, located about five miles from downtown San Francisco, 
could be used for both baseball and football. Cutrer revealed that original designs for 
Candlestick had contemplated adding an aluminum roof. The prospect of increased 
construction costs and potential public disapproval of a covered stadium on the bay 
ultimately led builders to keep Candlestick an open-air ballpark. In Milwaukee, the 
Milwaukee Park Commission had issued $7,741,000 of ten-year obligation bonds. County 
Stadium required additional seating expansion after its completion in 1954. In Kansas City, 
the revenue from the stadium could not amortize the bond debt. Kansas Citians voted for an 
additional $5 million in obligation bonds to remain a big league city. St. Louis was currently 
constructing a privately financed sports and convention center in the downtown area. The 
total cost of the complex was estimated at $80 million, $5 million of which had been voted 
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by the public for street improvements. Each of the mayors told Cutrer that big league 
baseball was a tremendous financial asset to their cities. Cutrer, on the other hand, refused to 
make his personal opinion of the bonds and the stadium known before the election. He did 
promise complete cooperation if the voters approved of the measure.^  
On the eve of the election, one fact was certain among the many charges, counter­
charges, innuendo, and hyperbole. Harris County did not have a written contract with the 
HSA, but "only an understanding between men of integrity that the HSA will guarantee the 
cost of amortizing the bonds in accordance with the County request." At the very worst, if the 
HSA failed to make its lease payment, then the County would need to assume stadium 
operation. The Commissioners discussed this possibility and confirmed that if this occurred, 
some county services would be reduced, but none eliminated, and no new taxes would need 
to be imposed. The other concern among voters centered around the leasing of the stadium to 
the HSA. The Commissioners again conceded that they were granting power to a private 
business venture. But, they said, the HSA would take the responsibility to sub-lease the 
stadium to other groups and to maintain the building. The County was more than willing to 
allow the HSA to perform the scheduling and maintenance duties, a headache Harris County 
did not need.* 
County Clerk R. E. Tunentine, Jr. predicted a light voter turnout for the election. 'T 
see a very light vote of 10,000 to 15,000," he said, and doubted whether more than 20,000 
Houstonians would vote.^  On Tuesday, 31 January 1961, over 116,000 county voters went to 
the polls to determine the fate of the tax-bond issue and the domed stadium. After the vote, 
6. 
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legislators planned to cancel the previous $20 million revenue bonds. Legislators also 
intended to validate the election results, in an effort to make the bonds "more attractive" to 
buyers. Generally, the issue received its greatest support from precincts to the west and south 
of Harris County, areas that stood to gain the most impact from the stadium's construction. 
Opponents to the bond came from the north and eastern sections where the vote either 
rejected the bonds issue outright or gave it a narrow margin of victory. These areas would not 
experience a financial boom of the stadium.^  
Members of the HSA gathered at the association headquarters at 6:45 that night for a 
party, win or lose. The mood was reported as "tense and subdued," when they began to 
arrive. As results from various precincts were announced over the radio, the mood became 
worse. Hofheinz sat over a map of Houston, pencil in one hand, transistor radio in the other, 
awaiting the results. The vote was too close for comfort. By 9:30, however, the number of 
"for" votes finally outnumbered those "against." "Frowns had turned to cautious smiles," 
once it appeared that the HSA won another contest. Tense, idle talk Ailed the room as some 
men tried to quell their fears and those of their friends. Gabe Paul said, "Kirksey tells me that 
Texas got into the Union by a margin of one vote." "Indiana," replied Kirksey. Cullinan was 
told that he and the HSA would win because they had "the right cause." A jittery Cullinan 
retorted, "If the right cause won all the wars, the world wouldn't be in the shape it's in." By 
10:15, the victory was assured and the group brought out the champagne/* R.E. Smith 
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declared, "Members of the Houston Sports Association accept the vote as a public trust. 
We'll do just what we said we would."* 
Hofheinz guaranteed, "Dirt will fly on South Main immediately." However, some of 
the opposition hinted at filing a lawsuit to challenge the legality of the funding mechanism. 
Leon Weinberg, a Houston attorney, argued that the financing plan was unconstitutional. 
Former Councilman Reeves, disappointed with the results, said, "It's hard to stop a panzer 
division with a cap pistol, but we tried." Reeves said that the results proved the old adage that 
money wins elections, "It's hard to fight dollars with sense." Walter Keith lamented the 
results, but did not plan on a legal challenge. Keith, instead, blasted the county's decision to 
have the election as quickly as it could. "Obviously a 17-day notice of the election provided a 
completely uninformed and misinformed electorate to go to the polls," he said. Keith, 
though, still wished the HSA his "best" and hoped that they could provide the city what they 
promised.61 
On Thursday, February excavation for the stadium began as "[A] huge dragline 
ripped dirt from a 300-acre site off S. Main." [The groundbreaking ceremony was for a 
temporary structure to drain the hole once it was dug.] After construction firm John Kraak, 
Inc. started its excavation, an immediate problem became apparent. Water continually seeped 
into the hole. The installation of pumping machines kept water from completely Ailing the 
crater. Later that summer, Kraak buried a drainage system, five to twenty feet below the 
playing surface, to remove sixty-eight gallons per minute. Since the playing surface was 
thirty feet below ground level, the drainage system reached fifty feet underground. The HSA 
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started the excavation work without a formal contract with the County, in its desire to have 
the structure ready for the start of the 1962 baseball season. This meant that the work was 
being financed completely by the HSA. Gabe Paul, general manager of the HSA's baseball 
team, said the HSA would finance construction until an agreement was reached. "This is one 
of those times when you have to gamble," he said. The 260,000 cubic yards of dirt required 
to reach the proposed level of the playing field (twenty-five feet below ground level) at least 
ninety days of digging. ^  
An additional result of the election concerned the Stock Show. With its future 
location still in limbo, Stock Show building committee member Ralph A. Johnson said that 
his group could revisit a South Main location. With stadium construction moving forward, 
other infrastructure around the stadium would be built. This included access roads and 
utilities into the land owned by the Stock Show. Johnson said that this activity "could help 
get our building program moving" at South Main. Even though a small strip of land separated 
the stadium site and the Stock Show land, both parties could use the same parking facilities.^  
Two days after the election, Hofheinz met with county officials Judge Elliott, auditor 
S. B. Bruce, and attorney Resweber to begin contract negotiations. The HSA had already 
arranged to start excavating 260,000 cubic yards of earth on 4 February. The HSA authorized 
the excavation work only after receiving the consent of the landowners, Hilton Hotels, Inc.* 
Bruce said that the county would have to create a "prospectus" for the potential bond buyers. 
Then the bonds would have to be advertised to the public before any bids would be accepted. 
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Once the bonds were sold, signed, and delivered, county funds would become available for 
construction of the stadium. This meant that the HSA would finance at least two months of 
work before the county money arrived. Judge Elliott confirmed that Harris County officials 
planned to support validation of the bonds in the legislature, a measure that would reduce any 
future legal entanglements. Any lawsuits could threaten the potential sale of the bonds and 
would delay construction.^  
While excavation at South Main and contract negotiations got underway, the legal 
threat became a reality. Ned Gill, a Houston printing executive, filed to contest on Thursday, 
2 February, seven hours after the dirt began to fly. According to the petition, Gill claimed 
that Harris County did not have the constitutional authority to issue the obligation bonds. 
Additionally, according to Gill, the county did not have power to generate a tax to purchase 
or improve land without two-thirds approval from the voters. Gill claimed his lawsuit was 
"an amicable action," "a friendly clearing of the air" on the constitutionality of the election. 
With the results so close, Gill continued, "a degree of opposition that is disturbing" was 
obvious. A lawsuit would determine the legality of the county's actions and assuage the fears 
that the measure had been ramrodded through the system. He also said that he wanted a 
united community behind the stadium and the only way to generate united support was to 
answer, legally, all the questions had been were generated before the election. Gill's lawsuit 
meant that construction would be interrupted until the case made its way through the courts, 
and maybe even the United States Supreme Court. County attorney Resweber disagreed, "We 
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think the bonds were voted at a legal election, and that the bonds can be sold." According to 
Judge Elliott, Gill's lawsuit was not "friendly."* 
Judge Elliott hoped to hammer out a contract with the HSA within two weeks of the 
election date, but was unable to achieve his goal. With only one meeting between the County 
and the HSA taking place, it looked as if negotiations would be dragged out through the 
spring. Elliott speculated that the contract would involve clarifying profit sharing between 
the two sides. Elliott wanted the county to reap some percentage of the gross profits of the 
HSA, but admitted that the figure would have to be determined in negotiations. [Validation 
bills went through the Texas House and Senate without difficulty.]  ^
Herman Lloyd delivered some bad news on the heels of Gill's lawsuit. According to 
Lloyd, the stadium could cost at least $1.5 million more than the original $15 million 
estimate. "I can't guarantee it won't go to $16.5 million or even higher," Lloyd said. If the 
costs rose above $15 million, Lloyd promised "we'll have to cut down on some things." The 
$15 million overall estimate had been based on a careful study but Lloyd could not guarantee 
that any of the bids would be lower than the estimate. The original estimate, he said, had not 
been a conservative one. If the lowest bid proved to be higher than the estimate, Lloyd said 
that there would be certain reductions in the stadium, but not the dome. "The people voted 
$15 million for the stadium plant to include the dome and air-conditioning," said Lloyd, and 
"under no circumstances that I could think of would these two features be eliminated if costs 
turned out to be higher than normal." Other amenities would get cut first, Lloyd insisted; a 
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stadium without a dome would never considered. He made this statement despite mentioning 
the estimated cost of the plastic dome. Early calculations of the roofs cost were between $2 
and $3 million said Lloyd. He based this figure on smaller domes constructed for auditoriums 
in Pittsburgh and Baton Rouge. Judge Elliott and commissioners Kyle Chapman and Lyons 
also promised that a stadium with a dome and air conditioning would be constructed. In fact, 
they said that if the cost exceeded the estimate, they would rather kill the stadium altogether, 
rather than authorize the building of an inferior structure. The public, they all agreed, had 
voted for a domed stadium and that was exactly what the Commissioners were going to 
ensure got built. Elliott said that he and the county "have to live with that $15 million 
figure." The County had put its faith in the expertise of the architects and engineers in 1958, 
when the estimate was set at $15 million. What about the $20 million revenue bonds from 
1958? These bonds, said Elliott, were to be invalidated when the obligation bonds were 
validated. Elliott, Chapman, and Lyons refused to create another revenue bond initiative if 
the bids for construction exceeded the $15 million of bonds.** 
The Commissioners Court certified the results of the election as proposition one, the 
$18 million park bond issue, passed with a 7,441 majority of 115,695 votes. Proposition two, 
$4 million for off-site improvements, passed with a majority of 15,465 of 111,949 votes.** 
After the certification, the HSA went back to work. They hoped that by moving forward as 
quickly as possible, their construction schedule would get back on track so the stadium 
would be finished by the end of the year, and ready for baseball in 1962. By mid-February, 
the company hired by the HSA to drain the land had completed its job. The next issue was 
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closing bids for the translucent dome. The Commissioners Court, however, informed the 
HSA to halt all construction activity. Commissioner Phil Sayers said that the HSA was 
moving ahead "too fast," assigning work without County funds or input. Commissioner Kyle 
Ramsey added, "It's our project and we're going to build it." His colleague Chapman 
concurred. "This is a Harris County project and that Harris County is going to let all bids and 
supervise the construction," Chapman said. Ramsey wanted the HSA to realize that the 
County did not have to compensate the syndicate for any work already completed. If Gill 
won the lawsuit, Harris County would not reimburse the HSA one cent. The county could not 
let out bids for this work, according to the Commissioners Court, until the litigation ended 
and the county approved the stadium "plans and specifications."70 
On Monday, 6 March, District Judge Max Rogers upheld the legality of the January 
31 election. Rogers ruled on two of Gill's three issues: voter notification time and voter 
approval. Rogers' decision ruled that the notice given two weeks before was sufficient, and 
that a simple majority was all that was required for approval. First, according to Rogers, the 
number of votes cast (over 115,000) proved that there had been ample amount of time to 
notify the public. "The size of the vote on this election is ample evidence that the people of 
Harris County were intensely interested in the election," he opined. Second, concerning the 
need for a simple majority, Rogers said he "would not feel that this court, or any other, would 
feel justified in striking it down." Despite losing the lawsuit, Gill promised an appeal. "I 
think the judge erred, and we're going to appeal, that's all there is to it," Gill declared. Elliott 
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remarked, "I think it is somewhat sad that some people want to treat a thing like this as a big 
joke."?' 
Despite the County's latest victory, time was running out for baseball in Houston. 
Gill's appeal meant that stadium construction was indefinitely halted. The County still could 
not make a contract with the HSA, sell the bonds, or post bids for the stadium. The Court 
learned that a County-HS A agreement was near. Upon hearing this news, Judge Elliott, 
Commissioner Sayers, and Park Board Chairman Kirkland wanted to expedite the sale of the 
bonds, regardless of any possible legal appeal by Gill. If the courts proved Gill's lawsuit was 
"a harassment-type suit," Elliott said that he thought that the bonds could be sold. Elliott 
argued that Gill was simply determined "to delay this matter at all cost, regardless of what it 
will do to the stadium and to bringing of major league sports and big conventions to Harris 
County." Delaying the sale of the bonds pushed back the construction timetable. All Sayers 
wanted, he said, was "reasonable assurance from engineers and architects that the stadium 
can be built as we planned within the $15 million allotted to construction." Commissioners 
Lyons, Ramsey, and Chapman preferred to eliminate the legal challenge before selling the 
bonds. Once safe from future litigation, then the county could "move full speed ahead." 
Elliott also remarked that he had been in contact with two prominent groups to bring their 
conventions to Houston. The American Legion and the Lions International, according to 
Elliott, had already made inquiries about using the domed stadium when it was finished.^  
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Gill delayed filing his appeal with the County, using the thirty-day maximum time 
limit set by Texas law. editors expressed their outrage at Gill's strong-armed tactics. 
"You can not compromise with a man who is trying to hold a gun to your head," wrote the 
Prg&s, "You either surrender or you overpower him." Gill wanted County officials to meet 
two conditions before he withdrew his lawsuit. First, Gill wanted the bond agreement to 
contain a clause requiring the bonds to be amortized by stadium revenue and only stadium 
revenues. According to Gill, this addendum would protect all taxpayers from any attempt by 
the county to increase taxes. Second, the County should invalidate the previous $20 million 
revenue bonds voted in 1958. For Gill, this assured that funds from the first bond issue would 
not be used if the stadium cost more than expected. Although no formal agreement had been 
made between Gill and the County, Elliott promised that if these clauses raised the interest 
rate, each would be eliminated.^  
A month after filing his appeal. Gill aborted his lawsuit against the County. In a 
meeting with Elliott, Chapman, Lyons, and Resweber, Gill explained to those present what 
County officials could do to stop his litigation. Gill wanted assurances that there would be no 
increase in taxes, and he wanted a written guarantee that all stadium revenue would be used 
to amortize the bonds. The County leaders eagerly accepted Gill's provisos to end his appeal. 
Lyons upheld one of his previous promises. "I have said this before and I say again that we 
are not to spend more than $15 million for that stadium," said Lyon. Elliott confirmed that he 
switched the bond plans so the County "would be able to lease the stadium for enough money 
to retire the bonds." Kirksey was more pragmatic. The cessation of the appeal meant that 
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construction could resume, pending weather. "We now have a fighting chance for the 
stadium to be ready by next April," Kirksey said.^  
By agreeing to write into the bonds a stipulation that all stadium revenue would be 
used to retire the bonds, the stadium backers found what seemed like an easy solution to a 
pesky problem. County officials failed to realize that the interest rate would increase by one 
million dollars if Gill's demands were written into the bonds. According to the County's 
fiscal agents, this would make the bonds would be costlier and more difficult to sell to 
potential buyers. County auditor Bruce warned that the wording would only confuse buyers 
who would "shy away" from them. Gill's attorney rejected these conclusions. Gill and Biggs 
met with their own bond attorneys, who said that the interest rate would not be affected by 
Gill's conditions.^  
Adding to the frustration, the Architects dashed any chance that the stadium would be 
ready for 1962. Architects could not work on the plans while Gill's lawsuit was pending. 
Instead of being ready for bids on May 1, the architects hoped that they could finish the 
designs by July. Judge Elliott speculated on the implications of design and construction 
delays. "If we haven't started, or if it looks like we are not going to get started, the national 
League would pull out," posited Elliott/* 
On a visit to Houston, NL president Giles inspected the stadium site and offered a 
word of concern to the city. "Any undue delays caused by citizens, or any unnecessary delays 
by engineers," Giles warned, he "would have to reexamine the situation" in Houston. His 
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terse statement was concluded with a more optimistic tone, "But I don't anticipate any such 
delays" especially from the men of the HSA. Giles did not consider Gill's legal actions as an 
"undue delay."  ^What delays could possibly arise now? The legal battles had been resolved. 
The HSA had purchased the territorial rights for Houston, ensuring a united front for major 
league baseball. South Main had Anally been settled as the location. The HSA and the 
County signed an acceptable lease, guaranteeing rent for forty years. Now the challenge 
would be to produce a design that everyone could agree was special. 
76 Vemiaud, "Hopes For Stadium by 1962 Dim," Post, 29 April 1961, sec. 1, p. 1,7. 
^ Nealon, "Post Time," Posf, 21 February 1961, sec. 4, p. 1; Nealon, "Buff Stadium Site Is 'Ideal,' Giles 
Asserts," SN, 1 March 1961, p. 13. 
128 
CHAPTER 5: DESIGNED TO BE THE BIGGEST AND THE BEST 
The model domed stadium Roy Hofheinz proudly displayed epitomized the feeling 
prevalent amongst the HSA, the County, the architects, and the engineers. [Something about 
optimism?] First, the attitude was that Houston and Harris County demanded nothing but the 
best, no matter how difficult it was to build. Second, a domed stadium demonstrated the 
enthusiasm and faith of modem technology. The domed stadium would incorporate the most 
modern technology that "would stand for the city of Houston itself" in professional sports 
and American technical prowess/ To this effect, the stadium must be bigger and better than 
any other ballpark or arena before or since. But it also was testimony to the optimism in 
Houston and confirm the city's greatness, now and forever. During the design phase of the 
Astrodome, the architects and engineers experienced some ordinary engineering problems. 
But the size of the stadium also brought completely new engineering problems that required 
novel solutions. 
On one hand, the domed stadium took its place among the many other arenas 
constructed during the twentieth century. Sigrid Marczoch, staff writer for the journal 
American Engineer, wrote an article in 1965 that described the myriad of these "new look 
stadiums" popping up all across the United States. Marczoch opined that the twentieth 
century had ushered in "a new boom in stadium construction." "Across the United States 
alone," he continued, "some one hundred structures had gone up by 1930." Of this one 
hundred stadia, eighteen, including the Los Angeles Olympic Stadium (105,000), 
Philadelphia Municipal Stadium (75,000), Chicago's Soldiers' Field (99,000), and Yankee 
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Stadium (67,000) had been constructed between World War One and the Great Depression/ 
The fervor did not return until the era of optimism during the 1950s, when "promotion-
minded municipalities" looked to rejuvenate their cities and instigated "a renaissance of 
major stadium construction." Milwaukee started the stadium fever that spread to California 
with San Francisco's Candlestick Park and Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles. The outbreak 
was not limited to California but appeared on the East Coast too, as the District of Columbia 
Stadium in Washington and the forthcoming William A Shea Stadium in New York and 
Fulton County Stadium in Atlanta demonstrated/ 
The new stadiums were some of the largest buildings constructed in the US because, 
as Robert E. Fischer claimed, the architect and engineer no longer faced a limit in the design 
and construction of a modem structure. By exploiting the advances in science and technology 
and the "wealth of resources," architects and engineers could create complicated structures 
that were once considered impossible to build. Essentially, a "tremendous break-through in 
technical limitations" and in materials had become practicable, thanks in large part to "the 
great rise in strength-to-weight ratio in materials." Just as important was the advances "in 
structural engineering," as structural engineers now examined more intensely the "destructive 
forces inherent within a building." This notion of limitlessness, of infinite possibilities, 
affected the ways architects and engineers approached the design and construction of new 
structures. The only limitation facing architects and engineers, if it could be considered a 
limit during an era of optimism, was money. This new era of "human technological 
achievement never before remotely approximated in human history" permeated throughout 
1 Kammer, 313. 
2 Sigrid Marczoch, "The New Look Stadiums," American Engineer, 35 (September 1965): 33-34. 
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American society. Viewed in this light, the domed stadium symbolize the era of Houston in 
which it was conceived/ 
City leaders, in deciding to build the "new look stadiums," hoped to take advantage of 
the "unlimited opportunity" a multi-purpose facility promised "for community recreation, 
mass assembly, and the stimuli of competition for both spectators and performers."  ^
Engineers Richard Q. Praeger and John W. Waterbury (consultants for the Astrodome and 
designers of Shea Stadium) asserted that "the economic key to these new parks stems from 
their convertibility factor and year-round use capabilities." City leaders, they continued, 
understood that the "twin realities" of television and financial prosperity, that arose in 
America after WWII, compelled stadium planners and boosters to seek and demand 
convertible stadia that could be used much of the year. According to Praeger and Waterbury, 
a stadium designer, in blueprinting for the greatest number of "saleable seats," faced difficult 
challenges. "He must create a facility that is free from the aggravations of crowding," they 
said, "that has ready access to public and private transportation, that provides conveniently 
located food concessions and accessible rest rooms, and that affords an unobstructed view of 
the action from every seat in the house." These amenities, they asserted, would entice the fan 
from the home to the stadium. The baseball or football game, it seemed, was no longer to 
remain the main attraction. The stadium became the reason modem fans went to the ballpark 
not the event/ 
^ R. Q. Praeger and John W. Waterbury, "Convertibility," 77# American Cify 81 (August 1966): 100. 
4 Robert E. Fischer, ed., Architectural Engineering, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964),. "A New Approach to 
Structure," ArcAzfecfwraf forum, 106 (January 1957): 125; Alan Gowans, Anogw of/bwricam living; Four 
Centuries of Architecture and Furniture as Cultural Expression (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 450-451. 
' Marczoch, 33. 
6 Praeger and Waterbury, 100. 
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All other attempts to utilize a baseball stadium for multiple events like boxing 
matches, football games, conventions, or music concerts, had experienced limited success at 
best. The main problem was the shape of these ballparks. Generally, most and the best seats 
were located behind home plate, the dugouts, and beyond the outfield. The triangular 
baseball playing field could not be efficiently converted to these other events, but a 
rectangular football field was especially difficult. A football fan, for example, ended up 
sitting in the end zones or so far from the game that his home recliner in front of the 
television set offered a better seat, closer to the action. "An effective answer" to this 
quandary, according to Praeger and Waterbury, was "convertibility, coupled with a circular 
seating layout." Praeger and Waterbury with their firm Praeger-Kavanaugh-Waterbury, 
developed a system of movable stands that promised a cleaner sight line of the playing field. 
The movable stands could be shifted to orient a spectator's vision, to provide a clear, 
unobstructed view of the event. Praeger employed this system for the District of Columbia 
Stadium that opened in 1961 and William A. Shea Stadium New York opened in 1964. This 
meant that for baseball games the seats would be aligned to second base and for football 
games the fifty yard line. To achieve this seemingly impossible task, Praeger-Kavanaugh-
Waterbury utilized movable stands that, depending on the event, could be rotated to allow the 
best view possible. For example, the stands would be rotated to form a "V" lining up parallel 
to the foul lines for Mets games. For events that required a rectangular performance area, like 
a Beatles concert or a football game, the movable stands would be rotated and positioned 
directly opposite from each other/ Movable grandstands worked best in circular stadiums. 
The circular stands were aligned to the center of the stadium circle. "The two moving 
7 Praeger and Waterbury, 100-101. 
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sections provide twice as many seats for rotation to the most desirable locations, since the 
axis of a football field is coincident with the line that runs from home plate through second 
base and center field in baseball."* 
Mankind has employed dome structures throughout recorded history. As seen in the 
construction of the Hagia Sophia, St. Paul's Cathedral, the US Capitol, and the Taj Mahal, 
domed buildings were generally used for either religious or governmental purposes and 
demonstrated an aspect of each culture that constructed them/ These domes, asserted 
engineers David E. Stevens and Gerald S. Odom from the American Institute of Steel 
Construction, were "ornamental" while their functions were largely ignored. This began to 
change in the twentieth century, they argued, as a dome's economic use of space began to be 
exploited. Stevens and Odom argued that it was not until after World War H, however, that 
"the full structural potential of the dome has been realized." The steel framed dome's 
"structural efficiency has now become a full partner with majestic architectural beauty." 
Steel framed domes, they continued, could now unite "economy of materials" with 
"economy of cost." Stevens and Odom suggested that any shape, spherical or conical, could 
be built with any type of roof system, from geodesic to lamella. But Stevens and Odom 
added that "lamella, lattice, and geodesic domes were relatively unknown" and unpopular 
for two reasons. The first reason, they wrote was that "they are highly complex, statically 
indeterminate space frames" and necessitated model analysis to confirm the design. The 
second reason was that "their design and construction can only be achieved under proprietary 
8 Marczoch, 33-40. 
* For a description of several types of domes from different cultures, see Michele Melaragno, Am Aurodwcfzon fo 
Shell Structures: The Art and Science of Vaulting (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1991), chs 1-3. 1-3. 
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rights." The confidence among the Astrodome planners would prove Stevens and Odom 
wrong/" 
The HSA asked two Houston architectural firms, Wilson, Morris, and Crane and Lott-
Drake, to perform all the initial research and designs for the stadium. Members from both 
firms toured these stadia before completing their plans. From the new District of Columbia 
stadium to Walter O'Malley's Dodger Stadium at Chavez Ravine, the architects the pros and 
cons of these new ballparks were scrutinized and recorded. One possible design was for a 
multi-decked stadium like that used for the Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Yankee stadia. These 
modem stadia incorporated a structural steel framework for the grandstands and reinforced 
concrete for the foundations, floors, and decks. Although fine designs, each stadium 
implemented support columns for the upper grandstand, which obstructed the view of the 
spectators sitting in the lower grandstands. These designs were actually a compromise. The 
number of support columns was reduced and they were located at the rear of the deck, while 
girders and trusses were implemented for additional support." 
A visit to each ballpark reaffirmed the boosters' conviction that Houston's facility 
would be greater than all other sports arenas yet built. The architects understood the 
significance of their task and wanted to "design something new and different"  ^The 
architects could, and did, take their time before committing to a Anal design. Every type of 
stadium design was researched, studied, and critiqued. For over three years, according to 
Robert J. Minchew, an architect for one of the consultants Walter P. Moore, Inc., the 
10 David E. Stevens and Gerald S. Odom, "The Steel Framed Dome," Engineering Journal, 1 (July 1964): 84. 
11 Homer T. Borton, "Stadium Design Is a Challenge," Consulting Engineer, (August 1956): 48-51. The joint 
venture of Wilson, Morris, Grain and Anderson and Lloyd and Morgan performed all the initial work without 
charging a fee to the HSA or Harris County. It would not be until 1961 that the architects were formally hired. 
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architects studied all the "appropriate plans," rejected those deemed "unadaptable," and 
"recommended a "circular plan." Since the primary use for the stadium would be baseball, 
with football a close second, a circular form fulfilled the requirements as stipulated by the 
County and the HSA.^  This design would accommodate the facilities for both baseball and 
football, the two main spectator sports. By creating movable sections of the grandstands, like 
that used in the stadia for Washington and New York, the seating arrangement maximized 
the number of seats while still providing an unobstructed view throughout the stadium. The 
Washington and New York stadiums were also circular in shape, which allowed more 
interior space than all other designs. A circular form with arched ribs, "one of the most 
efficient and economical methods for achieving long spans," according to Stevens and 
Odom, also economized the use of materials and space. "These two factors tend to make the 
domical-roofed, circular building efficient," they opined/* 
In 1960, Roy Hofheinz, a member of the HSA, told Judge Elliott, Hermon Lloyd, and 
S. I. Morris that he wanted to take more of a role in the design of the stadium. During the 
summer meeting, Hofheinz revealed his fascination with the geodesic dome of Buckminster 
Fuller and his desire to build a domed stadium to house both baseball and football, grow 
natural grass, and have air conditioning. A domed stadium, he argued, would take full 
advantage of the proposed multi-purpose stadium the architects had envisioned. Hofheinz 
asked the architects if it could be built. Lloyd and Morris confirmed that such a stadium 
could be built with existing technology and architectural processes, but at a severe financial 
12 Lloyd and Morgan internal document (1958), Minchcw Collection, 94-274/15, Engineering reports, 1960s 
Ale. 
13 Robert J. Minchew to Edwin M. Long (4/29/64), Minchcw Collection, 94-274/9, Skylight Inspections, 1964-
1978 File. 
14 Stevens Odom. 83. 
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cost. Hofheinz would not let the dome's potentially high cost prohibit him from having it 
built. Hofheinz argued that a domed stadium would not only save money in the long run, but 
actually make more than a regular open-air stadium. Not only could baseball and football be 
played inside a domed stadium, but other activities like political conventions, religious 
meetings, and trade shows, that could not be held in an open-air arena, could be comfortably 
housed inside it, too." 
Hofheinz also told the architects that he wanted the stadium's playing surface be 
natural grass. This decision, in effect, forced the hand of the architects. The architects briefly 
considered a retractable roof like the one being constructed in Pittsburgh. The Pittsburgh 
Public Auditorium (completed in 1961) was 415-feet in diameter and 136-feet high, stainless 
steel, retractable domed arena. Built as a multiple purpose facility, the Pittsburgh arena could 
seat 13,600 spectators in a climate controlled environment. Private and public funds were 
used to construct the $20 million auditorium. The stainless steel dome consisted of eight 
"pie-shaped" leaves with two leaves stationary. The remaining six leaves were of different 
sizes and could move along curved rails to open and close the roof. When fully opened, the 
leaves retracted "into the nested position like multiple-leaf rolling doors."'* A retractable roof 
^ Nealon, et al., 56-57; Ray, 257,303-304. Bill Veeck claimed to have designed one of the earliest multi-
purpose entertainment facilities in Texas history. Veeck and Bill Zcckcndorf, considered building a structure 
with movable sections, dining rooms, and a sliding roof in Arlington, Texas in 1956. The Arlington facility 
would eliminate the feud between Dallas and Fort Worth and redirect the two cities' energy to the support of a 
professional baseball team. Veeck, ever the visionary, wanted to be efficient in the use of space by erecting a 
ballpark on the roof of a large shopping mall and served by a colossal parking lot. To combat the Texas 
weather, Veeck devised a "sliding roof' which would be opened for baseball games, but closed for non-sports 
venues. Veeck viewed the domed stadium's permanent roof as "a great mistake" because it obliterated the 
aesthetics of a baseball game and replaced it with a plastic, "synthetic background." By corralling as many 
entertainment outlets as possible in one structure, the baseball team's financial burden would be reduced, 
according to Veeck. See Bill Veeck, "Veeck Claims Permanent Roof On Domed Stadium 'Mistake,'" 
Chronicle, 21 July 1963, sec. 7, p. 4. 
16 
"A Retractable Stainless Steel Dome For Pittsburgh," Architectural and Engineering News, 1, (June 1959): 6-
8; Z. S. Makowski, "A History of the Development of Domes and a Review of Recent Achievements World-
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was dismissed, according to Lloyd, because it was impractical. Lloyd toured the Pittsburgh 
facility and was not impressed. There were too many potential problems with a retractable 
roof. A retractable dome, for example, would cost too much to build and operate. Harris 
County voters had allotted only a finite amount of bonds for construction. Even though the 
future tenants were indeed wealthy Texans, the men of the HSA argued that they could not 
be expected to extensively fund the construction of a stadium and expect to survive 
financially. This was actually a curious argument, especially when Walter 0"Malley had used 
his own money to construct Dodger Stadium at Chavez Ravine. Opening and closing of a 
retractable roof would severely tax the air conditioning system, increasing the operating costs 
of the stadium. It would also create an unnecessary maintenance concern for the future.'7 
The cost and inherent problems of a retractable roof were major concerns for the 
architects. But there was another reason that the Houston stadium would remain fixed-roofed. 
This was Houston's weather. "The prime reason for considering a covered stadium," wrote 
architect Robert Minchew, was the "Texas Gulf Coast weather" of high humidity, torrential 
rains, and intense heat. "Those of us who live here thrive on it," he continued, "so long as we 
are in the confines of an air conditioned space." Because of these weather consideration, and 
"despite rumors to the contrary," Minchew added, "there was never any consideration of 
designing a stadium with a movable roof for Houston."'* 
Once the architects agreed to construct a domed stadium with a natural grass playing 
surface, they had to determine which roof design would span a large distance. The architects 
Wide." (hereafter cited as HDD) in Analysis, Design and Construction of Braced Domes, ed. Z. S. Makowski 
(New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1984), 64. 
17 Ray, 304; "Record-Span Dome Roofs Air-Conditioned Stadium," Engineering News-Record, 27 February 
1964,26. 
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had ten types of domes from which to select for the stadium. These were the Schwelder, 
Zimmermann, ribbed, stiff-jointed framed, network, plate-type, grid, lamella, geodesic, and 
space frame. Of these ten types only the geodesic and lamella domes promised to safely span 
a distance of over 600 feet. ^  
The geodesic design patented by R. Buckminster Fuller was a essentially a trussed 
dome. Geometrically, the geodesic dome utilized equal-length members to form equilateral 
triangles. Single-layer geodesies (characterized with the nodal connecting points on the 
surface of a single sphere) could not create a span greater than 120 feet. A two-later geodesic 
contained two spherical domes with a space in between them. The nodal points of the 
exterior sphere was connected to the nodal points of the interior sphere to maximize 
structural strength. The skin of these two geodesic forms did not carry any load. A third 
geodesic design incorporated the skin to provide additional strength. An advantage of the 
geodesic dome was that it could be prefabricated, which lessened the overall cost of 
construction.^  
A lamella dome uses units called lamellas that are usually arranged in a diamond 
shape or X-shape.^  By utilizing roof purlins (a horizontal beam that extended the length of 
the roof to support other beams and rafters), the diamond is completed, generating additional 
stability. The main framework consisted of twelve, large, double beamed trussed ribs. 
18 Robert J. Minchcw to Edwin M. Long (4/29/64), Minchew Collection, 94-274/9, Skylight Inspections, 1964-
1978 File. 
19 Melaragno, 308-325; Benjamin, The Analysis of Braced Domes, 2-7; Makowski, HDD, 5-63. 
20 Makowski, HDD, 32-38, 42-54; Melaragno, 318-320. 
21 Herr Zollinger, city architect of Dessau, Germany, patented the lamella roof system in his home country in 
1908. The Lamella Roof Syndicate brought the patent and trademark to the US in 1925. In 1930, G. R. Kiewitt 
obtained the franchise rights to the lamella system and founded Roof Structures, Inc. The largest steel lamella 
dome Roof Structures, Inc. engineered was the 285 feet-domed Field House for Wichita State in 1955. It also 
collaborated with LM in 1960 for the KTRK television studio in Houston. See, "An Introduction to Roof 
Structures, Inc.," (1961) WMPA archives. 
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Connecting the beams were smaller chords called lacings. The main ribs were positioned at 
thirty degree intervals, much like numbers on a standard clock. The main ribs met at the apex 
of the dome and ran to the tension ring. Located at the base of the dome, the planar tension 
ring anchored the roof to the walls, encircled the base, and resisted the outward forces that 
pushed against the lower sides of the dome. Parallel to the main ribs were bracings that 
intersected with one of the six "trussed circles or hoops" in the roof. The six trussed circles 
also intersected with the main trusses. These beams created the lamella roofs renowned 
diamond design. The interconnected steel beams quickly and efficiently distributed the 
concentrated (live) loads and stresses evenly throughout the roof system, predominantly 
producing "axial forces."  ^
As the architects pondered the merits of the two dome designs, they needed to answer 
another question. The question was how to get enough natural light into the stadium for the 
grass. The architects and HSA had asked Texas A&M agronomist George G. McBee to 
perform a series of experiments to determine which type of natural grass would perform the 
best inside the stadium. He recommended Tifway bermuda grass over other varieties, but 
said that would also include fescue in his experiment. The result of McBee's experiments was 
the selection of Tifway 419. This bermuda grass, according to McBee, was the best grass that 
tolerated low light levels that could be expected inside the stadium. The Tifway strain 
promised a deep, dark green grass that kept its color longer than other varieties, even with 
smaller amounts of nitrogen fertilizer. After planted from sprigs (Tifway was sterile), the 
22 Makowski, HDD, 29-30: Engineering News-Record (ENR), 27 February 1964, 27; T. B. Jefferson, "Welded 
Steel Frames World's Largest Clear-Span Domed Stadium," Welding Engineer 49 (June 1964): 57; "Gamma 
Rays Inspect Welds in World's Largest Clear-Span Enclosed Structure," Welding Design and Fabrication 
(WDF), 37 (August 1964): 58-59. 
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grass would grow into a dense sod that would resist the wear of professional sports and 
frequent conversions.^  
Even though McBee contended that the Tifway would grow and thrive inside the 
stadium, the architects developed a contingency plan just in case something went awry. 
Architect Ralph Anderson contemplated a plan for an "artificial playing field grass" and 
informed Hofheinz of it. The result of Anderson's inquiry was an artificial turf that simulated 
natural grass in color, texture, and performance that would be placed on a concrete sub-floor. 
The artificial grass would not rot and resist mildew while maintaining resiliency and offer 
excellent traction for athletes. The fake grass would offer a truly multi-purpose surface.* 
The technology needed to employ a synthetic playing surface already existed and 
could have been installed in the stadium. Hofheinz decided in favor of natural grass for two 
reasons. First, Hofheinz said the time was not right for artificial grass because there was too 
much controversy over indoor baseball already. Playing baseball on fake grass, Hofheinz 
said, would only exacerbate hostility to the HSA. A second reason for avoiding artificial 
grass was the novelty of growing natural grass indoors. The decision to cover the playing 
surface with natural grass demonstrated the optimism in science and technology. The HSA 
was confidant that the special grass would thrive indoors because the A & M experiments 
proved it would. Besides, the HSA could illustrate its prestige by proving grass could grow 
indoors.^  
23 George G. McBee, "Association of Certain Variations in Light Quality with the Performance of Selected 
Turf grasses," Crop Science 9 (January/February 1966): 14-17; Glenn W. Burton, "Registration of Crop 
Varieties," Crop Science 9 (January/February 1966): 93-94. 
24 Untitled WMCA, (12/30/60), Minchew Collection 94-274/2, Construction Material Brochures, 1958-1962 
File. Wilson, Morris Crane and Anderson, Early Correspondence, 1961-192 File. 
= Ray, 305-307 
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As the architects determined the roofing system, they searched for a way to introduce 
natural sunlight in the stadium. Fortunately for the architects, the geodesic and lamella 
designs allowed the incorporation a transparent material into the roof. The next question was 
to select a transparent material that was both strong and lightweight. The architects were 
essentially limited to two materials for the skylights, glass and plastic. Plastic held several 
advantages over glass. Plastic was much lighter than glass. A lighter material reduced the 
overall load on the structure. The remaining design would not have to compensate for the 
added stress of the glass skylights. Plastic could be readily molded into whatever shape the 
employed for the dome design. Plastic could also withstand external pressure from 150,000 
to 500,000 pounds per square inch. A lighter, stronger material also reduced the time needed 
for installation. Using plastic would also save money. The translucency of plastic could be 
altered to limit the amount of light entering the stadium. If the HSA determined that the 
skylight should only allow a certain percent of natural light into the stadium, they could have 
the manufacturer create a skylight to fit their demanding specifications. Simply put, plastic 
allowed greater versatility.^  
Ralph Anderson said that the architects received plenty of information, some of it 
"conflicting and possibly dubious," from plastic fabricators and salesmen concerning the life 
of various translucent panels. As Anderson understood it, plastic, an organic chemical, would 
eventually deteriorate under constant and continual ultraviolet exposure. Early in the search, 
the considered reinforce and non-reinforced acrylic, reinforced polyester, and unreinforced 
poly-vinyl chloride. They had not given up on finding a glass skylight, "either a sandwich or 
26 Svend W. Bruun and Joseph R. Loring, "Plastics in Lighting," in Plastics in Building, ed. Irving Skeist (New 
York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1966) (herafter cited as Skeist (ed)), 313-315; Gilbert Ford Kinney, 
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a single glazed unit," that contained the optical properties of plastic. Their early inquiries into 
glass skylights had been unfruitful because of the high cost of glass lights/7 
R W. McKinley of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company opined that glass should be 
considered for the skylights. The glass, McKinley asserted, should have a "positive barrier" 
like a wire screen, to stop a worker from falling through it. He said that he could not 
recommend "regular T-window" for Houston because of internal condensation problems 
between the glass and water vapor accumulating from the atmosphere. A weep hole that 
allowed water to drain from the surface could work, he posited, but only if it could be free 
from debris. To eliminate condensation on a single-glazed piece, McKiley suggested that the 
glass could be kept warm either by relocating an artificial lighting system outside the stadium 
or by utilizing a special coating and a electrical current to keep the surface warm. In either 
case, the glass skylight systems envisioned by McKinley were expensive and complicated.^  
Of course, plastics contained some inherent characteristics that caused some concern. 
Plastics had a low strength threshold; it could warp, shrink, deteriorate, and was difficult and 
expensive to install and repair.* Plastics also had a problem with permanence. Some organic 
plastics contain the element carbon. At high temperatures, the carbon could combine with the 
oxygen in the air to yield carbon dioxide, thus destroying the organic plastic. Second, organic 
solvents attack organic compounds and reduce the stability, durability, and other properties 
of the plastic. The skylights, therefore, could not be an organic plastic, but, instead, should 
Engineering Properties and Applications of Plastics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), 1-2; Skeist, 
"The Role of Plastics in Construction," in Skeist (ed), 1-3. 
27 Letter from Ralph Anderson to Cecil R. Parks, Minchew Collection, 94-274/13 Plastic Skylight Documents, 
1957-1962 file. 
28 
"Memorandum to all Stadium Architects" (9/15/61), Minchew Collection 94-274/13, Plastic Skylight 
Documents, 1957-1962 file. 
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use a synthetic plastic like the styrenes, PVC, or acrylics. Plastics, especially thermoplastics, 
were affected by the increase in temperatures and could cause discoloration, warping, and 
even failure.* 
Third, ultraviolet (UV) light wreaked havoc on plastics. By continuing to absorb UV 
light, a plastic increased its thermal energy, causing thermal degradation. The UV light also 
excited the electrons, raised their energy levels, and increased the chances of breaking their 
bonds. The results of these broken bonds could be something benign like discoloration or 
something more serious like the loss of the plastic's physical characteristics. UV stabilizers 
could be added to a plastic that would absorb and/or scatter the harmful rays, protecting the 
plastic. Stabilizers, however, could not be employed for the skylights. The stabilizers would 
negate a skylight's transparency, reducing the amount of sunlight coming into the stadium. If 
the HSA wanted to grow natural grass, any pigment or material that deflected or absorbed 
light would not facilitate the growth of natural grass/' 
Another environmental hazard, oxidation, resulted from exposure to higher 
temperatures and an excess of foreign molecules. Every polymer reacted with oxygen. The 
results of this reaction was the creation of a free radical. The free radical reacted with 
oxygen, creating a peroxide radical. The peroxide radical, then, attacked other molecules, 
generating hydroxyperoxide, which, in turn, could decompose and create more freed radicals. 
This process could continue on and on without stopping.^  
29 Kinney, pp. 1-2; Skeist, "The Role of Plastics in Construction," in Skeist (ed), 1-3; Bruun and Loring, in 
Skeist (ed), 313-315. 
30 Kinney, 5-6; Bruun and Loring, 314-315. 
Strong, 156-157; Vishu Shah, Amd&oot of f badca TecAnokgy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc.: 1998), 135-136; Shah, 95-97. 
32 Shah, 93-94; Strong, 158-159. All other forms of PE, from low-density and high-density polyethylene to 
crosslinked polyethylene and PE copolymers could be ignored as a skylight material due to the initial traits of 
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The architects had several types of plastics to consider for the skylights. The 
composition requirements were strict, although there were many types of plastics available 
that contained one or more of the desired characteristics for a skylight. The most important 
was the transmission of light. The key to the light transmission was transparency. Some 
plastics had high levels of light translucency, but this was not the same to transparency. The 
HSA's demand to grow grass inside the stadium required transparent skylights. Transparent 
plastics permitted the greatest amount of light to pass while obstructing or scattering the least 
possible. Translucent plastics permitted some light to pass through, but not as good as 
transparent. Translucent skylights could be considered if, and only if, it could nourish the 
growth of grass. All other plastics, the opaques, despite any other desired trait, were 
dismissed.^  
Plastics are classified into either thermoplastics or thermosetting. Thermoplastics 
were solids at room temperature and did not change after being heated. A thermoplastic resin 
can be heated, made soft, and molded again and again into any desired shape. A 
thermosetting plastic could be a solid or a liquid at room temperature. It could be softened 
after heating. But unlike thermoplastics, the continual application of heat, hardened it, and 
made it rigid and stiff. A thermosetting plastic could not be remolded after the initial 
chemical reaction during the initial molding process. This was due to the nature of 
crosslinking during the molding process. The chemical crosslinking reaction was permanent 
PE. All forms of PE could not be made transparent without losing toughness and vice versa. See Strong, 198-
208. 
* Strong, 178-180. 
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and could not be reversed after the initial curing. Therefore, if a thermoset was heated, it 
could soften, but would keep its original molded shape.* 
Initially, some thermoset plastics could be viewed for the composition of the 
skylights.^  The group of amino plastics provided a possibility for the skylight material. 
Amino resins possessed several characteristics like superb scratch, heat, and water resistance, 
and remarkable surface strength. One amino resin in particular, known since the 1920s, was 
urea-formaldehyde. First applied in Europe as an alternative to glass for window panes, the 
clarity of urea-formaldehyde suffered in comparison to glass. The urea-formaldehyde resin 
required a filler material to increase stability. Called "Beetle ware," the urea-formaldehyde 
plastic lost some of its clarity, but retained much of its translucency, about sixty percent. Any 
filler material greatly diminished transparency and effectively eliminated all amino resins 
and phenolic resins. Nevertheless, even though urea-formaldehyde's strength and light 
weight was a distinct possibility, it was dismissed due to its susceptibility to humidity that 
caused fissures and failure. The other amino plastic, melamine-formaldehyde, possessed 
many of the same physical properties of urea-formaldehyde, except that melamine-
formaldehyde was less humidity sensitive and more expensive. Aniline-formaldehyde, an 
amber-colored resin, could not be considered due to its original hue. Unsaturated polyester 
had great strength and was resistant to most chemicals and water, but did not withstand the 
weathering of outdoors.* 
* Kinney. 3; Harold A. Sarvetnick, "The Plastic Materials," in Skeist (ed), 11-20; Strong, 62-63, 263-264. 
Strong also provides additional information concerning the crosslinking of thermosets. See 265-270. 
35 Thermosets included, but are not limited to. phenolics, amino plastics, polyester thermosets, epoxies, 
polyurethanes, and imides. 
36 Kinney, 105-113; Strong, 276-279; Skinner and Goldhar, 87-95; Sarvetnick, 20-23. For a brief discussion of 
filler material, see Shah, 102-108. 
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Upon further scrutiny, the thermosets could not viewed as a legitimate possibility 
because of their crosslinking reaction. Crosslinking made the thermosets more brittle than 
thermoplastics. To compensate the brittleness, manufacturers added 611er material. These 
fillers, while decreasing brittleness, reduced the transparency of all thermosets. For example, 
phenolic plastics (PF), the most famous being Bakelite, was indeed strong and durable. The 
pure resin necessitated a filler material during manufacture to overcome its fragility. 
Regardless of the type of filler material used, the phenolic resin became opaque. Skylights, 
then, could not be composed of any phenolic material.^  
With the elimination of thermosets, the architects investigated the possible 
thermoplastics.38 Polyethylene (PE), for example, was the simplest of all polymers and was a 
component of many flexible products. PE was easy and inexpensive to fabricate. The 
transparency of PE could be increased, but at a cost of its permeability, tensile strength, and 
hardness/* Polypropylene (PP) possessed many of the same traits as PE, such as its light 
weight and chemical resistance. PP, however, was not only stiffer than PE, but more 
vulnerable to UV light and oxidation. PE could not be used for the skylight material.* 
Polyvinylidene chloride, also known as saran, was a strong and clear plastic. But it 
contained chlorine atoms, unlike acrylics, making it sensitive to ultraviolet light.* 
Polyvinyl chloride (PVC) had a peculiar characteristic called autocatalytic decomposition. If 
external temperatures rose near its melting point, the PVC starts to decompose. Nearby 
^ Kinney, 93-104; Strong, 274-276; W. S. Penn, fZasdca-m-ZMMmg How&oot (London: Maclaren and Sons, 
Ltd., 1964) 7. 
38 The thermoplastics included, but are not limited to, nylons [PA], acetals, thermoplastic polyesters, 
polycarbonates, acrylics, fluoropolymers, ccllulosics, polyphenylenes, polysulfones, polymides and 
poly aryletherketones. 
39 Strong, 194-198; Skinner and Goldhar, 52-60. 
40 Strong, 208-211; Skinner and Goldhar, 60-69. 
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hydrogen and chloride atoms also begin to decompose, increasing the rate of decomposition. 
It could be cast into transparent, rigid sheets, but its sensitivity to UV light and oxidation 
ruled it out Even though the eliminated PVC for the skylights, PVC would be useable in the 
frames for the skylights. PVC frames purported to have several advantages over aluminum 
frames. The frames could be dyed white during the fabrication process, eliminating the need 
to paint in the future, although the plastic frames could be painted if necessary. Water 
condensation on the PVC frames was lower than that of the metal alternative. Less 
condensation on the exterior of the frame would reduce the amount of water that could pool 
on the frame and limit the leaking of the frame.42 Surprisingly, the architects did not research 
the possibility to incorporate PVC frames, but used metal frames instead.43 
Lightweight styrene thermoplastics could be manufactured into translucent sheets and 
used for the skylights. But styrenes limited the amount of sunlight to pass through it, even 
upon the addition of acrylics, and did not withstand ultraviolet or heat very well. This 
eliminated the outdoor use of styrenes. On a similar note, the could not consider vinyl 
plastics because of vinyl's index of refraction. Vinyl skylights would not allow the growing 
of natural grass inside the stadium.44 One styrene resin, polystyrene (PS), seemed to provide 
just the kind of performance needed for a skylight. It was colorless, transparent, and allowed 
sunlight to pass through without refracting it. It could be made into a clear, transparent, and 
waterproof panel. Long term exposure to UV light and oxygen, however, yellowed and 
41 Kinney. 62-66. 
* Strong, 211-216. 
43 R. C. Hess and J. A. Baumann, "Other Plastics for Walls, Roofs and Doors," in Skeist (ed), 157-164. 
44 Bruun and Loring, 320-324. 
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stressed PS. Since the skylights were to last for decades, PS could not be used for the 
skylights.^  
The final plastic resin, and the one that had the most desirable characteristics of 
transparency, uniformity, durability, ease of maintenance, stability, and weatherability, was 
acrylic. There were two types of clear acrylics, PAN and PMMA, also known as Lucite, 
Plexiglas, and Perspex. PMMA allowed ninety-two to ninety-three percent of light 
transmission. All other clear plastics gradually yellowed after exposure to infrared and 
ultraviolet light from both natural and artificial sources. Acrylic, however, did not yellow in 
laboratory tests. The architects wanted crystal clear skylights for stadium aesthetics, but 
demanded clarity for the grass. Acrylic could withstand long exposure to weather and 
sunlight while retaining its optical clarity. Even though acrylic plastics could develop a series 
of small, fine cracks during fabrication, vigilant inspection eliminated those damaged 
products. Annealing the acrylic greatly reduced the "locked-in stresses" that contributed to 
cracking. The major problem of acrylic skylights was the thermal expansion of the joints. 
The expansion taxed the joints. The best way to offset the expansion of the joints was to 
apply elastomeric sealants. Despite these problems, an acrylic, PMMA, became the material 
to be used for the skylights.* 
Because the architects were designing something radically new, they were unsure just 
what types of skylights would work best. They decided that it would be best to test as many 
skylights as possible. For the first test, the architects used two acrylic skylights and three 
45 Strong, 217-218; Skinner and Goldhar, 78-79. 
46 Bruim and Loring. 318-319; Strong, 246-247; George R. Rugger, "Weathering," in Rosato and Schwartz 
(eds.), 390-393; Chanda and Roy, 421; Kinney, 52-58; Skinner and Goldhar, 85-86; Joseph W. Prane, in Skeist 
(ed), 366; Birlcy and Heath, 60-64. 
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glass skylights/? glass skylights generated an immediate concern that outweighed any 
potential benefits. This was the weight and cost of the glass blocks. Each glass panel weighed 
eighteen pounds per square foot, and cost $125 each. One acrylic skylight looked like a 
"bubble" on a three-by-six base. The plastic dome panels could be partially adjusted, if 
needed, after initial installation. They weighed only one pound a square foot, and cost $50 
each. A concern, however, was that the raised surface of these panels might increase air 
turbulence in high winds. The other acrylic skylight, and the one eventually implemented, 
was a louvered system of two layers. The top layer would be constructed with a light 
transmission greater than eighty-five percent with a translucent bottom layer of fifty-five 
percent. It would cost ($75 per panel) and weigh (two pounds per square foot) slightly more 
than the bubble skylight. Once installed the louvered system could not be adjusted. The 
louvered skylights provided the greatest amount of light into the stadium available.* 
The skylights themselves were constructed of double layers of acrylic sheets. A 0.250 
inch thick outer layer "crystal clear layer" protected against the elements, while the inner 
layer, a 0.187 inch thick, diffused the incoming sunlight. The double sheets, separated by an 
inch and a half, were inserted into a case of "sound-absorbent wood-fiber" and placed into an 
aluminum frame 44 x 84 inches. To seal the skylights, the architects took advantage of the 
advances that had been made in the manufacture of caulks. They did not have to rely on 
oxidized vegetable oil compounds which had a mere ten year life expectancy at best. The 
complex skylight joints demanded an alternative caulk to keep out whatever Houston's 
weather could dish out. First, elastomenc tape was inserted into the joint. Elastomeric 
47 
"Summary of skylight situation as of 8-7-61," Minchew Collection 94-274/13, Plastic Skylight Documents, 
1957-1962 file. 
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polymers could be stretched or compressed but would always return to their original shape. 
(Of course, if the elastomer was stressed well beyond its yield point, it could not return back 
to the original.) After placing the tape, the joint received five coats of neoprene/Hypalon. 
Neoprene was a solvent released sealant. Basically, as the solvent evaporated, the sealant 
shrank while its consistency increased. Importantly, neoprene did not need any other 
ingredients before applying nor any curing agents to facilitate the bond. It provided great 
flexibility under extreme weather conditions with a life span greater than twenty years. But 
with all sealants, neoprene included, all could fail if pulled from the joint. Hypalon resisted 
water, sunlight, chemicals, and extreme temperatures while maintaining good adhesion to the 
aluminum frames. The system provided a waterproof and durable sealant. The double layered 
acrylic skylights provided "insulation and condensation control." A clear "top layer" allowed 
sunlight to enter, kept out insects, water, dust, and other unwanted items. The "second layer" 
consisted of "internal prisms" that diffused the incoming light to reduce glare. The "light-
diffused prismatic surface" pattern allowed for a 50% transmission of light into the stadium 
to grow natural grass/* 
In March 1961, Ralph Anderson sent letters and diagrams to those engineering 
companies that had expressed interest in competing for the stadium roof contract. Anderson 
included a diagram of a "typical sector of the Lamella roof pattern" with a three-foot by six-
* G. C. Phillips to WMCA (10/19/61), Minchew Collection 94-274/7, Depositions, Insurance Reports, 
Construction Reports, Correspondence, 1961-1973 file. 
* Jack D. Hunter, "Indoor Outdoor Playing Field," Dwfonf Mogazznf, 58 (March-April 1964): 4; "Fluid 
Applied Roofing For Houston Stadium," Architectural Record, 137 (January, 1965): 185-186; McGlew 
(DuPont) to Minchew (9/14/64), Minchew Collection 94-274/4, Harris County Domed Stadium Construction 
Correspondence, file #17, September 1964; "Record-Span Dome Roofs Air-Conditioned Stadium," ENR, 27 
February 1964,26; "Plastics Score in Stadiums," Chemical Week, 17 April 1965, 87-88; Gordon E. Hann, 
"Sealants." in Skeist (ed), 188-196; A. Brent Strong, Plastics: Materials and Processing, 2d ed. (Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2000), 312; Anthony Errico, "Architectural and Maintenance Coatings," in 
Skeist (ed), 353; Joseph W. Prane, "Plastics in Roofing," in Skeist (ed), 364-365; Kinney, 156-157. 
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foot skylight to be "installed directly to the top" of the roof. The net translucency for the roof 
area was to be at least 50%. The HSA decided against reinforced polyester materials for the 
exterior of the roof in favor of reinforced acrylic sheet. The internal structure of the skylight 
should allow the least amount of angular light cut off. The HSA considered attaching by 
metal straps a "single heavy-gauge sheet of aluminum with a punched louver pattern" to be 
employed six inches above the skylight as a sunshade. Anderson wanted contractors to 
provide a cost estimate of their plans, but to keep the information secret until the HSA 
decided on its course of direction. Anderson wanted to make sure that the information about 
the Lamella roof would not "stir up any unnecessary trepidation" in contractors who had 
submitted plans for different roof schemes. Anderson wanted the stadium architects to 
receive every possible design plan so as to determine the best course of action for the HSA.* 
Overall, the architects received nine bids from eight engineering companies. Three 
bids incorporated the geodesic dome patented by R. Buckminster Fuller. Two of these came 
from Synergetics, Inc., with the other coming from Jeffrey Lindsay and Associates. 
Synergetics, an engineering firm located in Raleigh, NC, had designed the Climatron in 
1961, a geodesic domed greenhouse for the Missouri Botanical Garden of St. Louis (also 
called Shaw's Garden after its founder Henry Shaw).^  The remaining six bids included one 
that was a Kaiser System, one of laminated wood, one suspension system, a air-supported 
roof, a lamella roof, and one aluminum space frame. The immediate problem with each 
geodesic system was cost. Synergetics and Lindsay each made a bid of $4,814,000 and 
Synergetics had another over $5 million. Lydick Roofing Co.'s Kaiser system was listed at 
50 Ralph A. Anderson. Jr., (3/28/61), Minchew Collection, 94-274/2, Preliminary Cost Estimate, Houston Sports 
Stadium, 1960 file 
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$4,989,490. Even costlier was North American Aviation, Inc.'s bid of $5,500,000 for its 
Geolatic System of an aluminum space frame. The suspension system of International 
Consultants, Inc. would cost $4,625,000 and Timber Structures, Inc. estimated its laminate 
wood system at $3,654,000. The architects, although open to any design, immediately 
eliminated the air supported system from GT Schjeldahl Company. A plastic roof, they 
feared, could not withstand the potential hurricane-force winds that Houston periodically 
faced. The final, and lowest bid of the nine, came from Roof Structures, Inc. The St. Louis 
firm planned a steel lamella roof system for $3,224,726.^  
Architect and engineer Donald Richter created the Kaiser dome using the Fuller's 
geodesic form. It was called the Kaiser Aluminum dome, not the Richter dome, because the 
patent was owned by Henry Kaiser's company and not Donald Richter. (Richter eventually 
left Kaiser to start his own company, Temcor Aluminum Geodesic Domes.) Both the Kaiser 
and the Fuller domes utilize a frame of geodesic design and a skin stretched across it. The 
difference, however, was that the Kaiser dome combined the frame and the skin into one 
complete, prefabricated unit. The Fuller dome, on the other hand, kept the frame and the skin 
separate until construction. Richter's innovation enhanced the strength of the entire unit. The 
first Kaiser dome was a convention hall built in 1957 in Hawaiian Village, Honolulu that 
withstood hurricane-force winds.^  
51 Untitled document (1/6/61), Minchew Collection 94-274/7, Wilson, Morris Crane and Anderson, Early 
Correspondence, 1961-192 File; "Jungle Under Plexiglas," /Wm and Aba; Jk/xwler, (May-June, 1961): 12-16. 
52 Untitled document (1/6/61), Minchew Collection 94-274/7, Wilson, Morris Crane and Anderson, Early 
Correspondence, 1961-192 File. Aluminum domes, characterized by the use of aluminum alloys, gained in 
repute due to the construction in 1951 of the Dome of Discovery for the Festival of Britain. The benefits of 
aluminum alloys included light weight, corrosion resistance, and simple manufacture (each panel was of one 
size and could be, in theory, interchanged). See Makowski, 54-58. 
53 Makowski, 46-54; "Aluminum Panels Pleated For Strength," in Architectural Engineering—New Structures, 
ed. Robert E. Fischer (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1964), 7-10. Richter's Temcor firm built three Kaiser 
domes at Elmira College, New York. Each of the domes spanned 233-feet and rose 62-feet above the ground. 
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Anderson wrote to Joe Lydick of Lydick Roofing Company to thank him for his offer 
and explain why Lydick's Kaiser system was eliminated. The Kaiser system, wrote 
Anderson, not only would cost too much, but also would wreak havoc with the entire 
construction time schedule. Anderson assured Lydick that the source of the problem was that 
the original roof estimate of 1960 was too low. "It has become necessary for us to be 
absolutely ruthless paring back every aspect of the Stadium to some degree," Anderson wrote 
to Lydick. Therefore, the needed to look elsewhere for a design scheme.* 
To be sure, the low estimate was a factor in selecting the lamella roof, but so was the 
speed of erection. There were other benefits, however, that also favored the selection of the 
lamella roof. The architects chose the lamella design because of a proven record (over a 
dozen lamella roofs had been constructed during the late 1950s and early 1960s), "apparent 
economy," and the enthusiastic cooperation of Roof Structures, Inc.^  The lamella framing 
incorporated ordinary building materials and therefore reduced the final price of construction. 
A lamella roof could "clear span" an area over one thousand feet long while distributing 
stresses evenly among its beams and supports. For the Harris County Domed Stadium, the 
roof's steel framework spanned 641-feet, 8 inches across and arched to a height of 213-feet 
over the playing field. The roof could span a large distance by utilizing trussed beams 
Although most of the Kaiser/Temcor domes utilized an aluminum skin with the aluminum frame, the 
Crystogen, a Temcor creation, employed plastic panels to replace the aluminum skin. This design was 
implemented for the Botanical Gardens in Des Moines, Iowa. See, D. L. Richter, '"Developments in Temcor 
aluminum domes," in Analysis, Design and Construction of Braced Domes, ed. Z. S. Makowski (New York: 
Nichols Publishing Company, 1984), 526-252, 538-539. 
54 Ralph Anderson to Joe Lydick (1/18/61), Minchew Collection 94-274/7, Wilson, Morris Crane and Anderson, 
Early Correspondence, 1961-192 File. 
55 
"Considerations in Design of Astrodome Roofing," Minchew Collection 94-274/8, Skylight Correspondence, 
1961, 1975 file; G. R. Kiewitt, "The New Look of Lamella Roofs," in Architectural Engineering—New 
Structures, ed. Robert E. Fischer (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1964), 20-24. 
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connected into a diamond-shaped pattern.* Just as important, however, was the system's 
track record to withstand tremendous wind forces. Houston faced the threat of hurricanes 
every year because of its proximity to the Gulf of Mexico. A roofing system that could 
survive the high winds generated by a hurricane received extra attention by the architects.^  
The Astrodome, wrote consulting engineer Dale S. Cooper after the stadium opened, 
was simply "the application of conventional equipment, using tried and proven engineering 
principles and methods."* If the science and technology that the architects and engineers 
used to design and build the domed stadium were well-known and unremarkable, why was it, 
then, that the Astrodome garnered so much press and attention? What made the Astrodome 
unique or special, Cooper argued, was "the size and the manner in which the products are 
used." There were other buildings that could boast of some larger services or infrastructure, 
like wiring, refrigeration, or height. "But, putting large numbers of people in one enclosure, 
large enough to house a baseball field, or football field, making the ceilings high enough not 
to be hit by a batted ball, and then attempting to grow grass under the translucent roof," 
Cooper added, "has captured the imagination of people all over the world.Indeed, the 
Astrodome was merely the application of known mathematics and engineering. But it was in 
its design and construction that the Astrodome reached the zenith of splendor. Conceived in 
an era of unbridled optimism, the Astrodome was designed and built to be the biggest and the 
best, intended to antiquate every structure that came before and would come after it. "We 
56 
"Record-Span Dome Roofs Air-Conditioned Stadium," ENR, 27 February 1964,27; WDF, 58; Jefferson, 55-
57. 
^ Makowski, HDD, 30. 
58 Dale S. Cooper, "Houston Astrodome-Power Plant and Mechanical Services Design," ASHRAE Journal 8 
(June 1966): 90. 
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have built something that will set the pattern for the 21* Century," boasted Hofheinz, a 
stadium that "will antiquate every other structure of this type in the world."* 
60 Mickey Herskowitz, '"Welcome Earthlings," Post, 8 April 1965, see. 9, p. 2, 6. 
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CHAPTER 6: LAWYERS, GUNS AND MONEY 
Speaking at the Houston Home Builders Association sponsored "Big League Sports 
Night" on & February 1961, the Houston Sports Association's (HSA) Roy Hofheinz 
trumpeted the importance of the stadium to everyone in Houston and Southeast Texas. 
Looking out into the crowd, he announced, "I don't think that Houston yet realizes the 
impact the stadium will have." The stadium's greatest impact, at least the one most cited by 
its defenders, was economic. Anything that brought more people and more money into 
Houston's economy was considered good. Without the stadium, supposedly these visitors 
would not travel to Houston. "The opportunity for the merchants is tremendous." he 
continued, because like a giant magnet that pulled metal to its poles, the new "stadium and 
the attractions in it" will bring loads of revenue and "change the buying habits of the people 
of the entire Texas-Louisiana Gulf Coast area. ' 
Hofheinz did not just cite the potential profits of local businesses. He promised that 
the stadium would be the great social equalizer in Houston. Under the dome roof, every 
spectator would receive individual attention. From the man who wanted a seat behind home 
plate to the one who desired a view from right field, each would sit in the lap of air-
conditioned luxury. "The man who buys the last seat in the house will be as close to second 
base as the man who buys the highest price seat," he promised his listeners.^  The stadium, 
therefore, would alter all life in Houston, Harris County, and the Texas Gulf Coast 
community. Hofheinz's statement hearkened to the confident and upbeat conditions in which 
1 
"Pro Sports Heads Feted by Builders." Post, 8 February 1961, sec. 4, p. 3. 
2 
"Pro Sports Heads Feted by Builders," Post, 8 February 1961, sec. 4, p. 3. 
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the stadium idea was first trumpeted. The first bond issue in 1958 had passed by an 
overwhelming margin. But in just three years, the positive attitude towards the stadium 
encountered several snags. The turmoil over a suitable location, the battle between the HSA 
and Marty Marion, the alteration in funding, followed by a closer-than-expected bond 
election, and two legal challenges signaled a change in the public's outlook of the stadium. 
As a result of Ned Gill's lawsuits, county leaders and HSA officials began the long process 
of hammering out a workable lease contract. In the midst of this latest legal wrangling, the 
County Commissioners and the HSA pursued federal money to supplement the bond funds. 
The pursuit of federal money to reduce the financial burden of Houston taxpayers, however, 
resulted in the loss of money, time, and public confidence. 
Commissioner Kyle Chapman wanted the public to view the proposed HSA-Harris 
County contract before any agreement was reached. He did not want to revive notions of 
perceived secrecy that had surrounded the Memorial Park debacle. "As far as having people 
know what will be in the contract, I think they should have a reasonable time to investigate 
this proposed agreement and go into any phase or sentence of it," Chapman said. It was in the 
public's and the County's best interest, he said, that the people who voted bonds for the 
stadium know exactly what was in the contract. On the heels of two lawsuits, the 
Commissioners needed to assuage fears that they were keeping secrets from their constituents 
and acting unilaterally without the people's consent/ 
HSA lead attorney W. Ervin James, escorted by representatives of two consulting law 
firms, delivered the HSA's sixty-five-page document to the Commissioners Court on Friday, 
5 May 1961. James announced that the document "represents our draft of what we think 
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should be included in the contract" including "out proposals as to leasing, percentages of 
revenue sharing, and other salient features." County Attorney Joe Resweber rebuffed all 
questions reporters asked pertaining to the draft's content. There was no need to needlessly 
speculate on the document and engage the rumor mill. He only promised that he and his 
assistants would quickly and carefully pore over the document and render a decision within a 
few weeks/ 
If Resweber was upbeat that he and his assistants would look over the document and 
render a quick and painless interpretation, he was less enthusiastic days later. The HSA 
contract differed in several provisions to the one that had been worked upon, according to 
Resweber. One alteration focused on the selling of the seat options. The HSA wanted to 
deduct the costs of selling the seat options from its final obligation, instead of paying for the 
seat option sales. A second change centered on which party was responsible for all stadium 
maintenance and costs. The HSA asserted that this was the County's duty, since it was the 
County's building. And finally all staffing, utility, and insurance costs should now be paid by 
Harris County, not the HSA. Resweber feared that the new contract financially favored the 
HSA, while not guaranteeing that the HSA satisfy its contractual obligations. Even trickier 
than the contract, Commissioner "Squatty" Lyons wanted to determine if the HSA would 
make an advance rental payment before the county set its 1962 tax rate in July. If the HSA 
paid $562,000, the county's tax rate would not have to be increased to pay the interest on the 
bonds. County auditor Bruce understood that the HSA agreed to deposit the rent once they 
3 
"Chapman Wants Public To Study Stadium Pact," Post, 13 February 1961, sec. 1, p. 7. 
4 
"Resweber Mum On Stadium Pact," Chronicle, 6 May 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1,2. 
signed the contract. HSA attorney James contended that rent would not be paid until the 
bonds were sold/ 
Resweber recommended to the Commissioners that Attorney General Will Wilson 
decide upon the legality of the HSA's revised contract. Resweber stated that Wilson's legal 
opinion would protect the county from future lawsuits and "help us get better interest rates on 
the bonds." W. Ervin James argued that this decision "could jeopardize the Houston 
franchise with the National League" because the HSA needed a contract for the stadium 
before June 1. Resweber hinted that the revised contract could be signed before Wilson's 
approval if the HSA understood that clauses deemed unconstitutional would be changed. The 
Commissioners agreed that the bonds would not be sold until Wilson approved the contract. 
Provisions within the revised contract included the construction of a temporary stadium, built 
by the HSA with the syndicates own money, adjacent to the domed stadium. Another sticking 
point concerned "alterations, improvements and additions to the stadium." County leaders 
wanted to reserve the right to veto any additional structure or facility. The HSA, on the other 
hand, wanted to have the ability to build a parking garage, for example, at its own expense on 
the county land. The HSA, then, would reap all revenue until construction costs were 
redeemed. The HSA responded with something called a "surrender clause." If the county 
disapproved of any structure the HSA hoped to erect, the HSA could terminate its lease 
within five years, leaving the County in control of the stadium and the bond debt. Another 
issue was the sale of seat options. The HSA hoped to deduct all advertising costs of the seat 
5 
"Stadium Hits Snag In Contract Terms," Post, 16 May 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1, 9. 
159 
options from the net. Originally Commissioners objected, but decided that ten percent from 
the receipts could be subtracted for advertising/ 
One provision of the new contract allowed the HSA to construct a temporary stadium 
at the South Main location and reap all income from it during the year. County 
commissioners asked Attorney General Wilson to provide his opinion on the contract before 
any agreement was made. Resweber wanted to exercise some prudence creating the stadium 
covenant because "It is going to be with us for a long time" and "must not be held 
unconstitutional at a later date." Only by exercising caution would any future legal threats be 
eliminated. Commissioners Lyons and Chapman suggested that the contract be signed and a 
copy sent to the attorney general. The commissioners made this recommendation after the 
HSA warned the court members that the NL might pull the franchise out from under Houston 
unless a stadium agreement was reached. Elliott agreed with Lyons and Chapman. "I'm in 
favor of signing the contract, if we reach agreement, sending it to Wilson for a ruling and at 
he same time to advertise the sale of bonds." In Elliott's opinion, the bonds could be sold as 
soon as the contract was signed, expediting the situation/ 
Before the meeting on 26 May, "seventy-five of Houston's leading citizens" met at 
the Houston Club to sign a petition affirming their support of the HSA-County lease contract. 
These "leader citizens" feared that the HSA would not meet the June 1 deadline set by the 
National League and would thereby lose its franchise. NL president Warren Giles denied that 
he would take such a drastic action without examining the entire "Houston situation." To this 
effect, the petition stated that the commissioners should sign the contract and avoid 
6 Stan Redding, "County Asks State Ruling On Contract for Stadium," Chronicle, 24 May 1961, sec. 1, p. 1, 14; 
Elliott Pledges Legal Opinion Won't Delay Stadium Contract," CArowck, 25 May 1961, sec. 1, pp. 1,14. 
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jeopardizing big league baseball. Houston attorney John Jamison was confident in the 
continuing good will and faith of the HSA. "Roy Hofheinz and other members of the Sports 
Association have been insistent from the time of the election that the HSA carry out 
everything it agreed to do at that time," Jamison said, "We think the HSA has tendered 
everything it agreed to tender." Park Board chairman William Kirkland said, "I have read this 
contract three times and I haven't found a thing that both parties can't sign in good 
conscience." Jamison and Kirkland pointed out that the HSA guaranteed that the county 
would share in stadium profits. "The HSA has gone farther than its original proposition in 
offering the county a percentage of he gross receipts as defined in the lease proposition," 
affirmed Jamison. Kirkland said that any contract required faith from both parties. This lease 
agreement was no different. "The HSA is taking a heavy financial responsibility," Kirkland 
continued, and agreed "to give the county a cut in the excess profits."* 
Meeting all day at the Harris County courthouse on Friday, 26 May, the HSA and the 
Commissioners Court agreed to a stadium contract and scheduled the formal signing for the 
following Monday. Two of the largest obstacles, "alterations, improvements, and additions" 
to the stadium area and lease renewal options, were resolved by compromises for both sides. 
Commissioners wanted the authority to veto future structures adjacent to the stadium. The 
HSA, then, asked that the "surrender clause" be instituted that allowed the syndicate to 
terminate the lease within five years. If the County rejected a proposed HSA building (a 
parking garage, for example), the HSA could end its rental obligations. The Commissioners 
offered a compromise to the "surrender clause." The new provision granted the county 
7 Verniaud. "Harris To Seek Wilson's OK on Pact for Stadium," Post, 25 May 1961. sec. 1, pp. 1, 6; Nealon, 
"Post Time," fa#, 25 May 1961, sec. 4, pp. 1,2. 
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"absolute veto power" from 1 January 1962 to 1 January 1965 on any planned facility for the 
stadium area. After these three years, the HSA could terminate the lease within thirty days if 
the county "refused a reasonable and lawful request." Hofheinz argued that the HSA required 
this type of control in an effort to promote the stadium for other venues. Hofheinz, ever the 
promoter, defended this assertion in terms of communal benefit. "If we can't generate 
enough money from what we do out there," he continued, "three things will happen: we will 
go broke and lose $5 million, big league baseball will go out the door, and the county will be 
stuck with the stadium bonds." Now that the HSA was in the management and promotion 
businesses, Hofheinz advocated for greater power over the stadium and stadium property. 
The HSA desired some freedom in the development of the site for protection of their 
investment. Concerning the lease renewals, the HSA received two ten-year lease options with 
$750,000 rental fee. In return, the HSA would share fifty-fifty in the first $2 million of gross 
revenue. The HSA also agreed to pay the yearly rent before the county levied its tax 
assessment for the next year/ 
At 9:45 am, Monday, 29 May, Commissioner Ramsey motioned, and Commissioner 
Lyons seconded, that Judge Elliott sign the stadium lease with the HSA. Cullman and James, 
representing the HSA, and Harris County officials Judge Elliott and William Kirkland signed 
the stadium contract, beating the 1 June deadline. Once the attorney general approved the 
contract, Harris County could begin the sale of the $22 million tax bonds. Then Harris 
County right-of-way engineer E. E. Schwenke could negotiate with the Hilton Hotel 
* "Stadium Contract Backed By 75 of City's Civic Leaders," C&romck, 26 May 1961, sec. 8, p. 2; Nealon, 
"Blue-Ribbon Group Backs HSA's Lease," Post, 26 May 1961, see. 1, pp. 1,5. 
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Corporation and other land owners at South Main for the stadium and roads. Elliott also 
notified the Architects that they could now complete all stadium designsT 
Attorney general Wilson pronounced his verdict on what he called an "unusual" 
contract two days later. He approved the forty-year lease contract after he and his staff 
"worked around the clock" through the fifty-six page document to ready the legal opinion 
before the HSA's June 1 deadline. Despite working in haste, Wilson's decision was "not 
particularly difficult" and he anticipated that it should withstand any legal challenge in the 
future. With legal validation, HSA attorney James notified NL president Giles that the 
stadium contract had finally been sanctioned. "This was the last stumbling block," a pleased 
Hofheinz announced, "We are now officially in the National League." Commissioners Court 
members also expressed their delight over Wilson's opinion and determination to speed-up 
the rest of the project. Wilson still needed to validate the $15 million construction bond issue. 
Commissioners began the process of advertising to the $22 million bonds in the hopes of 
opening the bids on 28 June. When the Commissioners opened the bids, the HSA would 
remit its first rental payment." 
On 2 June 1961, Judge Elliott notified Lloyd and Morgan and Wilson, Morris, Crain 
and Anderson that "your associated partnerships" would be officially employed by Harris 
County "for the purpose of designing a sports stadium, complete with dome covering and 
year-round air conditioning." The contract, according to Elliott, would be signed once the 
County sold the bonds. The architects, in turn, notified Roof Structures, Inc. of St. Louis that 
10 
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they would be the body to sign the contract for the structural engineering of the lamella 
roof." 
The bidders on the $18 million bonds asked for the highest interest rate possible, 
3.80901%. The county prepared to sell the bonds on 6 July to the Harris Trust and Savings 
Bank of Chicago, the head of the alliance, only if the HSA deposited a lease payment of 
$556,900. The HSA, as required by its contract with Harris County, was to deposit its first 
payment in advance. Even though the syndicate offered a lower combined interest rate for the 
$15 million construction and $3 million purchase bonds, auditor Bruce said that splitting the 
bonds among several buyers would guarantee the County the best rates across the board. 
According to Bruce, the combined bid would actually cost the County $84,055, due to the 
coupon rates during the first ten years of the lease contract. A concern arose, however, 
because the interest rate meant that the county would be forced to pay $7,385 every year, the 
difference between the interest rate and the HSA's rental payment. The Anal cost of the 
construction bonds was $29,413,775 in forty years, with $14,413,775 being interest. The 
worst part was that the bonds could have secured a lower interest rate if sold sixty days 
previously, according to a county fiscal advisor." 
With a grave financial future facing Harris County, the HSA failed to deposit the 
advanced rent payment before July 6. An upset Commissioner Phil Sayers threatened to 
cancel the entire bond issue. Sayers blasted the HSA. "They were present June 28 when the 
bids were opened, they were told we wouldn't sell the bonds until the money was in hand," 
he said. "They knew we were meeting Thursday (July 6) to sell the bonds, and should have 
12 Bill Elliott to the Architects (6/2/61); Morgan and Morris to Roof Structures, Inc. (6/23/61), Houston Dome 
Special Revision Folder, WMPA Archives. 
been present with the check," he continued. "If they don't show Monday," he concluded, 
"I'm going to move we cancel the whole thing." Cooler heads prevailed, as the rest of the 
commissioners court decided to give the HSA until Monday, 10 July to make the deposit. 
Hofheinz pleaded ignorance, "We had no notification that we were to have the money on 
hand Thursday." Hofheinz said that the HSA would have sent the check earlier if it was 
really required. He promised to make the payment on Monday. According to Hofheinz, the 
letter from auditor Bruce that instructed the HSA to remit its payment before or on the date 
of the bond sale did not actually have a date stated/* 
Hofheinz presented the $566,900 check to Judge Elliott on Monday, 10 July. The 
Commissioners immediately ordered the issuance of the bonds. Hofheinz also presented a 
letter that explained the tardiness of the rental check. According to Hofheinz, the HSA was 
"not obligated to pay such sum until the date of the closing of the sale of the stadium bonds." 
Future payments, the letter continued, "will occur when the bonds are delivered and the 
money received." But since the commissioners demanded the first payment "30 days in 
advance of the due date," the HSA was "glad to co-operate." Hofheinz's letter hinted at the 
commissioner's skeptical attitude that the HSA did not have the rent money. Commissioner 
E. A. Lyons said that the commissioners were simply guarding the county's fiscal future. The 
check averted any financial "jeopardy." The HSA, according to Lyons, simply acted 
irresponsibly. Hofheinz's reluctance to remit the first check, however, created the perception 
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that the HSA was not looking out for the people's best interest. Instead of quelling 
pessimistic opinions of the HSA, Hofheinz opened the door to future attacks and derision.^  
Later that month, President John F. Kennedy declared that the nation needed more 
civilian protection from "nuclear explosions" and fallout. When Judge Elliott learned that 
federal money could be available if the stadium's design included a 150,000-person fallout 
shelter, he began to explore the possibility of including this design feature. Stadium architect 
S. I. Morris agreed that the stadium could incorporate a fallout shelter. "There's a lot in the 
stadium that makes it a natural to be beefed up for a shelter," Morris said. Elliott agreed. 
"There is real potential in the domed stadium," he stated, "now that President Kennedy is so 
interested in picking up civil defense, we should explore the idea of making such use of the 
stadium." Hofheinz met with assistant defense secretary and civil defense director, Adam 
Yarmolinsky to discuss the stadium's shelter possibilities. President Kennedy and Vice-
President Lyndon B. Johnson both eagerly approved of the plan. Kennedy instructed the 
Defense Department to formulate its own fallout shelter plan for the domed stadium and 
report the results.'* 
If the County pursued this plan, $8.74 million would be added to the cost of 
construction. Judge Elliott wanted to quell rumors that this digression would delay 
construction of the stadium. Even though the architects were completing the final stadium 
blueprints, Elliott promised that construction would not be delayed. The architects used the 
present stadium design, with the only alteration being a deeper excavation than previously 
envisioned. A two-tier excavation under the grandstands and one located under the parking 
15 
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lot, 300-feet wide around the stadium, were the two additions. The new stadium plan would 
locate twenty-acres of parking and exhibition space underground to serve as protection from 
"nuclear explosions." The fallout shelter pledged to house over 85,000 individuals beneath 
the surface, with an additional 64,000 occupying the area underneath the concrete stands. The 
increase in construction cost was estimated at $58.57 per person, which would be financed by 
Uncle Sam. County and HSA officials hoped that the proximity of downtown Houston would 
make the stadium more attractive to the federal government. The Harris County proposal 
asked only that the federal government pay for the alterations of the stadium and make a 
decision quickly.17 
The federal government, however enthusiastic, allocated at most only $750,000 for 
the stadium. Texas Representative Albert Thomas reported that Secretary of Defense 
McNamara believed "the project to be an excellent one, but said funds are limited." With 
such a paltry sum of money, members of the commissioners court decided to abandon the 
fallout shelter prospect and move forward. Commissioners Lyons and Sayers also expressed 
a concern that the federal government might become involved in the operation of the 
stadium. "I don't want the participation of the government if they think they're going to run 
the stadium," said Lyons. "If federal money means there will be any federal influence on 
construction, I say we forget it," avowed Sayers. Chapman concluded that the paltry amount 
16 
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of federal money resulted in "minimum protection" for Houstonians anyway and, therefore, 
should be abandoned/* 
Even as the County awarded contracts to the stadium architects, it did not completely 
own the site. The Hilton Hotel Corporation still controlled 494-acres at South Main. HSA 
stockholders Robert E. Smith and Hofheinz purchased the land from Hilton and pledged to 
sell 180-acres of it to the County at cost or $10,121.46 an acre. Smith pledged to sell an 
additional seventy acres to the county at the same rate. The County would pay $2,528,182 for 
250 acres. This action allowed the County to buy the entire stadium location for less than the 
$3 million originally appraised. Hofheinz asked, in return, that the county pay the cost of 
draining the site for the HSA's temporary stadium. Smith and Hofheinz also promised to 
cooperate with the State Highway Department, providing it with the right-of-way for the 
South Freeway.'* 
Commissioners were determined to protect the county's investment by helping the 
HSA control competing businesses adjacent to the stadium. The Commissioners asked four 
property owners adjacent to the Kirby Drive extension, on the western border of the stadium, 
to avoid building things like parking garages and potentially dangerous service stations. If 
they refused, Elliott threatened to realign Kirby Drive just like the county did on Fanin 
Street, placing the road within the stadium site. By doing this, the county guaranteed the 
HSA, in the words of the lease agreement, "the exclusive right to.. .control the leased 
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premises.. .and other streets, roadways and other areas contained therein." If the property 
owners were unwilling to cooperate with the county, Elliott threatened the use of harsher 
tactics. "We will build a fence on that strip and make it impossible for cars to get to that 
property to work," warned Elliott. Only one owner, however, agreed to the county's demand. 
Commissioners decided to align south Kirby completely within stadium property. 
Commissioners acted, they argued, only to protect the HSA revenues that would be used to 
amortize the bonds. On the eastern side of the stadium, then, Fanin ran 2,050 feet and on the 
western flank Kirby ran 4,169 with the South Loop abutting the southern boundary of the 
stadium.20 
Thirteen contractors picked up the bid forms from the county for the excavation and 
subdrainage work. Only one Arm, W. S. Bellows Construction Corporation, returned a 
completed bid to the commissioners court. The offer of $857,769 was much more than the 
original estimate of $500,000. The court then sent the lone bid to the architects for 
recommendation even though it was understood it would be rejected. According to Morris, 
"There's no point in taking such a high bid just because it's the only one." The lack of 
enthusiasm from excavation contractors lessened the hopes that the stadium would be 
completed for the 1963 baseball season. "The target is not out of our reach yet, but it's 
getting rather shaky," lamented Elliott/' 
A brief glimmer of optimism returned in early December 1961 when A. V. Looper 
told the Court that his contracting company would accept the entire stadium construction job. 
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Although this was not a new proposition, Looper said his company "will do the work on the 
stadium, including the excavation, according to the plans of architects and engineers, at the 
cost of labor and materials." The commissioners "enthusiastically" recognized this offer and 
informed Looper that he would receive an interview with the court. Looper had not seen 
architect drawings or engineering specifications, but said "I'm willing sight unseen to do the 
job at whatever its costs." He would do this because he formed his new firm, Lindco, only 
five weeks previous to his offer. "I am willing to do this for recognition," Looper informed 
the media. If the commissioners and Looper could come to amicable terms, the stadium just 
might be built for the $15 million estimate. If this was just a ruse by Looper, however, the 
county could not expect to build the stadium for the earlier estimate.22 
Before the County opened the excavation bids, Ned Gill returned to the forefront, 
armed with another lawsuit threat. This time Gill opposed "piecemeal" contracting of the 
commissioners. Only by awarding one contract for the entire stadium project, he argued, 
could the stadium be constructed for $15 million." Gill said that he did not think the stadium 
could be constructed for this estimate, but would cost at least $10 million more. Gill now 
argued that the voters should decide if they want a stadium that will cost more than they had 
been promised. The only way his lawsuit could be averted, said Gill, would be "absolute 
assurance" from the commissioners that this piecemeal contracting would result in a $15 
million domed stadium. Elliott responded to this news with skepticism. Elliott expected 
21 Verniaud, "Lone Bid Is Received On Stadium,'' Post, 31 October 1961, sec. 1, p. 9;"New Stadium Job To 
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another legal challenge from Gill. But he would not dwell on this information. Bids for 
stadium construction would be received, Elliott said, early in 1962.^  
The second round of excavation bids ended in December. The apparent low bid came 
from an El Paso firm, C. H. Leavell & Company, that bid $664,906 for 120-days of work on 
both subdrainage and excavation. This combined low bid was still almost $60,000 more than 
the revised estimate Morris had presented three weeks previous. Instead of the combination 
bid from Leavell, the court selected John Kraak Construction Company, based on the 
recommendation of the architects and consulting engineers, Lockwood and Andrew, and 
Newman, Inc. Instead of saving a paltry sum of money, the Court deferred to the expertise of 
their architects who wanted to work with a familiar client. In the endorsement of Frank H. 
Newman, Jr., the architects said that they preferred that all excavation and earthwork be 
completed without delay, which would, in turn, ready all future construction projects. Kraak 
Inc.'s bid of $430,311 for only excavation was $689 lower than Morris's revised estimate.* 
On New Year's Eve, Judge Elliott announced that in just four days, "a tremendous 
relief to me," the start of excavation work would finally begin. Said Elliott, "Getting this hole 
started means the construction of the stadium has actually begun." The Judge not only 
confirmed the economic importance the stadium would have on Houston, but would also 
provide "symbolic greatness of the leading city of the South." "The stadium will typify 
Houston's imagination and vision," wrote Bob Rule because "[N]ever before in history has 
any city dared build a gigantic outdoor arena seating 52,000 persons and put a roof over it," 
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complete with air-conditioning. "It will be a world showplace," not just a Texas or American 
monument.^  * 
On Wednesday, 3 January 1962, Judge Elliott, every member of the Commissioners 
Court, members from the Houston Chamber of Commerce, and four officials from the HSA 
(Roy Hofheinz, Craig Cullinan, Jr., Paul Richards, and R. E. Smith) symbolically fired Colt 
.45s into the Texas soil to commence the excavation of the domed stadium. "Events in the 
National Baseball League led to the rapid planning of this stadium," said Elliott, "Its quick 
development is a tribute to the co-operation of everyone in Harris County who helped make 
it possible." Hofheinz spoke a few words on this "historic occasion." In typical Hofheinz 
bravado, he said, "One of the greatest buildings in the world is about to start," built for the 
entire community, the county, and the state. The planned work by John Kraak, Inc. entailed 
excavating twenty-four feet in depth and 700 feet in diameter in 120 days.^  
The exuberance of the groundbreaking ceremony did not last long. Pa# reporter 
Marshall Vemiaud revealed that he had sorted through the county auditor's records over the 
last several days. What he found was most discouraging. Harris County only had $15 million 
left of the original $22 million to actually build the stadium.* It appeared to Verinaud that 
the County could not construct the stadium with the available funds. With a looming 
desperate fiscal future, Looper's proposition might And a favorable audience within the 
Commissioners Court. The Commissioners, however, unanimously rejected Looper's offer to 
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build the domed stadium at cost. Looper's scheme involved the County buying and renting 
the equipment for the construction of the stadium while Looper and his construction manager 
supervised the labor. Essentially, this arrangement asked that two private contractors be paid 
like county employees. Commissioner Lyons opposed the formula, saying it was not "in 
good taste or in good business."* 
With work on the temporary stadium speeding towards completion for the 1962 
baseball season, Hofheinz spoke to Bob Rule about the domed stadium. "There's no doubt in 
my mind that this stadium will be second only to the Ship Channel in its economic impact on 
Houston," boasted Hofheinz, "and after it's finished it may not be second." The tireless effort 
that Hofheinz brought to the realization of the stadium could not be overlooked, asserted 
Rule. Only a "genius that he is" was able to coordinate the money and energies of the 
disparate local, state, and federal government agencies into the domed stadium. Rule did not 
want to reduce the importance and influence of Cullinan, Kirksey, nor the County 
Commissioners, "But the man who provided the jet fuel was Hofheinz.. .Without him 
Houston wouldn't be in the major leagues.. .Without him there would be no stadium."* 
CAromck reporter Zarko Franks was not as conciliatory to Hofheinz as 
Rule. Hofheinz did have a "midas touch" and "silver tongue," conceded Franks, but he also 
had an "insufferable" ego to match. He was "controversial," and oftentimes confrontational 
and disagreeable. Franks reminded those who had forgotten, that Hofheinz was nearly 
impeached by the Houston city council because of Hofheinz's refusal to work with others. 
Hofheinz, who invented long dugouts for the stadiums and color-coded tickets, liked the 
28 Marshall Vcrinaud, "Stadium Bankroll Down $5.7 Million After Year," Post, 7 January 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1, 
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seventy-five foot long dugouts because "everybody wants a box seat behind the first or third 
base dugout." The longer the dugout, then, the more box seats available to the baseball fan 
and the more boxed seats that the HSA could sell. The color-coded ticket helped the fan 
locate his seat easier, in theory. For example, if the grandstand section was red, then the 
ticket for that grandstand section was also red. This would allow the HSA to reduce the 
number of ushers to help the fans locate the seats. Hofheinz, asserted Franks, was indeed 
interested in the baseball fan: his money 
John Kraak's excavation work proceeded on schedule. Two months into the four 
month contract, twelve feet of earth had been removed and relocated for the auxiliary 
stadium's parking lot Kraak needed to remove another twelve feet before the job was 
finished. Elliott said that the county hoped to have the stadium ready for the 1963 baseball 
season. But due to the labor and Ned Gill lawsuits, 1964 seemed more likely. Along with 
excavation, work on utilities, roads, and sewers advanced, too. When the Architects 
submitted their final designs for the stadium, the County would present them for bids and 
award the contracts. Elliott wanted to do this while Kraak worked so that when excavation 
ended, construction would begin immediately.^  
Elliott confirmed his prediction that the stadium would not be completed in 1963 in 
early April. The Commissioners still hoped for additional federal money, up to $2 million, to 
incorporate fallout shelter modifications in the stadium's designs even though they had 
apparently been informed that a large amount of money was not available from the federal 
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government. Once the federal government responded, then the Architects could resume their 
work on the stadium blueprints. "Although excavation will be completed around May 1 as 
scheduled, we will not be ready to ask for bids then because we do not know how much the 
Federal government will participate in the project," said Elliott. The Judge told reporters that 
the County already assumed $750,000 even though this was an error. Harris County was 
offered, but never accepted, $750,000 from the Defense Department. At any rate, Elliott 
continued, "this amount would not do the job, so we asked for $1,200,000 additional for a 
total of $1,950,000." Once the Commissioners received the fallout specifications and the 
money from the Defense Department, then the architects could design the system 
accordingly. ""We have no word yet whether we will get this money, so we cannot complete 
plans and specifications to call for bids," Elliott concluded. According to S. L Morris , "We 
don't know and the federal government doesn't know, exactly what its fallout shelter 
requirements are." These standards affected stadium wall thickness, for example, and the 
number and size of internal generators to provide electricity. Until then, the Commissioners 
Court would not begin the construction bidding process until they heard from the Department 
of Defense, until June.^  
Houstonians pondered the fiscal realities for four months before they could be 
distracted by big league baseball. The HSA's major league baseball team, the Colt .45s 
officially began play on Tuesday, 10 April 1962 in Colt Stadium, the temporary ballpark 
adjacent to the domed stadium. The .45s defeated the Chicago Cubs on opening day, 11-2.* 
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The next day, a "soft rain, fanned by a northeast wind" delayed the baseball game over an 
hour, demonstrating the future benefit of the domed stadium.^  Although the .45s and the 
Cubs finished the game, the rainfall wreaked havoc on the domed stadium's excavation next 
door. With a significant amount of rainfall, the hole quickly filled with water. To resume 
digging, the water had to be pumped out of the hole. To keep the hole dry, the County paid 
$3,200 a week. Commissioner Chapman argued that it made financial sense if the County 
started accepting subdrainage bids immediately. "We can't let the hole fill up with water," 
Chapman said, because "it would fall in, and we'd have to do the job all over again." 
Chapman's plan, however, required a revision of the entire contracting system for the 
stadium. The commissioners decided to let the contract on the stadium include subdrainage. 
Stadium construction bids could not be accepted until the federal government made its 
decision about the fallout shelter plan. The cost of pumping the stadium hole would make the 
final cost of the stadium greater than expected with this continued inaction.* 
Three members of the Court, Judge Elliott, and Hofheinz made two trips to 
Washington to petition for federal money for the stadium.^  The first trip was made in May 
1962, before the end of the fiscal year, June 30. After this date, the stadium would not be 
suited for federal fallout shelter funds under the Kennedy administration's shelter incentive 
program. The Houston contingent met with Assistant Secretary of Defense Stewart Pittman 
and other Defense Department officials in an effort to receive a $2 million federal grant 
(nearly one quarter of the original $8.7 million the County desired). Pittman said that the 
stadium would not receive any additional funds because the was not considered a "welfare 
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orientated" public facility. Furthermore, the original $750,000 had already been used for 
other programs and would probably be unavailable for the domed stadium project. Without a 
generous grant from the Defense Department, the County could not justify meeting the 
fallout shelter plans in the stadium design. Elliott, therefore, wanted to eliminate all the 
fallout shelter specifications from the stadium design and hopefully reduce the final estimates 
of construction. "I think we ought to strip out the fallout idea, come up with plans retaining 
the dome for which the people voted, call for bids, and see exactly where we are," said 
Elliott. Stadium architect William Morgan did not know if excluding fallout shelter 
specifications would keep the costs within the $15 million estimate. "Nearly completed plans 
call for fallout specifications," he said, adding that eliminating these would take the 
architects another two weeks. Even though Elliott did not know the stadium's final price tag, 
he hoped the architects and engineers could estimate the stadium's final cost without federal 
money to determine if the remaining $13.3 million of bond funds would suffice. Elliot 
confirmed that the original $20 million revenue bonds voted in 1958 would not be used to 
complete the stadium. "The Commissioners Court is on the record as opposing the use of 
them, and the Legislature has been asked to invalidate them," Elliott said. He then was asked 
if the County would require another bond issue to build the stadium. "Of the possible need 
for a new tax-backed bond issue, we don't know," he said. What Elliott did affirm was that 
the stadium would not be fallout shelter. After the quixotic chase of federal money, Harris 
County faced the possibility that the remaining $13.3 million would not be enough to build 
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the stadium. This comedy of errors cost the County and the HSA money, time, and public 
confidence/* 
Since the commissioners already rejected the idea of building the stadium without the 
dome, they began to investigate alternative means to reduce the cost. "An informed source" 
told C&romzcfg reporter Carol Foley that Harris County needed an additional $5 million in 
bonds to complete the stadium Elliott rejected this claim. "I have never been given any such 
figure," he said, "nor have I been told by our architects and engineers that we were short that 
much." Each Commissioner wanted to discuss the stadium plans with the architects before 
they decided on another bond election. The architects did not know the final cost of the 
stadium, said architect Hermon Lloyd, "until the Commissioners Court tells us what it wants 
done." Elliott admitted that if a "stripped down" dome kept the costs under the $15 million 
price tag, then this altered design would be explored. Elliott would not consider any designs 
that eliminated the dome. "This stadium will not be just for baseball," he said, but "used for 
many purposes." Besides, he continued, "The people voted for a domed stadium and that's 
what it's going to get." "We have relied on the opinion of professional architects and 
engineers that the stadium can be built with what we have," Elliott concluded. "I believe it 
can." "We must be careful that the cutting of construction costs does not increase 
maintenance costs to where the difference will be lost." Sayers expressed his frustration with 
the Department of Defense and the Kennedy administration and regretted trying to get 
federal funds. "The county has wasted a lot of money trying to get federal aid," Sayers 
lamented, "We will have spent maybe $1 million in digging the hole specially and getting 
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architectural designs for the shelter." "The excavation for the stadium had to be made much 
larger to take care of the fallout shelter we expected to get, " Sayers said. He continued, 
"Now with that bigger hole, the stadium walls will have to be stronger than would have had 
been needed if the excavation had been made with the slopes planned at first."* 
The continual delays in construction began to erode the average Houstonian's faith 
that the stadium would ever be completed. County officials and the HSA were blamed for the 
"continued delays and double talk." These leaders needed to determine the final plans to 
overcome growing public apathy. On one hand, Judge Elliott seemed to say that the County 
would build a "modified stadium," while on the other hand reports suggested that another $5 
million was needed to start and finish the stadium. The entire episode demonstrated the 
increasing cynicism in Houston. No longer was the stadium viewed with admiration and 
verve, but increasing skepticism and derision.*" 
At the scheduled Monday meeting between the members of the commissioners court, 
the architects, and engineers, all fallout shelter plans were abandoned and any potential 
federal money that was tied with it. According to Elliott, the Court rejected federal money 
because of unknown federal standards for the fallout shelter. Since the federal government 
never provided the building standards, members of the court decided that the paltry sum was 
not worth further changes to the stadium design. Only Commissioner Sayers, who did not 
make the trip to Washington, wanted to give the federal government one last chance and send 
them design specifications. His colleagues, however, denied this last plea. Commissioner 
Admits Stadium May Need More Bonds." Post, 17 May 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1, 19; Foley, "Stadium Sill Big Hole; 
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Chapman articulated the general consensus among the Court, "I'm in favor of building what 
we want and forgetting what they want" The Architects were asked to return in a week with 
a clear revised estimate of overall costs as well as a figure that included the elimination of 
some "frills." Commissioners Chapman and Lyons wanted the estimates for "a first class 
stadium," "something we can be proud of," said Lyons. Elliott concluded the meeting by 
informing the architects and engineers that he and his fellow Court members understood that 
the stadium costs had increased since the original estimates of I960.41 
The Press editor disagreed with Elliott's idea of "cutting comers" from the stadium 
and asserted that it "seems to be entirely out of order," for several reasons. First, architectural 
and engineering experts testified that the $22 million of obligation bonds would be sufficient 
to build a first-class stadium. The idea of cutting some frills seemed premature, because no 
definite plan had been formulated. Second, "not a cotton-picking thing has happened to date 
to throw the stadium off track," not even the deeper than needed excavation. The "fall-out 
flop or failure," according to the Pra», apparently shook up not only the public officials 
involved but also some of the expert planners." The perception was that these experts could 
not come up with a remedy to the deeper stadium design or anything else. Judge Elliott 
needed to step forward and "get on with the stadium." The people of Harris County 
demanded a stadium plan, complete with specifications to obtain contract bids. Once this 
simple formula had been done, "then and only then," would the Commissioners, architects, 
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engineers, and Houstonians finally know if the remaining $13 million was enough, if comers 
needed to be cut, and if another bond election was necessary.^  
After meeting all week, the architects and engineers tried to design a first-class 
domed stadium. Even before the official meeting, S. I. Morris announced that the remaining 
money was not enough.^  Morris affirmed his earlier sentiment when he presented to the 
court the results of the revised stadium cost study. "We have progressed to the point that we 
can say the cost will exceed $15 million," he told the Commissioners. Morris revealed the 
type of stadium Harris County could get with the remaining $13.4 million: a "first class, 
domeless, and therefore un-airconditioned stadium usuable (sic) primarily for sports only, 
and not as an all-purpose stadium and convention exhibition hall." Morris was less sure about 
the final cost of the domed stadium. "If this were a standardized type of structure," Morris 
continued, "we could project a reasonably exact estimate." To get that number, he said, the 
court had to wait until it received bids from the contractors. Commissioner Lyons retorted, "I 
can't conceive of a businessman making this kind of bid when the money is not available." 
The only recommendation from Morris was to call for another bond issue to come up with 
the remaining funds. Asked what kind of stadium could be constructed with the remaining 
funds, Morris said that the dome and air conditioning would have to be eliminated. Morris 
defended himself by saying that the stadium was so revolutionary that many factors could not 
be immediately known or calculated. Morris provided an example of the difficulty in 
pinpointing a firm construction cost for the dome alone. He said that dome estimates had 
varied by $4 million "at one time," from $1.5 to $5 million. Only by opening bids and 
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receiving them from contractors could a realistic price of the dome be determined. Said 
Morris, "If I give you an unsafe estimate, we are going to be in a pickle. If we estimate on the 
up side or the down side, we could jeopardize the whole project unjustifiably." Morris 
remained optimistic that the stadium could be ready for the 1963 baseball season. Elliott, 
Lyons, and Sayers disagreed with Morris. They argued that it would take at least four months 
to receive construction bids and then begin the task of another bond issue. Sayers said that 
they would be "lucky" if the stadium was ready at the end of 1964.* 
Another problem concerned the HSA. The County was asking the Association to 
make three lease payments before the stadium was complete. The second payment of 
$566,900 was scheduled for July 1. Resweber warned that the HSA had the right to cancel 
the lease since the County would be unable to comply with completed construction by 1963. 
R. E. Smith precluded any further delays when he promised that the HSA would cooperate 
fully with the County. Heartened by Smith's promise, Chapman was ready to ask the HSA 
for an "advance" to help the County. The HSA would be reimbursed the money, Chapman 
professed, from the seat option sales. The only option for the Court was, in the words of 
Commissioner Sayers, "another bond issue." "The only thing to do is get the picture, present 
it to the people and follow their dictates," Sayers continued. Once the court procured the 
picture, it would relay it to the public, who would then decide the fate of the stadium. "If they 
want it, fine. If they don't, we've got a nice big hole in the ground," Sayers concluded. Elliott 
contemplated a plan to start the stadium and call a bond election when the funds ran out. "We 
aren't going to kid people by putting in a foundation and then ask them for sufficient money 
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to complete the stadium," averred Sayers. With much uncertainty and disappointment 
emanating from the discussion, Elliott wanted to affirm his steadfast intentions to get the 
project started and completed. At the end of the meeting, Elliott emphasized to all present 
that Harris County would build a domed stadium. "AU I can say for sure is that we will have 
a stadium," he said, and "it will be domed."* 
The County meeting did not clarify every issue. Instead of receiving a precise 
estimate of construction costs, Morris said that the stadium would cost more than $15 
million. The "fuzzy thinking and talking by all concerned" at the Court house revealed that 
neither the architects and engineers nor the commissioners knew what it would take to build 
the domed stadium. Over two years and two bond elections since the domed stadium idea 
was presented by the park board, the only accomplishment was the large hole at South Main 
Street.* 
Once the stadium architects were unable to determine a concrete estimate, Welden F. 
Appelt returned to the County Court house to sell his design for a covered stadium. Appelt's 
primary engineering experience revolved around designing bridges for natural gas and oil 
pipelines. In addition to these structures, Appelt submitted a design for a professional 
football stadium in 1954. Appelt claimed that his "colisadium" design could be built for the 
remaining amount of bond money available. He based his claim on his fabrication of the 
arches and spans, "the jigs and tools" his company already possessed, and his knowledge of 
the final cost of construction. "We can put up the building alone, and put it up quickly, for 
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about $5.2 million," Appelt proclaimed. He stated that the colisadium could be completed 
within nine months and, if he began immediately, it would be ready for the 1963 baseball 
season. Appelt said that he had originally presented these designs to elected officials and 
civic leaders of Houston in 1949. At that time, Appelt's plan did not receive the support of 
engineers who questioned its safety. Since then, Appelt said that he had proved this design in 
practice. Elliott was concerned that Appelt never built a stadium or coliseum, but only 
pipeline bridges. Although Appelt approached members of the HSA concerning his stadium 
design, the Park Board did not invite him to submit a proposal because the Park Board only 
accepted plans by architects and not engineers. Appelt's design had already been considered 
and reviewed by architects and engineers. "I'm satisfied that had another workable proposal 
been in existence, it would have come up," Elliott said/" 
Appelt's scheme incorporated a "parabolic arch" roof, instead of a dome, "covered 
with a skin of panels, consisting of sandwiches of sheet aluminum and insulation." The 
arched roof would slide on rails to allow sunlight inside the stadium. "What better light can 
you get on a pretty day than from the clear blue sky?," pondered Appelt. This arched 
aluminum roof, according to Appelt, would reduce the cost of cooling the stadium by 
eliminating the transparent dome and by using the arch supports to carry the air conditioning 
systems vents and ducts. Appelt said that his design resembled the Architects' only in that 
both were "covered, all-weather and air-conditioned." By employing welded "hollow box 
section members" to frame the ceiling that he used to build his pipeline bridges, Appelt 
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boasted that using beams and pulleys the roof could be hoisted in just a few days. These 
internally reinforced "welded box sections" could withstand the stresses of being raised into 
position, quickening the pace of construction. According to Appelt, while preparing the 
foundation, these "box girders could be prefabricated right here in Houston by October." 
Aspects of this arch mechanism also carried the load for the two seating sections of the 
stadium. "The fittings and furnishings can meet the same or similar specifications that are set 
up for them now—seats, ramps, lights, etc. cane be conventional.. .The dome's the thing," he 
said.* 
Stadium architect F. Talbott Wilson told reporters that he had never heard of Appelt's 
stadium design. "Personally—and 1 think that goes for the rest of the stadium architects—this 
is the first I've heard about this design," Wilson avowed. Judge Elliott responded to Appelt's 
newest proposal with guarded interest. Early in the day, Elliott said that Appelt's 
reemergence was just a cheap means to generate publicity for his business. Later on, 
however, Elliott professed, "It would be a good idea to listen to this fellow." Appelt's design, 
he said, "has been considered by architects in recent months," but this design did not muster 
the support of the County's experts. "However," cautioned Elliott, "if there is something new 
in the proposal, I'd definitely be willing to get some expert opinion on whether it would work 
and how it would work." Commissioner Ramsey voiced his willingness to review Appelt's 
design to determine if it would be workable. Ramsey wanted a chance to interview Appelt 
and review his blueprints for the colisadium, but wanted additional information from Appelt. 
Commissioner Chapman concurred with Ramsey that Appelt must bring his designs to the 
court house so all the commissioners could peruse them. Only then, he said could the 
""Ibid. 
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Commissioners be truly satisfied that the domed stadium was "The very best stadium, that it 
is possible for us to build." "Frankly, I don't think this is the kind of stadium the people 
expected when they voted $15 million for stadium construction," he concluded, "they voted 
for a domed, air-conditioned stadium." Ethically, it was unclear whether the Commissioners 
Court could talk with another engineer even though it already signed a contract with two 
other Arms. Commissioner Lyons said that it could jeopardize the accord, but he and bis 
fellow commissioners needed to leam all possible design schemes so they could act in the 
public's best interest.49 
Stadium architects S. I. Morris and Hermon Lloyd disclosed their arguments against 
Appelt's design to the Commissioners Court. Morris cited several major disadvantages of 
Appelt's scheme as compared to the circular dome plan. Firstly, for the paying spectator, the 
seating arrangements inside the quonset were problematic. The back seats "would place back 
seats only inches above front seats," resulting in poor visibility for those sitting in the back 
rows. The topmost level of seating was eight stories. This required a climb of eight stories or 
the installation of expensive escalators. Secondly, the structure actually required more air 
conditioning than Appelt planned, said Morris, because the building would have "much 
unused dead space." Appelt alleged that only 3,000 tons of refrigerant would be needed to 
cool the quonset. Morris, however, disagreed. Morris argued that at least 4,900 tons was 
necessary for the minimal comfort of 46,000 spectators. Thirdly, an opaque roof would kill 
the grass if it could not be opened for ten days. In each of his examples, Morris concluded 
that the circular domed stadium design was superior. After the presentation, Commissioner 
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Chapman said, "We don't want this quonset hut business." Chapman then asked his fellow 
commissioners to give their architects "a vote of confidence" because they are designing the 
domed stadium, which was what the people of Harris County wanted. Hofheinz was pleased 
with the decision of the Commissioners Court to proceed with the dome design. "From our 
(the HSA) standpoint," said Hofheinz, "making this facility pay is most important, and we 
never could have done it relying on a quonset hut with.. .seats so far removed from the sports 
arena that binoculars and transistor radios would have been necessary for the fan to know 
what was going on."* 
The Commissioners did not invite Appelt to the Monday conference and instead 
relied on Morris' interpretation of Appelt's proposal. "The county judge and several 
commissioners agreed last Thursday to have me explain the features of my design," said 
Appelt, but then they commissioners refused to invite Appelt to the meeting. But, the County 
officials had rebuffed his proposal, contended Appelt, based on "misleading information 
offered to them by their architects." Appelt questioned the "reckless" decision-making of the 
County leaders as well as the integrity of Morris and Lloyd. Morris gave his presentation 
based on his opinion of Appelt's supposed design, not anything specific. "This information 
was given without any of my plans being seen by those architects," Appelt charged. Despite 
this ignorance, he continued, "they came into Commissioners Court on Monday and made an 
elaborate, fourteen-point presentation about them, picking them apart in detail." Not only 
could the "accuracy" of Morris' facts be disputed but also his "objectivity." Despite his 
disappointment with the County's decision, and the means it used to make it, Appelt 
promised he would not pursue his plan any further. Appelt did take the opportunity to throw 
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one last jab at Moms and Lloyd. "The county's architects," Appelt said, championed a plan 
that "cannot be built for the money remaining in the fund" while he said his could.^  
The HSA neglected to remit their second lease payment of $209,760 set for 29 June.^  
The County gave the HSA another two weeks to make its installment. When this date came 
and went, a tense situation became worse. Hofheinz charged that Harris County was in 
default of the contract agreement because it failed to acquire the land and start construction 
of the stadium. Hofheinz also claimed that the payment due date was August 16. "Should we 
make payment before the payment is due?" he wondered. An incensed Commissioner 
Chapman replied with a threat to cease all work at the stadium site, including the $3,200-a-
week pumping of "Lake Elliott" that began on June 11. "By Monday (July 23) we will have 
spent $19,200 keeping that stadium hole pumped dry," said Chapman. The easiest way to end 
this was to stop pumping and not award a subdrainage contract until the HSA cooperates. "I 
don't know what will happen if we take those pumps out," Chapman said, "But in my 
opinion not much damage will be done." Chapman was prepared to stop draining the stadium 
hole immediately if the HSA did not send the check. He also wanted the HSA to stop 
procrastinating on the escrow deed for R. E. Smith's sixty-acres of land that completed the 
entire acreage for the stadium site.^  
Chapman was still upset two days later. Commissioner Sayers concurred with his 
colleague and pondered a real possibility of removing the pumps. "If the deed to that land has 
not been put in escrow by Thursday and some arrangement made on the payment of the 
money," Sayers announced, "I say let's pull those pumps out of there." Chapman, bolstered 
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by Sayers's support, even hinted at aborting the stadium project. "Maybe it's time to take a 
look at all of this and decide if Harris County wants to operate a sports stadium," concluded 
Chapman. Judge Elliott tried to calm Chapman and Sayers. Elliott said that in a conversation 
with Hofheinz, Roy maintained that HSA attorneys were working on the deed. Chapman 
remained unmoved. "They may have said they are working on an escrow agreement, but we 
haven't seen it," he retorted. "Unless the HSA shows the responsibility incumbent upon it, I 
don't see why we should go further without new consideration," concluded Chapman.* 
In the midst of the wrangling over the lease installment and the deed, speculation that 
the County would have to ask for another $8 million appeared in the media. The original 
bond issue contained the provision of $15 million for stadium construction. Architects and 
engineers based this calculation on the 1960 estimates for stadia built in Los Angeles, 
Washington, and San Francisco. These estimates were too optimistic, resulting in a low 
assessment for the domed stadium. The extra $8 million bond was "sure money" to avoid 
another "goof." Raising the tensions, the HSA refused to provide any financial support and 
even threatened to void the lease contract and force the County to operate the stadium. HSA 
leaders defended their tough stance. Baseball economics, they insisted, could not tolerate the 
HSA spending more than the $1.25 million a year that it was already spending for the lease 
and operation of the Colt .45s. Therefore, the sole responsibility for the new bond issue 
remained with the County. Commissioners wanted to determine if another bond election 
could raise the taxes. If not, the next issue was whether to call the election before receiving 
construction bids or waiting until the bids were opened and the County could ascertain how 
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much more money was necessary to build the stadium. If the County opted for the latter 
option, based on the seventeen-month construction timetable, the building would not be 
finished in 1964, eliminating the city's lofty (and unrealistic) goal of holding both the 
Republican and Democratic nominating conventions in 1964. If the former course was taken 
and the electorate approved of the bond issue, the County could offer the construction bid in 
November 1962.^  
The HSA responded to the threats from Chapman and Sayers by issuing its own 
warning and a series of demands. HSA attorney John M. Jamison advised the County to 
complete the stadium by 31 January 1965. If it failed, the HSA might exercise its right and 
nullify the stadium contract. Jamison told the Commissioners that the HSA could 
immediately abandon the pact, based upon a section within the original lease that stated "any 
unreasonable delay" during the stadium's construction allowed the breaking of the lease 
agreement. Along with this threat, Jamison presented the Commissioners Court, in addition 
to the deed for R. E. Smith's 61-acres of land, a supplement to the lease in which the HSA 
promised to remit the 1962 installment, but would not make another payment until 
construction finished. If the County refused, the HSA could not guarantee its 1962 
installment of $209,670. Jamsion hoped the Commissioners understood that the HSA wanted 
the stadium built as soon as possible to protect its investment. Hence, the HSA would not 
pour any more money into the stadium until it was finished. By accepting the supplement, 
Harris County assumed $1.5 million of additional bond debt with the HSA reimbursing the 
County in the latter years of the lease. Commissioner Chapman, instead of escalating the 
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tension, seemed satisfied with the HSA's actions. "If we get the county attorneys approval, 
then we night be able to let contract on subdrainage ," he said, which saved the county 
$3,200 every week. The HSA agreed to one of his stipulations by presenting the deed for 
Smith's land. Pending approval from Resweber, Chapman did not voice any concern of the 
lease supplement but wanted to move forward and sign a contract for stadium subdrainage.* 
Chapman's desire to sign a subdrainage contract became a reality when the 
Commissioners Court voted three to two in favor of awarding John Kraak, Inc. the contract. 
Even though Chapman professed to be ready to move forward, let a contract, and relieve 
Harris County of the cost of $3,200-a-week pumping bill, he voted against the measure. 
Chapman said that only by delaying any construction until November, when the County 
received the construction bids, would the Commissioners Court have better insight into the 
cost of construction and determine what additional funds were required. Sayers also voted 
against the measure with Chapman. Sayers said that his dissenting vote should not be viewed 
as a disintegration of his support for the stadium. Instead, he said, "I object to spending 
another quarter of a million dollars in that hole until the people let us know by a bond vote 
whether they want us to go ahead with this." For Sayers, he wanted another public vote for 
more bonds before acting in a unified and determined manner. Chapman and Sayers said they 
wanted to delay any further spending until the County received answers to its financial 
questions. A divided Commissioners Court proved the indecisiveness of the stadium project. 
Without a concerted direction to start construction, the timid actions of Chapman and Sayers 
demonstrated the increasing doubt facing the future of the stadium. Chapman and Sayers 
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hoped the residents of Harris County would vote for more bonds, but delaying further action 
showed their increasing uncertainty of its success.^  
In addition to letting the subdrainage contract, Commissioners reviewed the HSA's 
supplemental contract. County attorney Resweber said that some sections of the supplement 
were outright illegal while other sections reduced protection for the County. The new 
contract allowed the HSA to recover all its expenses and sue for damages, whereas the 
original contract stated that the HSA had to sue to recover its lease payments. He also 
revealed that legally the HSA could make its lease payments on 16 August. Hofheinz told the 
Court that the HSA would pay the 1962 lease on 8 August to assist the County for tax 
reasons. But, he continued, the HSA would not make another payment until the County 
finished the stadium. According to Hofheinz, the HSA in advanced the supplement in an 
effort to "help the county" and demonstrate its "good faith." Judge Elliott and 
Commissioners Ramsey and Lyons understood that the HSA was acing in "good faith." By 
awarding the subdrainage contract, therefore, the commissioners confirmed its confidence in 
the HSA. The actions of the Court also showed that the County needed another bond issue to 
complete the stadium.^  
After rumors swirled that the County needed another $8 million, the stadium 
continued to receive some support, most importantly from the Houston newspapers. The 
public, however, began to question the increasing cost of the stadium. Originally, the 
* Foley, "H.S.A. Threatens to Break Lease," CA/wwck, 26 July 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1,2; "HSA Offers County 
New Deals On Stadium—Asks Guarantees," Press, 26 July 1962, pp. 1,4; "County Faces Stadium Debt of $1.5 
Million," Chronicle, 27 July 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1,2. 
57 Foley, "Stadium Drainage Given Green Light," Chronicle, 1 August 1962, sec. 6, p. 1; Verniaud. "Court OKs 
More For Arena," Post, 1 August 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1, 2. 
58 Foley, "Stadium Drainage Given Green Light," Chronicle, 1 August 1962, sec. 6, p. 1; "We're on the Way 
With the Stadium," Chronicle, 1 August 1962, sec. 4, p. 10. 
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Houston public had been promised that the stadium could be constructed for $15 million. 
This turned out to be a false assumption. Could the public trust that another $8 million would 
do the job? County leaders promised their voters that they would not have to use tax money 
to pay for it. With the HSA's lease supplement, Harris County became responsible for the 
next two bond payments of $1.5 million. Should Harris County voters approve additional 
funds before County leaders and the HSA reach a full and satisfying lease agreement and 
before the final stadium blueprints were finished? Did not the County and the HSA already 
agree to contract? Now both parties were wrangling over the facts and figures within the 
signed document. The obfuscation and "wasteful nonsense" of the last few months, as one 
Press editorial called it, must be remedied by County officials.59 
Attorney General Will Wilson approved the supplemental contract. Judge Elliott said 
that it would be signed within a week, contingent on the HSA's second lease payment.* The 
"bright prospect" offered to Harris County voters of a stadium constructed without raising 
taxes dimmed, as the HSA failed to remit its second lease payment. The $15 million voted in 
1961 would not be enough to pay for construction and only $785,000 of the $3 million bond 
remained to buy the last sixty-one acres at South Main. Seat options were not sold, hence 
there was not any funds to pay for the land. Of the $22 million, $6.7 had been spent for 
preliminary excavation and road work. The $15 million bonds eventually would cost almost 
$30 million including interest. "Far from getting something from nothing," wrote Verniaud, 
"the county taxpayers have already laid out $587,000 this year to pay for the bonds sold last 
August." In the 1963 "tax levy," Houstonians were asked to pay at least one million dollars 
59 
"The Stadium Situation," Press, 9 August 1962, p. 4; '"Domed Stadium, Tower of Babel, Both Aimed Too 
High, He Fears," frase, 9 August 1962, p. 4; "For Having Stadium Ready for Conventions," fraw, 9 August 
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"for debt service" even if the county failed to complete the stadium. Even though the tax rate 
could not be increased, the amount of money to pay for the bond debts came from the 
County's general tax fund. Thus, the bond debt occupied 8.6 cents out of the 80-cent tax limit 
that was used to pay for other County operations. The bonds could not be recalled either, 
meaning that the County was still obligated for the $39,410,875 that the bonds would cost. 
The HSA refused to pay its lease until the stadium was ready for baseball/' 
As the date to assess the County's 1962 tax rate approached, the HSA remained 
silent. County officials hoped to receive the lease payment of $142,000 before Friday, 17 
August. If the HSA's installment did not make it in time, the County would be forced to use 
one-cent more from the 80-cent general fund to provide the debt service on the bonds. When 
the payment never arrived, Commissioner Sayers threatened that he would not sign the 
modified contract. "I want to see that check before I sign," Sayers promised his colleagues. 
Sayer's consent, however, was not required by the Court to approve the supplement. 
Commissioners Court inaction delayed fixing the 1962 tax rate. If the HSA continued its 
torpor, County officials would be forced to raid the road and bridge maintenance funds of 
$56,000. A modified lease with the HSA would force the HSA to make its 1962 payment in 
return for a solid promise that the County would begin construction by July 1,1963 and 
finish the stadium by January 31,1965. Additionally, the HSA would be exempt from further 
lease payments until it fully possessed the stadium's leased 
1962, p. 4; "For Letting Our Officials know We Want Stadium—Built Right," Press, 15 August 1962, p. 8. 
60 
"County and HSA Agree on Revised Stadium Contract," Press, 16 August 1962, pp. 1, 8. 
61 Verniaud, "Harris Taxes Diverted To Interest on Bonds," Post, 16 August 1962, sec. 1, p. 7. 
62 Verniaud, "County Awaits Word On Stadium Lease Payment," Post, 16 August 1962, sec. 1, p. 1; "Sayers 
Won't Sign Pact, Wants Stadium Check," Chronicle, 17 August 1962, sec. 1, p. 10. 
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Even as the HSA seemed in control in its skirmish over the addendum to the contract, 
another battle front opened within the HSA. A once apparently unified syndicate, organized 
to obtain big league baseball and a big league stadium, experienced internal dissension. HSA 
stockholder and owner of the AFL Houston Oilers Bud Adams "blasted" the HSA, and 
Hofheinz in particular, for the cost of renting Colt Stadium. Adams's "blast" could not come 
at a worse time for the HSA. "The prolonged period of silence," wrote Bob Rule, "on what's 
to be done about Houston's long-talked domed stadium continues to befuddle the general 
public, and continues to spawn rumors of all sorts." Adams told the media that he and the 
season ticket holders decided to remain at Jeppesen Stadium, and not move to the HSA-
owned Colt Stadium. Even though Adams risked Hofheinz's threat of a seeking a competing 
NFL franchise, he remained resolute in his decision. Adams complained that his previous 
inquiries as to the cost of renting Colt Stadium had gone unanswered by Hofheinz. But what 
really irked Adams was the way Hofheinz was running the HSA. Adams remarked that he 
had invested $600,000 of his money in the HSA solely for a future home for his football team 
in the domed stadium. "I just own 10 per cent of the Houston Sports Association," he said, 
and "I don't know whether I have a home or not." "This is the only business I ever had any 
money invested in where I didn't know what was going on. I don't know whether we're 
making money or losing money. There's never been a financial statement of any kind issued. 
I don't know what's going on and neither do the other stockholders. I guess only Mr. Smith 
and Mr. Hofheinz know." The HSA's internal squabble threatened the possibility of getting 
another $8 million in bonds. Houston could not withstand another professional sports war 
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like it did over the Buffs. Disunity and dissension only added to the pessimism effervescing 
in Harris County.^  
The HSA revealed that Adams offered his football team to the syndicate for $2.5 
million. In a public statement, the HSA also affirmed that as a stockholder, Adams could 
have learned of the syndicate's finances if he had ever attended a meeting. Since Adams 
continually missed these meetings, he could have requested for the book of HSA 
stockholders and other financial information at the HSA offices. The apparent "friction" 
between the HSA and one of its stockholders was a bad omen of possible future difficulties. 
With another bond election eminent, any strife in the once united stadium front could spell 
disaster, since the previous bond issue had passed by only a slim margin. Adams rebutted the 
charge that he was financially destitute. According to Adams, he wanted complete 
professional sport "unity" to protect Houston. (At the time, the NFL and the AFL were vying 
for supremacy in Dallas.) According to Adams, he wanted to avoid the entrance of another 
professional football team into Houston, which could financially jeopardize both teams.* 
At a two-hour "amiable" meeting between the HSA and County officials on 24 
August 1962, the HSA tendered $99,898 as its lease payment for 1962. Although County 
Auditor Bruce and County Attorney Resweber desired the original payment of $142,672, 
they agreed to accept the smaller amount with the remaining $42,774 to be credited on the 
next lease payment. The County accepted as part of the lease supplement a delay in future 
63 Frank A. Gcxlsoe, "Adams Decides To Keep Oilers At Jeppesen," Press, 22 August 1962, p. 16; Rule, 
"Sidelights," Press, 22 August 1962, p. 16; Gallagher, "Oilers Will Stay at Jeppesen; Adams Blasts Officials of 
USA," Post, 22 August 1962, sec. 3, p. 1.4; "Oiler Owner, H.S.A. Feud Over Stadium," Chronicle, 22 August 
1962, sec. I, pp. 1.14; "H.S.A. Replies To Charges Of Bud Adams," Chronicle, 22 August 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1, 
14. 
* Gallagher, "Bid Offered Oilers For Sale, Says HSA," 23 August 1962, sec. 6, pp. 1,4; "Tried to Avert 
'Another Dallas,"' Post, 23 August 1962, sec. 6, pp. 1,4. 
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lease payments until the stadium was complete. The HSA charged that since the County had 
failed to begin stadium woik by the dates specified in the original contract, the syndicate was 
free from paying its lease.* 
On September 17, the Architects submitted the Anal stadium blueprints and 
specifications to the Commissioners Court. The structural steel frame domed stadium 
complete with 4,596 plastic skylights promised to seat 47,004 for baseball, 53,614 for 
football, and 66,000 for conventions. The playing surface remained beneath the ground at 36-
feet below ground level. The stadium's cooling system would operate at 75-degrees 
throughout the year, regardless of the number of spectators, time of day, or season. Over 
20,000 cars were provided for in a radial parking lot. "While economy has dictated 
elimination of decorative features, we believe the design is one which should be a source of 
pride to the community," said S. I. Morris, Jr. "For example," he continued, "we have used 
the less expensive framing for exterior structural wall supports, and we have specified an 
asphalt floor for the first level exhibit area." The architects affirmed that they had solved all 
the nagging problems surrounding the design of the dome, growing natural grass indoors, and 
the former fallout shelter space. Hermon Lloyd dismissed qualms about building the dome, 
"there was never any real doubt" that it could be designed and built, while the grass questions 
were answered "satisfactorily." He also explained that the Architects successfully utilized the 
former fallout shelter space for added exhibition area. "The additional space provided in the 
new plans will make the stadium an even greater convention center," posited Lloyd. More 
exhibition space meant that the stadium would figure more prominently as a convention 
center than previously believed. The HSA's baseball team needed, at most, eighty-one dates 
65 Verniaud, "Sports Association And County OK Stadium Plan," Post, 25 August 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1, 12. 
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for scheduled play. The HSA, then, had to exploit the stadium's convention space for the rest 
of the calendar year. The remaining question was the dome's price tag. Morris reaffirmed the 
"pointless speculation" concerning the stadium's Anal cost, but affirmed that it would cost 
more than $15 million. Regardless, Lloyd said, "There isn't a thing in the world now to 
prevent construction from going right ahead whenever the county is ready."* 
When the HSA submitted its revised supplement, one clause further deterred an 
agreement. The objectionable provision allowed the HSA to receive as compensation land or 
money if the County failed to start construction before July 1,1963 or finish construction by 
January 31,1965. The County could refund to the HSA $666,798 (the total amount of the 
syndicates' lease payments) or 66.679 acres of land adjacent to Colt Stadium. The County 
bought this land for $667,000 and also spent $716,000 for its excavation. Judge Elliott took 
exception to the clause allowing the HSA to be remunerated in county land instead of money. 
"Actually," Elliott continued, "not only is the one clause objectionable, but much of this 
supplement disturbs me." He wanted to discuss the supplement with the Court and the HSA 
to hammer out an agreement. After reviewing (he HSA's amendment, Commissioners 
rejected it. Commissioner Chapman said that it was "foolish" for the Court to even consider 
the proposal. Commissioner Sayers said, "Within five years that land will be worth $8 
million, even with no more work on it." Even thought the Commissioners opposed the 
amendment (Judge Elliott did not offer an opinion), they expressed their desire to complete 
the stadium regardless of the final cost.*' 
66 Rule, "Sidelights," Press. 14 September 1962, p. 12: "Domed Stadium Plans Accepted," Chronicle, 17 
September 1962, sec. 2, p. 7; Marie Dauplaise, "County Gets Stadium Plans," Press, 17 September 1962, p. 1, 
2; Verniaud, "Harris Gets New Dome Arena Plan," Post, 18 September 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1,18. 
67 Verniaud, "Lease Supplement Adds 6 Acres If No Stadium," Post, 14 September 1962, sec. 1, p. 4; 
Dauplaise, "County Balks At Stadium Lease Offer," Press, 28 September 1962, p. 3; Thome, "County Says 
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Almost two months after presenting its lease supplement, the HSA submitted its final 
proposal. The new contract eliminated the two clauses that Elliott and the Commissioners 
found objectionable. Thus, the HSA returned to the original lease. Elliott lauded the HSA for 
abandoning the questionable articles. This was a "victory" for the County, exclaimed Elliott, 
who added, "I'm ready to sign now." Now what remained was an approval from the County 
attorney and signing of the agreement by County and HSA officials. This they eventually did 
on 14 November. "Perhaps this is not an agreement entirely satisfactory to each side, but its 
terms seem like an agreement we can all live with," said Elliott. With the signing, the County 
was responsible to start construction before 1 July 1963 and complete it by 31 January 1965. 
As part of the signing ceremony, the County purchased the land (61.4 acres) underneath Colt 
Stadium for $1,647,898. As part of the agreement, the HSA would not make a lease payment 
until the stadium was finished.** 
The contract dispute epitomized the growing skepticism towards the stadium and the 
HSA. Judge Elliott claimed the county "won" the battle and "defeated" the HSA. It implied 
that there were two completely different sides, one "right" and the other "wrong." And the 
resulting contract was a set of terms and limits imposed by the victor on the vanquished. But 
the fact that one side asserted that it was victorious was part of the problem. The appearance 
that the county was on one "side" and the HSA on the other, illustrated the change fairing 
shape in Houston. On one hand, the actions of the county could be interpreted as an attempt 
to maintain order and control over the HSA. By doing this, the county would be assured a 
'No' To Stadium Lease Proposal," Chronicle, 28 September 1962sec. 1, pp. I,11; Verniaud, "County Not in 
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fair rental payment for decades to come. On the other hand, the HSA's actions were seen as 
an attack on the county. The HSA selfishly and deliberately obfuscated the facts to cheat the 
county of its deserved money. The HSA forced the county to take action and thwart its 
nefarious intentions. This clearly was thinking that would not have appeared a mere two 
years earlier. The HSA and the County Commissioners were allies in the campaign to alter 
Houston's future. They collectively fought for big league sports and worked hand-in-hand to 
make the domed stadium a reality. Before the stadium even began to rise from the Texas 
prairie, the battle line between the county and the HSA had started to form. 
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CHAPTER 7: THIRD TIME THE CHARM 
The division between the Houston Sports Association and Harris County leaders that 
had bubbled to the surface during the lease negotiations momentarily receded after the 
agreement. With this squabble behind both parties, they needed to put aside their differences 
and begin the process of constructing the stadium for the common good. Their first task was 
to advertise for bids, open the bids, determine which was most satisfactory, award a 
construction contract, and sit back and watch the domed stadium take shape. This was hardly 
a period of inactivity, but instead a calm before the storm. County engineer Richard Doss 
recommended that the County advertise construction bids immediately, with opening of the 
bids set for mid-November. "We have to advertise now if we're going to complete the 
stadium in time for the 1965 baseball season," he warned Elliott and the members of the 
Commissioners Court. Doss speculated that it would require 432 days to finish the stadium. 
With cooperation from the weather, a completion date of early 1965 was not impossible. The 
HSA and the County, however, would require more than just help from mother nature. As 
can been seen in the stadium's brief history, the best laid plans often went awry/ 
The Commissioners Court received six construction bids. The lowest came from a 
joint bid by the Minneapolis firm of Johnson, Drake and Piper with H. A. Lott of Houston 
(Lott-Drake) for $19,440,000. Lott-Drake's bid pushed the cost the stadium to $22 million, 
exceeding the remaining construction bond money by $6,640,000 and a total of $7.5 million 
of the entire bond account. Lott-Drake's also included several other bids based on the 
elimination of six nonessential items. Expunging all six items could save the County 
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$790,000. The extras included escalators from ground level to upper stands ($381,000), 
pneumatic tubes for the ticket offices ($75,000), kitchen equipment ($128,000), eliminating 
2,000 top level seats ($111,000), 8,000 grand stand seats ($36,000), and replacing the 
removable stands with temporary seating ($59,000). Once the Court opened the binds, 
speculation turned to the probable bond election. Commissioners planned on a bond election 
after 18 December but before Christmas Day, making Saturday, December 22 the likely date. 
They were set to ask the public for at least $8 million more to complete the stadium. The $22 
million price tag meant that Houston's new domed stadium would be in the price class of 
stadiums in Washington, D. C. and Los Angeles/ 
When Commissioners debated the bond issue, Commissioner Ramsey desired $10 
million to insure the completion of every facet related to the stadium. Elliott agreed. 
Chapman, on the other hand, only wanted what was "absolutely necessary to assure 
completion of that job" because this money would come from public tax revenues. "A 
minimum of funds.. .is all I'm going to be in favor of submitting to the people," Elliott 
confirmed. The County needed at least $7 million to erect the stadium, but also enough 
money to build parking facilities (estimated at least $1 million) and to pay R. E. Smith for his 
61-acres of land. Elliott leaned towards keeping the stadium first class by retaining the six 
nonessential items highlighted by Lott-Drake. Although by nature all construction estimates 
gravitated towards the conservative side, the County could still build its first-class stadium 
1 
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and save money by reducing some frills. Still, the new estimated cost for "the showplace of 
the Southwest" was now nearly $22 million/ 
As Harris County voters faced yet another stadium bond issue, Près? sports editor 
Bob Rule asked them to keep in mind that the stadium was merely "under estimated." Rule 
agreed that several errors and gaffes had been committed in the stadium's early history. But 
no one individual or group associated with the project, he continued, "deliberately lied, or 
mis-represented facts." This was not a case of stealing from the public or someone grabbing 
"an undeserved profit." Rule attempted to squelch possible beliefs that something was not 
quite right. The rhetoric Rule used revealed the changing attitude in Houston. "Nobody has 
discriminated against you or me," he wrote, nor has anyone " gone back on a promise," or 
"raised our taxes." The HSA and County leaders were not trying to fleece the public, he 
continued, but merely fighting for the public to get the best facility for Houston. "If there's a 
city in the world that should build a domed stadium first, Houston is that city," Rule added, 
because Houston "isn't just an ordinary place." Rule asked to try and find any other city that 
experienced the "explosive progress you find in Houston." This progress, the result of the 
hard work of every Houstonian, proved that the city had earned the domed stadium. Thus, the 
people would continue to make it better by keeping the stadium on track and accepting the 
inevitable bond issue/ 
County Engineer Doss faced the task of reviewing the alternate bids of Lott-Drake 
and proffer his recommendation to Judge Elliott and the Commissioners on 3 December 
1962. When Doss finished, the Commissioners Court would award the contract. After Doss 
3 Bailey, "Bond Issue Only to Meet Stadium Cost," Press, 30 November 1962, p. 1, 2; "The Stadium Comes 
Clear," Press, 30 November 1962, p. 8; "Let Your Pride Show," Chronicle, 30 November 1962. sec. 2, p. 4; 
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recommended the lowest bid by Lott-Drake, the Commissioners Court set the $9.6 million 
bond election date for the 22 December, the Saturday before Christmas. Doss estimated that 
the entire construction costs would be $22,681,068. He broke down the $22 million cost as 
follows: $19,470,000 for stadium construction, $1,594,000 for parking lots, $428,068 for 
extra architect fees, $150,000 for soil testing and examination, $1,033,000 to R. E. Smith and 
the HSA for improvements on the 61.4 acres under Colt Stadium and the 21,213 seats within 
the stadium. With only $13,068,489 remaining from the original 1961 bond issue of $18 
million, the County needed $9,612,579 more. Commissioner Chapman suggested that the 
bond issue be limited to $9.6 million with the County covering the difference. If voters 
approved the new $9.6 million bond issue, the cost of the stadium would balloon to $31.6 
million, with the HSA required to pay for $15 million of the total/ 
As happened the two previous times, Houston's "civic, labor, and sports leaders" 
implored voter approval of the $9.6 million bond issue. Again, these individuals said that 
Houston's prestige and civic pride were at stake, but now even more so. Failure to pass the 
bonds meant that Houston would be the laughing stock of the entire nation. A vote against 
the bonds, the supporters said, represented a vote against progress, further city development, 
and Houston's economic future. Their justification echoed the sentiments used during the 
"Do the Stadium Job—Right," Press, 1 December 1962, p. 6. 
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first two bond elections. But this bond issue was scheduled in 1962, not 1958. It worked 
during the era of optimism, but would it succeed in an increasingly pessimistic Houston?* 
While supporters and opponents mustered their forces, the Press announced its 
continued recommendation for the stadium. "Yes, we are still for the stadium, all the way," it 
went, but "we also are against spending one dime more above what is absolutely necessary to 
get it." Tax revenue was slated to finance $16.6 million of the $31.6 stadium. "If 80 cents 
interest per dollar on the $16.6 million the county will borrow via bond insurance is added, 
the tax money total will go up another $13,280,000," wrote the Pre.». With such a large 
financial responsibility facing the County, the Press hoped Commissioners would "cut every 
possible corner" to lessen the burden. Instead of an immediate sale of tax bonds, the Press 
asked that the County Commissioners "use the county's ready money, and save the taxpayers 
of the future something like $2.5 million in interest charges." The Praw editorial revealed the 
rising concern over the spiraling cost of the stadium and what it meant for the future. On the 
one hand, the future seemed certain with a $15 million stadium that would bring prestige to 
Houston and infuse its economy with an seemingly unlimited source of entertainment money. 
On the other hand, with the rising cost of the stadium and the increasing pessimism revolving 
around it, the future looked bleak and worrisome. "What county officials must keep in mind 
is the way this project has pyramided," the editorial continued, and make sure that all means 
are taken to eliminate increasing costs. Once the Commissioners Court "exercise total 
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prudence in the way they approach this gigantic public investment," voters will most 
assuredly pass the new bonds issue/ 
Voters wrote to the three newspapers expressing their opinion concerning the stadium 
and the upcoming election. The letters that were printed tended to denounce the stadium, the 
bond issue, and the HSA, signifying increasing skepticism in Houston. For example, Milton 
Edwards could not endorse more tax bonds for a "white elephant." The money, he argued, 
should be used for the less advantaged and not millionaires. He tabulated the cost of the first 
year's interest of the bonds to be $800,000, short of the HSA's promised lease payment. 
Milton wrote that it simply was his Christian duty to oppose the bonds. Milton questioned the 
true intentions of the HSA who tyrannically controlled a public facility.8 Walter E. 
Liljestrand echoed the previous opposition of using tax money to finance a private 
corporation. Liljestrand envisioned two choices facing the people of Houston. The first was 
to eliminate all tax money for the stadium. Thus, the HSA would assume all costs for the 
stadium. The second was for the County to operate the stadium. Although he professed that 
he could live with the second choice, Liljestrand wanted the bond issue to go down to defeat 
because "[N]o self -respecting person with community pride can vote for continuing this 
mess."* Clyde Thomasson questioned the timing of the election, the Saturday before 
Christmas. Did stadium supporters hope for a light voter turnout, he wondered, which would 
aid their cause? Regardless of their motivations, Thomasson wrote, County and HSA 
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officials had already demonstrated their able mismanagement techniques by wasting $3 
million to pump out a large hole for months on end/" 
The more vociferous opponents were the same ones who had fought the last bond 
issue. Dan E. Goodykoontz, Ned Gill, and Gail Reeves each made separate public 
announcements attacking the bond issue. Goodykoontz, a former US Treasury Agent, 
Houston Crime Commissioner and attorney, lamented the increased financial burden the 
stadium bonds would heap upon Harris County taxpayers. Goodykoontz focused his tirade on 
repudiating the promise of stadium boosters that the bonds would not increase the tax rate. 
Goodykoontz agreed that the tax rate could not and would not be increased, but not the tax 
assessment. Speaking of his personal experience, "So many people have already had their tax 
assessments doubled, he said. Because the HSA promised to pay $15 million to the County, 
the rest of the $16.5 million fell upon taxpayers. He defended himself attesting to his support 
of the stadium, but not its control by a private corporation. "I would be for it if the county 
had control of it," he concluded. Printing executive Gill concurred with Goodykoontz that the 
public was going to finance the bulk of the stadium bill. "We are going to be for it and it 
comes out of tax money," said Gill. "The simple expedient will be to increase the 
assessments on property which will increase taxes," he said. Former councilman Reeves 
calculated the public subsidy to the HSA for each baseball game played under the dome for 
the next thirty years at $16,000. Reeves opposed the public subsidy for the HSA as well. 
"The domed stadium has been misrepresented, mishandled, and mismanaged to a degree 
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which is unparalleled in Harris County," said Reeves. By selecting December 22 as the 
election date only proved that some kind of fiendish conspiracy between County and HSA 
leaders existed. Reeves asked for every voter to head to the polls and resoundingly defeat the 
bond issue." 
The f oaf and its sports editor Clark Nealon wrote in favor of the bonds, but with less 
enthusiasm than used for the prior elections. Harris County and its citizens "are now so 
deeply committed to the project that it is only good sense and good business to go ahead and 
finish the job." They agreed with others that maybe the bond money could go to other worthy 
causes, but was not that the case of every governmental expenditure? Similarly, they 
continued, it was not atypical for estimates to be wrong nor "for costs to turn out to be higher 
than first anticipated" much like the Harris County Courthouse. %lark Nealon was not as 
reserved as his newspaper. "A vote for the bond issue is a vote to separate Houston from 
other cities in the country in feature sports events of the future," he wrote, "a vote to make 
Houston the unquestioned leader as a Sports City as well as The Space City, not only 
nationally but internationally." Nealon wanted the rest of Houston to remember what the 
stadium meant to their city. He asked that they remain optimistic and confident in the city's 
future. If they believed their city was destined for leadership, then they could not vote against 
it. A better future was at stake." 
At a Pasadena breakfast meeting for businessmen attended by Judge Elliott, architect 
S. I. Morris, and Commissioners Ramsey and Lyons, questions were asked about financing 
Election," Post, 21 December 1962, sec. 1, p. 1; "Sound-Off," Post, 19 December 1962, sec 3, p. 6; "Sound-
Off," Post, 20 December 1962, sec 8, p. 2; "Sound-Off," Post, 21 December 1962. sec 3, p. 2. 
11 Bailey, "Stadium Bond Foes Charge 'Subsidy' —Predict Higher Taxes," Press, 14 December 1962, pp. 1,6. 
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and cost comparison of the domed stadium. First, the County officials wanted to make 
absolutely clear that the money being used for the stadium was not being taken from other 
projects like the hospital. Funds for city-county hospital came from the general fund while 
bonds would pay for the stadium. Elliott promised county funds for the hospital. "The money 
will be available," he vowed. Second, the supplemental bonds would not, and could not, 
increase taxes. Morris added that these bonds were needed because the early estimate was 
much too low. Any attempt to nail down a concrete estimate proved difficult, Morris 
continued, because they had no post-war stadium on which to base their estimate. Third, the 
seemingly astronomical cost of the domed stadium compared favorably with the new, open-
air stadiums in Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D. C.14 
Judge Elliott again appointed William A. Smith and Gus Wortham to chair the 
Committee for the Domed Stadium. Smith announced his desire to start "construction 
immediately" once County voters approved the new bond issue. "Our city is destined to be 
one of the greatest cities in the world, and certainly the many uses for which the domed 
stadium will be available make its construction now a must," Smith said. Wortham said that 
the stadium would alter the county-wide perception of Houston for the better. "There may be 
some who still think us as an oil town on the bayou," he said," but this was already under 
assault. The stadium could be counted along with the Manned Spacecraft Center and the 
Texas Medical Center as proof that Houston was "reaching the heights" in just about every 
important community asset. ^  
14 
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Smith and Wortham focused on the positive effect the stadium would have on 
Houston's economy and its prestige. Wortham said the dome would "excite the imagination 
of anyone with any amount of imagination." These individuals would come to Houston, 
spend massive amounts of money, and pump-up the local economy. These types of benefits 
would "create more jobs," "produce business and new sources of revenue," "resulting) in a 
stronger overall economy" and "more prosperity for Harris County," according to Smith. The 
stadium itself would achieve these lofty goals by hosting large conventions and spurring 
construction throughout the city. Smith and Wortham labeled the stadium a sound 
investment. "This is like acquiring a block of blue chip stocks and paying for them out of the 
income they yield," the proclaimed. The value of the land alone promised to increase several 
times what Harris County paid for it. The HSA rental fee would pay off the $15 million of 
original construction bonds. The $9.6 million tax bonds would come from "the regular 
county bond financing tax rate" within the 80-cent limit. This need not worry the public, they 
continued, because the county would continue to grow. The expansion of the county's tax 
rolls would definitely make a dent in paying off the bonds. Any other fund that may be 
required, they said, could be found by "shifting of tax rates within the 80-cent limit." This 
idea could be summed up in the saying, "Robbing Peter to pay Paul." Harris County leaders 
would shift money from one or more projects to amortize the park bond debt. Still, Smith and 
Wortham doggedly supported the stadium and the financing mechanism. "Any way you look 
at the project," they said, "the domed stadium is a sound investment for the taxpayers, a wise 
one which will yield far more in income to this community than its cost to the taxpayers."  ^
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Essentially, Houston was in a struggle with other cities across the globe for future 
industry, tourism, and prosperity. In effect, Houston was involved in a national conflict for 
limited amenities. If Houston failed to pass the bond issue, the domed stadium most 
assuredly would not be completed. Bond and stadium opponents, therefore, supposedly 
doomed their city to a sterile, bankrupt future. Then, Houston would lose its chance to 
become "a better place to live" Arguments shifted from the optimistic potential of the 
stadium to the bleak, pessimistic results of failure. 
Other bond proponents began to line-up their support before the election. Directors 
from the Stock Show, the Greater Houston Bowl Association, in which William A. Smith 
was a chairman, the AFL-CIO, the Houston Chamber of Commerce, and the Harris County 
Council of Organizations, "a centralized council of 50 Negro organizations," announced their 
approval of the bonds and the stadium. The endorsements from such diverse groups only 
proved that the bonds appealed to a broad constituency throughout Harris County, argued 
Smith and Wortham. Said Smith, "The variety of organizations endorsing the stadium bonds 
indicates that a wide cross-section of the public favors supplying the necessary funds to 
complete the domed stadium."" 
The Tax Research Association (TRA) performed its own analysis of the tax bonds 
and announced that it "should not adversely affect the taxpaying public except as it will 
remove funds from availability for alternative purposes." The County was responsible for 
$16.6 million of the total $31.6 million cost. The County's funds would come from within the 
County's eighty-cent rate. Of the eighty-cent limit, the County's park bonds occupied an 
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extra six cents with the passage of the latest bond outlay that required three cents. The TRA 
hypothesized that the park bonds could rise from the current 10.45 cents to 16 cents in 1963. 
By 1964 and especially 1965 when the HSA's lease payments resumed, the rate would 
decline. The "strong position of the county finances," according to the TRA report, allowed 
the county to incorporate the additional expense without hindering its ability to finance other 
projects. The TRA also viewed the leasing of the stadium to the HSA as a benefit to the 
County, not a liability as stadium and bonds opponents asserted. According to the TRA, the 
HSA could exploit its own "resources which are not available to a governmental body" that 
would obtain the "maximum use of the facility." The County would not have to spend its 
limited amount of money to seek others interested in using the stadium.18 
A C&romck editorial refuted the charge that the stadium would increase everyone's 
taxes. The CAromc/e used the same arguments it had implemented from the previous bond 
election. Firstly, the HSA guaranteed to retire $15 million of the $24.6 million through lease 
payments. Secondly, the tax rate could not be changed without altering the Texas state 
constitution. These examples were irrefutable. The final argument, however, seemed out of 
place. Essentially, the C&romc/e wrote that "through Harris County's fast-growing property 
values—its tax base" will assuredly generate enough taxable revenue so that the tax rate 
would not increase. "The homemaker, for example, will pay the same county tax next year as 
this year," cited the editorial. This defense was out of place in late 1962 Houston. It seemed 
to have come from Houston's era of unbridled enthusiasm and optimism and did not relate to 
17 
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the city's growing pessimism. Houston's economic future, according to the CAromck , was 
still one of infinite growth and not scarcity/* 
The editorial staff of the C&rowcZe compared the three newest stadiums with the yet-
to-be-built domed stadium By focusing on the stadiums other cities had constructed, or were 
in the midst of completing, the article attempted to dismiss the notion that the dome was just 
too expensive. The open-air, baseball-only stadium at Chavez Ravine for the Dodgers cost 
$22 million and only had 55,000 seats. The Washington. D. C. stadium, although the home 
for the Senators and the Redskins (both sorry sports teams), cost $20 million and had 50,000 
seats open to the climate of the Capitol. And, finally, Shea Stadium in Flushing Meadows, 
New York was estimated at $20.5 million with 50,000 seats. These stadiums were fine 
examples of modem architecture and engineering, but not the best. Houston would have the 
best stadium in the land, not because it could house baseball and football. The Washington 
and New York stadiums, as well as others, could do this. The Houston stadium could hold 
conventions underneath its dome in air-conditioned comforL Support the bonds and the $24.6 
million domed stadium because "We'll have a stadium that makes the best built elsewhere 
recently turn green with envy."  ^
R. E. Turrentine expected a turnout between 100,000 to 125,000 voters for the 
election or about one-third of Harris County's 357,000 eligible voters. The clerk's office 
already received 1,712 absentee ballots, 649 more than in the 1962 election. Turrentine did 
not anticipate a "proportionate increase" in total votes based on the sixty-one percent upsurge 
in absentee ballots. In the 1962 bond election, "an unprecedented turnout" of 115,803 voted. 
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If the number of voters also increase sixty-one percent, 189,841 votes would be cast. Judge 
Elliott attributed the increase in absentee votes to the greater number of voters who were 
going to be out of town for the holidays. The real question was whether the proximity of the 
election to Christmas day or the qualification that the voter have a poll tax receipt or 
exemption and own property would affect voter turnout. Elliott desired a huge turnout, but 
conceded that less than 100,000 appeared to be the most likely result.^  
County Commissioners were asking their constituents to pay for $16.6 million of the 
stadium's final cost. Roads, sewers, bridges and other "commonplace county improvements" 
occupied $4,000,000 of the $16,600,000. The 310-acres of stadium land cost another $3 
million. This meant that the final $9.6 million would come from the public.22 But bond 
proponents consistently pointed to the county's growing population to placate public ire. A 
growing population meant a continued growth in the county's economy through an increase 
in the number of taxpayers. County tax assessor-collector Carl Smith predicted a $60 million 
increase in property values in the county's immediate future. Smith based this "conservative" 
estimate on NASA construction in Clear Lake and other construction throughout the county. 
"I personally can see no future need to have to change the ratio of assessment because of this 
fast growth," he said.^  
On the eve of stadium "D-Day,"2* Wortham and Smith said that it would actually cost 
voters less money if they approved more bonds. "We wither pay $9.6 million for a domed, 
air-conditioned stadium or $15 million and no stadium," they said. The County would still 
21 
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have to retire the original $15 million bond issue. The bond money could not be used for any 
other purpose that for the County parks system and not for a new hospital or jail. "The 
alternative is simple," Wortham and Smith ruminated, "It's merely a question of whether the 
voters want to pay for fewer bonds and a stadium so great it staggers the imagination, or pay 
for more bonds—and have no stadium." ^  
Ten state representatives who represented Harris County backed the stadium bond 
issue. Generally, the representatives cited the economic and tourism bonanza the domed 
stadium would bring to Texas, Harris County, and Houston. National League president 
Warren Giles reiterated baseball's interest in the election. It was all the talk of baseball 
executives and fans across the country. He hoped this issue would pass, but if it failed, Giles 
again warned that Houston could lose its franchise. He wanted voters to remember that the 
NL chose Houston because of the domed stadium Still, Giles did not foresee voters defeating 
the bonds and the stadium. "1 just can't imagine the pride and progressive thinking people of 
Harris County not voting approval of the bonds by an overwhelming majority," he said.* 
The facts, as they appeared, pointed to Harris County paying for the stadium, one way 
or another. If the voters rejected the supplement, the County would repay $566,000 to the 
HSA, amortize the $15 million in bonds without rent from the HSA, a large hole, and 193 
acres of valuable land at South Main. Of the $15 million bonds, $12 million remained in the 
bank earning three percent interest totaling $360,000. But, the County also paid $450,000 to 
the bondholders. Beginning in 1963, the County was scheduled to pay off the other $3 
million that would cost $150,000 each year for forty years. Rejecting the bonds meant that in 
25 
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1963 alone, Harris County was required to spend $806,000. If the bonds received approval, 
the County would not have to return the HSA's rent. In 1963, then, the cost for Harris County 
was a half-million dollars each year, including interest. This need not concern the average 
taxpayer. Houston's growth rate will be aided by the stadium, bringing to the area the much 
coveted tourism and convention dollar. "With this kind of financial choice and this kind of 
civic opportunity the choice is for the bonds," voiced the C&romck. The choice was not 
whether to pay now or pay later. Either alternative meant that County taxpayers would 
finance the stadium. The choice was to pay a little each year and get a spectacular stadium or 
pay a little each year and get a spectacular hole.^  
Harris County voters stayed away from the polls. Even though Turrentine predicted a 
possible 125,000 ballots cast and Elliott hoped for at least 90,000 votes, most precincts 
reported a "slow" to "fair" turnout. The third bond election witnessed the closest approval 
margin. The final bond issue received 42,911 (54.3 percent) votes of support with 36,110 
(45.7 percent) votes against it. Hofheinz, never one to remain idle or rest on his laurels, 
immediately announced plans to land both the Democratic and Republican conventions in 
1964. "The HSA is offering to underwrite...$500,000 each to the Democratic and Republican 
parties to defray costs of, and to obtain" both national conventions. Hofheinz understood that 
construction would have to begin in earnest to complete the stadium in less than two years. 
"We are working in a tight schedule," Hofheinz said, adding that to complete the "precedent 
shattering structure" the HSA needed "the whole hearted support and energies" of the city. R. 
E. Smith echoed Hofheinz's plea for continual community support. "We recognize that the 
26 
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HSA is more than a business venture because of the responsibilities we have assumed under 
our contract with the County," said Smith. But even if the people of the County did not rally 
around the HSA, Smith concluded, the HSA would not abandon its "civic responsibility" and 
"obligation to the public" in building the stadium. Hofheinz agreed. "Now that the public has 
spoken," said Hofheinz, "there will be no unnecessary delays in carrying out the mandate."* 
Lott-Drake would need all the 440 days stipulated in the construction contract to 
attain Hofheinz's schedule. Alan C. Farnsworth, president of H. A. Lott, Inc., in response to 
Hofheinz, said, "I think it's tight, but we believe we can get it done." He added that his 
company would need at least 360 working days to finish the stadium and might need all 440 
days. "But even given ideal conditions," he continued, "I don't believe we could do the job 
materially earlier than the deadline." Farnsworth quashed any hope that it could be finished 
in record time. Even with Famsworth's guarded optimism, the HSA had no chance to land 
either party's national convention. Starting in February 1963 and working five days a week 
under the best weather conditions, the earliest completion date landed in mid-October 1964. 
Traditionally, the Democrats held their convention first in July with Republicans following 
sometime in August. Obviously, Houston and the domed stadium would have to wait for the 
national conventions. If Lott-Drake worked a six day work week with average weather, it 
could finish the stadium in June or July 1964. Lott-Drake did have a stake in competing 
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construction in time for the national conventions. According to their contract, Lott-Drake 
would be fined $100 a day after the 440 day limit.* 
The men of the Commissioners Court could finally breathe a sigh of relief. Each 
commissioner said that he was elated over the outcome and hoped that the opponents would 
eventually support the stadium. Judge Elliott, not one to agree with Hofheinz on many issues, 
agreed that the election results should be interpreted as a "mandate" from the people, 
demonstrating the confidence of the voters to allow the Commissioners Court to proceed 
"with as much speed" to complete the stadium Other members of the Court affirmed that 
speed was of the essence to finish the project and prove that the stadium would be everything 
its supporters claimed to the future of Houston. Smith and Hofheinz issued a joint statement 
commending the Commissioners Court, William A. Smith, Gus Wortham, and other 
volunteers who worked tirelessly for the passage of the bonds. Smith and Hofheinz also 
wanted to dispel the charges prevalent during the bond battle that the HSA was fleecing the 
public. They applauded the sagacity and civic awareness of the voters. These individuals 
were looking toward the future of the city, not its past. The stadium, thanks to their approval, 
would continue to bring economic prosperity and untold riches to the Houston. In return for 
their trust, the HSA promised to "continue to operate the H.S.A. with a keen awareness of 
civic responsibility we have undertaken and of our obligations to the public."* 
Judge Elliott attempted to hasten construction by splitting the contract into two 
stages. The earlier it began, he argued, the greater the chances of Houston landing both 
political conventions and the entire Oilers home football schedule that would begin in the late 
29 Wagner, "Stadium Start Likely in February," Press, 24 December 1962, p. 2; Thorne, "Stadium Job to Be 
Rushed For '64 Finish," Chronicle, 27 December 1962, sec. 1, pp. 1, 5. 
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summer. Elliott conversed with county attorney Resweber and county auditor Bruce about 
the legality of such a scheme. "There is nothing illegal about handling the work this way," 
assured Elliott. Construction, therefore, could begin while the new bonds were advertised and 
sold. With the sale date slated for 24 January 1963, construction could get a two to three 
month head start. The first stage was for the foundation work and cost $10 million. The 
second phase, the stadium's "superstructure" would cost the remaining $9,476,000. The 
County could split the contract because it had enough money remaining from the first bond 
issue to fund the first stage. The second phase's funds would come from the recently passed 
$9.6 million issue. Resweber said that the County could do this legally because it had enough 
money available for the first contract. "It will be up to the architects, engineers and 
contractors to decide whether the overall contract can be broken up into portions so that part 
of the work can begin immediately," Resweber concluded/' 
Judge Elliott, like Hofheinz, wanted construction to begin without any further delay. 
Elliott hoped to persuade his colleagues in the Commissioners Court to allow construction 
before they sold the $9.6 million of bonds. Sayers refused to split the contract awarded, just 
so building could begin. Sayers said he doubted that the national parties would reverse their 
decisions to decline Hofheinz's invitation to Houston. "I do not believe that a sufficient 
guarantee could be made by Harris County that the stadium facilities would be 100 per cent 
complete in time," Sayers said. Chapman agreed that the County could not guarantee the 
stadium would be ready in mid-1964. Besides, Sayers concluded, the stadium bids asked for 
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by the County were for " a complete stadium" and the contract should not be split after the 
fact. If the Court opened this can of worms, it could possibly face yet another lawsuit. Lyons 
agreed with Sayers. Lyons opined that holding on to the contract as it was would give the 
County just a little insurance until the bonds were sold or in case another lawsuit was filed. 
"We ought to take all the safeguards we can," Lyons opined and what Elliott wanted was 
"too big a gamble." Elliott persisted, "If we let the contract right now, the first steel would 
probably not be moved in until May." Sayers was unmoved by the Judge's pleas. "The 
people are worn out with trying to hurry something," Sayers told Elliott.^  
Elliott's companions, however, quashed this ploy to get construction started 
immediately. Commissioner Sayers called Elliott's plan "outlandish" and provided the 
reasons why they opposed splitting the contract First, he said, the Republicans and 
Democrats simply could not select Houston for their conventions. The stadium would not be 
"100 per cent complete in time" and Harris County could not guarantee it would be. Second, 
the original stadium bid was for a complete stadium, not two separate phases. All the 
companies that made bids "would have legitimate complaints if the contract were split." 
Additionally, once the County split the contract, it would have no recourse against Lott-
Drake regarding stadium delays coming from financing, selling the bonds, or legal 
challenges. Third, the persistent rumors of another lawsuit hastened caution, not recklessness. 
Sayers did not want to imperil the new bond issue or encourage bond opponents by deciding 
on something "absurd." Lyons agreed. "We all want the stadium," he said, "but a move like 
this is too big a gamble." "I don't think that (the threat of lawsuits) should discourage us," 
Immediately," Post, 28 December 1962, sec. 1, p. 1; "County Judge To Push Split Stadium Work," Chronicle, 2 
January 1963, sec. 1, pp. 1,11. 
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Elliott said, because voters had approved of the stadium on three different occasions. The 
Commissioners Court should be more concerned about carrying out the will of the public, he 
continued, and not baseless rumors.^  
Even though he understood that another lawsuit would stymie construction, Elliott 
persisted to sway the Commissioners to his plan. "If we signed a contract now," he said, "the 
steel could not be moved until May." Sayers questioned Elliott on the feasibility of such a 
plan. "You wouldn't handle your personal business this way?" charged Sayers, who refused 
to take a risk with public money and faith. Elliott refused to back down. "Why not?," he 
retorted, "There's nothing illegal about it." "I'm not talking about illegality," Sayers 
responded but "common horse sense." " Besides." said Sayers as he interrupted Elliott, 
"We've had too much monkeying around already." Sayers wanted to proceed with extreme 
caution and wait until the bonds were sold. Although Elliott convinced Commissioner Lyons 
to the Judge's plan, Elliott's contract-split ploy failed three-to-two. The Court's decision 
ensured that stadium construction would not begin until after 1 March. If the Court sided 
with Elliott, building could have commenced on 12 February. A disappointed Elliott wanted 
the stadium finished so the Oilers could have played their entire 1964 season under the 
dome.* 
The Chicago Arm Northern Trust Co. & Associates purchased the thirty-year bonds 
on 24 January "at the best interest rate" ever received by Harris County. The interest rate of 
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3.155 per cent totaled $5,301,536 over the lifetime of the bonds. Bonds could be sold after 
the thirty-day limit to contest the bonds came and went. A jubilant Judge Elliott viewed the 
low rate as "a tremendous expression of trust in Harris County in view of the pitfalls we have 
encountered in trying to get our domed stadium program going." All appeared well in 
Houston. No new litigation could emerge, the bonds were sold, and construction was finally 
slated to start sometime in March. County officials, the HSA, and stadium supporters could 
sit back and patiently wait until the construction contract with Lott-Drake was officially 
signed. Then, all the hard work, all the effort from everyone involved would pay off as the 
domed stadium would begin to rise from the Texas prairie.^  
Harris County representative Don Shipley had other plans in mind. He introduced a 
bill that attacked the HSA and its exemption from state and county taxes. The HSA, as a 
lease holder, did not have to pay state taxes because it was exempt. It could pay county taxes, 
but only if Harris County chose to do so. The HSA, therefore, was shielded from paying two 
major sources of income at the state and county levels. To rectify this injustice, Shipley 
introduced a bill in the Legislature that would allow the collection of state taxes on county 
owned property. Shipley claimed that he was not specifically targeting the HSA or the domed 
stadium, but "the domed stadium did bring the situation to my attention." This action, he 
explained, was not done out of animosity, spite, or a personal vendetta against anyone 
associated with the HSA. Shipley's actions become clearer when viewed with the prevailing 
spirit of flnitude at the time. With a limited amount of funds, the HSA's exemption seemed to 
be a downright theft from the public coffers. It was criminal for a private firm consisting of 
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millionaires to be absolved from paying their fair share of taxes like everyone else. Shipley 
made this point evident. "I want it clear that I am not trying to run the county's business or 
penalize the HSA," he averred, "I am only trying to protect the state's interest and pick up a 
tax windfall that has been neglected." The HSA, Shipley concluded, "should be taxed like 
anybody else."* 
Shipley's actions, in a nutshell, signaled what historians Alan I Marcus and Howard 
P. Segal identified as a disillusionment in American society. Marcus and Seal argued that the 
shift from optimism and plenty to an outlook of skepticism and finitude provided a new 
framework for American society. "Whenever any person or group received a piece of the 
pie," according to Marcus and Segal, "there remained that much less to be divide among 
others." In a world of limits, Marcus and Segal asserted, individuals personalized the actions 
of others as external forces seemed to threaten the "strivings" of the individual. Shipley's 
actions summed up this general feeling of limits that began to take over the US. Shipley 
personalized the tax exempt status of the HSA. The HSA, as a threatening, external force, 
seemed to be taking more that its fair share from the public pie. Shipley could no longer rely 
on the good will of the commissioners to check the HSA from taking advantage of the 
people. Shipley responded in the only way he could, on his own behalf. In Shipley's case, the 
HSA's exempt status took money away from the people of Harris County. Shipley's actions 
illustrated that the optimistic era of Houston was almost over.^  
pp. 1, 2. 
36 
"H.S.A. Will Get Stadium Tax Bill." Chronicle, 26 February 1963, sec. 1, p. 1, 5; Stuart Long, "Bill Would 
Clamp State Tax on HSA," Press, 26 February 1963, p. 1,6. 
37 Alan I Marcus and Howard P. Segal, Technology in America: A Brief History, second edition, (Forth Worth: 
Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999), 303. 
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The HSA, however, faced paying state and county taxes on the profits from the 
stadium. According to County Tax Assessor-Collector Carl S. Smith, he could collect taxes 
on "county-owned property that is leased to private individuals." The equation for taxing the 
HSA was based on the difference it paid in annual rental of the stadium and the revenue it 
generated. Shipley, on the other hand, wanted to tax the assessed value of the entire stadium 
property. Employing the "usual assessed value," the $27 million stadium property, based 
upon the rate of twenty percent, would be $5.4 million. With state property rates at 42-cents 
per $100 valuation and Harris County rates at $1.51 per $100, the HSA faced a $104,200 of 
property taxes.* 
Judge Elliott disagreed that Harris County would gain revenue by slapping a 
redundant aJ vaZorg/% tax on the HSA. As mentioned above, the HSA already faced state and 
county taxes for its use of the stadium The profit the HSA generated could not escape the 
taxman. "I had already planned to tax the Houston Sports Assn.'s leasehold interest in the 
stadium as soon as it built," promised County Collector-Assessor Smith. Elliott did not want 
potential county profits, as stipulated in the lease agreement with the HSA, being neutralized. 
"Under the contract," Elliott said, "the county will share in the gross profits, and taxing the 
stadium would only reduce the profits." Clearly, Shipley was targeting the HSA and the 
domed stadium with his bill hinted Elliott, "the stadium is the only property of any size that 
the county has under lease," Elliott continued, "The bill must be aimed at the stadium." Even 
worse than this assault on County profits, Elliott could not understand why Shipley would 
want to increase Harris County's share of the state Worem tax instead of annulling it. 
38 
"H.S.A. Will Get Stadium Tax Bill," Chronicle, 26 February 1963, sec. 1, p. 1, 5; Stuart Long, "Bill Would 
Clamp State Tax on HSA," Press, 26 February 1963, pp. 1, 6. 
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Harris County, one of the state's largest counties, already paid one-sixth of Texas' 
Worem taxes. Elliott and the five members of the Commissioners Court formed a resolution 
denouncing Shipley's bill in behalf of the county and its interests.* 
County officials including Judge Elliott traveled to New York to sign the $9.6 million 
bonds. After delivering the bonds, receiving and depositing the check, returning to Houston, 
and convening into session, the Commissioners Court hoped to sign the county's portion of 
the contract and "get things moving." Since Lott-Drake signed the contract earlier and began 
initial work, it expected formal construction to begin ten days after the Court awarded the 
contract. ^  
The Commissioners Court convened on 6 March 1963 to officially award the 
$19,476,00 construction contract to Lott-Drake. With the approval of the Commissioners, 
Judge Elliott reached into his suit pocket for a pen to sign the contract. Elliott tried one 
pocket then the other and could not find one. After borrowing a pen from one of his 
colleagues, Elliott signed the contract and breathed a sigh of relief. "It gives me a great deal 
of pleasure to sign the largest construction ever awarded by a county or municipality in the 
history of the Southwest," said a relieved Elliott. No lawsuit appeared to challenge the last 
bond issue; no judicial order prohibiting the sale of the bonds developed; no a disagreement 
with the HSA materialized/' The court, the HSA, and Lott-Drake finally received the formal 
"go ahead" after years of planning, progression, regression, and hard work . H. R. Fredrich, 
* "H.S.A. Will Get Stadium Tax Bill," CAromcb, 26 February 1963, sec. 1, pp. 1,5; "County Opposes Tax on 
Stadium," Chronicle, 4 March 1963, sec. 1, p. 1. 
* "Stadium Work Can Get Started," Pre.», 5 March 1963, pp. 1,2. 
41 It would not be until 1 May 1963 that Elliott, the Commissioners, and the HSA could no longer fear the 
retribution of an angry or miffed voter. Representative Tom Bass sponsored HB 984 that validated all bonds for 
the domed stadium. HB 984 ostensibly certified county parks bonds in Texas counties that claimed a population 
more than a million. See "Bill Validating Domed Stadium Bonds Passed," Post, 1 May 1063, sec. 1, p. 6. 
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vice-president of Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., told those present that work on the stadium's 
footings would begin in 10 days. "We are all looking forward to hearing the umpire yell 
'play ball,'" he added, "or a gavel to ring down for the opening of a convention with 65,000 
persons present in our new air conditioned, domed stadium.'*" 
On 27 March 1963, 360 persons, not including construction workers, attended the 
cornerstone laying ceremony. On the floor of the former "Elliott Lake," HSA president R. E. 
Smith, never one to crave the limelight, delivered a typical short speech congratulating 
everyone that helped make the domed stadium a coming reality. Judge Elliott's wife pulled 
the string that released the first load of concrete from its container to the dirt ground.* 
Houston and Harris County, after five long, turbulent years begun the construction of the 
much ballyhooed multi-purpose domed stadium. In those five years, the excitement and 
exhilaration that Houston and Harris County viewed the stadium had eroded. The stadium's 
initial price tag of a mere $15 million seemed reasonable. Houstonians voted for revenue 
bonds to cover the cost of building the stadium with the hope of reaping the benefits of 
becoming a big league city. These idealistic dreams crumbled as the stadium drive 
experienced problem after problem. When the Anal costs of the stadium reached $22 million, 
Houstonians, still proud of becoming big league, began to view the stadium differently. The 
domed stadium had become Frankenstein's monster, turning on its creator, wreaking havoc, 
confusion, pessimism, and disgust. 
^ Bailey, "At Last! Contract Signed for Domed Stadium Construction," Press, 6 March 1963, p. 11; "County 
Signs Domed Stadium Contract; Work Due in 10 Days," Post, 7 March 1963, sec. 1, p. 1. 
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CHAPTER 8: BUILDING THE DOME 
Initial construction commenced the day after the 1961 tax bond election. Within 
weeks, John Kraak, Inc. removed over 260,000 cubic yards of dirt, creating a mile-long 
drainage ditch. As a result of the myriad legal, financial, and political challenges, additional 
work ceased until 1963, a full two years. Fans making their way to Colt Stadium to watch a 
Colt .45 baseball game could gaze at Elliott's Lake before they entered. With the resumption 
of construction in 1963, the earlier excavation would now benefit the timetable for 
completion. So too did the state urban expressway engineer A. C. Keyser's forethought to 
extend highway 610 from South Main Street all the way to the stadium.1 Time would truly be 
of the essence since the original stadium plan envisioned total completion before the 1963 
baseball season. The HSA and County officials could only hope for the efficient and 
expeditious completion of the stadium before the Colt .45s 1964 season ended. Stadium 
boosters wanted to stave off the public's increasing cynicism directed towards the stadium, 
which came with every obstacle and delay. 
Before official construction began, Howafo# f sports editor Bob Rule interviewed 
the president of the Colt .45s, Roy Hofheinz. One subject Rule covered was the completion 
date of the stadium. Under optimal working conditions, speculation on a seventeen-month 
completion date floated around Houston. Hofheinz wanted the quickest pace of construction 
so the stadium could be dedicated immediately. "Naturally, we'd selfishly like to see baseball 
the first event held in the stadium," he promised, "but it should be completed in, say October 
or November, then you can be certain we wouldn't wait until the next baseball season to 
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open it." Hofheinz's assertion should not be construed as a better relationship with Oilers 
owner Bud Adams. They still loathed each other. Hofheinz was simply being pragmatic. "We 
certainly couldn't afford to let it stand idle from October or November until April the 
following year," he said. Every day that passed without the facility being used cost the HSA 
at least $10,000 a day and potentially threatened the future of Harris County. If the HSA 
failed to make money and defaulted on any of its lease payments, the people of Harris 
County would face a $20 million bill. Rule asked Hofheinz how the HSA planned to And 
stadium sub-lessees, especially since the Houston Stock Show remained aloof. Hofheinz 
expressed his confidence in his ability to locate, sign, and bring any event to Houston/ 
Like Hofheinz, Herbert M. Eyster, vice president of H. A. Lott and project manager 
of construction, could not confirm any specific finishing dates for the whole stadium or the 
various construction phases. The stadium, he opined, would begin to rise out of the ground 
by September or October. In early April, Eyster oversaw the "pouring of concrete and setting 
anchor bolts for footings, where we will attach the structural steel for the outside walls of the 
stadium." With the official start on 18 March, Lott predicted the delivery of the steel in mid-
June, and the first phases of erection around the beginning of July. The steel erection towers 
would be the first to rise into the sky. The towers would place and support the roof trusses 
until each was welded and would "look like a field of oil rigs." After the removal of the 
towers and the free standing of the roof on its base, the installation of the skylights and 
interior work would commence. Eyster hoped that this would start in January 1964 and be 
1 Thomas Mahr, "State to Speed Loop Road to Stadium," Press, 2 February 1961, pp. 1,2. 
2 Bob Rule, "Sidelights," Press, 19 March 1963, p. 10. 
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ready for the grand opening in October. "When this thing is finished it will mean more to 
Houston than anything since," he paused, "well, than anything since they struck oil."  ^
While excitement surrounded the start of construction, the American Bridge Division 
of US Steel (AmBridge) received the structural steel contract from Lott-Drake on 7 April 
1963. Lott-Drake projected 9,000 tons of steel for the supporting framework, dome, and 
movable stands from its Orange, Texas plant/ AmBridge was forced to halt its fabrication of 
the structural steel almost immediately. Roof Structures was unable to send the completed 
roof blueprints to AmBridge causing a one month delay. AmBridge required that every detail 
be ready for fabrication, shipping the steel to Houston, and erection at the site to avoid 
delays, mistakes, and unsound construction.5 
Steel was the natural choice for the stadium frame and roof. The properties of steel 
included high strength, uniformity, ductility (ability to withstand deformation before failure), 
toughness (ability to withstand and absorb massive amounts of energy), resistance to aging, 
and speed of erection. It could be used to create any designed frame conceived. No other 
construction material (wood, concrete, aluminum, or plastic) satisfied the strict requirements 
as did steel. For example, wood was not uniform, could be damaged during handling and 
erection, and expanded and contracted under temperature changes. The average tensile 
strength of wood was a mere 700 pounds per square inch (psi) to steel's 22,000 psi. Concrete, 
although deserving consideration, could not be used for the roof because of its low tensile 
3 Steve Perkins, "The Domed Stadium Will Be Hoping for A White Christmas," Post, 9 April 1963, sec. 4, pp. 
5,20. 
4 United States Steel Corporation, press release (7 April 1963), Robert J. Minchew Collection, 94-274/4 "Harris 
County Domed Stadium Construction Correspondence, File #1, March-April 1963," University of Texas 
(Austin, TX). 
5 N. W. Young of American Bridge to Roof Structures, Inc., 3/29/63, Minchew Collection, 94-274/4, "Harris 
County Domed Stadium Construction Correspondence, File #1, March-April 1963." 
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strength, higher cost than steel, and design limitation. A concrete roof could not incorporate 
the individual skylights that the HSA demanded. Aluminum could be dismissed as a 
structural component because of its high cost and its inherent softness. Plastics were reserved 
only for applications like piping, skylights, and adhesives. But steel was not without its 
drawbacks. Steel tended to corrode especially when continually exposed to air or water. Steel 
also lost strength at high temperatures or Are. Stress reversals and various tension levels 
contribute to fatigue of steel, which, in turn, increases its brittleness. Steel was not a perfect 
material, but provided the best desired characteristics for construction/ 
To create steel, carbon is essentially refined from an oxide. This process requires the 
use of energy. The resultant steel is less stable than the original oxide. The steel, under 
certain conditions, will revert back to its original oxide form. In this electrochemical process, 
the steel reacted with water and oxygen to form oxides and hydroxides. During the steel 
decay, its escaping electrons formed hydroxyl ions with the surrounding oxygen atoms and 
water. The steel was the anode and the hydroxyl ions were the cathode. Corrosion could only 
occur if both the anode and the cathode were available for the reaction/ 
Houston's environment posed a problem for the steel structure. Often, but especially 
during the summer, Houston experienced humid conditions. The water vapor in Houston's 
air, however, was not the sole cause for the rusting of steel. Minute quantities of impurities 
and pollutants, like the sulfur dioxide prevalent in Houston, increased the rate and severity of 
rusting. Houston was located in a "very high industrial" corrosive environment with its 
6 McCormac and Nelson, 1-4; James Ambrose, Structural Materials, 2d ed. (New York; John Wiley and Sons, 
1993), 24-27; Edward Allen, Fundamentals of Building Construction: Materials and Methods, 2d ed. (New 
York; John Wiley and Sons, 1990), 422. 
7 Petros P. Xanthakos, Ground Anchors and Anchored Structures (New York; John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1991), 
241. 
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humidity, proximity to the Gulf of Mexico, heavy industry, especially petrochemicals, and 
the number of automobiles, which necessitated proactive measures. This resulted in the 
painting of every inch of exposed steel framework/ 
The steel selected for the lamella frame and the grandstands was plain-carbon A36 
steel. The American Society for Testing and Materials set the standardized minimum strength 
of this steel at 36,000 psi. The A36 steel was the most common structural steel employed in 
the US.9 The tension ring consisted of two fourteen-inch wide flange A441 high-strength 
steel beams. The A441 was a steel alloy containing magnesium and another alloy to increase 
overall strength. The use of welds throughout the tension ring necessitated A441 steel. In 
addition to its weldability, the A441 steel promised resistance to corrosion and fissure.10 
A concrete reinforced retaining wall protected the stadium from the backfill and 
provided support for three levels. Much of the pressure against the retaining wall was 
relieved by 298 steel tendons, attached to both the wall and deadmen located eighty-five feet 
from the retaining wall. Each tendon could withstand 240,000 psi. A cathodic protection 
system preserved the steel tendons from rusting in the corrosive soil. To shield the tendons 
from water and compacted backfill, a cardboard sheath was placed around the tendon. Once 
in place, a liquid polyurethane was poured into the cardboard tubes and allowed to solidify. 
The cardboard would eventually deteriorate, but provided the polyurethane the needed time 
to set. Steps were taken to protect the steel inside the retaining walls. A coating of asphalt 
8 D. A. Bayliss and D. H. Deacon, Steelwork Corrosion Control (London: Spon Press, 2002), 11-14, 60. 
9 Albert Hanson and J. Gordon Parr, The Engineer's Guide to Steel (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1965), 201; Samuel H. Marcus, Basics of Structural Steel Design, 2d ed. (Reston, 
Virginia: Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), 27. 
10 Hanson and Parr, 203; Marcus, 28. 
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mastic followed by a glass fabric was applied. It was repeated before the final layer of 
"asphalt saturated felt"" 
Aided by a mostly dry spring, the foundation work, which began in late March, 
chugged ahead into June. "The period of dry weather has come at the ideal time, and we'll 
have no trouble being ready for the first delivery of steel in the first week of June," said 
Hermon Lloyd. The only significant rain delay occurred in mid-May, but did not affect 
AmBridge's delivery of steel in June. If the weather cooperated, Lloyd did not see why the 
erection could not be finished by December 1. If the pace held up, Lloyd said the curious 
would "see the size and shape of the dome by Thanksgiving Day." The early excavation 
work that resulted in the infamous Elliott's Lake now benefited the HSA's tight schedule.^  
American Bridge started building the first of an eventual thirty-seven erection towers 
in late June, three months ahead of schedule. In less than four weeks, "a nest of oil wells," 
highlighted by "eleven derricks.. .and giant cranes transporting steel around" pointed to the 
sky and befitted the oil city. It also demonstrated the rapid pace of construction. Workers had 
placed steel framing to support the tension ring at a height of three stories on the southwest 
side of the site. Architects Naman and Morris speculated that the temporary towers would 
remain until late November when the stadium and the dome frame would be finished. Then 
work would commence inside the stadium, as workers began installing the seats and the air 
conditioning system and on the skylights." 
11 
"Corrosion Control at Houston's Domed Stadium," Materials Protection 3 (November 1964), 65-66. 
12 Clark Nealon, "Post Time," Post, 12 May 1963, sec. 4, p. 2. 
13 Bill Porterfield, "Dome Stadium Work Going on Schedule," Chronicle, 16 June 1963, sec. 7, p. 6; Steve 
Perkins, "Dear Colts: How High the Rent?," Post, 30 June 1963, sec. 4, p. 3; Nealon, "Post Time," Post, 16 July 
1963, sec. 4, p. 1. 
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Reporter Steve Perkins visited the site in late June. "Man, that's a crazy erector set 
they've got going on South Main," he reported. Workers placed and connected some of the 
exterior framework. This was joined by the thirty-seven erection towers. At the center of the 
stadium was a 303-foot tall tower, surrounded by an inner ring of twelve 200-foot towers and 
twenty-four smaller towers (160-feet tall) in an outer ring. Two cranes lifted the sections of 
the roof truss and ribs onto the towers. A 100-ton jack that would lower the roof truss after 
bolting. "You think it looks like something now, wait till we start the span," said 
superintendent Eyster. He hoped that the roof would be complete in December, so a visitor 
could really appreciate the vast size of the roof by standing on the playing surface "at second 
base and break your neck following the sweep of it from one side to the other."14 
Bob Minchew reported a serious transgression committed by American Bridge. 
Minchew claimed that AmBridge was not following the "Architect's reps specific 
instructions." The first violation occurred on July 18 when workers from AmBridge erected a 
steel column a day before the starting date on a concrete footing poured on July 16 late in the 
afternoon. On July 30, American Bridge crew raised part of the tension ring on three columns 
contrary to instruction. Due to the nature of the project and the shared responsibility with its 
successes (or failures), Minchew would not tolerate repeated violations. Another offense by 
American Bridge or any of its sub-contractors would result in ceasing all operations until the 
Architect's directions had been fulfilled and "properly observed." American Bridge crews 
* Perkins, "Dome's Going Up, But Will Grass Ever Grow?," fa#, 21 July 1963, sec. 4, p. 6; "Record-Span 
Dome Roofs Air-Conditioned Stadium," ENR, 27 February 1964, pp. 27-28; T. B. Jefferson, "Welded Steel 
Frames World's Largest Clear-Span Domed Stadium," Welding Engineer 49 (June 1964): 56-57; "Corrosion 
Control at Houston's Domed Stadium," MP 3 (November 1964): 66-67. 
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were instructed to return to the work on the tension ring in an effort to quickly complete this 
portion of the ring.^  
The 750-ton circular tension ring, "the key to the success" of the lamella roof, 
consisted of five-feet high and 2,105-feet long welded steel truss. Seventy-two sections, each 
twenty-seven feet, nine inches, were lifted and welded into place to compose the ring. Each 
section rested on a steel column, 120-feet above the stadium floor. At this nexus "articulated 
joints" were placed. These joints contained two sets of ball bearings, to allow the movement 
of the roof upon its base. The expansion and contraction of the roof would not jeopardize the 
integrity of the structure because of the articulated joints.16 
There were twelve main trusses in the roof. The truss started at the tension ring and 
spanned the gap to the tower at the center of the roof. Each truss was 110-feet long, made of 
two fifty-five feet long pieces welded together. Once the crew placed the first two ribs, the 
lamella trusses were then welded to it. Think of a pie cut into twelve pieces. Each "cut" 
represented a main truss. If six concentric circles were drawn on the surface of the pie, 
towards the edge, these would be the lamella trusses. In between each lamella, additional 
bracings were welded that formed the triangular pattern of the roof. These purlins were about 
thirty feet long. A crane lifted each truss into place. It was bolted to the tension ring and 
welded to the other sections. " 
Welds were used extensively throughout the stadium. There were two locations that 
utilized bolts: the connections between the tension ring and the support columns and 
segments of the trussed ribs. Bolts were used at these key connections to allow the roof to 
15 Robert Minchew to Alan Farasworth, (7/31/63); Minchew to Lott-Drake (7/18/63) Minchew Collection, 94-
274/4, "Harris County Domed Stadium Construction Correspondence, File #3, March-June 1963." 
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move depending on various forces and loads. Welding benefits included eliminating bolt 
heads and the splicing plates between beams. Fusing two beams created a continuous 
structure that is actually stronger than base metal of the steel girders. Welding allowed the 
correction of errors during the erection of the steel framework. Also, fewer pieces are used, 
saving time in the completion of the stadium. Of the two main types of welds available 
during construction, framers used fillet welds instead of groove welds. Although groove 
welds are stronger than fillet welds, they were also more expensive. Additionally, groove 
welds required that each beam be lined up in the same plane and fit perfectly to each other, 
something almost impossible with the average steel beam.18 
Dr. G. R. Kiewitt informed the architects that "radiographs" should be taken of all 
welds of the tension ring because they could crack due to the extreme heaviness of the 
materials. American Bridge wanted to use its radiograph department to take the x-rays and 
forward the results to the architects/* The architects employed Engineering Testing 
Laboratory (ETL) of Houston to inspect and test every critical weld in the structure. ETL's 9 
August report declared that the welding in all divisions of the building were inadequate. Even 
though all the structural steel had been completed in Division 1, for example, only 97%, 
according to ETL, was welded. In Division 2,99% of the structural steel had been 
completed, but only 75% welded. Even worse, Divisions 3 and 4 had structural steel erected 
but none of it had been welded. ETL asserted that "hanging of this much steel secured only 
by erection bolts" was not a good construction practice. Indeed, the report continued, the 
16 Jefferson, 56-55 
18 McCormac and Nelson. 430-431,437-449; Michelle Melaragno, An Introduction to Shell Structures: The Art 
and Science of Vaulting, (New York: Von Nostrand Rcinhold, 1991), 315. 
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small amount of welding was "unsafe." A high force wind, such as the 90 mile/hour one that 
had hit Victoria, Texas two weeks previous, could knock down the steel structures causing 
"great damage and possibly the injury or death of a workman resulting in extensive lawsuits 
to all parties concerned." ETL advocated that additional welders should be employed to 
rectify the situation.* 
A welding shop inspection proposal by ETL asked that one man inspect all welding 
thus far completed to ensure "sound welding construction practices, such as proper prep for 
welding, prepare fit-up, proper cleaning of each weld pass" and that all welders have the 
proper certification. After the three to four day duty, only intermittent checks would be 
required. ETL also recommended a field inspector of all on-going welding who then could 
perform the duties of shop inspection, increasing cost by a mere $8,100 for one man working 
about 135 days to cover the remaining field construction/1 
As construction workers raised and placed the steel framework, a disillusioned, 
skeptical, and unnamed Houston architect pronounced his critique of the stadium. The 
architect prophesized that grass could not grow under the dome and called the $19.8 million 
price tag a farce. Concerning the grass, the architect said, "If you pour in enough air 
conditioning to cool the customers, then you do not have enough heat to grow the grass." 
And the stadium cost? Other cities, the architect asserted, were spending much more than $20 
million for a uncovered stadium. "Somebody is being kidded," he claimed. Hofheinz said he 
19 G. R. Kiewitt to Associated Sports Center Architects (6/6/63). Minchew Collection, 94-274/4, "Harris County 
Domed Stadium Construction Correspondence. File #3, March-June 1963." 
20 Structural Steel Filed Inspection by Engineers Testing Lab, Inc. (8/13/63), Harris County Domed Stadium 
Construction Correspondence, file # 4, June-August 1963; "Gamma Rays Inspect Welds in World's Largest 
Clear-Span Enclosed Structure," Welding Design and Fabrication 37 (August 1964); 58-59. 
21 ETL to Architects (10/1/63), Harris County Domed Stadium Construction Correspondence, file #6, October 
1963. 
236 
was "disheartened" to read such reports. New York's dome-less, single-purpose stadium, he 
posited, was already at least a year behind schedule. O'Malley's Dodger Stadium, he 
continued, was a year late and Candlestick Park suffered from serious design flaws. Hofheinz 
pointed out that the construction schedule for the domed stadium, on the other hand, was 
actually ahead of schedule and, more importantly, cheaper than these inferior ballparks. "We 
are building something nobody on the world has or will have for years to come, something 
that will set the pattern for the 21" century and we're doing it for less money," declared 
Hofheinz. How could this be?, asked Hofheinz. "This is a prestige project," he said. "Every 
supplier has given the Dome Stadium top priority," he continued, and none wanted to be 
perceived as the reason for delay. Besides, Hofheinz added, "Everybody connected with this 
project is going to emerge as the one-and-only, 100-per-cent expert on covered stadiums in 
his Geld." The domed stadium, therefore, was going to have an effect on the future financial 
well-being for those companies affiliated with the stadium. These companies would be able 
to use the stadium as a giant advertisement and reap the benefits of its success.^  
The pace of construction slowed in September 1963 when increased rain, combined 
with the downpours and high winds of Hurricane Cindy, arrived in Houston and stayed for 
four days. The one-time hope of opening the stadium in 1964 due to a better-than-expected 
pace evaporated. Even though the HSA wanted to open the stadium in earnest, Hofheinz 
promised they would wait until the stadium was completed before holding an event under the 
dome. If this meant that opening ceremonies would have to wait until 1965, then Hofheinz 
asked that everyone remain patient. "Certainly, nobody wants to see the stadium used before 
22 Perkins, "Dome's Going Up, But Will Grass Ever Grow?," Post, 21 July 1963, sec. 4, p. 6; Perkins, 
"Hofheinz Reports on Dome: All Systems Go," Post, 28 July 1963, sec. 5, p. 5. 
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it's completely ready," he said. Hofheinz refused to speculate about the finishing date 
because, in his words, "There are so many little details in finishing up the stadium that 
simply can't be accurately gauged as to the length of time it will take to complete." Besides, 
he concluded, "the public will want to see everything perfect" Anything less than perfection 
associated with the stadium would tarnish its already damaged reputation. Hofheinz, 
however, predicted that if good weather reappeared, the beginning of placing the roof on the 
steel frame would commence in December and finish on the first of February. After that, the 
next step was placing the skylights (finishing on 1 March) and completing the remainder of 
the inside work. Despite Hofheinz's exuberance, his construction schedule left less than two 
months to complete the stadium before the start of the 1965 baseball season in April.23 
Another delay arose as a result of a labor dispute between Lott-Drake and the Local 
450 of the International Union of Operating Engineers. This work stoppage postponed 
construction for eight days beginning on 9 October. The work stoppage was not a strike in 
the eyes of the labor union because each worker decided that he "did not want to work." The 
twenty hoisting engineers, according to the Lott-Drake representative, idled an additional 
four hundred laborers, severely hindering construction. The strike cost Lott-Drake cost 
$6,800 each day. Just as important, said Herbert Eyster vice president of H. A. Lott, Inc., the 
strike cost eight days of decent weather. "The weather is a big factor on this job," said Eyster, 
"and we have to make hay while the sun shines." The reasons for the strike, the removal and 
reclassification of a foreman, are not the issue here. What is important is that the fracas 
delayed construction and threatened the chances of completing the stadium before the start of 
the 1965 baseball season. Jack McDonald, business agent for the union, said that the real 
23 Bob Rule, "Sidelights," Press, 17 September 1963, p. 14. 
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reason for the dispute was Lott-Drake searching for a scapegoat "The contractors are behind 
schedule," McDonald charged, "and are looking for an excuse to get an extension from the 
county." The HSA timetable could not withstand work stoppages of any kind if it hoped to 
start the 1964 baseball season under the dome.* 
Despite periods of inclement weather and a work stoppage, AmBridge placed the 
final piece of the dome's steel frame, still three weeks ahead of schedule. To commemorate 
the occasion, AmBridge workers placed two Colt .45s pennants atop the roof. The next phase 
required AmBridge to remove the construction towers and allow work to commence on the 
skylights. Minchew informed Dr. Kiewitt that AmBridge would be ready to start "dome 
swinging" on 25 November if weather cooperated.25 
On Monday, 2 December John Savoy, AmBridge's construction superintendent, 
illustrated his faith in the strength of the roofs steel frame and the stadium's steel support 
columns. A large jack on the top of each of the thirty-seven towers held the frame in place 
until Savoy's order. At 12:30, he communicated via walkie-talkie to workers to began 
lowering the support towers on to the columns. Even Dr. G. R. Kiewitt, of Roof Structures, 
Inc. who designed the dome, climbed the two hundred feet to the top of the "A" support 
tower to observe the process. The "A" tower was the one located at the center of the roof 
with twelve and twenty-four, respectively, branching out from the center in their own perfect 
circles. As the workers lowered the jacks, the frame rested squarely upon the steel pillars. 
24 J. F. M. Davison of Lott-Drake to Architects (10/11/63), Harris County Domed Stadium Construction 
Correspondence, file #6, October 1963; Louis Hofferbert, "Stadium's $31 Million Job Jeopardized," Press, 17 
October 1963. p. 1, 2; "NLRB Complaint Filed In Stadium Dispute," Press, 18 October 1963, p. 2; Charles 
Turbyville, "Domed Stadium Work Resumed," Press, 21 October 1963, pp. 1, 4. 
25 
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Herb Eyster of Lott-Drake predicted that once work began, the dome would be complete 
within ninety days. Eyster said that he was pleased with the progress of construction. "We're 
just about on schedule," he said with work "ahead on some phases.. .and behind on others."* 
The upbeat atmosphere suffered a slight setback during the lowering operation. The 
dome's steel frame came to rest on only one of the three internal supporting walls due to the 
speed of finishing the dome and the wall of steel pillars. As a result, the roof transferred 
220,000 pounds of pressure to each of the stadium's "foot-thick" supporting columns. Instead 
of waiting until they could inspect the remaining walls, the architects decided to place the 
dome upon the steel columns. The immense weight caused each column to bend slightly, an 
inch and one-eighth. AmBridge immediately ceased lowering the dome and hastily erected 
several temporary steel supports between the first and second wall columns. By spreading the 
dome's weight across two wall columns, AmBridge corrected the deflection and avoided 
disaster. Morris claimed this was indeed harmless to the structure and actually allowed them 
to determine the amount of deflection of the columns. Morris tried to quell any concern that 
the deflection damaged structural integrity. A deflection was not a "bow" or "buckle" of the 
beam, he said, but a normal and foreseen effect. To position the support beams on the 
stadium columns retarded construction by three weeks. Morris, however, remained upbeat. If 
they received only "average breaks on the weather," Morris predicted completion "by 
November or December." With the steel skeleton firmly in place, American Bridge began the 
tedious work of removing the roof's support towers.^  
26 Rule. "Sidelights," Press, 3 December 1963, p. 8; Kent Demaret, "Dome Problem Licked, Stadium Moves 
Ahead," Pre&r, 18 January 1964, p. 2. 
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ETL filed its report of the welds in the tension ring and the lamella roof to Minchew 
who, in turn, informed Dr. Kiewitt and John Savoy of AmBridge. Minchew reported that "in 
several locations the iron does not make-up satisfactorily" and could jeopardize AmBridge's 
proposal to "swing the dome" in just a couple of days. Could AmBridge start swinging the 
dome into place if several roof welds were defective? Minchew wanted to ascertain Kiewitt's 
opinion to the "seriousness" of the finding's of this report.* Three weeks later, V. S. Skinner 
of ETL opined that the defective pieces be removed at once.* 
AmBridge began lowering the dome on 2 December 1963. All jacks started lowering 
the roof one-half inch at a time at a tower at a time. After being lowered the first one-half 
inch, ETL inspectors surveyed all connections before continuing. The inspectors stopped any 
additional "jacking down" because of the discovery "that some of the stub columns appeared 
to be leaning out and some leaning in." The representatives from the architects, Roof 
Structures, Walter P. Moore, and Lott-Drake agreed to halt lowering the dome. Ten days 
later, at another group meeting, it was collectively agreed that the columns be "cross 
brac(ed)" immediately.^  Working diligently, the cross bracing would be completed by 15 
January 1964, at which time AmBridge would swing the dome/' 
The dome descended on six-feet long "stub columns" that, in turn, settled on the 
seventy-two main columns. A pin located at one end anchored the "stub column" to the dome 
while another pin at the opposite end fixed the stub to the support column. The stub columns 
28 Letter from Robert J. Minchew to Dr. G. R. Kiewitt, (11/19/63), ETL Folder, WMPA Archives. 
29 Letter from V. S. Skinner to Robert Minchew (12/16/63), ETL Folder, WMPA Archives. 
30 Structural Steel Field Inspection (12/17/63), ETL Folder, WMPA Archives. 
31 G. R. Kiewitt to Louis O. Bass (1/7/64), ETL Folder, WMPA Archives. 
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compensated for expansion and contraction by the dome due to temperature change and the 
forces of external and internal winds.^  
ETL inspector V. S. Skinner notified the architects of distorted steel at "many 
connecting points of lamella chords." AmBridge either did not notice this during installation 
or ignored it. This situation meant, according to Skinner, that the "essential" iron-to-iron 
bolted connections could not be completed. ETL wanted the "distorted plates removed and 
new plates inserted."  ^Because of the extremes stresses placed on the welds of the tension 
ring, no defects could be allowed in any welds on the tension ring or the lamella. ETL 
inspected the 474 welds. Inspectors from Magnaflux MTL worked 120 feet above the ground 
and shot 259 gamma ray "pictures" using gamma ray equipment. After all the welds were 
photographed and evaluated, twenty-three welds were rejected in the tension ring and ten in 
the lamella roof. Each weld was removed, re-welded, and re-certified. The MTL workers also 
went around the stadium to perform random inspections on the welds of individual workers. 
They found ten defective welds, which were corrected.* 
Alan Famsworth of Lott-Drake asked that the exterior drainage work start so as to 
avoid water damage to the base of the stadium. Famsworth reported that his Arm was 
preparing to start its work on the roof. This included installing the decking, skylights, 
flashing, and downspout system. The entire roof system, as designed, was to move water 
from the ten-acre roof through downspout pipes located in the building to the exterior. The 
storm drainage, then, carried the water away from the complex. If the system was not 
32 Demaret, "Dome Problem Licked, Stadium Moves Ahead," Press, 18 January 1964, p. 2. 
33 V. S. Skinner of ETL to Architects (12/18/63), Minchew 94-274/4, Harris County Domed Stadium 
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available, warned Famsworth, "excessive flooding" would result, damaging equipment, 
delaying the project, and increasing the cost. Famsworth wanted the contract to be signed by 
1 March 1964 so as to be completed by May 1.^  
A meeting on 16 January 1964 "to consolidate review work of the past month and 
determine procedures to be followed to continue the 'swinging' of the dome" was attended by 
representatives from just about every group involved in the first phases of construction. S. I. 
Morris representing the architects wanted to deliberate on the statement from Roof Structures 
that claimed the roof was ready to swing free of the towers. The structural engineers 
concurred that the structure below dome was ready to receive it, while the "contractor's 
statement that they were ready and prepared to proceed with the work of swinging the 
dome." Dr. Kiewitt expressed that he had "no reservations which would prevent work from 
progressing." Ken Zimmerman said that once the temporary bracing structure was installed, 
and the inspections completed, the base would be ready for the dome. AmBridge announced 
that it was ready to proceed, and only needed the go-ahead from all other parties. Lott-
Drake's Famsworth asked about when and how long towers could be removed. Kiewitt said 
towers could not be moved until the inspection and repairs were finished. The groups 
"generally agreed" that as inspections continued, repairs made, and inspectors were satisfied, 
"the towers could be removed from the completed sections." AmBridge said that under good 
weather conditions, the towers could be removed in a total of three weeks time.* 
Construction that had been lauded as ahead of schedule only one month earlier, nearly 
ground to a halt. The welding problems held up continuing work. Since the welds had to be 
35 Alan Famsworth (of Lott-Drake) to Architects (1/14/64), Minchew Collection 94-274/4, Harris County 
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flawless, all other work had to be ceased. The delay assured that the stadium would not be 
ready for the 1964 baseball season or any other events. As the HSA announced the new 
schedule, some detractors started labeling the stadium "Houston's Folly." Editors of TTzg 
.Sporfmg News wanted its readers to dismiss the criticisms and applaud the effort. The editors 
called the stadium a "progressive project" that "will bring a new concept to baseball." The 
new domed stadium, 77# ,S]porfmg News continued, would "produce a new era in the sport, 
possibly the greatest in history."  ^
The HSA celebrated every milestone in the construction process and the removal of 
the Anal erection tower was no different Like a child standing on its own legs, a parent 
might notify family and friends of the momentous occasion. Hofheinz wanted the Houston 
family to commemorate a similar milestone in domed stadium history on 12 March. The last 
of the thirty-seven support towers was removed in its place of roof support Freed of the 
towers, the roof rested completely on the stadium walls. Once everything was prepared, the 
7.5 million-pound roof was lowered from the tower supports on to the stadium "an inch at a 
time." On February 4, the roof joined the rest of the stadium and was no longer supported by 
the towers. Workers turned the winch that held the roof on the jacks, and lowered it on its 
steel skeleton. For the rest of the month, the towers were removed one at a time, at a rate of 
two per day. The stadium sank a little over four inches when the roof was released from the 
towers. The engineers calculated that the stadium would sink 4 1/4 inches. The target date to 
36 Memorandum by Robert Minchew (1/17/64), Minchew Collection 94-274/4, Harris County Domed Stadium 
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place the 4,596 skylights was April 1. The seat risers made of concrete were next to be 
installed.* 
Lott-Drake representatives claimed that as of 16 April 1964, "The miracle of South 
Main" was 62% complete. They speculated a June 1" date for the completion of the dome 
roof and a fmalization of the outside walls by the end of the summer. This meant that all 
remaining work would be done inside a complete enclosure, free from interference from 
Houston's weather. "Everything seems to be right on schedule (for a November 25 
completion date) and we've had only the normal amount of delays, and they were anticipated 
in an undertaking of this magnitude," said Hofheinz. 
As construction sped towards completion in 1964, the city's congenial and optimistic 
opinion of Roy Hofheinz and the Houston Sports Association suffered two hits. One of the 
setbacks Hofheinz inflicted upon himself. During the middle of construction, Hofheinz 
decided to change the stadium design. He wanted to add dozens of boxed seats at the top of 
the stadium. But the boxes seats were not just any average boxed seats, they would be 
personal, luxurious clubrooms for the HSA's wealthy cronies. Suddenly, the stadium funded 
by bonds voted by the average Houstonian took on an air of elitism. To say that this was at an 
inopportune time would be an understatement. The other was a result of a growing 
skepticism of the stadium as well as a personal vendetta against Hofheinz. Simply, Mayor 
Louie Welch wanted a downtown coliseum in downtown Houston and he would do anything 
he could to get one. He hoped that the Stock Show would stay downtown if the city built a 
new coliseum. Stock Show officials, however, remained adamant in relocating to northwest 
Harris County. Undeterred, Welch took his plan to the people of Houston to get his coliseum. 
38 
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On 10 April 1964 Hofheinz paid a visit to the Commissioners Court to discuss 
altering stadium designs. Up until now, Hofheinz uncharacteristically kept himself out of 
public scrutiny. He had been too busy overseeing the various aspects of construction. When 
Hofheinz visited the Commissioners, it was not just for a friendly chat. Hofheinz, 
preoccupied with the stadium, conversed only about his investment and ways he could better 
it for the public. His April call centered on improving and expanding seating under the dome. 
Hofheinz requested adding forty-two "private clubrooms" on the ninth level, behind the 
2,000 seats on the ninth level. The clubrooms, said Hofheinz, would actually increase the sale 
of seat options and expedite the amortization of the $3 million bond initiative. The HSA, he 
told the Court, was willing to pay $1 million towards the construction of these clubrooms. 
The plan for these clubrooms, however, required moving air ducts. This would cost an extra 
$168,095. Hofheinz asked the Commissioners for this amount to cover the modification. 
Understandably, the Commissioners neglected to make an immediate response to Hofheinz's 
inquiry. The County remained on a tight fiscal budget. County Engineer Doss reported that of 
the $500,000 contingency fund, only $153,000 remained for the duration of construction, 
which was more than ten months away. And acquiescing to another iron-fisted demand from 
Hofheinz, without considering the impact on future construction, would be unwise and 
fiscally dangerous. Hofheinz asked the Commissioners to raid the contingency fund and 
exploit the interest from the $9.6 million bond issue, a reported $335,000. If this was not 
enough, Hofheinz told the Commissioners to demand the $750,000 Uncle Sam owed Harris 
County for the fallout shelter changes.* 
39 
"Domed Stadium in Need of Cash," Chronicle, 9 April 1964, sec. 1, p. 1; "$168,095 Asked For Stadium 
Clubrooms," Post, 10 April 1964, sec. 1, pp. 1, 5. 
246 
Hofheinz wanted a little consideration from the County for everything he and the 
HSA had already provided. But the clubroom spat evidenced the change in attitude towards 
the HSA, Hofheinz, and the stadium. Only a few years earlier, the people of Houston 
entrusted the HSA with almost $30 million in tax backed bonds. Now, the public refused to 
support the costly, and frivolous, financial additions that Hofheinz craved. If Hofheinz 
wanted these skyboxes, then he should pay for them, not the public. A change was coming in 
Houston and, for the HSA, this change was not good. It was not an immediate turnabout 
against the HSA, but a gradual conversion from allegiance to opposition. 
After the meeting, Judge Elliott contacted Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of 
Civil Defense William P. Durkee and even traveled to Washington, D. C. in the hopes of 
obtaining the $750,000 of civil defense funds. Elliott discovered, however, that not a cent of 
federal money would be available. Durkee insisted that the Civil Defense Department 
notified Harris County, and specifically Elliott, back on 26 June 1962 that federal money 
would not be available. "I am disappointed," said Elliott who insisted that the County should 
be remunerated due to the incorporation of stadium alterations as alluded to by the federal 
government. Architect S. I. Morris also expressed his surprise about this revelation and 
hoped that federal money would become available.* 
Even though the Commissioners "found" $194,000 in savings from the paving and 
drainage contracts, they were unwilling to spend this money on "lavish conference and 
clubrooms for box seat option holders." Ultimately, the court refused Hofheinz's request "to 
crown the stadium with forty-two plush conference rooms." In a vote 4-to-l, the 
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Commissioners worried that by granting this request, the county would only have $140,000 
remaining for any other "construction emergencies." County Engineer Doss and County 
Auditor Bruce said this amount was "dangerously small."* 
The CAromcZe, usually a supporter of the stadium and the HSA, questioned the timing 
of Hofheinz's request. Hofheinz "one of the most aggressive promoters of our times," the 
newspaper reported, had wanted the clubrooms since the start of construction. The newspaper 
wondered why Hofheinz waited until construction was nearly complete before he submitted 
his plans. The C&rowck speculated that Hofheinz waited until the county elections before 
dropping his bombshell. Some of Hofheinz's Mends were running for office. By delaying his 
request, the newspaper continued, Hofheinz could force the commissioners to relent to his 
demands or be threatened with defeat. The newspaper agreed that the forty-two clubrooms 
were a sound investment for the county, but wanted Hofheinz to explain why the HSA 
needed a small amount of county money ($23,000 per room) for the $1 million project. This 
was not exactly a utilitarian use of County money, the paper concluded, and maybe the 
money could be best spent elsewhere.^  
County Engineer Doss and architect S. I. Morris assuaged the commissioner's fears 
that the clubrooms would not greatly affect the performance or safety of the stadium. The 
Commissioners Court relented to Hofheinz's demands and authorized the construction of the 
clubrooms. The commissioners demanded that the HSA cover all construction costs and 
absolve the County of all responsibility if the stadium was not completed before the start of 
the 1965 baseball season. Now that Hofheinz received the approval of his clubrooms, he 
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would have to pay for the relocation of the air conditioning pipes from the top of the stadium 
to the eighth level, the creation of steel stairs and elevators to the ninth level, the extension of 
the plumbing system, and the removal of the uppermost wall. Hofheinz got his club rooms, 
but at the exorbitant financial and personal cost. The people of Houston doubted Hofheinz's 
intentions and his vision of the stadium.^  
R. E. Smith tried to divert negative publicity of the stadium in an interview with a 
Pa# reporter. Smith wanted the people to remember what the completed stadium would due 
to the reputation of Houston. It would put Houston on the baseball and convention maps and 
stimulate the local economy. "Nothing in the world has ever been built that offers the 
advantages to its general area that this thing does," he said. Smith and Hofheinz affirmed the 
concerns they held as lessees of the stadium. Baseball by itself, they said, could not pay for 
the HSA's rent or maintenance. The HSA was forced to create a sales department to find 
groups interested in using the stadium in 1965 to pay the annual rent. Both Smith and 
Hofheinz remained confident that they would find enough renters to make a profit on their 
investment. All that remained, they concluded, was the creation of additional hotel and motel 
space for the burgeoning conventioneers that would most assuredly come to Houston." 
After the 1964 Livestock Show and Rodeo closed its doors for another year, E. C. 
(Dick) Weekley , general manager of the Stock Show, explained the conditions the Show 
experienced at the Coliseum. Due to the lack of space, the Show only displayed "beef and 
dairy cattle, breed sheep and lambs, fat lambs, horses, and rabbits." The Show eliminated 
poultry and hogs while housing horses at Pin Oak Stables. Another problem the Show faced 
42 
"Stadium Compromise?: $1 Million Should Move Ducts, Too," Chronicle, 15 April 1964, sec. 5, p. 2. 
43 Vcrniuad. "HSA Given OK For Clubrooms in Dome," Post, 19 June 1964. sec. 1, pp. 1,12. 
249 
downtown was bringing in and moving the livestock. "We have a problem dragging cattle 
across the street and up concrete ramps, Weekley complained, and "exhibitors don't like 
this." For the rodeo, a bigger arena, 300-feet-long in the stadium compared to 200 in the 
coliseum, "would give the calves and steers a chance to go full-speed." allowing cowboys a 
better opportunity to demonstrating their skills and generating "more excitement for the 
spectators."* 
The Stock Show's plans to erect its new facilities in northwest Houston came to an 
end with a report from its consulting engineers. The engineers estimated that at a minimum, 
new facilities at the northwest site would cost $2,568,000. The Show's buildings and grounds 
committee was authorized to start construction if the report was less than $2 million. Stock 
Show officials, including the new president Stuart Lang, signed a report halting future 
construction. They feared that once construction began, the Stock Show would never 
complete all facilities nor pay off the debt Former Show president Neill Masterson told his 
colleagues that Strain Steel Corporation agreed to construct a "slightly modified show plant," 
including parking lots, bams, and an auction arena, for $2 million. Officials agreed to remain 
at the Sam Houston Coliseum and to reconsider the South Main location.* 
After the Stock Show halted its plan to start construction, the HSA opened 
negotiations with the Stock Show in an effort to relocate the rodeo and related activities to 
the domed stadium site. HSA representatives wanted the Stock Show to construct an 
exhibition building adjacent to the stadium where the rodeo could be held. To lure the Stock 
Show, the HSA revised an earlier proposal to create a new $3.5 million exhibition hall just 
* Ralph Dodd, "Portable Grass?," Poaf, 14 June 1964, sec. 5, pp. 1,2. 
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south of the domed stadium and lease it for free. Upon receiving the HSA offer, Stock Show 
directors authorized its building committee to draw up a contract with the HSA for a 
"double-winged," 500,000 square-foot building. With the stadium's 300,000 square-feet of 
exhibition space, the complex would have the largest exhibit space in the nation. The Stock 
Show would reimburse the HSA up to $3.5 million for the building. (Stock Show officials 
said that it could pay for the $3.5 million at any time due to its vast real estate holdings 
within the city.) The HSA would provide permanent office space and furnish all facilities to 
the Show for free during the rodeo. The HSA would also operate on a "non-profit basis" with 
the Stock Show in this agreement because all income over the general operating expenses 
would go to the Stock Show. The other eleven months of the year, the HSA could use the hall 
as it wished. Both the stadium and the exhibit hall had the potential effect of thrusting 
Houston into the limelight as a major force for conventions and tourism.^  
The Stock Show's executive committee reviewed the proposal for almost six months 
before officially accepting it on 13 February 1964. Labeled "the biggest and finest decision 
that's ever been made by this board," the announcement finally ended several aborted 
attempts made by the HSA to unite its future with that of the Houston Livestock Show and 
Rodeo. Said Leopold Meyer, chairman of the Show's buildings and grounds committee, 
"[Ajfter many ups and downs, differences of opinion and conflicts of emotions" and "many, 
many years of sweat and bold" both sides were able to reach an amicable resolution. 
Importantly, the decision would allow the Show to grow in size and scope. "We'll have more 
46 Bill Durham. "Stock Show's Building Plan Is Called Off," Post, 2 July 1963, sec. 1. pp. 1, 6. 
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cattle, more horses, and possibly quarter horse races and chariot races," said Meyer. "In any 
case," he continued "we'll have a great many accessory attractions that heretofore had not 
been possible." The ability to hold more events and attractions meant that the Stock Show 
would be able to broaden its appeal to the public. With more visitors, Meyer hoped that ticket 
prices could be lowered, thus further widening its popularity. Judge Elliott expressed his 
elation of the decision by the Stock Show men. "We're finally getting around to what was 
originally planned" when the domed stadium was first suggested in the late 1950s.48 
The agreement did not dissuade Mayor Louie Welch from proffering his downtown 
alternative to anyone who would listen. Welch asked the Stock Show to purchase $6.2 
million of city revenue bonds to build a city civic center and keep the Show downtown. 
Keeping the Stock Show downtown, he implored, would "maintain the basis of a unified 
Houston" and enrich the entire downtown district. In the growing convention industry, 
Houston found itself competing with the HSA as "an arm of the county government." The 
results of this "unusual competition" could seriously harm the economy of the city. The only 
way to circumvent this potential financial disaster and take full advantage of the convention 
boom, posited Welch, was for the city to build its own convention and exposition facilities. 
To that end, Welch proposed to expand the Coliseum, build a new convention building, and 
erect two multi-leveled parking lots all for $15.2 million. Welch's civic center promised 
408,000 feet of exhibit space, a miniscule amount as compared to the HSA proposal Welch 
promised that he would not change his mind or alter his proposal. But Welch's harangue fell 
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on interested, but skeptical, Stock Show ears. Stock Show leaders feared that this plan would 
limit the "potential growth" of the Show. Meyer added his own opinion of the decision to 
side with the HSA. "We have to think of the future," he said. Welch again announced that the 
decision "disappointed" him, but pledged to build a new downtown exhibition building 
without the aid and support of the Stock Show* 
Mayor Welch intensified his efforts for a downtown exhibition facility only a few 
months later. Welch, allied by Stock Show president Stuart Lang, contended that a downtown 
civic center would make Houston an even greater convention city. Welch asserted that the 
civic center, the domed stadium and the Stock Show were "not only compatible, but 
complement one another." The stadium facilities could adequately handle the nation's largest 
convention, argued Welch, but not the smaller ones. The civic center, he continued, would 
fill this gap. Welch cited a study by the Greater Houston Convention and Visitors Council, 
which stated that an expanded civic center would accommodate 81% of all national 
conventions. The remaining 19% could be housed in the stadium, the study continued. The 
Houston Chamber of Commerce echoed Welch's sentiments. For the Chamber, additional 
facilities would provide Houston with greater flexibility, meeting the provisions of any, and 
all, groups across the nation.* 
Rebuffed so many times in the past, the civic center idea seemed superfluous 
especially with the near completion of the domed stadium. The same arguments used to 
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justify spending millions of dollars on the domed stadium were implemented in the defense 
of an expanded civic center. At a cost of a mere $7.3 million in city bonds, the creation of an 
exhibition hall and convention center was a real bargain to Houston. Like the stadium, the 
civic center promised to bring in revenue from every individual attending a convention or 
meeting. The planners for these meetings, it was argued, previously had avoided Houston 
because Houston lacked modem, comfortable convention and exhibition facilities, especially 
in the downtown area that housed large hotels, popular restaurants, and expanding 
entertainment facilities. Unlike the stadium and the adjacent exhibition hall, the civic center 
was "centrally located." The civic center promised to be "more accessible, more convenient, 
to at least three-fourths of the residents of the county than any other possible location."51 
Hofheinz and Smith wasted no time in denouncing the civic center. In a press release, 
they asserted that the civic center would duplicate the facilities of the stadium and the Stock 
Show hall, but not as well. They argued that the Coliseum, the Music Hall, and the city 
auditorium failed to generate enough revenue to cover the cost of construction. They even 
borrowed arguments their opponents used against the stadium. For example, money for 
needed city infrastructure, they said, was being stolen to pay for this unneeded facility. Even 
worse, the mayor seemed to seek bankrupting the city to satisfy his own greed and self-
centered pleasure, according to Hofheinz and Smith. The people of Houston needed to take a 
long, hard look at the mayor's proposal, they continued. Voting for more city bonds, they 
warned, was a vote for increased taxes and financial ruin for all involved. Hofheinz and 
Smith were just looking out for the people of Houston and Harris County. Competing 
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facilities would only result in limiting the benefits they could provide and financially 
damaging each while ruining the reputation of Houston.^  
Mayor Welch shot back at the two HSA executives. First, Welch said, the bond issue 
would not raise taxes for the same reason taxes were not increased after the many stadium-
related bond issues. Second, a civic center would not preempt any other city improvement 
needs. These two assertions by Hofheinz and Smith were simply untrue, Welch argued. 
These type of statements were just attempts to scare the public into opposing the civic center 
plan. Welch wanted every Houstonian to know that the same men who supported the dome 
stadium also supported the civic center. "Many of the business interests putting up money for 
the livestock exposition hall at the Domed Stadium site have endorsed" the civic center as 
did the Chamber of Commerce, he blared. But most importantly, the Civic Center "will be 
owned and operated by the community for the benefit of the entire community," Welch said, 
"and not for the private profit of two individuals."  ^
Welch's final assertion that the civic center would benefit every Houstonian, not two 
millionaires, succinctly defined the main argument against the dome stadium and typified the 
increasing pessimism in Houston. Hofheinz and Smith, representing the millionaires club 
called the HSA, were just looking out for their own financial well-being, not what was best 
for the people of Houston. Viewed in this way, the HSA was a menace to the city that 
corralled, unfairly, a larger amount of Houston's wealth at the expense of every Houstonian. 
Welch, then, was empowering his city in an attempt to rectify this disturbing attack in the 
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only way available to the city. A competing civic center would level the playing field, so to 
speak, and allow the city to prosper against an overwhelming threat. 
Proponents of the bond issue held a "fund-raising dinner" at the Rice Hotel. Even 
though the $7.3 million civic center bond issue was one of twelve propositions, the 
comments aired by Hofheinz garnered much of the attention. One of the scheduled speakers 
was Leon Jaworski, the same man who led the drives for the stadium bond issues. Jaworski 
used the platform to rebuke Hofheinz. To Jaworski, Hofheinz's view was dangerously 
myopic. It was this type of improvidence that Jaworski and Hofheinz tried to eliminate when 
he chaired the stadium bond drives. Now that Hofheinz had his stadium, he was unwilling to 
foster additional city growth. "If the same shortsightedness had been shown by the citizens of 
Harris County toward the domed stadium" that Hofheinz was exhibiting towards the civic 
center, averred Jaworski, "there would be no stadium." Hofheinz's charge that an improved 
civic center merely duplicated stadium facilities was also doubted by Jaworski. "Even if there 
is some small duplication," he declared, "anyone having faith in our city's growth knows that 
the Civic Center improvements will be needed in addition to whatever Mr. Hofheinz has to 
offer at the domed stadium facilities—miles from the downtown section."* 
Echoing Jaworski's sentiments was C&rowc/g reporter Morris Frank. Frank wanted 
those present to understand that this issue was not about damaging the HSA's baseball 
franchise or tarnishing the dome's reputation as the premier convention place. Voting for the 
improvements, claimed Frank, was a vote in favor of the future for the city and its people. 
"We want to be in the big leagues with both the city and the people," said Frank, because it 
was "one heck of a city." To make Houston big league in every facet was to endorse the civic 
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center. But Frank did not end his remarks with just rooting for the civic center. He also 
bemoaned Hofheinz's dominion of the stadium as his own personal fiefdom. "I thought the 
dome," he exclaimed, "was for ALL of us," not just Hofheinz's castle. "We need a 
downtown convention center big enough for all and accessible to all," he maintained, "a 
convention center where if a person wants to drink Coca-Cola, sip his favorite brand of beer, 
dip his particular brand of snuff, or park his car, he can do so, without any interference from 
any deals, manipulations, or negotiations." Frank, displeased that he could not purchase a 
Coca-Cola at Colt Stadium, did not want some impersonal, unseen force making decision's 
for him. Hofheinz decided the types of beverages available within the stadium, and Coca-
Cola was not one of them. In this light, a vote for the civic center was a vote for personal 
empowerment over the tyranny of Hofheinz and the HSA.^  
The ffowjfon CAromc/g took issue with Hofheinz's contention in its lead editorial. 
The real reason behind Hofheinz's opposition was not complex, but simple. He wanted a 
monopoly on the city's convention business. The CAromck, it affirmed, "believe(s) in 
competition," especially when the public's interest is at stake. If Hofheinz and Smith had 
their way, it charged, they would have the power to manipulate Houston's "enormous 
convention business—inviting whom they choose, setting the rates of space rental, for 
parking, deciding which souvenirs, which brands of hotdogs and cold drinks can be sold on 
the premises., .and what prices to charge." According to the CArowck, Hofheinz was against 
fair competition in any realm that challenged his power and authority. Without competition 
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from the civic center, conventions would have only one place to go in Houston—the domed 
stadium operated by a tyrant.* 
Houston voters went to the polls on 28 June 1964 to decide on the future of Mayor 
Welch's Civic Center. Over 61,000 Houstonians, the largest in the city's history of bond 
elections, voted in the special election. Judge Elliott still labeled the number of voters as "a 
sorry turnout," in part due to his aversion to most of the twelve propositions. Voters 
approved the Civic Center issue 37,006 for and 24,555 against or a margin of 60.1 percent.^  
After viewing the election results, a disappointed Hofheinz praised those individuals 
who supported the HSA's position, while claiming that he "accepted) the public's decision 
with good grace." Still, Hofheinz tried to gamer public empathy for the future difficulty the 
HSA could face as a result of the election. "Three years ago," he said, "we made a 
commitment to pay the county $750,000 a year under the assumption that the public wanted 
this community's convention center to be at the site of the domed stadium." The people had 
spoken against the success of the domed stadium. Hofheinz wanted his opponents to 
understand that he, Smith, members of the HSA, and all of Harris County for the matter, had 
a serious financial stake in the success of the stadium. If the HSA failed to make its lease 
payments, the HSA would declare bankruptcy and Harris County would be stuck trying to 
amortize the bond debts. The Civic Center, and its inevitable competition, could seriously 
jeopardize the fmancial future of the city and the county. "Had we known that the public 
was prepared to invest in two convention centers, we would not have been willing to make 
such a commitment," he continued. Now the HSA was forced to look elsewhere for revenue 
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to cover its lease with the county. With less than one hundred days scheduled for 1965, the 
HSA started to look for other tenants. One obvious source would be the Oilers, but would 
also require a truce between Hofheinz and Adams. Since larger conventions solidified their 
schedules years in advance, the HSA began scrambling for other events like circuses, auto 
and boat shows, and political rallies.* 
The arguments Hofheinz used to justify the stadium and impugn the new civic center 
reveal more than just simple self interest. For Hofheinz, an assault on the stadium was akin to 
an attack on his person or family. He vigorously defended the stadium because he was 
defending his reputation. Doing so, Hofheinz exposed the shift that was well underway in 
Houston. Hofheinz's rhetoric revealed the growing cynicism in society. Previously, Houston 
faced a bright, infinite future in which the domed stadium obviously maintained and 
represented. Even if the sports team were pathetic, the stadium would always generate 
revenue. There was plenty of room in Houston's economic pie, a feeling of infinitude. In his 
reappraisal of Houston, Hofheinz could now only see a city beset by serious limits. The once 
bustling and Houston could not support more than one large convention center. The new 
civic center would take events, prestige, and money from the domed stadium that Hofheinz 
perceived was rightfully the County's and the HSA's. Even worse, Mayor Welch and his 
supporters foisted their new civic center plans on the HSA and Hofheinz. The people had 
already spoken, and voted for the stadium. But with his meddling, the mayor's civic center 
would only bring chaos. 
* "Hofheinz Says He'll Take Loss Gracefully," C&ronick, 28 June 1964, sec. 1, p. 18; Dick Rayciaft, "Domed 
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Still, Hofheinz would not let his stadium, and the weakening enthusiasm around it, 
die without a battle. Neither would NL president Warren Giles. On an overcast and rainy 
September day, Giles paid his fourth visit to the now eighty-five percent complete stadium. 
Giles expressed his delight with the progress of construction and his relief that Houston was 
in the National League. As workers placed the standards for the seats, Giles remarked on the 
brightness inside despite the cloudy skies outside. "Why it's bright enough in here now to 
play a game without lights," Giles concluded. The NL president also commented on his 
feeling of the stadium's interior. "I got the idea the structure was so big it might lack 
warmth" inside the "cold, steel building," he said. Surprisingly, he continued, "(T)t's not like 
that at all." Hofheinz added that the multi-colored seats would only add additional "warmth" 
to the atmosphere under the dome.^  
Taken individually, the clubroom and coliseum battles could be viewed as simply the 
fickleness of Houston voters and leaders. On one hand, they refused to pay for Hofheinz's 
stadium alterations. Since he wanted the sky boxes, then he should pay for them. On the 
other hand, they went to the polls to provide funds for a new downtown coliseum, 
implementing the same arguments Hofheinz used in the earlier bond skirmishes. But 
collectively, the results of these two disputes showed a decreasing enthusiasm for Hofheinz 
and the HSA. 
With construction proceeding, an almost impatient atmosphere swirled among dome 
disciples, the curious, and the skeptical. The HSA and nearly every worker on-site were 
inundated with requests to tour the stadium or asked questions pertaining to any one of the 
stadium's facts. Robert Minchew, stadium architect provided just a small sample of the 
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questions he answered. "The man on the street wants the dome to be a big plastic bubble and 
he wants it to open. It won't." he said. "There'll be a lot of steel up there," Minchew added, 
"You'll be able to see the sky all right, but not through one big picture window." Mickey 
Herskowitz, sports reporter for the Poaf, toured the forty percent complete stadium 
in mid-February. "Hearing about it, and seeing it for oneself," he wrote, "is the difference 
between reading that Jayne Mansfield measures 42-19-37, and seeing her in a bikini." For 
Herskowitz, it was one thing to hear about the various statistics of the domed stadium, like 
the 210 feet to the acme of the roof or that the stadium's stands on 40,000 cubic feet of 
concrete, and actually touring through the incomplete, but still impressive, structure. "To 
appreciate the sweeping vastness of this project, the full majesty of it, you have to stand on 
the ground floor and let the size of it overpower you," Herskowitz concluded.* 
Throughout the fall and winter months, the number of tours to the stadium increased. 
Judge Elliott, British consul general Peter Hop, and seamen from the HMS London. 
participated in an impromptu "football game," the first "game" under the dome on 28 
September. Eighteen days later, a group of senior citizens from Bellaire, Texas paid a visit. 
Instead of traveling to Clear Lake, Texas to tour the Manned Spacecraft Center, the forty-six 
seniors asked to see the domed stadium. In late November, hundreds of major and minor 
leagues executives and sports reporters strolled through the stadium during baseball's winter 
meetings. After viewing the stadium and listening to the tour guide cite dozens of facts and 
figures, almost every visitor left impressed with the stadium. Some individuals, like Dayfon 
Afgwj reporter Si Burick, Earl Lawson from the Cmczwzafz Posf and fraw writer 
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Les Biederman, exited the stadium with positive impressions. Burick cited the "vastness of 
the stadium," Biederman labeled it "revolutionary" while Lawson simply said, "I'm awed." 
Others, however, remained skeptical. Some like writer Bill Leggest 
commented on the un-baseball-like conditions under the dome. "The knuckle ball won't 
break," he said. Other writers, like Harry Jupiter from the Am Francisco Examiner, boldly 
denounced the stadium experiment. "It will never leave the ground," he said. What can be 
learned is that that the tourist through the stadium was not necessarily a baseball or sports 
fan. Individuals wanted to see the stadium for themselves and formulate their own opinion of 
it. All that was certain from these tours was that the dome stadium was generating interest.61 
Hofheinz proudly announced that the Colt. 45s would play the world champion New 
York Yankees in a weekend series during April 9,10, and 11,1965 to "launch" the domed 
stadium. The Baltimore Orioles would also play the .45s over the same weekend on the 10* 
and the 11*. "This schedule of pre-season games," said Hofheinz, "will permit our out-of-
county and out-of-state friends to come see the Domed Stadium for the first week end event 
ever held in the stadium." The .45s would play three games against the Yankees and two 
against the Orioles. This "informal inauguration" of the Dome, according to Hofheinz, 
allowed .45s fans to see as many Houston players as possible competing for a roster spot in 
1965. This was an understandable "baseball-savvy" rationale. But the Yankees, then as now, 
were the most popular team in the major leagues. With names like Whitey Ford, Clete Boyer, 
61 Bob Lee, "Domed Stadium First 'Game,'" Post, 28 September 1964, sec. 1, p. 1, 15; "Citizens Agog at 
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Roger Maris, and the great Mickey Mantle, baseball fans from across Texas would want to 
see the lowly .45s battle the Yankee juggernaut.^  
The new pitching coach for the Colt .45s, Howie Pollet, asked Hofheinz when he and 
his staff could start their workouts inside the stadium. Hofheinz tentatively replied that the 
.45s pitchers might perform some limited practice before Christmas, with batting practice 
after the new year, and "some full scale tests" in late February, after the installation of the 
sod. By exploring the conditions under the dome, Pollet wanted his pitchers to get to know 
their future home. "What we want to do is found out all we can about what problems both 
pitchers and hitters are going to have in the stadium," he said. "After all, we're going to be 
going down an uncharted course," Pollet continued, and the .45s needed to be prepared to 
know, and predict, the possible contingencies they could expect under the dome.^  
In between the winter meetings and the trips to the stadium, Hofheinz convened a 
press conference at the Shamrock Hilton. The sports writers who assembled anticipated the 
announcement of a major trade for the .45s, maybe the acquisition of a much coveted power 
hitter. Instead, Hofheinz declared the change of the Houston nickname. Speaking to national 
sports writers, Hofheinz, with R. E. Smith at his side, proclaimed that, due to a legal skirmish 
with the Colt Firearms Company, the Houston baseball team "From henceforth and 
evermore" would be called the "Astros." (The Colt Company originally gave permission to 
the HSA to use the "Colt .45" name and symbol, but then asked for a percentage from the 
sale of souvenirs. Hofheinz refused to share any revenue with the firearm firm and so decided 
to change the nickname.) Hofheinz garnered the greatest effect by announcing his decision at 
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the baseball winter meetings. Instead of causing just a small, local outbreak, Clark Nealon 
opined that Hofheinz's "guided missile" secured "national exposure, which was just what 
Hofheinz wanted.* 
The newspaper accounts of the stadium still supported the stadium, but with less 
exhilaration. Hofheinz generated even more favorable press when Houston Oilers general 
manager, Carroll Martin, agreed to a ten-year lease with the HSA. The Oiler's, it appeared, 
would play all home games under the dome, ending four months of speculation and the often 
cantankerous negotiations. Meeting in Hofheinz's personal apartment, Martin said, "Let us 
say that the Oilers are very pleased to give their fans a chance to see professional football in 
the most modern stadium in the nation." "In the world," interrupted Hofheinz said in an 
effort to refine Martin's less-than-accurate statement. Hofheinz also revealed that a synthetic 
grass would eventually be installed in the dome that would allow different types of events on 
the same surface. Hofheinz detailed how the playing surface would be converted from a 
baseball field to a football Geld. Grass questions, he continued, would cease to exist in 1966 
when a synthetic surface would replace the natural grass. "If we were only concerned with 
sports, we'd have half as many problems," said Hofheinz, "But we have to consider all the 
ultimate uses of the stadium."  ^
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Keeping his winning streak alive a week later, Hofheinz revealed the new Astros 
insignia. Said Hofheinz, "We feel the new insignia encompasses all aspects of the Houston 
baseball scene—the dome, the new name, baseball and the space connotation." Hofheinz 
explained the incorporation of the three almost disparate parts into one seemingly coherent 
idea. Hofheinz claimed his space-theme insignia "was most logical" because the Houston 
was "Space City, USA" and Astros trained close to "Launching Pad USA" (in Cocoa, 
Florida, lose to Cape Kennedy). Hofheinz placed the domed stadium at the center of the blue 
circular emblem. Directly beneath the stadium, "Astros" appeared in block lettering with four 
baseballs orbiting both stadium and nickname. The colors of the insignia remained orange 
and blue. "We are a new ball club with the world's most modern stadium and we felt the 
name and trademark should be on the same theme," said Hofheinz. But Hofheinz provided 
the most important reasoning for his new nickname and new symbol for the baseball club. 
"This theme will help dispel the image of Texas as a land of cowboys and Indians," he said, 
"and it behooves every citizen in this area to call attention to the 20* century aspects of 
Texas and Houston." A new nickname and new symbol for the Houston baseball nine would 
eliminate all other erroneous beliefs and opinions of the city and the state.* 
Hofheinz, ever the promoter, asserted that the new insignia and nickname could even 
alter the economic landscape of Houston, along with the stadium. "If in the use of the name 
and insignia we call attention to the great economic impact on the city and cause one family 
and one industry to move here," he said, "we have put additional dollars into the economy of 
66 Hal Lundgren, "Astros Unveil Insignia for '65," Post, 10 December 1964, sec. 11, p. 1. 
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the city." But, Hofheinz continued, the baseball team and the stadium would "encourage 
many people to move here and many industries to locate here."  ^
Hofheniz, Smith, Adams, Dr. Philip Hoffman (president of the University of 
Houston), and Stuart Lang (president of the Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo) announced 
12 December 1964 that they planned to call the stadium the Astrodome. Judge Elliott said 
"They can call it what they like, but the official name is still the Harris County Domed 
Stadium." Elliott refused to allow the HSA to exert its influence over the name of the public 
stadium. The people of Harris County paid for the stadium, therefore it was the public's 
stadium, not the HSA. "I am confidant," Elliott presumed, "the name is not in keeping with 
the wishes of the people."68 
When the Colt .45s closed their first stadium and walked the few hundred feet to the 
domed stadium, baseball fans could bid "adieu" to many sources of spectator displeasure and 
player dissatisfaction. From the sport side, "Gone will be the gripes from players on the bad 
lighting" and "the stiff wind blowing in from right field that frustrated so many lefthand 
hitters." Baseball players could expect the perfect playing conditions. For baseball fans, 
"[G]one will be the mosquito spraying chores" and the "sweltering heat that sent over 100 
fans to the first aid room during a Sunday afternoon doubleheader. Spectators would be 
surrounded with splendor and grandeur. 
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CHAPTER 9: DOMESDAY 
A long, arduous journey neared its end in April 1965. The Houston Sports 
Association (HSA) and their newly christened Astros baseball squad, the members of the 
Harris County Commissioners Court, and the people of Harris County and Houston prepared 
to unveil the multi-million dollar, multi-purpose domed stadium to the rest of the world. The 
Harris County Domed Stadium, or the Astrodome according to HSA president Roy Hofheinz, 
stood prepared to entertain tens of thousands of spectators for any type of event that could be 
conceived. The "Texas-size solarium" eradicated the hot, humid, muggy Gulf summers and 
the blood thirsty mosquitoes that had feasted on Houston baseball fans before 1965. "Inside 
and out," the Astrodome was "designed to pamper the fan," entice him from the TV in his air 
conditioned home, and cajole him to spend his money/ 
Generally, the atmosphere in Houston for the grand opening, or "Domesday," was 
electric and optimistic. The Astrodome, the "gigantic plastic-capped edifice that stands like a 
glimmering gem in South Texas sun,"  ^was called "bigger than show biz, even Texas style, 
and a "testimonial to man's ingenuity," "a cathedral," and "Houston's gaudiest jewel. 
Hundreds of the interested and curious had already toured the stadium through its various 
stages of completion. Now that Domesday loomed closer, the tours ceased and the workers 
hurried to finish the interior. The stadium would topple the stereotype that Houston was a 
"cow town with an oversupply of bricks and bucks."  ^Jake Gaudaùr, a veteran Canadian 
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stadium operator, opined, "The minute the doors of this Astrodome were opened every sports 
arena in the world became obsolete."* 
Much rode on the success of Domesday. The HSA had faced continual skepticism 
concerning the stadium's cost and safety, its lucrative contract with the County, Roy 
Hofheinz's personal apartment behind the scoreboard, and his objectionable demand for his 
opulent clubrooms. The public demanded that the stadium, therefore, be more than what its 
supporters claimed. This is where the importance of Roy Hofheinz can not be 
underestimated. Throughout his public discourse, Hofheinz focused on individual choice and 
empowerment. In a world of limits, Hofheinz championed ideas of individual autonomy. The 
stadium would be the great equalizer, socially and athletically. The stadium was supposed to 
eliminate unforeseen, uncontrollable forces outside while carefully regulating everything that 
occurred under the dome. 
The outside of the Astrodome had been described as "an intricate Viennese torte that 
had risen nicely on top and was covered with latticework pastry like pies baked by farm 
wives."  ^An average baseball fan could arrive at the stadium via Highway 610 and park his 
car in the vast lot that could hold 30,000 autos and 100 buses. Even if he parked in the lots 
furthest distance from the stadium, he had to walk only a few hundred feet to the stadium's 
entrance or ticket booth. As he entered the stadium, he could see the green grass in the 
distance, twenty-five feet below ground level. As he walked towards the seats, and peered 
away 6om the playing field, he might naturally look upwards at the lattice framework of the 
roof and the 4,596 skylights. Turning his gaze from the sky, back to the inside of the stadium, 
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he would see nothing but the color of the grandstands that "stretched in great bands, first red, 
then purple, then gold and yellow, black and blue." Each of these individual colors denoted 
"a different caste, a different price, and perhaps a different cushion in the seat."* Similarly, 
the Astros ticket he purchased was color-coded, corresponding to the seating section where 
his seat was located. For example, a purple ticket meant the spectator's seat was located in 
the purple section, a gold ticket the gold section, red for red, and so forth. The HSA took an 
additional step to aid the spectator in finding his seat in the stadium. Portable concession 
stands, outer walls of the section, and even the lavatory walls were painted to match the seat 
colors/ 
The color-coded seats, walls, and concession stands were not the only devices that the 
HSA implemented to help the spectator find his seat while enjoying his surroundings. The t 
the uniform a stadium employee wore depended on where he or she worked. Hofheinz 
devised a specific theme for the different places inside the stadium. Hofheinz wanted his 
employee to wear a costume that demonstrated his idea of this theme. Hofheinz employed 
costume designer Evelyn Norton Anderson to make these ideas come to life. The result was 
fifty-three designs for stadium workers. The gate men and parking lot attendants, or "space 
cadets," wore "galactic blue" space suits, which included a decorative helmet of fiberglass, 
adapted from those worn by real astronauts from NASA. Groundskeepers wore red space 
suits with gold helmets and black boots. "Spacettes," female ushers, were clad in gold lame. 
Evelyn Anderson's coordinator, Iris Siff said of the spacette uniform, "We did a real theatre 
suit for the spacettes" because "You have to have an elegant uniform for that setting." Siff 
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asserted that once a spectator entered the stadium, "it's more like a huge theatre" that 
required the elegant uniform and not something just "cute." "We had the gold lame quilted 
with lightweight flannel" that Siff speculated would have cost $200 retail. The hats the 
spacettes wore had "peek-thru windows like the dome, and they're deep pillboxes so they 
won't mess up a girls' hair." Hofheinz told Siff to design what she wanted, regardless of cost. 
"We were able to select what we wanted," said Siff, and take the designs to Hofheinz for his 
approval. In the Bavarian beer garden called the Domeskeller, the waitresses wore "a blue 
peasant maid costume" with white tights. The colors selected for the Sky Dome Club were 
gold, green, and blue. The long skirts of the hostesses were "gold metallic boucle, threaded 
with green and blue." The bodices were marked with "bright rays" that matched the Club's 
emblem. At the Countdown Cafeteria, counter servers wore costumes adorned with numbers 
so that at the beginning of the line you were served by "10" and at the end, the dessert line, 
you were served by "1" and you paid the cashier labeled "Blastoff." The busboys wore shirts 
emblazoned with the number zero. Butlers of the private boxes wore orange jackets with gold 
buttons and black trousers and white gloves. The whole thing was "comparable to costuming 
a dozen operas: Wagnerian style!"'" 
Hofheinz explained his reasons behind the color schemes inside the clubrooms on the 
ninth level and implemented throughout the stadium. Hofheinz made his decisions on the 
color schemes after several surveys showed that 42% of TV and radio audiences for baseball 
games were women. "We did a lot of research before choosing the color," he said, and "made 
sure that each color complemented the complexion and cosmetics and clothing of women." 
* "The Match Game," Posf, 8 April 1965, sec. 9, p. 7; "Arenas," Time, 4 January 1958, p. 68. 
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This was by no means an easy feat to create fifty-three different color schemes, he admitted, 
but it was definitely worth the two weeks he spent on it. "Women will go to the ball game 
now because there will be no wind to whip their hairdos, no rain to ruin their dress and no 
sun to turn them red," he continued. The result, Hofheinz proudly asserted, was that "The 
Astrodome will get a promenade of the best-gowned, best-looking and most-influential 
women ever collected."" 
"The colors are exactly as I first projected," boasted Hofheinz. He started his color 
study with the green of the playing Geld. The remaining colors complimented the green and 
"the color of blue on the skyboxes at the top." Hofheinz wanted the club rooms painted blue 
because it was "the best color" he could use "to show off milady's gown." Hofheinz then 
selected the remaining hues "to declare gaiety," he said, because, "I don't want people 
walking in here and falling asleep." Hofheinz's emphasis on the color patterns he 
implemented throughout the stadium pointed to the importance of the individual fan to the 
success of the stadium. But it also signaled his understanding of personalizing the 
individual's experience inside the stadium. Providing an appealing atmosphere, with 
complimentary colors that proved gentle on the eyes, would enhance the individual 
experience. Hofheinz promised, "I could change the color of this stadium and change your 
mood."  ^
In addition to the concession stands, or as they were called the "Lunching Pads," the 
stadium's amenities included five separate restaurants. Two of the Ave were private clubs, 
these were the Skydome Club and the Astrodome Club. The Skydome Club, a replica of a 
" Texas Magazine, 4 April 1962, p. 22. 
271 
Japanese steakhouse, was reserved solely for those individuals who occupied the private sky 
boxes. The Astrodome Club served 600 people and was open throughout the year. To 
become a member of the Astrodome Club, one had to be a season ticket holder. Located at 
the press box level, the Astrodome Club's décor demonstrated the history of Texas from the 
early 19* century to Texas's part in the space program. It also had three bars, one 100-foot 
long, another a 90-foot perimeter bar, and the third was a all-male bar. The Trailblazer Club, 
located in the purple level, was open to the general public and sat 300. It was also based on a 
historical theme, but this one was "man's struggle for a better life down through the ages." 
On the main level, the Countdown Cafeteria was located. The Cafeteria was decorated with 
statues of athletes from antiquity to modem times. And Anally, under the centerfield pavilion, 
was the Astrodome's version of a Bavarian beer garden, the Domeskeller, complete with 
artificial trees and a large window to view the playing field during warm ups. The Astrodome 
seemed more like a luxuriant resort hotel than a stadium. No matter the price of the ticket, 
every fan could partake in one of the stadium's eating and drinking establishments." 
Box seats cost $3.50 with reserved seats priced at $2.50. The amenities for these 
spectators included access to the Trailblazer Restaurant, which served the general spectator 
in lieu of a separate club. "The great unwashed," according to one observer, will find 
nourishment in the Count-Down Cafeteria" with its sporting theme.* General admission 
seats cost $2 while the 4,000 "cheap" seats (seats without a cushioned backrest) cost $1.50. 
"See those windows in the centerfield fence?" Hofheinz queried rhetorically, "A man who 
12 Gary Cartwright, "A Barnum Named Hofheinz. A Big Top Called Astrodome." The New York Times 
Magazine, 21 July 1968, p. 10. 
13 
"5 Restaurants Under Dome," Chronicle, 8 April 1965, sec. 5, p. 46; "Lost in the Stars," Newsweek, 19 April 
1965, p. 64. 
14 Sutton, pp. 36-37. 
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gets here early parks in one of our 30,000 spaces, buys a $1.50 ticket, watches batting and 
fielding practice from one of those windows while he eats in the Domeskellar and then sees 
the game, will spend less than it would cost him to stay home watching television with one 
light turned on and his air conditioning running." This was such a bargain, boasted Hofheinz. 
"He can't afford to stay home."  ^
Bill Connolly, reporter for the ffowrfon CAromck observed, "The Harris County 
Domed Stadium has a place for everyone." The rich occupied the top of the stadium and the 
Skydome Club. The "almost rich" resided in the fifth level in their Astrodome Club/* Season 
ticket holders bought access to the Astrodome Club. On one wall of the Club a Toulouse-
Lautrec mural was recreated created using formica (looking closely at the mural, a likeness 
of Hofheinz appeared as one of the subjects). Over the one-hundred feet long bar was a 
model spaceship, complete with its floating astronaut. The average fan, which Hofheinz and 
the HSA desperately wanted to bring to the stadium and make it a paying venture, enjoyed 
several choices. The average fan that walked up to the ticket office the day of the game 
needed to develop a personal identity inside the stadium. This was what Hofheinz hoped he 
was achieving by catering to the various demands of various individuals. Hofheinz spent 
millions of dollars "to assure complete comfort for the spectators." The upholstered theater 
seats and other small details "so essential to spectator convenience" included the sound 
system, ease of getting to the seats, and the parking facilities." 
15 Smith, "It's Cheaper at Dome Than Stay in' Home,'' Post, 15 February 1965, sec. 4, p. 2; Sutton, 36. 
16 Connolly, "Everyone and Everything Is Ready at the Dome," Chronicle, 9 April 1965, Texas edition, sec. I, 
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Speaking of the type of baseball fan who went to the Astrodome, Hofheinz said, "Our 
fans are more like the ones they have out in California" not the "rowdies or semi-delinquents 
who follow the (New York) Mets." The spectators who would come out to see an Astros 
game, claimed Hofheinz, were new fans. These new fans did not make the effort to suffer 
through the heat, humidity, and mosquitoes of a minor league Houston Buffaloes. Hofheinz 
even posited that the new baseball fans refused to attend Astros' games when they were 
called the Colt .45s and played across the street. Hofheinz argued that these new fans were 
also part of the new rich in Houston. "We have by far a higher percentage of fans in the 
upper economic brackets than you'll find in any other park," boasted Hofheinz. But he 
reassured the common fan that the Astrodome had plenty of amenities for him. This was due 
to the competitive nature of the sports business. "You're competing for attention," he added 
so "we ako have the best seats and service at the dollar-fifty level." All the frills and 
superfluous amenities were designed by Hofheinz in an attempt to create new kinds of fans/* 
Each of the fifty-four private club rooms were decorated in a different theme. 
Although Hofheinz allowed the lessee to select the theme for the club room, he still 
maintained veto authority and eliminated anything he deemed objectionable. Still, none of 
the lessees attempted to personalize the private box. This allowed Hofheinz to determine the 
motif for each luxury suite. In one suite, for example, Hofheinz offered his interpretation of 
the American West with a pair of longhoms and flintlock guns in a gun rack. In another, 
Hofheinz decorated like the interior of a ship's cabin, complete with wood-paneled walls, 
portholes, wheels, and lanterns. The HSA sold each box "on a firm five-year contract." 
Spectators could choose from either a 24- or a 30-seat private room ($14,800- and $18,6000-
18 Roger Angel 1, "The Cool Bubble," New Yorker, 14 May 1966, p. 135 (italics in original). 
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a-year, respectively) complete with a sixteen by eleven and one-half private clubroom, 
personal waiter, refrigerator, closed-circuit television set, private washroom, and access to 
the Skydome Club, open every day of the year so "When Joe Hunk from Timbuctoo (sic) 
comes visiting in the winter you'll bring him out here for lunch and tell him 'If there was a 
ball game on, you'd watch it from here.'"'* 
Although to some it seemed that Hofheinz cared more for his wealthy Mends of 
Houston than the commoner, Hofheinz assured everyone that they would experience nothing 
but ease and comfort under the dome. HSA officials claimed the reason they chose a domed 
stadium was due to competition "against more entertainment activities conducted in more 
comfortable conditions." This was the reason the stadium would be air conditioned, the aisles 
would be wide, the myriad colors, and "theatre-type seats" were chosen.* Hofheinz was 
"also determined that the common man of Harris County," who voted for the tax bonds to 
build the Astrodome, "should feel that he is being treated just as well as the kings of 
petroleum, gas, and cattle in the upper tiers" with air-conditioned comfort on upholstered 
seats that Hofheinz claimed "reduce(d) the length of a baseball game by an hour."  ^
Hofheinz deflected additional criticism that the stadium's opulence was just a result 
of his amazing selfishness. Hofheinz, the critique went, was foisting his vision of the stadium 
upon the people. The Harris County Domed Stadium, it continued, was not Hofheinz's 
personal playground. He should not decorate it in such a garish fashion or make it into an 
edifice to aggrandize himself. The stadium, Hofheinz countered, was not only the great 
equalizer among sports players, but also the great equalizer for the fan. "Now let's talk about 
Smith, "It's Cheaper at Dome Than Stayin' Home," f osf, 15 February 1965, sec. 4, p. 2; Gary Taylor, "End 
of an AstroEra," Houston City Magazine 6 (June 1982): 43. 
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real grandeur, about the guy who spends $1.50 to see a ball game, and can sit on foam 
rubber, and have a reasonable meal without having to eat hot dogs." He insisted that he did 
not forget about the needs of the common Houston fan. "If we've established grandeur we've 
done it for the bleacher fan," he continued "and the country club member." Both individuals 
would be able to satisfy their own personal tastes under the dome. Hofheinz said, "A man can 
pick his budget." He can choose what type of experience he could have inside the stadium, 
within reason and within Hofheinz's own conception. "Baseball people," he continued, "will 
tell you that just give them a crackerbarrel seat and a stale frankfurter and they'll be happy." 
Hofheinz was unwilling to follow this pedestrian formula, partly because it would prove 
financially disastrous. "Maybe you can do that with a real baseball fan" in cities with an 
established heritage of big league sports franchises, "but we're just educating the people to 
baseball here." Besides, concluded Hofheinz, "why shouldn't they feel good and 
comfortable."  ^
Liz Smith of TZZwafrafed toured the Astrodome before its grand opening and 
offered her report on the interior. According to Smith, "Judge Hofheinz has gilded the 
Houston Astrodome with $6 million worth of luxuries that have little to do with 
baseball—except to coddle the fan as he has never been coddled before," she wrote.^  "But 
nowhere is his Midas touch, and taste, more evident than within the confines of the Dome 
itself," she continued. True, he had spent millions for the HSA office, with "yards and yards 
of deep gold carpet, lush velvet scarlet-and-gold chairs supported by rampant Austrian lions 
20 
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or gold metal frames, specially designed gold telephones on every gold-trimmed Louis XIV 
desk."* Even the toilet facilities were spray painted with yellow-gold Velvatex, seat, lid, 
pipes, everything. A unnamed architect asserted to Smith that the baseball team "was the last 
thing on the judge's mind."  ^
Since the dome was designed to be the biggest and the best, Hofheinz incorporated a 
$2 million, 474-foot long, four stories high, electronic scoreboard. Containing over 50,000 
individual light bulbs, the flashing scoreboard promised to provide "the biggest spectacle in 
lights ever constructed." Controlled in the press box by six technicians, the 300-ton 
scoreboard required over 1,200 miles of wiring. A typical scoreboard recorded balls, strikes, 
and outs. This was too blasé for Hofheinz, who wanted a scoreboard that exemplified the 
entertainment aspect of the stadium The scoreboard, like the game itself, was entertainment, 
said HSA publicity man Bill Giles. "Anything we can do to put a little more entertainment 
into it," Giles said, " we want to do." The scoreboard was another amenity on a grand scale 
for the average fan. When an Astro hit a homerun, the scoreboard erupted in electronic 
fireworks and skyrockets. The heads of two steers appeared, snorting fire. Then, a cowboy 
emerged on the left of the screen and chased a steer that appeared on the right. Similarly, if 
the opposition his a homerun, the words "tilt" flashed across the screen. * 
In a 1966 interview, a reporter questioned the Hofheinz about baseball attendees 
whom did not seem devoted to the game because these spectators did not keep score. "This 
park keeps 'em interested enough so they don't Aave to keep busy with a pencil and 
scorecard," Hofheinz replied. In his rejoinder, Hofheinz told the reporter that the stadium was 
* L.Smith, 46. 
= L. Smith, 51. 
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designed completely for the fan, not for himself. "Why, in most other parks you got nothing 
to do but watch the game, keep score, and sit on a hard wooden seat," but the Astrodome was 
wholly different. "This place was built to keep the fans happy," he continued, complete with 
"good seats, fine restaurants, and our scoreboard to look at." Fans who traveled to the 
stadium should not "have to make a personal sacrifice to like baseball" especially since the 
Astrodome "removed baseball from the rough-and-tumble era." We're in the business of 
sports entertainment. Baseball isn't a game to which your individuals come alone just to 
watch the game. They come for social enjoyment. They like to entertain and entertained at 
the ball park."  ^
"The place wouldn't be anywhere near as elegant as it is if it weren't for Roy," said 
business partner R. E. Smith. "We've spent $8 million of our own funds because he wanted it 
to be just so. That super-duper score board of his was a $2 million item that won't cost the 
taxpayers a cent. Roy said he had to have it," concluded Smith. Others agreed with R. E. 
Smith that the Astrodome had become a reality thanks to Hofheinz. "It was he who insisted 
that it could be done," who hastened its completion for the 1965 baseball season, and moved 
into his personal office inside the incomplete stadium six months ahead of schedule "to make 
sure that every detail was perfect." According to Hofheinz, what sold the major leagues on 
Texas baseball was the idea of a domed stadium "The idea of a showplace stadium" was the 
reason major league baseball backed the HSA's move for a team over Marty Marion.^  
Hofheinz viewed the Astrodome as his own "personal living room" in his mansion, 
even though he owned a 110-acre property he called Yorktown, a beach house on Galveston 
26 
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Bay called "Huckster House," a 550-acre farm, and two hunting camps, the Kwik Kwack 
Klub and the Loose Goose Lodge. Hofheinz decorated each room in Huckster House in a 
different theme, the Old West, the South Seas Lounge, a Buccaneer Room (complete with 
"The Brig") a Circus Room, the Gay Nineties Room, the French Room, and the Harem 
Room. This vision of theme areas paralled Hofheinz's interpretation of the Astrodome.* 
Behind the scoreboard, Hofheinz created his own personal apartment of rooms that 
spanned from the ground level to the roof. At the ground level, or the third level inside the 
stadium, was Hofheinz's office. On the sixth level, Hofheinz installed a conference room 
decorated in New Orleans-French Quarter-style, a barber shop, ten-seat movie theater, a 
billiards room, an arcade-styled shooting gallery (with a western theme, of course), and "the 
judge's pride," the "Tipsy Tavern." Inside the Tavern, the floor and bar were slanted. If one 
ordered a beer, the bartender would send the mug careening down the bar. Just when it 
looked as if the mug would spill off the bar and onto the floor, a magnet located under the 
bar, near the edge, stopped the mug before its suicidal plunge. Other Hofheinz-related 
novelties in the Tavern included flickering lights, wobbly tables, and a bar stool that could be 
moved up and down. The Tavern's lavatory was located in an elevator just outside the 
entrance. An individual would experience the sense of dropping several stories, thanks to a 
window view of simulated bricks. At the bottom of the "ride," the individual would discover 
an outhouse with a barrel and Sears catalog (instead of tissue).* 
27 Angell, p. 135 (italics in original). 
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On the eighth floor, behind the scoreboard, Hofheinz had built a replica medieval-
inspired chapel, a beauty parlor, puppet theater, a playroom, and rooms for "maids and 
nannies." Hofheinz wanted guests and Mends of the HSA to feel right at home while visiting 
the stadium A half-floor below, on the seventh level, was the Presidential Suite complete 
with library, bedroom, and reception area. Bedrooms for the Secret Service had to be cobbled 
together because Hofheinz forgot to include them in his original plan. On the ninth level, the 
HSA offices and the Caribbean Room were located to allow Hofheinz to entertain important 
guests and personal friends. The Caribbean Room, a party room for fifty people, contained 
blue carpet, rattan furniture, and life-sized statues/' 
Hofheinz's private apartment was also on the eighth level. The HSA president 
justified the elaborate décor of his personal suite (which included stained glass windows, 
Oriental masks, a completely gilded washroom, private kitchen and dining room, thirteen-
foot rosewood desk, and sauna) because he wanted members of Madison Avenue to take him, 
the HSA, and the Astros seriously. "If you look just like a tobacco-spitting venture, it won't 
work. Whether you like it or not your in show business."  ^Hofheinz explained why he 
decorated his office the way he did. After visiting his son in Tokyo, he and his wife traveled 
"to Hong Kong, Bangkok, and all." All of the décor, he explained, came from Hong Kong, 
his last stop. "Then I bought 26,000 pounds of junk for this place," he said because he "didn't 
want anybody to come in here and say, 'I saw the very same thing last week in Joe's Bar.'"  ^
" Cartwright, 26; Frady, 89; Taylor, 43,45. 
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Hofheinz said, "I got into this because the city has needed a multi-purpose stadium from the 
beginning. The stadium actually served as a vehicle to get major league ball here."* 
C&rofwck reporter Wells Twombly wrote that the domed stadium allowed man to 
conquer nature, since baseball could now finally be freed from the weather. Hofheinz's 
vision of indoor baseball, he continued, made "the most improbable fantasy" and imagination 
a reality, "nothing will ever seem impossible again." But the question remained, despite 
preseason experiments and scrimmages, could baseball be played under the dome?35 
A special "stadium preview" for Texas and Southwest sports editors and writers 
occurred on 8 February 1965. Ostensibly, local Astros players would participate in a batting 
practice to test the effect of air conditioning on the flight of a baseball and see if the lighting 
system's 1,906 lamps adequately lit the field. The "stadium preview" promised game-like 
conditions and the best account of what might be expected in the inaugural season of the 
stadium. At the $150,000 party, "The Houston Sports Association introduced science Action 
baseball to the world...in the most pompous batting practice setting ever held." Hofheinz 
welcomed almost three hundred guests to "the first full dress preview" of "the greatest 
stadium ever constructed by man." He then proceeded to rattle off the facts and figures of the 
stadium in a forty-seven minute presentation. After Hofheinz's speech, singer Anita Bryant 
threw out a ceremonial ball, and the sound system played the national anthem Once the 
pomp ended, the batting practice began. Rusty Staub was the only Astro to hit a home run as 
he belted two, one during day conditions and the second with the lights on later that night. 
Fellow Astro Bob Lillis explained that the hitting conditions under the dome were no 
34 
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different than those outside. "It's just like hitting a ball outdoor under normal conditions, 
without a lot of wind," he said. Bob Aspromonte concurred with his teammate. "Everybody 
wants to know if the ball is going to jump out of here—I'll tell them no," Aspromonte said. 
Aspro added that the ball would not be "dead" either.* 
The Astros ended their spring training in Florida early so they could get acquainted 
with the stadium before their exhibition games against the Yankees and Orioles. The Astros 
played two intra-squad games against their minor league affiliate the Oklahoma City 89ers. 
The first on Wednesday, 7 April, the Astros and the 89ers took the Geld to practice under the 
dome for the first time before their evening scrimmage. Both teams worked out in an effort to 
ascertain the playing conditions they would experience that night. Throwing and hitting the 
baseball was no different than outdoors, they again reported. The most disturbing result was 
that the players had difficulty locating a batted baseball amidst the skylights and steel girders 
of the roof. The early evening glare from the sun wreaked havoc on several fielders. Astros 
outfielder Jim Beauchamp trotted off the field in disbelief. "First you see it, then you don't," 
he said in frustration. Minor leaguer Ronnie Davis confessed that he could not follow the ball 
accurately. "I was losing the ball in the glass," he lamented, "and picking it up in the 
girders." Other fielders said that they would lose the flight of the ball when it passed in front 
of the roof s framework. Astros catcher Ron Bran agreed that catching fly balls could prove 
difficult, but he still expressed his amazement over the stadium when he said "This park is 
36 Bill Giles to R. E. Smith, Herbert Eyster. Robert Minchew, Roy Hofheinz (1/15/65), Minchew Collection 94-
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fantastic." Houston Astros General Manager Paul Richards wanted to foist blame upon the 
time of day. "It's this time of day (4:30) that we may have problems," he said, but added that 
he thought it would be fixed with little trouble. For the scheduled scrimmage on Thursday in 
the afternoon, Richards promised that the lights would be turned on, just in case.^  
The Thursday afternoon game revealed that a glaring problem did exist for fielders. 
The intra-squad scrimmage was halted after seven innings, due in large part to the problems 
of the outfielders. Luman Harris, manager for the Astros, did not want any of the players 
injured and so he halted the exercise after seven innings. Ron Davis, center fielder for the 
89ers, said, "I caught two flyballs out of about 10 or 12." "Outdoors, you can shade the glare 
with your glove," he added, "But here the glare with your glove is so strong it just surrounds 
the glove." Davis, fearing for his safety, wore his batting helmet in the Geld in an effort to 
obtain some semblance of protection. Fortunately, nether Davis nor any other player suffered 
a glare-related injury during the scrimmage. The HSA sent out for dozens of pairs of 
sunglasses in various tints and shades to try and discern a quick solution. The brief 
experiment, however, provided no relief. Astros outfielder A1 Spangler offered his 
summation of the stadium and its fault. "A routine fly ball is no longer routine," he said.* 
The failure of sunglasses to provide protection further exacerbated the "ding dong 
dilly" of a flaw. Players, coaches, and management wanted to And any remedy as soon as 
possible. The Astros were scheduled to play twenty-one day-games and threatened the three 
upcoming afternoon exhibition games against the Yankees and Orioles. According to Astros 
^ "Astros, Yankees Open Fabulous Dome Friday Night," CArowck, 4 April 1965, sec. 7, p. 2; Herskowitz, 
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manager Luman Harris, a baseball could not be caught under those conditions. GM Richards 
agreed with his manager, "It's impossible to play under these conditions." The immediate, 
knee-jerk solution to the glare problem was to alter the dome itself by "blacking out" the 
sunlight. This would definitely reduce the glare and entry of sunlight into the stadium but 
could also kill the natural grass. Astros general manager Paul Richards felt no reservations 
about this solution. He expressed his personal satisfaction with substituting any synthetic 
surface to replace the natural grass. But before any action was taken, Richards wanted to 
reaffirm his faith that a solution could be found. "I know that people who can build a 
wonderful stadium like this can solve this one little problem," he said.^  
During the evening "dress rehearsal," the players did not experience any difficulty 
catching, throwing, or hitting a baseball during the eight-inning contest. In an otherwise 
typical baseball game, Astros second baseman Joe Morgan performed the only notable feat. 
Morgan pounded a second-inning fastball over the right field fence, sparking the celebratory 
explosions from the scoreboard.* 
Herman Lloyd claimed to have recognized the potential problem after a "few 
hundred" of the skylights had been installed, but no individual from the HSA had responded 
to his concern. "I told the HSA what might happen," he said, and "They seemed to think that 
it was a situation that would be easily resolved." Lloyd reassured the public that any future 
remedies would involve the ballplayers and their equipment, not costly alterations to the 
38 Lundgrcn, "Hard Helmets in Outfield?," Post, 9 April 1965, sec. 5, p. 1 ; John Wilson, "Flaw in Dome a Ding 
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stadium. "I don't think that we will have to make any major changes in the dome," he 
posited, "I think the answer is probably outfielders." Lloyd opined a simple solution of 
"colored baseballs" to aid the fielders. Architect Seth Morris disagreed with Lloyd. The 
answer to the glare, according to Morris, could not be rectified so easily as merely altering 
the playing equipment. The answer would require a bit more time to discover. Morris did 
elucidate his confidence in an eventual conclusion to the glaring conundrum. The HSA's Bill 
Giles speculated on using a canvas to cover the dome during day games and then removing it 
after the games, thus allowing the grass to get its requirement of sunlight. Tinting or other 
permanent alterations to the skylights would result in killing the grass and require installing 
an artificial playing surface, he continued. Any changes to the stadium, asserted Judge 
Elliott, would be the territory of the HSA/" 
With opening day looming on the horizon, a "nervous as hell" Bill Giles promised 
that all the restaurants would be ready. "However," he added, "we'll have construction men 
in the stadium working until late June, finishing up little things." One of the more 
embarrassing and lingering problems concerned the roof: it leaked. Workers climbed to the 
roof to perform maintenance duties on over seventy leaks. "The last time there was a storm 
we had only three leaks, just small ones," admitted Giles. Other small, "nit-picking things" 
still required the attention of Giles, Hofheinz, and workers who toiled "around the clock" 
trying to get the stadium ready. The "major things," installing the 50,000 lights for the 
gigantic scoreboard, for example, were already completed, but over two hundred little things 
(like removing masking tape around toilet fixtures and painting the stairwells and rusted 
40 Nealon, "Morgan Raps 1st 'Domer,'" Post, 8 April 1965, sec. 8, p. 1,2; "Morgan First to Light Dome Pinball 
Machine," Chronicle, 8 April 1965, sec. 5. p. 2. 
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areas on the roof) still required attention. "These items are such a magnitude that we do not 
feel we can finally accept the stadium until the work has been performed," Hofheinz 
threatened. The reputation of Hofheinz, the HSA, County Commissioners, Houston, and 
Texas was on the line for the world to critique. Only careful attention to the completion of 
the minute details could assuage some of the detractors and skeptics.'" 
Thursday night, the race was on. Hundreds of Houston's social elite made their way 
to the exclusivity of the Stadium Club to eat, drink, and cavort with Hofheinz. Houston's 
"almost rich" did the same in the Astrodome Club. Meanwhile, throughout the stadium, 
dozens of workers rushed around the stadium to ready it for the grand opening on Friday. 
Groundskeepers inspected the playing field for any defects. Signs still needed to be hanged, 
lights installed, seats cleaned, trash cans set out, and the Stadium Club's outside walls 
painted.^  
"Domesday" arrived in spectacular fashion on 9 April 1965 when "fantasy met 
reality." In a "mighty splash of color and sound," the long awaited grand opening of the 
stadium took precedence over the baseball game. The stadium's gates would finally be 
thrown wide-open to those lucky enough to procure tickets. The HSA expected more than 
51,000 spectators to fill the stadium, after selling 5,000 standing room only tickets in 
addition to the 46,000 seats. Adding to the excitement of the festivities, rumors abounded 
that President Lyndon Johnson, a long-time friend of Hofheinz, would attend the baseball 
41 
"Architect Says He Warned HSA of Glare in Dome," Chronicle, 9 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,11. 
42 Hofheinz to WMCS (2/11/65), Minchew Collection 94-274/5, Harris County Domed Stadium Construction 
Correspondence, file #21, January 1965; Twombly, "Domed Stadium Even Has Indoor Air Force," Chronicle, 
21 March 1965, see. 6. p. 6; Herskowitz, "Dome Countdown," Post, 4 April 1965, sec. 5, p. 6. 
43 Connolly, "Everyone and Everything Is Ready at the Dome," Chronicle, 9 April 1965 (Texas Ed.), sec. 1. p. 
1 , 1 1 .  
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game." Opening night represented the culmination of a little more than two years of 
construction work and almost a decade of planning. The stadium was finally "official, 
professional, and competitive" at 7:30 that evening.* 
"The Dome was everything its creators said it would be including a perfect place to 
play baseball," wrote Peebles. The playing conditions were impeccable for both athlete and 
spectator. Officially, at 7:11 pm, the Spring Branch High School band started "My Country 
'Tis of Thee." Texas governor John Connally gave a speech at 7:30 pm and distributed 
bouquets of flowers to "those responsible for this magnificent structure," Hofheinz and 
Smith, "men of vision." "This stadium is a monument to (their) true faith," announced the 
governor. Connally and Smith also thanked the people of Harris County for building the 
stadium. Connally then threw out the ceremonial first pitch to Astros catcher Ron Brand. 
Dick Farrell, facing Mickey Mantle, made the first official pitch. After catching the toss, 
Brand jogged over to NL president Warren Giles, sitting in box seats, and handed over the 
baseball. A few minutes later, LBJ arrived at the stadium. Hofheinz welcomed LBJ and Lady 
Bird to the stadium and escorted the couple to his office and then to his private clubroom. 
The game halted when the scoreboard acknowledged LBJ's appearance with the message 
"Welcome, Mr. President" At the top of the ninth inning as the Astros took the field, 
scoreboard operators started the 45-second home run spectacular, usually reserved for Astro 
home runs only. A crowd of 47,876 watched the Astros beat the Yankees, 2-to-l, in twelve 
innings as Astros coach Nellie Fox (the Astros ran out of players) batted in the game winning 
run with two out. In addition to a victory for the home team, the crowd witnessed "the first 
* Peebles, "LBJ May Visit the Dome Tonight," CAronick, 9 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,11; Herskowitz, "A New 
Order Cometh to Baseball," Post, 9 April 1965. sec. 5, p. 2.. 
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genuine home run." Mantle, playing despite a strained hamstring, walloped a home run, 406-
feet over the right-center field wall. The ball ricocheted back into the outfield and fielder 
Jimmy Wynn picked up the ball and tossed it to a fan, unaware of its importance to the Hall 
of Fame. Said Mantle of his home run, "I hit that ball and it barely got there." Mantle also 
recorded the first hit of the game as he led off the first inning.* 
'The glamour of the dome, not just here in these Skyboxes, but the whole thing," 
chimed Charles Manning, a TV executive from Corpus Christi, TX, "will draw fans and 
bring baseball into a new phase." Manning asserted that Hofheinz's formula not only 
achieved its goal, but would continue to work long into the future. "Things like this will 
really appeal to people and make baseball what it was, the great American pastime," 
concluded Manning.^  He was echoed by President Johnson. Upon leaving Hofheinz's sky 
box, LBJ anticipated that every American would some day come to the stadium He also said 
that every Houstonian "ought to be very proud of this stadium." "It is massive, beautiful, and 
it will be a very great asset," he added. Lady Bird congratulated Hofheinz, saying, "Roy, it 
was simply marvelous.'"* 
Another reporter who covered Domesday for the Pa# was Sandra ByBee. 
"Opening night at the Domed Stadium was a tableau of society and fashion, entertainment 
and prestige," she wrote. The "enthusiasm and excitement about the stadium," she continued, 
* Nealon, "Post Time," foaf, 9 April 1965, sec. 1, p.l, sec. 5, p. 2. 
* Herskowitz, "In a Mighty Splash, It's Open," Posf, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,12; Betty Ewing, "Grissom 
Meets Another 'Spaceman' in Big Dome," CAronick, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,12; Peebles, "Fox, Mantle 
Show Dome Is a Winner," Chronicle, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1, 9; "Connally Hands Out Bouquets for Dome," 
Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 12; "LBJ, Lady Bird Help Open Astrodome," Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1, 
12; Saul Friedman and Oscar Griffin, "LBJ: 'Everybody Will Visit Dome,'" Chronicle, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 
1, 7; Twombly, "History In The Making," Chronicle, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 9; John Hollis, '"I Hit That Ball,' 
Says Mick," Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 1,5; Nealon, "Little Nell's Hit Wins It in 12, 2-1," Post, 10 April 
1965, sec 4, p. 1, 3. 
47 Joe Adcock. "No Smell of Popcorn, Hotdogs and Beer," Chronicle, 10 April 1965, sec 1, p. 12 
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"was reflected by the fans in their eyes and smiles as they stepped through the gates.'** Her 
colleague Bob Cargill affirmed the "carnival-like gaiety about the crowd." As Hofheinz 
planned, Cargill witnessed the "cross section of the county's society, the chic and the 
shabby." Although most of those who could get tickets for the opening game were from the 
more affluent of Houston, the common Dome-seeker still was able to get some tickets. 
Cargill saw "men in business suits and men in faded work clothes." The female spectators, 
on the other hand, "were decked out in spring finery of vibrant colors." Female spectators 
wearing extravagant clothing to a baseball game "would have looked out of place at an 
ordinary ball park, but they harmonized beautifully with Friday night's mad mood." Most 
women would not have worn some of their best clothes to a baseball game in any other open-
air ballpark.* 
C&rofwck writer Wells Twombly wondered "[D]o you think outdoor baseball will 
ever make a comeback?"  ^"The color Friday night was deafening," wrote forf sports 
reporter Mickey Herskowitz. He was also impressed with the various colors of the Dome 
employees. "There were the vendors in iridescent blue coveralls, of the type worn by airplane 
mechanics; the grounds crew in burnt orange spacesuits and helmets." Herskowitz echoed the 
descriptions of many types of fans who viewed the opening night spectacle. "Male spectators 
dressed in suits and neckties," Herskowitz said, while "women wore evening gowns, attire 
more befitting opera or the theater, not baseball." For many like Herskowitz, it just did not 
seem that the Dome's surroundings were befitting a sporting event. Herskowitz was used to 
48 Friedman and Griffin, "LBJ: 'Everybody Will Visit Dome,'" Chronicle, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,7. 
49 Sandra ByBee, "Opening Night: A Society Tableau," Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 12. 
50 Bob Cargill, '"Like...a Foreign Country,'" Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,13. 
51 Twombly, "Color It 'Vanish,'" Chronicle, 11 April 1965, sec. 7, p. 5. 
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Houston fans in casual clothes and not their finest evening wear.^  HSA official Paul 
Richards jokingly questioned how the Astrodome could be considered merely the "Eighth 
Wonder of the World." Richards answered his own query. "This is the ultimate," he boasted, 
"and no one yet can conceive how great will be its contributions to the sport. 
The people who witnessed Domesday lauded nearly everything about the Astrodome. 
They voiced nothing but accolades and superlatives. For example, H. S. AHums pulled his 
son from school so he could attend the exhibition game. Allums explicated his reasoning for 
making the four-hour drive from his home in Premont, Texas. "I figured that this is more 
educational than anything he could get in the classroom," he said.54 The playing conditions, 
on the other hand, received more of a dubious reception. A1 Spangler said, "It's not bad.. .it's 
worse." Rusty Staub expressed his difficulty in picking up the baseball from the pitcher 
because of the background in centerfield. Bob Lillis concurred. "You have to concentrate 
very hard on following the ball," said Lillis, "The pitcher will be throwing out of the third 
row of centerfield seats." He added, "The worst thing is the glass doors in the centerfield 
section and the people moving about on the third level." Roger Maris said that the steel 
girders should be painted green to help the players see and follow the ball.^  
The following Saturday the Astros played the Orioles in the afternoon and the 
Yankees at night. The attendance for the Orioles game was 22,457 and the Yankees game 
was 48,145, pushing attendance to 118,478 for the three exhibition games. The HSA learned 
that people in the Houston area were interested in major league baseball, if not the 
Astrodome itself. But the HSA also learned what was in store for the upcoming baseball 
52 Herskowitz, "In a Mighty Splash, It's Open," Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1, 12. 
53 Arthur Daley, "Dome Baseball 'Laboratory,'" Chronicle, 11 April 1965, sec. 7, p. 7. 
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season. First, the stadium would yield homeruns and not just to the reputed home run hitters 
like Mickey Mantle and Roger Maris, but also from the likes of Astro Jim Beauchamp. 
Second, the skylights and the frames challenged the fielders to catch fly balls. Third, the 
natural grass did not perform as hoped. Solving the glare problem still concerned Hofheinz. 
The easiest answer to the brightest days of summer, he said, was to "pray for rain." He 
promised that he would exhaust all possibilities before painting the skylights. Blacking out 
the sunlight would kill all the grass and reduce the playing surface to dirt and dust. In the 
outfield, the grass had grown unevenly and turned brown in some areas. Immediate 
speculation centered on the idea of getting synthetic turf to replace the natural grass. "We are 
aware of the advantages of synthetic or plastic type grass, but we haven't given up on 
growing natural grass in the Astrodome," Hofheinz said. The HSA had invested too much 
time and money in the A&M experiments to determine the if grass would grow under the 
dome. To abandon natural grass this early, before the completion of the exhibition 
homestand, would be a rash, knee-jerk reaction. "There is a chance we might go to plastic 
grass in 1966," Hofheinz confirmed, "but I think speculation about it at this time is 
premature."* 
The HSA received numerous suggestions concerning the glare before the Saturday 
exhibition with the Baltimore Orioles. Du Pont dispatched a research team to view the 
problem and offer suggestions. From Kansas City Athletics owner Arnold Johnson who 
offered orange-colored baseballs to a Massachusetts women's belief that blue floodlights 
54 Gallagher, "They Came Early and Stayed Late in the Public Dome-ain," Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 2. 
55 
"You Got To Go First Class, Keane Says About Dome," Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 2. 
56 
"Record 48,145 Jampack Dome," Chronicle, 11 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,12; "Synthetic Grass for Big Dome?" 
Post, 11 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1; Herskowitz, "Hofheinz Offers Answer For Dome: 'Pray for Rain,'" Post, 11 
April 1965, sec. 4. p. 6; Red Smith, "Cooperstown to the Countdown Café," Post, 11 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 6. 
291 
would solve the visual nightmare, all types of solutions were offered. In the first line of 
defense, players wore "extra-thick red sunglasses" to fight the glare. When this failed, the 
HSA used different colors of baseball. The first experiment with orange baseballs fell short 
of a miraculous resolution. Fielders, and now batters, could not follow the flight of the ball. 
Players tried various shades of sunglasses, but fared no better. A third alternative was to 
reschedule the twenty-one day games to night contests. The HSA dismissed this suggestion, 
despite receiving approval from NL president Giles. The reason was financial. Since the 
Dome eliminated inclement weather, television selected Astros home games as the 
alternative "Game-of-the-Week" in case the regularly scheduled game was postponed. The 
HSA stood to lose $300,000. A fourth, and permanent, solution was to paint the skylights.57 
Grounds superintendent George Myers gazed at the turf after the six-game exhibition. 
The area around home plate and right Geld, in particular, did not fare well. "You can't use the 
same amount of water as on the outside because you don't have the sun, wind and air to dry it 
out," Myers said, "If I tried over-watering it I'd wind up with a bunch of mud puddles." 
Myers said that the amount he watered was "just enough to keep the moisture in the ground." 
Despite its appearance, Myers maintained the grass would eventually thicken and thrive in 
the artificial conditions under the Dome. Once the baseball team left for a road trip, the 
ground crew replaced the bare areas with sod. The amount of use, asserted Myers, had been 
atypical and greatly contributed to the rapid deterioration of the turf. Hofheinz's alternative, 
synthetic grass, would require more time to install than the ground crew had available. Even 
though the baseball team was gone from the stadium for two weeks, removing the turf, 
57 Herskowitz, "Dome Puzzle Deepens," Post, 10 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 2; Gallagher, "They Came Early and 
Stayed Late in the Public Dome-ain," foA, 10 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 2; "The Dome Must Be Blacked Out," 
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pouring a concrete base, laying cables, and then replacing the dirt could not be completed in 
the time allowed. "It is unlikely they'll put in synthetic grass this year because they don't 
have time," Myers said. He paused and then looked around at the stadium and replied, "Then 
again, nothing is impossible."* 
The Astros faced the Philadelphia Phillies in the stadium's first, official major league 
baseball game on Monday, 13 April. Since this was a night game, players did not have to fret 
about catching fly balls. The HSA tried to come up with a special guest of honor for this 
game on par with President Johnson's attendance at the Yankee exhibition. The HSA 
selected twenty-three astronauts from nearby NASA, including Gus Grissom and John 
Young. NL president Warren Giles presented each spaceman with lifetime passes to baseball 
games held under the dome. Said Giles as he presented the passes to the spacemen, "This is a 
proud day for baseball, for Houston, and for the National League." As it did for the Yankee 
game, the stadium still garnered most of the attention, even with real astronauts in 
attendance. Giles continued to applaud all those involved with the stadium, from the average 
Houston voter and construction worker to Craig Cullman, Jr., George Kirksey, and Roy 
Hofheinz. "It took vision, imagination and courage to complete this stadium," Giles added. 
Major league baseball commissioner Ford Frick also made a brief speech. The domed 
stadium, he said, "opens a completely new field not just to baseball, but to all municipal 
activities." He asserted that Houston should remain proud of its stadium even in the face of 
criticism/* 
Engineering News-Record, 15 April 1965, p. 31; "'Lost in the Stars," Newsweek, 19 April 1963, p. 64.. 
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Before and after Domesday and its related hoopla, individuals from other American 
cities expressed their interest in building similar domed stadiums. New York City's sports 
commissioner Ben Finney, for example, promised to put a dome on just completed Shea 
Stadium. "The original contemplation was that we would go far beyond what was done in 
Houston and construct a retractable roof," Finney said. However, the construction on Shea 
began before these plans were implemented, he continued, and the city decided that it did not 
have enough financial resources to add the roof. But, Finney promised, Shea would get a 
"transparent plastic" dome in the near future that would also be "air-conditioned and heated." 
Finney promised that the new and improved Shea Stadium "will serve as a mode or prototype 
for many existing stadium throughout the nation which can and will be roofed in the 
comparatively near future when America leams how important this kind of facility can be to 
the economy of its great cities." Because of the current design of Shea (it looked like 
stadium, an arc or unfinished circle), Finney's plan faced several obstacles, but nothing that 
New York could not handle. The result would make New York City "the true sports capital 
of the world," Finney guaranteed.* 
By early June 1965, Finney met with architects and engineers to discover if a Shea 
dome was feasible. One New Orleans engineer promised Finney that not only could a roof be 
added to Shea, but that it would cost less than Finney originally conceived. Finney assured 
fellow New Yorkers that the increased revenue of a larger stadium would offset the costs of 
the alterations. "Moreover, we have the men behind it who have enough faith in this entire 
program to handle the financing on a private basis," Finney continued. Increased revenue 
from the enlarged seating capacity, plus private capital meant "the entire project would be 
60 Carl Lundquist, "Dome for Shea Stadium—N.Y.'s Next Bid Goal," SN, 27 February 1965, p. 19. 
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self-liquidating" and not require a penny of civic money. The result of Finney's scheme 
would be a reemergence of New York as the sports capital of the world. Finney never did 
mention the American city that ousted New York as the sports capital. But the comparisons 
of Shea Stadium with the Astrodome could only suggest that Finney considered Houston the 
new leader and that Finney was conceding a new truth: the Astrodome was the Taj Mahal of 
sport/' 
Oakland, California, entered the stadium sweepstakes in mid-1965. The proposal was 
for a $30 million stadium, combined in the same location with a indoor coliseum and a 
convention center. Supporters launched a $25.5 million bond issue that combined the 
financial resources from the city of Oakland and Alameda County to amortize the debt.62 Not 
to be outdone, Jackson County, Missouri unveiled a plan for a "sports and convention 
complex" that included a domed stadium. The preliminary report instigated by county leaders 
affirmed that a tax bond would be needed to build this complex. Although this was just a 
preliminary report, Kansas City and Jackson County leaders expressed the need for these 
facilities to the economic and entertainment future of the community as being so vital that 
they would consider spending over $100 million for it.* And in 1968, Los Angeles architect 
Charles Luckman showed Ohio Governor James Rhodes, Cleveland Mayor Carl Stokes, and 
City Council President James V. Stanton, as well as representatives of the Browns and 
Indians a model of his domed stadium* 
The final stadium of this era to be built for an expansion team was in Anaheim for the 
California Angels in May 1965. The gimmick the Anaheim stadium would employ, 
61 Lundquist, "Roof on Shea by '66, Sports Boss Forecasts," SN, 5 June 1965, p. 7. 
62 Joe King, "New Oakland Stadium Threat to S.F." SN. 26 June 1965, p. 14. 
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according to its mayor Odra Lawton Chandler, was "progress, an orange grove setting and 
weather." The Angels did not need a domed stadium because of the southern California 
weather. Construction magnate Del Webb's firm handled the building of the Anaheim 
stadium. Chandler said he had no qualms that the stadium would stand out among the latest 
arenas. "I don't have any doubts about our stadium being the most modem and best in the 
land," he said, "Nothing is too good for Anaheim"  ^
The Astros finished in ninth place after the 1965 season. The home attendance, 
however, was not predicated on the play of the baseball team. The Astros drew 2,151,470 
people, as compared to the 725,773 gate at Colt Stadium in 1964. Some of the increase could 
be attributed to the seating capacity of the Astrodome to that of Colt Stadium, 45,000 versus 
35,000. But the on-field play of the team was basically the same: at, or near, the bottom both 
seasons. The significant increase in attendance was because of the new domed stadium The 
gate receipt was "barely second" to the LA Dodgers. Even though the stadium held baseball 
games, concerts, a Billy Graham Crusade, and the Ringling Brothers Circus, it still welcomed 
almost half-a-million visitors to tour it. The most expensive seats, the Sky Boxes, were also 
"the worst seats for baseball" but also gave users entrance into the exclusive Skydome Club 
with its Oriental restaurant and picturesque view of downtown Houston.* 
The Astrodome, and Hofheinz, seemed to silence some of the criticism Although 
"nature finally was completely blotted out," spectators could sit in air conditioned comfort in 
a "absolutely self-contained" environment. The Astrodome experience was labeled "the 
ultimate of Disney aesthetic, the simulation of nature," by writer Marshall Frady. But like 
63 Joe McGuff. "K. C. Plans Domed Stadium as Part of $109 Million Layout," SN, 12 March 1966, p. 25. 
64 Russell Schneider, "Proposal for Domed Stadium Makes Big Hit in Cleveland," SN, 6 July 1968, p. 15. 
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Disneyland, Hofheinz tried to control every individual' s experience. The Astrodome seemed 
to promise a respite from the conditions of Houston, a respite. "Under Hofheinz's hermetic 
glass-bell ornament," Frady continued, "there do continue to be certain small fretful 
infiltrations of nature, but, after a short while inside the Dome, one feels abstracted even out 
of time, arrested and suspended in a kind of hiatus of eternal shadowless daylight."*' But it 
was also billed as something out of time, from the future. Ironically, the Astrodome had been 
conceived during a period of optimism. Domesday coincided with the shift in Houston 
society, from this optimism to pessimism. After its grand opening, the Taj Mahal of Sport 
seemed just that—a large, elaborate tomb, a mausoleum to the uplifting infinitude of postwar 
America. 
^ James Enhght, "Anaheim Park Caps Major Building Boom," &V, 1 May 1965, pp. 9-10. 
66 Angel 1, 125 (italics in original). 
" Frady, 89. 
297 
CHAPTER 10: THE ASTRO-DOOMED STADIUM 
Houston, Harris County Commissioners, Roy Hofheinz and the Houston Sports 
Association initially received mostly accolades for the domed stadium from all across Texas 
and the United States. Some called the stadium "The Taj Mahal of Sport" and the "Eighth 
Wonder of the World." Others labeled it as "fantastic," "incredible," "indescribable," 
"science fiction," and "the greatest stadium ever constructed by man." President Lyndon 
Johnson simply called it "beautiful." New York Yankee icon Mickey Mantle said, "It's the 
prettiest park I've ever been in." Despite all of this, the Astrodome was far from perfect. 
There were problems with the structure, problems with the HSA, and concerns about the 
future of the stadium itself. These problems could not be swept underneath the rug, so to 
speak. Each necessitated immediate resolution. However, the solutions underwent additional 
scrutiny. Since Hofheinz made most of the decisions that involved the stadium, he proved 
unable, or unwilling, to recognize the change that had occurred in American society. It 
revealed that the effervescent optimism of Houston and American society was gone and 
replaced with a nagging cynicism. 
The stadium's most apparent problem was the skylights. Experts promised that the 
sunlight would be diluted, but still grow natural grass. Instead, during the late afternoon, the 
skylights focused the sunlight, creating a glare that blinded players and spectators. One 
reason was the translucent Lucite panels. As sunlight passed through the panels it was 
diffused into a powerful and blinding glare. Normally, an outfielder would experience this 
situation only if he looked directly at the sun. Under the dome, however, he encountered this 
if he just looked domeward. Secondly, the roof's steel beams were painted with a light color 
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that looked dark against the skylights and the frames. The consequence was "akin to 
camouflage." A baseball player, or fan, could not follow the path of a baseball as it traveled 
from the bright light of the ceiling into the "dark light" of the stadium's interior. Thirdly, the 
sunlight reflected off of these beams merely adding to the brutal glare. According to Ralph 
Anderson, the Architects expected a level of glare, but just not this intense.' 
Furthermore, the Lucite panels adversely affected the Tifway 419 bermuda grass. The 
HSA contacted several agronomy experts to find the best type of grass to grow under the 
unusual stadium conditions. The grass had to grow under low light conditions and withstand 
the traffic of professional athletic events. The Texas A&M experiments determined that this 
grass could tolerate low light conditions and withstand the wear and tear of sporting events, 
high traffic, and the conversion process to various events. But, in general, the bermuda grass 
struggled to survive in shady conditions. Compounding the turf's poor performance, it was 
planted during the worst possible time of the year, December, to be ready for Domesday in 
April. During the winter months, bermuda became dormant and could not recuperate as 
readily from adverse conditions. Tifway sod was typically planted during the spring for quick 
and rapid growth. By installing the sod in December, the bermuda could not establish itself in 
the stadium soil. Once installed in the climate controlled stadium, a constant 75" F to avoid 
high humidity and condensation, the turf never reached its optimal temperature of 80° to 95° 
F. This adversely affected the growth of the root system, hindering the absorption of nutrients 
and water in the soil. Therefore, it struggled to survive and remained unhealthy after the 
1 
"What a Wonder! What a Blunder!" Life, 58 23 April 1965, p. 78; "Small Flaw in Houston's Diamond," 
Business Week, 17 April 1965. pp. 31. 
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transplantation. The number of preseason games exacerbated the delicate condition of the 
grass/ 
Augmenting the disastrous December installation, Houston experienced cloudy 
conditions throughout the new year. The stadium limited the quality and duration of natural 
light. The optimal conditions for "sturdy growth" depended on at least twelve hours of 
natural light, especially from the UV, violet, and blue areas of the spectrum. The yellow and 
red regions spurred the shoot growth from seeds. The greatest amount of red and yellow 
wavelengths occurred during sunrise and sunset. This light could not enter the stadium The 
more natural light the grass received, the sturdier it was. The artificial lighting system created 
an artificial photoperiod. The refraction or deflection of these wavelengths jeopardized 
heartiness and continual growth. Even though photosynthesis occurred in lower light levels, 
the grass became weak, frail, and unable to endure and rebound from heavy use. Similarly, in 
some areas, the light entering the stadium was more intense than natural light. These sprigs 
grew horizontally, not vertically. The grass in these areas experienced destruction of 
chlorophyll/ 
Grounds superintendent George Myers gazed at the turf after the six-game exhibition 
and concluded that it did not fare well, especially around home plate and right field. "You 
can't use the same amount of water as on the outside because you don't have the sun, wind 
and air to dry it out," Myers said. Continual watering, he continued would only result in a 
mud bog. Myers said that the amount he watered was "just enough to keep the moisture in 
the ground." Despite its appearance, Myers maintained his optimism that the grass would 
2 Robert J. Minchew Collection, 94-274/16, Grass Research through December 1962 file; Beard, 133-142; 
"What a Wonder! What a Blunder!" I#, 23 April 1965, p. 78; Beard, 221-227,235-239,368-374524-529. 
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eventually thicken and thrive under the dome. Once the baseball team left for a road trip, the 
ground crew removed the bare areas and placed it with sod from the Wharton farm. Some of 
the turf was discarded, while the grass with live roots was returned to the farm to regrow it. 
The amount of use, asserted Myers, was atypical and greatly contributed to the rapid 
deterioration of the turf. The popular alternative that pundits debated was synthetic grass. 
Although a popular solution, it required more time to install than the HS A had available. 
Even though the baseball team was gone from the stadium for two weeks, removing the turf, 
pouring a concrete base, laying cables, and then replacing the dirt could not be completed in 
the time allowed. "It is unlikely they'll put in synthetic grass this year because they don't 
have time," Myers said. He paused and then looked around at his surroundings and replied, 
"Then again, nothing is impossible."* 
Du Pont tried to determine the cause of the glare problem. They sent engineers to 
Houston to view the glare themselves while working on the enigma back in the lab in 
Wilmington, Delaware. The Du Pont group faced a difficult time schedule. They had to find 
a tenable solution before the Astros' first day game on 25 April, less than three weeks. 
Unfortunately for the Du Pont group, they failed to produce a solution that Hofheinz liked. 
Hofheinz said, "The duPont (sic) people had their shot at correcting the problem," but now 
he was "taking charge." He promised to those who would listen that he would come up with 
a solution before the first daytime game/ 
Regardless of what Hofheinz's imaginative solution might be, there would be no glare 
problem during the 1966 baseball season. Instead of natural grass, a synthetic playing 
^ "What a Wonder! What a Blunder!" Zj/ë, 23 April 1965, p. 78; Beard, 181-208. 
4 Gallagher, "Growing Grass Beneath Dome As Easy as Catching Fly Ball," Post, 12 April 1965, sec. 3, p. 2. 
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surface, or "undertaker's grass" as Hofheinz labeled it, would be installed. Just two days after 
the grand opening, Hofheinz announced that "plastic grass" would replace the natural turf. 
Said Talbot Smith, "These synthetics are not in experimental stage because they've been on 
the market several years." Some of the companies vying for the contract included Minnesota 
Mining and Manufacturing of St. Paul, Minnesota (3M) and American Biltright Rubber's 
Boston Woven Hose and Rubber Division of Cambridge, MA. 3M's Floyd Dahlberg said 
that his company's product, Tartan, had been tested under football conditions in Seattle. The 
advantage of tartan was it could be shipped in pieces and installed in the stadium. A 
disadvantage from an aesthetics point of view was that it did not look like grass at all. Tartan 
Turf, a similar product, was tufted like natural grass but risked damage from the movable 
stands. Neo-turf, according to Charles Davis of American Biltright, on the other hand, was 
tufted but did not allow athletes to use spiked shoes. Neo-turf, manufactured in squares for 
installation, did not react well to a flame, which would damage it. Davis argued that Tartan 
was nearly impervious to fire. "It would take a blowtorch to discolor Tartan." Essentially, 
there was no difference between Tartan and natural grass. Tartan was installed for $2 a 
square-foot and Neo-turf for $1 a square-foot/ 
After receiving thousands of letters and the disappointing visit from du Pont 
engineers, Hofheinz decided to paint the Lucite skylights. He said that several greenhouse 
operators suggested the painting of the skylights. A crew of ten painters began applying the 
first gallons of the "off-white shade" of acrylic paint on the outside roof of the dome on 20 
April. The color closely approximated the color of the plastic skylights. "We're reasonably 
5 
"What a Wonder! What a Blunder!" Life, 23 April 1965, p. 78; "Small Flaw in Houston's Diamond," Business 
Week, 17 April 1965. p. 31. 
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certain this will stop the glare," but still allow light, Hofheinz said at the press conference 
before the painters commenced painting. Hofheinz promised that this "permanent coating" 
would "make the dome glitter on the outside and glow on the inside" during evening events 
the "enhancing the stadium's beauty." Asked if the paint would guarantee the elimination of 
the glare, Hofheinz grinned and chimed, "It's guaranteed to cover the dome." These "shots of 
paint heard around the sports world" required three days and almost seven hundred gallons to 
completely apply to all 4,596 skylights. Hofheinz also said that the paint would reduce 
twenty-five to forty percent of the sunlight coming into the dome. Reducing the amount of 
sunlight most assuredly would harm the natural grass, but this did not concern Hofheinz. 
Publicity director Giles informed the press crew that the HSA was ready to either install an 
artificial surface to the areas most affected by dying grass or play the remaining games on a 
dirt playing surface. The HSA paid for the $20,000 painting bill of the exterior side of the 
skylights because it was expected to be at least four to five times less than trying to cover the 
ceiling of the roof/ Red Smith of the Poaf, chimed in on the natural and ersatz grass 
conundrum. Smith did not have a problem with fake grass at all. "If baseball was going to be 
played under an artificial sky with artificial lighting in artificial temperatures, why bother the 
Almighty about furnishing grass when man could do it just as well, if not better?' wrote Red 
Smith/ 
The glare and the poor quality of the natural grass, Dome defenders argued, should 
not cloud the greatness of the stadium "One worm in the apple," wrote Red Smith, 
6 
"Dome to Get Plastic Grass Next Season," Chronicle, 11 April 1965, sec. 1. p. 1; Lundgren, "Will The Glare 
Question Be Answered This Week?," Post, 19 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 1,6; Ray, 307. 
7 
"Lundgren, "Top Of Dome To Get Paint," Post, 20 April 1965, sec. 1, p. 1, 11; Peebles, "To Catch a 
Fly...Dome Gets Paint," Chronicle, 20 April 1965, sec 1, p. 1; "Thousand Ideas, One Solution: 700-Gallon 
Paint Job on Dome," SN, 1 May 1965, p. 24. 
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"shouldn't obscure the fact that something truly revolutionary has been accomplished." The 
Astrodome still provided what Hofheinz promised: perfect indoor conditions at all times, 
comfort, and sport. "Regardless of the conditions outside, the game will be played as 
scheduled and fans will watch in perfect comfort, relaxed on upholstered theater seats in a 
climate tailored to their taste," Smith added. * Professional baseball players echoed Smith's 
gushing defense of the stadium. Pittsburgh Pirate reserve third baseman Gene Freese said, 
"This place is the greatest thing to come along since Noah's Ark." Pirate skipper Harry 
Walker echoed Freese's sentiments. "Anybody who doesn't like this place has to be nuts," 
said Walker, "This park is the biggest thing that ever hit Texas. It might be the biggest thing 
to hit anyplace." The paint job seemed to better the playing conditions. Rusty Staub said that 
the paint eliminated the glare. "It's a whole lot easier to see the ball," declared Staub 
although he tempered his delight with a cautionary observation. "Following the ball is still a 
little rugged," he added, warning other fielders to be diligent when trying to catch the 
baseball.10 
The Astrodome was comfortably billed as the means for man to overcome Houston's 
weather, once and for all. Regardless of the event held, Hofheinz said, the conditions as well 
as the creature comforts were guaranteed inside the stadium. "When it's raining and 
miserable in New Orleans to El Paso and from Amarillo to the Rio Grande Valley people are 
going to say 'Let's get away from all this drudgery, let's go on up to the dome'" to see a ball 
game or some other event. These travelers, Hofheinz argued, wanted to be pampered and 
8 Red Smith, "Plastic Grass and Aida," Post, 23 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 5. 
9 Smith, "Despite Flaw, Dome Is Revolutionary," Post, 12 April 1965, sec. 3, p. 8. 
10 Lundgren, "Dome Glare Doomed," Post, 23 April 1965, sec. 4, p. 1,2. 
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experience fine dining and see an event "on the upholstered seats."" "Up to now baseball has 
been a fair-weather game," Hofheinz proclaimed, "We expect to do our biggest business on 
week ends when the weather is bad." He continued, "When it rains people won't Ash or swim 
or go boating, play golf or tennis or take a drive. They'll get in their car and come to the ball 
park."  ^The perfect place for baseball, eliminating rain outs, gale force winds, oppressive 
humidity, and Hades-like heat. First it was the glare. A problem, not unforeseen, but still a 
chink in the Astrodome's mighty armor. Then an even more embarrassing fault emerged. 
In the middle of a seven-game losing skid, the Astros faced the Dodgers Tuesday 
evening, May 18. Earlier that day, a steady and heavy downpour fell all across the Houston 
area. The rain would not affect the evening ballgame, thanks to the weather-proof stadium. 
But as the amount of rain increased during the day, several areas throughout the stadium 
began to experience moisture leaking from the roof. Quickly and efficiently, stadium workers 
covered the seats under the leaks and two locations on the playing surface. Astros publicity 
guru Bill Giles said that the leaks were not a "major problem" and were actually "expected" 
by the HSA. Giles reminded everyone that the roof leaked before the grand opening, only to 
be stopped. These new leaks, according to Giles, were the result of the roof painting. With 
the number of painters and the nature of their movements, Giles speculated that they must 
have jarred a few skylights loose from their aluminum frames. When the weather cleared, 
Giles promised that all the leaks would be stopped, ensuring no more rain inside the 
Astrodome." 
11 Lipsyte, "Hofheinz Says Yanks Will Be Awed in Game Tomorrow," p. 50. 
12 Smith, "Bad Weather a Dome Crowd Booster," Post, 16 February 1965, sec. 4, p. 4. 
13 Mike Clark, "Suffering Cats! It Rained in the Dome," Post, 19 May 1965, sec. 1, p. 1. 
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Charles Fritts of Socony Paint Products Company ventured to the roof to survey the 
structural steel support beams. To his dismay, Fritts observed several areas of rust on the 
beams and bolts, some an eighth of an inch thick. Fritts judged that the initial coats of 
protective paint had failed miserably. Fritts Angered the hard and brittle paint, chipping it 
away from the steel. The rust seemed to be progressing under the paint, further damaging the 
steel. Fritts speculated that the steel was not wire brushed to remove scaling as had been 
reported. He recommended that workers return to the roof, remove "rust, dirt, and loose 
paint," then prime, and repaint the steel. The HSA eventually had the surface cleaned and 
repainted.'* 
Talbot Smith wanted the roof leaks repaired once and for all. Smith tired of receiving 
notifications of "so many leaks on movable stands and the playing field itself' and worried 
that the HSA would have to cancel an event.^  Louis O. Bass of Roof Structures, Bill Glaze 
of Walter P. Moore, Roger McDonnell from the HSA, and Robert J. Minchew representing 
the Architects walked on the roof to visually inspect its condition. Bass and Glaze warned 
that inaction would be disastrous to the stadium. The first remedy was to clean plugged weep 
holes in the skylights, which could be a source of water buildup and leakage. Second, remove 
all rust and scaling apparent in the roof and exposed interior structural steel. Third, repaint 
the steel lamella roof and the interior steel to prevent further corrosion. Preventative action 
was critical this early in the stadium's history. Inaction could prove deadly. "Within five 
14 Charles J. Fritts to Paul Knobloch of Tex-Kote, Inc. (11/10/65), Talbot M. Smith to Architects (11/30/65), 
Paul Knobloch to HSA (11/17/65), Minchew Collection, 94-274/8 Legal Documents and Notes, 1964-1971. 
15 Talbot M. Smith to Architects (10/2/65), Minchew Collection 94-274/5, Harris County Domed Stadium 
Construction Correspondence, file #28, September-October 1965. 
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years too much damage" would occur and result in "extensive repair and replacement," 
according to Bass and Glaze/* 
After another rain, the roof leaked again. This time J. R. Watson of Roof Decking, 
Inc. climbed to the top of the dome to determine where the water could be leaking into the 
stadium. Watson discovered six holes, in particular, in several horizontal joints where the 
neogard coating failed. In Watson's estimation, the holes were created during other roof 
repair efforts and exacerbated the stresses from expansion. Water entered through the holes 
and coagulated between the neoprene and the butyl sheet. Watson opined that the materials 
failed, not the work of the roofers.17 
Minchew performed his own inspection of the skylight. He agreed that by all outward 
appearances it seemed undamaged. After closer scrutiny, however, Minchew discovered 
something more ominous. The plastic panels had come free along the entire length of the 
metal frame. He then removed the skylight's screws to determine the extent of the damage. 
The vinyl gasket that was suppose to seal the metal frame and the plastic panel, he reported, 
"had been displaced along the majority of the long dimension of the frame." A detached 
gasket eliminated the watertight seal and allow the entrance of moisture. This would not 
matter if the amount of moisture was little. The torrential downpours that plagued Houston, 
however, would quickly expose the failed seal. Minchew immediately rejected the skylight 
and asked that the screw be placed closer to each other in the new skylight design. Two tests, 
16 S. I. Morris to Richard P. Doss ( 12/6/65), Minchew Collection 94-274/5. Harris County Domed Stadium 
Construction Correspondence, file #30, December 1965; S. I. Morris to Farnsworth (2/11/66), Minchew 
Collection 94-274/7, Depositions, Insurance Reports, Construction Reports, Correspondence, 1961-1973 file. 
17 J. R. Watson to LD (4/15/66), Minchew Collection 94-274/9, Recommendations for Completion, 1966 file; J. 
R. Watson to The Neogard Corporation (4/29/66), Minchew Collection 94-274/14, Drawings of Roof 
Structures, Houston Astrodome, 1973 file. 
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and two designs later, they came up with a design that seemed to work. Minchew gave the 
go-ahead after the successful dead load experiment and water leakage tesL  ^
Famsworth performed his separate investigation. He concluded that there was not one 
simple reason for the leaks. A source of some leakage was the skylight's outer plastic dome. 
Under heavy rainfall, the size and number of weep holes could not handle the amount of 
water. Water settled in the collection gutter and eventually spilled over the interior frame. 
The water then spilled over the skylight's interior frame and into the stadium. "The top 
plastic of the skylight," he opined, "was not designed to be waterproof sealed against the 
retaining angle and great quantities of water can enter the trough at this point." All previous 
stop-gap measures did not work. Farnsworth prescribed a coat of neoprene for every skylight 
frame on entire roof. But, others reported that the hypalon coating and rubber stripping 
foundered, allowing the leaks/* 
The off-white paint seemed to work until Astro outfielder Jim "The Toy Cannon" 
Wynn lost a routine fly ball that resulted in a three-run home run for the visiting Giants. "I 
saw the ball as it left the bat, but never after that," lamented Wynn. Wynn's misplay was 
blamed for the Astros' 5-2 defeat. Instead of focusing on Wynn's error, the roof again foisted 
the blame. (Wynn also misplayed a routine fly ball the previous day that resulted in a three-
base hit.) Giant outfield Jesus Alou also lost a fly ball during the game. Alou, however, 
shouldered the responsibility for missing the catch. "I took my eye 'out' of the ball," he said 
18 Robert J. Minchew to I. B. Weathers, (10/31/63), Minchew Collection 94-274/8, Skylight Correspondence, 
1961, 1975 file; V. S. Skinner and R. C. Hudson to Architects (11/8/63), (11/21/63). Minchew Collection 94-
274/8, Skylight Correspondence, 1961,1975 file; Robert J. Minchew to Eyster (5/5/64), Minchew Collection 
94-274/8, Skylight Correspondence, 1961,1975 file.. 
19 Farnsworth to Architects (10/27/65), Minchew Collection 94-274/8, Legal Documents and Notes, 1964-1971; 
Robert Minchew Summary of Meeting (8/23/66), Minchew Collection 94-274/5, Harris County Domed 
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308 
as he tired to locate teammate Willie McCovey playing first base. When he tried to relocate 
the baseball, he said he could not find it before it hit the turf. Astros general manager Paul 
Richards, Hofheinz assistant Tal Smith, two coaches, and three players met on the Geld after 
the loss to determine some way to handle the glare. After coach Jim Busby hit fly balls to the 
players, Smith suggested another coat of paint for two sections of skylights above the home 
plate area of the roof. "This one will have to be darker than the off-white we used before, 
probably green, blue, or black," he said. * 
The weekend the Giants were in town, rain fell almost continually from Friday to 
Sunday. The Dome permitted all four games to proceed, sheltering 130,514 spectators to 
watch the games. "It isn't stretching things too far to say that the Dome meant 130,000 paid 
admissions to the Astros and the Giants: paid admissions that would have been lost to the 
weather without the Dome."  ^Before the bond elections, stadium boosters most often cited 
the economic boom the stadium would most certainly have upon the city. The stadium, they 
argued, would pull hundreds of thousands of tourists, and their money, to Houston. In 
addition to the mere tourism dollars, the stadium would also attract industry and other large 
firms seeking a national headquarters. Although the stadium did bring more spectators 
through its turnstiles for the Astros, other economic benefits it brought were harder to assess. 
Restaurant and night club managers attested to an unforeseen negative economic 
impact of baseball and the stadium. Even though a night baseball game at the Dome could 
mean more money for motels and clothing stores, it could have an opposite effect on local 
restaurants, bowling lanes and night clubs. Local restaurant owner Ray West reported that his 
^ Lundgren, "Ah-Oh, Glare In Dome Again," Posf, 24 May 1965, sec. 4, p. 1,4. 
21 Nealon?? Post, 28 April 1965, sec. 3, p. 2. 
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establishment the "Old Hickory Stick" lost anywhere from $200 to $400 every day of an 
Astros homestand. "I would rather see horse racing instead of baseball," he said, because 
horse racing "would bring in people who would spend money." Sonny Look who also owned 
a restaurant said that he lost $250 a day. But unlike West, Look said that in the long run, the 
Dome would be the best for the city economically. George J. Lewis of "Ye Olde College 
Inn" complained that baseball spectators were eating at the stadium and would not need a 
restaurant after the game. One night club owner said that the length of the game determined 
baseball's effect. The longer a baseball game, the argument went, a night club would 
experience reduced amount of business and after a shorter game, baseball fans would 
patronize the club.22 
In the face of mounting problems, the glare, the dying grass, and the leaking roof the 
people of Houston could not point to the Astrodome as the city's preeminent shining star. 
The money that cost over $30 million seemed to be a giant failure. The stadium was not 
perfect despite the tens of millions of tax backed dollars poured into it and despite the boasts 
of Hofheinz. Whatever good graces and enthusiasm Hofheinz earned for his stadium, 
evaporated amidst a personal squabble with R. E. Smith. The team that created the 
Astrodome was no longer. The two former business associates and friends went their separate 
ways just after the paint on the roof began to dry. Although Smith and Hofheinz kept the 
squabble out of the newspapers, Posf sports writer Mickey Herskowitz reported that Smith 
grew more and more upset with Hofheinz's "autocratic" ways over the baseball team and 
Hofheinz's boorish people skills. Smith owned 63% of the HSA's stock and Hofheinz 
controlled 33%. Hofheinz had ninety days to purchase all but 10% of Smith's stock at a cost 
22 Gerald Egger, "How Dome Affects Houston Business." Post, 5 June 1965, sec. 1, p. 1, 5. 
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of $7 million. If Hofheinz failed, Smith promised to remain and take a greater role in 
operation of the baseball team.^  
With Hofheinz searching for the means to buy out Smith, Oilers owner Bud Adams 
announced that his Oilers would not play its home games under the Dome as had been 
previously believed. Instead, Adams moved from the high school facility Jeppeson Stadium 
to Rice Stadium. Disagreement over several aspects in the lease arrangement resulted in the 
rift between the two parties. Adams charged that the rent Smith demanded was not only 
exorbitant, but unfair. "The lease was to be renegotiated every year," said Adams, which 
meant that the HSA could alter the terms every year if it wanted. The HSA was to blame, 
asserted Adams, not the Oiler owner. "Before I'd sign the Oilers' life away, I'd have sold 
them or moved the franchise to another city," brayed an upset Adams. Hofheinz expressed 
his "surprise and disappointment" over Adams's decision. Hofheinz had hoped that the 
Oilers would call the Astrodome their home for years to come. Without the AFL Oilers, 
Hofheinz promised to look for a professional football team from the NFL. Hofheinz would 
have to lure an established franchise to Houston. Adams expressed his lack of concern for 
such a measure. "I say let 'em move," he said, "They'll find the Domed Stadium is the eighth 
wonder of the world, but at the same time they'll And Hofheinz's terms as the ninth wonder 
of the world."* 
Gallagher viewed Adams' decisions as bad for Harris County taxpayers. Hofheinz's 
"unreasonable rental demands" pressured Adams to search for a new home and sign a lease 
with Rice University. County residents, he continued, were plain and simply "duped" by 
23 Hcrskowitz, "Picture Begins To Take Shape On Smith-Hofheinz Transaction," Post, 23 May 1965, sec. 4, p. 
4; Ralph Dodd. "Smith and Hofheinz—How Serious the Rift?" Post, 6 June 1965, sec. 4, p. 11. 
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Hofheinz. Hofheinz persuaded the voters to pass the bond issue because he promised both 
professional football and baseball teams playing under the domed stadium. Gallagher even 
stated that if voters had the chance to vote again on the bond issue, "it would probably lose 
because of the highhanded, autocratic tactics of Roy Hofheinz." ^  Bud Adams announced, 
"Mr. Hofheinz is the reason, the only reason, we will be playing our games at Rice 
Stadium."* 
Hofheinz refused to be labeled as the bad guy by Adams and the Houston media. He 
called a press conference to explain his position in the Oilers contract dispute. Before he left 
for Montreal, Hofheinz believed he had an agreement with Adams. He learned of Adams's 
decision only after he arrived in Montreal. The real reason for Adams's decision, according 
to Hofheinz, was financial. Rice University charged a ten percent rental of the gross receipts 
versus seventeen-and-one-half percent of the HSA. A ten percent rent for 70,000 seats meant 
that Adams stood to make more money using the Rice facility. If Adams had a problem with 
the rental amount, Hofheinz said that he never heard it from Adams. "The American Football 
League had agreed that 17 1/2 per cent was a fair rental," Hofheinz charged, "and it had 
made allowances in Bud's contract (with the visiting teams) to take this off the top." So not 
only was Adams shorting the HSA and the people of Houston, but fellow owners in the 
AFL.2? 
One interested Houstonian wrote an editorial to the Pa# absolving Bud Adams in the 
contract dispute with Hofheinz. Adams just wanted a top-notch facility for his players and his 
24 Gallagher, "Oilers Will Play Games in Rice Stadium," Post, 5 June 1965, sec. 1, p. 1, 2; Hcrskowitz, 
"Houston, Dome Wide Open to NFL," Post, 5 June 1965, sec. 4, p. 1, 3. 
25 Gallagher. "Harris County Taxpayers Suffer In Switch From Dome to Rice," Post, 5 June 1965, sec. 4, p. 2. 
26 Hcrskowitz, "Judge Failed To Act In Good Faith, Adams Says," Post, 11 June 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,4. 
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fans, but ran into the stubborn Hofheinz. The Oilers occupying the Astrodome was beneficial 
for all of Houston. The rent Adams paid to the HSA would be used to amortize the yearly 
rent. Every rental check Hofheinz gave to the County assured that the people of Houston 
would not be saddled with the debt. Without a major tenant like the Oilers, the HSA's ability 
to make its rent seemed precarious. Hofheinz's actions betrayed the promise that the stadium 
was owned by Harris County with the HSA merely renting and operating the facility. "Roy 
Hofheinz must think he owns the Harris County Domed Stadium," wrote A. L. Stahl. It was 
"no wonder," continued Stahl, that Bob Smith renounced his partnership with the "greedy 
and selfish" Hofheinz and Bud Adams ended contract negotiations.^  
Sports reporter Clark Nealon, although no close friend with Hofheinz, ardently 
supported the stadium and other vestiges of professional athletics in Houston. Clark echoed 
the public's concern with Hofheinz's seeming inability to cooperate with anyone. Clark 
pledged his support of the stadium, he averred, based upon the "combination" of Smith, 
Hofheinz, the Astros, and the Oilers, "not complete control to any one man." As a result of 
Hofheinz's mishandling of just about every facet of stadium operation that required 
cooperation and understanding, "a battleground of personalities" revolved around Hofheinz. 
"Hofheinz has extended his individual and public relations losing streak which helped cause 
and had its first major blow in the rift with Smith," according to Nealon, while "Adams ran 
out of patience and bolted to take away a major source of some revenue and Rice was willing 
to provide the Oilers a haven." Maybe the pressure of paying the yearly rent was getting to 
Hofheinz. Maybe he wanted an NFL team as a tenant of the stadium and not the Oilers of the 
27 Hcrskowitz, "Judge Appeals Dome Rent Case to Public," Post, 10 June 1965, sec. 1, p. 1, 9; Hcrskowitz, 
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third-rate AFL. But whatever the reason, the truth of the situation was that Hofheinz's actions 
seriously damaged the reputation of Houston, continued Nealon. But more importantly was 
the dictatorial control of the HSA by Hofheinz who continued to amass more authority and 
power of the syndicate. "There is a major departure from the premise of the election, and 
personalities, however strong, seem to be more important than responsibility." The notion of 
the stadium as a boom to Houston was undergoing rapid transformation. A facility for the 
entire community had been commandeered by a lone tyrant who not only lived in stadium 
but considered it his own property and personal fiefdom.* 
Hofheinz promised to exercise the option and purchase Smith's HSA stock. At the 
scheduled HSA board meeting on August 3, Hofheinz would officially take control of the 
syndicate. "I obviously couldn't exercise the option unless I had the money or knew I had it," 
he told reporters. Once completed Hofheinz would own 86 percent of the HSA, Smith 10 
percent, George Kirksey 2 percent, and 1 percent owned by Earl Allen and John Beck each. 
Other than these minor stockholders, Hofheinz would not have anyone else as a "partner." "I 
think a baseball club can best serve its area interests if it owned by aggressive, full-time local 
people," Hofheinz announced. Hofheinz did not say one local person should shoulder all the 
responsibility, but that was what he desired.* 
During the meeting held in the Astrodome, Smith formally resigned as the HSA 
chairman of the board. Once the meeting was completed and Hofheinz became the sole man 
of power, Smith vented to the public and blasted his former business associate. "This 
business about us being friends is not true, not true at all," professed Smith. "I'm unhappy 
28 
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* Nealon, "Post Time," fa#, 18 June 1965, sec. 4, p. 4; Nealon, "Post Time," Poaf, 4 August 1965, sec 4, p. 1. 
314 
with every arrangement I've had with him. There is no such thing as a friendly relationship 
with him," he continued, "He's too autocratic." Smith retained ten percent of his HSA stock 
and quipped that that amount gave him the same clout when he was chairman of the board: 
none. Smith guaranteed that all other partnerships he had with Hofheinz were to be dissolved 
immediately. At his press conference, Hofheinz beamed, "I am pleased to announce that we 
have completed the transaction by which I have acquired 86 per cent of the stock in the 
Houston Sports Association." Hofheinz acquired the money to purchase Smith's stock from 
the Houston Bank and Trust Company. Immediately on the horizon for Hofheinz was the 
lease payment of $750,000. He wanted to dispel any ideas that he did not have enough 
money left to pay the year's rent. "The money's already in the bank and the payment will be 
made," assured Hofheinz.^  
The many disagreements that appeared between Hofheinz and his one time partners 
signaled the beginning of the end for the optimism of the Dome. As Nealon put it, "The 
Harris County Domed Stadium (notice that he failed to use the Hofheinz colloquialism of 
Astrodome) premise has strayed far afield from what was voted on by citizens in the bond 
elections to finance the structure and grant a lease to the Houston Sports Association." 
Nealon did not pretend to understand the rift between the one-time partners, but the 
animosity between Hofheinz and Adams could prove disastrous. "Whatever the reasons 
between Hofheinz and Adams, one basis was that the Astros and the Oilers would be tenants 
to help assure a return to pay off the general obligation bonds," continued Nealon, "Now the 
rift between Hofheinz and Smith.. .further distorts the original stadium picture. The 
30 
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combination of Hofheinz's accepted business acumen and Smith's immense wealth, 
responsibility and civic enthusiasm was another fundamental reason that many voters 
approved the bonds, $31,600,000 of them."  ^
Hofheinz escaped the increasing bitterness and traveled to Chicago to meet officials 
of the American Football Coaches Association to offer the Dome as the site for an all-star 
football game. He also wanted to establish a relationship with NFL commissioner Pete 
Rozelle for the purpose of landing a future franchise for Houston and the Dome.33 Rozelle 
then decided to go to Houston to meet with Hofheinz, watch a baseball game, and inspect the 
Dome. Rozelle informed Hofheinz that NFL policy banned an owner from controlling more 
than one professional sports franchise. Rozelle agreed with the policy when he said, "The 
primary business purpose of a pro football owner is football, and he can't do that if he's 
devoting full time to baseball." Hofheinz responded that his primary interest was getting a 
football tenant for the stadium although he did not rule out the possibility of becoming a 
minority owner. Now that Hofheinz could not count on the deep pockets of R. E. Smith nor 
the rental fee from Bud Adams, the search for a major tenant became even more important.* 
Without the Oilers occupying the stadium, Hofheinz came up with an event never 
seen before in Houston, a bloodless bullfight. This ploy, in addition to generate more revenue 
for the HSA, brought Hofheinz more publicity. The State of Texas, arguing that this type of 
event violated state law, sued the HSA to prohibit the bullfight. The 1895 law outlawed 
holding, showing, and participating in "a fight between a man and a bull." HSA attorney 
David Searls argued that the bloodless Portuguese-style bullfighting would not technically be 
^ "Judge Too 'Autocratic' for Friendship, Smith Says," Pasf, 4 August 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,20. 
32 Nealon, "Post Time," Post, 4 August 1965, sec. 4, p. 1. 
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a fight between man and bull. Instead, the matador would only attempt to "entice" the bull to 
charge at the red cape, much akin to a rodeo clown. State Attorney General Waggoner Carr 
rebutted Searls's reasoning, positing that it did not take the killing of a bull to necessitate a 
fight. "This has been advertised as a bullfight," said Carr, "the statue says it is illegal to have 
a fight between a man and a bull." Carr, who would not appeal the decision, must have 
determined the case was important enough to personally try it himself.^  Hofheinz always in 
search for another way to generate revenue looked to the newly formed North American 
Soccer League (NASL). Hofheinz, not the HSA, received the franchise after he personally 
invested $25,000. Hofheinz was confidant that soccer would take off in Houston and the rest 
of the US. "I think that in a few years soccer will be one of the top four sports in the county," 
he proclaimed, but only through "time, effort, and the proper promotion." The eleven-team 
league was scheduled to start in 1968.* 
Even though the Oilers did not call the Astrodome their home, the University of 
Houston Cougars still did. On 11 September, the Cougars played the University of Tulsa 
Golden Hurricane in the first collegiate football game under the Dome. NBC televised the 
game, paying $300,000 for the rights to broadcast it. The Golden Hurricane defeated the 
Cougars, 14-0, and the story was the low score. One possibility was the condition of the 
playing surface. Tulsa player Howard Twilley said, "The field was terrible. Like playing on 
rock." The other possibility was the players unfamiliarity with the stadium. Twilley 
complained that the skylights distracted a receiver from catching the football. These were 
33 Gallagher, "Hofheinz Shopping in Chicago for NFL Team." Post, 6 August 1965, sec. 1, p. 1. 
34 Gallagher, "NFL Policy Bans Roy as Club Owner," Post, 10 August 1965, sec. 4, p. 1,2. 
35 Molly Sinclair, "Bullfight Here Gets Court OK," Post, 1 February 1966, sec. 1, p. 1, 6. 
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fixable problems, however. His coach, Glenn Dobbs, agreed with his star of the game. "Any 
flaws are so minor that I predict conditions will be absolutely perfect when next football 
season opens." The HSA, to assure the image of perfection inside the stadium, had to cover 
large areas of the field with a "green sweeping compound" to make it look like grass for the 
television audience. Other discolored sections received a coat of green paint.^  
Financially, Hofheinz faced an unwelcome and unexpected tax bill. The HSA 
received notification that it would have to pay the full tax bill of Colt Stadium. Additionally, 
the special contract between the HSA and Lott-Drake neared its expiration on 15 March. This 
special contract stipulated that Lott-Drake repair any defects with the stadium. Hofheinz 
claimed that the HSA faced at least a $500,000 bill to repairs these "defects." Hofheinz asked 
for reimbursement for the improvements and repairs made to the roof the previous summer. 
He sent a letter to Lott-Drake, its bonding companies, and the county engineer demanding 
action on these problems. Hofheinz listed the extensive and intrinsic "defects" that remained 
as well as those that the HSA was forced to fix. Hofheinz "demanded" that every defect from 
the leaking and rusting roof to cracks in walls and floors "be corrected" and the stadium "be 
completed to specification without further delay." In addition to those defects, Hofheinz 
"demanded" compensation from Harris County and Lott-Drake "for all costs and expenses 
incurred" to complete and repair the stadium. He also met with the members of the 
Commissioners Court to personally demand satisfaction. Hofheinz, however, found an 
unsympathetic Commissioners Court. Judge Bill Elliott, Phil Sayers, and E. A. Lyons all 
scoffed at Hofheinz's request. The Court simply refused to become entangled in the latest 
37 Mollis, "Hurricane Watch at Dome: UH vs Tulsa," Post, 11 September 1965, sec. 1, p. 1,4; Lundgren, "Tulsa 
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Hofheinz skirmish. "He's in the Dome, and it's up to him to make changes that are not 
defects," the Court announced. None of the this concerned the County, they agreed. The 
HSA, as stipulated in the contract, was responsible for all improvements to the stadium. 
Hofheinz. however, argued that since the stadium was still unfinished, the County was 
legally bound to completely bring construction to an end.* 
A man of his word, Hofheinz confirmed that synthetic grass would be installed in the 
stadium for the 1966 baseball season. The first artificial grass surface was installed in 1964 at 
Moses Brown School in Providence, Rhode Island. Developed by Chemstrand, a division of 
Monsanto,39 this "Chemgrass" was one of the earliest entries to replace the natural grass 
inside the Astrodome.40 Besides Monsanto, 3M had a version of artificial grass called Tartan 
Turf. The main difference between the Monsanto and 3M synthetic surfaces revolved around 
installation. To prepare the surface for Tartan, workers began with a twelve inch layer of 
compacted and leveled soil. On top of the soil was six inches of gravel, then an inch and one-
half of asphalt. The "shock-absorbing pad" was poured directly onto the asphalt surface. 
Shutout," Post, 12 September 1965, sec. 5, p. 4. 
38 Sinclair, "$500,000 Dome Job Demanded," Post, 1 March 1966, sec. 1, p. 1, 5; "Hofheinz Dome Demands 
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Then the Tartan was directly bonded to the wet pad. Monsanto's Astroturf had a similar base 
of dirt, gravel, and asphalt. The difference was that the Astroturf was a removable rug. The 
half-inch Nylon monofilament, woven into a polyester base, was folded down and secured to 
a wood cleat bolted to a reinforced concrete anchor. Hofheinz eventually selected 
Chemstrand's grass in large part because Hofheinz experimented with it a Colt Stadium/' 
The first installation phase would be for the infield and foul territories of the playing 
surface. The outfield would be converted later in the baseball season, but only if the artificial 
surface performed well. "If the Astroturf works out as well as we anticipate, we plan to have 
the entire field converted midseason," declared Hofheinz. This "Astroturf," developed by 
Chemstrand, Inc., a division of Monsanto, promised to be more durable than natural grass 
and allow for quicker and cleaner conversion because it was developed especially for golf 
courses. Robert E. Smith of Chemstrand promised that the Astroturf would easily resist 
moisture and mildew while providing similar, if not better, playing conditions than natural 
grass. HSA director of publicity Warren Giles observed that up close the synthetic grass 
looked like "a green hairbrush with bristles extremely close" but at a distance it resembled a 
lush, green carpet. A January experiment that included Astros fielders demonstrated that the 
synthetic surface was more than adequate for a light practice. Ball players said that baseballs 
bounced and rolled normally and their footing was fine. Only Rusty Staub remained guarded 
in his enthusiasm. "It's got to be better than our field last year," said Staub. Always 
optimistic, Hofheinz concurred with his red-headed outfielder. "With the installation of 
41 William Johnson, "Goodby (sic) to Three Yards and a Cloud of Dust," Sports Illustrated, 30 (27 January 
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Astroturf, we will have eliminated the last pitfall in conjunction with the stadium," 
guaranteed Smith."" 
The HSA installed the Astroturf before the Astros' first exhibition games in the 
Astrodome in 1966. The Astros' faced the world champion Los Angeles Dodgers minus three 
all-stars: Sandy Koufax, Don Drysdale, and Maury Wills, each of whom was in the middle of 
contract renegotiations and would not be in uniform. CAromck sports editor Peebles poked 
fun at the timing of Hofheinz's Astroturf decision. According to Peebles, Hofheinz decided 
to install the artificial grass to keep the stadium packed with inquisitive fans that wanted to 
see the artificial turf in addition to the Dodgers.^  
The synthetic grass received favorable reviews after the first exhibition game. Wes 
Parker, Dodgers' first baseman, said, "This used to be the worst infield in the majors. Now 
it's only the dirt here in the Dome (that was the worst)." Parker's teammate, Nate Oliver 
agreed and said that the artificial turf was a definite improvement over the previous natural 
grass. The only problem the fielders reported was that the dirt underneath the surface needed 
to be firmer before the season began.* After viewing the surface, one reporter commented, 
"The infield looked and felt like a billiard table." "They came at us with this stuff. They 
asked us what we needed and we gave them about 20 specifications. They fulfilled every one 
of them," said Hofheinz. "Let's face it, they had to pick the Dome as the first place for 
artificial grass. This was the only showcase. By tomorrow every person in Houston is going 
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to start thinking about using this stuff for his back yard. In another few years, all the outdoor 
stadiums will have the same thing on their playing fields," boasted Hofheinz.^  
Before the first test of the Astroturf, Hofheinz Gelded reporters' questions regarding 
the fake grass. At the conclusion of the press conference, he then invited them to walk around 
on the Astroturf, kick at it, poke it, pull it, and judge for themselves the nylon's durability. 
The press then watched as Astros infielders performed a short practice. Bob Aspromonte, one 
of the fielders who tested the turf in January, again participated. The Astros third baseman 
said, "The ball came off much faster this time" and blamed a harder dirt base. Unlike the 
January test, the stiff subsurface added some "zip" to grounders that was not there 
previously. Although Aspromonte remained certain that fielders would eventually "get used 
to it," the bigger problem would be the footing on the turf. Aspromonte said that when he 
directly charged the ball, he had good footing. But if he moved laterally left or right, his 
cleats slipped. The uneasy footing, he said, might require a new type of shoe with rubber 
stubs and sides to lessen the amount of sliding. Until this shoe arrived, baseball players 
would still use their cleats and try to eliminate the amount of slipping on the turf.* 
During the exhibition game, the Astros and the Dodgers committed a total of five 
errors. The fake grass could be blamed for two of the miscues, and should have been credited 
for another. At the bottom of the first inning, Dodgers first baseman Wes Parker misjudged a 
sharp groundball off of the bat of Joe Morgan and was credited with an error. In the fourth 
inning, Parker again was the center of attention. He failed to glove a ground ball hit right at 
him. The ball sped under Parker's glove, but fortunately for Parker, he was not given an error 
* Twombly, "The Grass Is Fake," CTwwuck, 20 March 1966, sec. 6, p. 3. 
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by the official scorer. The next batter, catcher John Bateman, hit a grounder to second 
baseman Nate Oliver. Oliver could not get his glove on it and received an error.^  
Natural grass, painted green to disguise its sickly appearance, remained in the 
outfield. Hofheinz promised that the outfield would get Astroturf on 10 June. The turf arrived 
at the stadium in twelve-feet-wide strips, which were connected, via zippers. The dimensions 
of the turf was quarter-inch stiff base with a layer of nylon strands nine-sixteenths of inch 
long. Trenches eighteen-inches deep were dug. Workers placed a "floor" of two-by-fours, 
imbedded with hooks placed on springs inside trench. The borders of the "Astrorug" were 
folded into the trenches and tied to the series of springs. The turf would remain taut due to 
the continuous tension of the springs. Players' spike shoes could not reach the base of the rug. 
The strips were placed from third base across the diamond to first base. This meant that the 
grain of ersatz grass was also laid crosswise, reducing the effect of the grain on the spin and 
roll of a baseball. Hofheinz asserted that the artificial grass would reduce operation costs by 
eliminating the $4,000 to $5,000 cost to convert the playing surface for other events and 
ending the watering, fertilizing, mowing, and other maintenance of the grass each year.** 
The performance of the Astroturf remained at the mercy of its dirt base. Bob 
Aspromonte and Joe Morgan agreed that softening the underlying dirt would only improve 
the fake grass. "If they'll fix the dirt the grass will be better," said Morgan who railed against 
the dirt. "The dirt was lousy last year and it's lousy this year," he said. "Soft in one place, 
hard in another."** Like the other playing conditions under the dome, the Astroturf would be 
an equalizer. No longer could the home team's groundskeeper "doctor" the infield to benefit 
47 Nealon, "New Infield—But Same Old Astros," Post, 20 March 1966, sec 2, p. 1, 8. 
48 Red Smith. "Wall-to-Wall Baseball," Post, 21 March 1966, sec. 4, p. 5. 
323 
the home team and hinder the visitors. * The HSA listened to the opinions of its players and 
began working on the dirt base. The HSA wanted to soften the dirt in an attempt to decrease 
the speed and lessen the bounce of a ground ball. Joe Morgan said that the alterations did 
make a difference in the velocity of a baseball across the Astroturf.^  
Hofheinz purchased George Kirksey's HSA stock in May 1966. Kirksey ended his 
almost six year association with the HSA on friendly terms so that he could take a much 
desired vacation. Kirksey, a long time champion to bring major league baseball to Houston, 
said, "I was standing on the comer of Main and Texas in 1951. Bob Smith came along and I 
told him that the Philadelphia Athletics could be purchased for $2.5 million and moved to 
Houston." Smith replied that he would be in for $250,000. "Get nine more to put in that 
much and we're in business," Smith purportedly said. Because of this early effort and his 
activity in the Continental League, Hofheinz said that Kirksey made a "real contribution" to 
major league baseball in Houston. Hofheinz controlled eighty-eight percent of the HSA along 
with Smith's ten percent, Earl Allen, president of the Associated Pipeline Co., owning one 
percent, and Boheck Engineering Co.'s co-president John Beck also owning one percent.^  
With Hofheinz's near absolute control of the HSA, he "emerged as judge, jury, executioner 
and general manager."  ^
Hofheinz promised that the entire playing surface, except the dirt part of the infield 
and the cinder track, would be covered with Astroturf. "The Astroturf has really worked out 
better than we expected, and I think everyone.. .likes the playing surface," boasted Hofheinz. 
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Once the Geld was covered with the synthetic grass, the time to convert the playing surface 
from any event to another would require less than a full day without any damage, according 
to Hofheinz.* The HSA began the installation of the outfield Astroturf on Wednesday, 13 
July to coincide with the league's All-Star break. It required three days to place the 90,000-
square-feet of synthetic grass. The All-Star break allowed the installation to proceed at a 
deliberate pace without interruptions.^  
The HSA scheduled daily tours of the Astrodome and charged one dollar to take the 
tour, which made stops at the air-conditioning and weather control room, the Domeskeller, 
the Trail Blazer restaurant, the press boxes, but not a visit to a private skybox. The Trail 
Blazer, "the nicest place to eat in the dome if you aren't a member of either private club," 
cost $2.50 to enter, but included the price of the ticket. A meal at the Trail Blazer meal 
consisted of an entrée, salad, sourdough bread, and dessert. Beer cost extra. Once the 
baseball game began, the Trail Blazer closes its doors. The Domeskeller remained open until 
8 p.m. After the game, baseball fans were forced to look beyond the Astrodome's walls for 
their meals because none of the restaurants remained open. "Baseball used to be a dull game 
with not much to occupy a woman's mind between the rare home runs" wrote foaf reporter 
Pat Reed. "But at the Astrodome something is always happening" thanks to the "super-duper 
scoreboard."* 
The HSA did not remit a payment for its state or county taxes by the end of January. 
They awaited a decision on the ownership of Colt Stadium. According to the HSA, the 
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county owned the stadium, not the syndicate. The Harris County attorney opined that even 
though the county owned the land, the HSA maintained ownership of the stadium. How 
could this be possible? The county attorney used the wording of the deed for the basis of his 
decision. Bob Smith transferred the land to Harris County, not the stadium, which remained 
titled to the HSA. Smith valued the land at $167,080. The HSA, then, owed $3057 in taxes. 
When this $3057 was added to the January tax bill ($10,575 in county taxes and $3,150 in 
state taxes), the HSA's owed $16,782.^  
Carl Smith, Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector, notified the HSA that it failed to 
"render its property" to the county, five months past the official deadline. The results of 
Smith's negligence jeopardized the HSA's finances. The HSA would be unable to plead its 
case in front of the County Tax Equalization Board before the year ended. The result was that 
the County could set the value of the HSA's leasehold and personal property, costing the 
syndicate millions of dollars. The HSA responded in the only way it could. It sued the 
county, claiming its leasehold was tax exempt. Thus, the HSA should not be forced to pay 
property taxes on these holdings. The HSA also asked for a temporary injunction that would 
prevent Harris County from solely determining the monetary value of HSA property. 
According to Texas law, parties that leased state property for less than three years was 
exempt from Worem taxes. When the lease was longer than three years, however, the 
same Texas law provided that a leaseholder was subject to property taxes. The HSA petition 
asserted that this law was unconstitutional because it erroneously discriminated between 
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lengths of leases "and therefore does not provide for equal and uniform taxation of all 
leaseholds." The HSA, therefore, could not be taxed. ^  
Smith assessed HSA holdings at $11.3 million and would be the value for the 
syndicate's 1966 taxes. The HSA, on the other hand, rendered the "true values" of its 
personal property at $1.6 million and the leasehold at $1. The one dollar value included the 
stadium, everything inside it, all 270-acres of land, and all other improvements, which had 
cost over $30 million in public and private money. The HSA justified this seemingly paltry 
sum. Anyone interested in buying the leasehold, according to an unnamed HSA official, 
would face the $750,000 rental obligation. And face paying the rent without the Astros, 
which was the property of the HSA. No one would knowingly accept a lease of that 
magnitude. Smith rejected this rendition based on the advice of the Harris County attorney 
who questioned its accuracy and integrity.* 
Before the year ended, Harris County wanted to determine if the HSA was legally 
forced to pay taxes on its personal property and its leasehold with the County. Assistant 
County Attorney Charles F. Mitchell asserted that $50,000 was a stake in this issue. If the 
HSA could delay the hearing as long as possible, its position that the leasehold was valued 
for $1. For obvious reasons. Hofheinz was upset with Mitchell's and county tax assessor-
collector Carl Smith's assertion. Hofheinz vehemently denied that it should pay state and 
county taxes for its operation of the county stadium. According to Smith, Hofheinz openly 
speculated moving his baseball team to another city if the County pursued its present, and 
according to Hofheinz, illegal course of action. The HSA imposed a $1 tax valuation on its 
* Molly Sinclair, "HSA Sues To Block Tax on Dome Lease," Posf, 5 October 1966, sec. 1, p. 1,6. 
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leasehold. HSA assistant treasurer John K. Easter testified that the HSA generated a $3 
million net profit after grossing $11 million operating the stadium in 1965. Easter also 
testified that the HSA did not pay federal tax on this $3 million in 1965 because of the 
financial losses it accrued before moving into the Astrodome. Smith valued the HSA's 
leasehold at $9,736,457 and its personal property at $1,615,184. One of the key components 
of the hearing was Smith's admission that he failed to follow state law in his handling of this 
tax suit. According to law, Smith should have notified the HSA of his tax assessments before 
any other action took place. During his testimony, Fred Hofheinz, son of Roy and HSA first 
vice president, maintained that the HSA did not generate much money from its non-baseball 
events during 1965. Mitchell offered an opinion that the HSA could not exclusively use and 
operate the Harris County Domed Stadium because it was a public park, a public facility. But 
the reality was that a private corporation did indeed completely control the stadium. It 
decided who could use it and for how much money. The HSA could close the public roads 
adjacent to the stadium if it so desired. And, the syndicate charged an entry fee for any 
person who wanted to look at the stadium. Since of this had occurred, the lease between 
Harris County and the HSA was null and void.* 
In his decision, District Judge Solomon Casseb told the HSA to resubmit all of its tax 
valuations to the county assessor-collector. If the assessor-collector disagreed with the HSA's 
estimates, the Commissioners Court would review the materials and make the final, 
incontrovertible, decision on the valuations. Judge Casseb opined that the HSA's leasehold 
was taxable, but that the County and the HSA needed to determine the value. Both Mitchell 
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and Smith expressed their excitement over Casseb's decision. Mitchell and Smith wanted the 
Commissioners Court to set the value in the first place back in April. The HSA, Mitchell 
said, was "between a rock and the hardest place they ever saw." They could try and declare 
their leasehold at $1, which would confirm that it is taxable. If they refused to declare an 
amount on their leasehold, Smith could decide that the value was $9.7 million. Texas law 
was clear in this case. Any leaseholds that operated more than three years were subject to 
taxation."" 
Hofheinz notified the Commissioners Court about the condition of the gondola and its 
concern to the HSA. According to Hofheinz, several "imperfections of construction and 
installation of the gondola" jeopardized the integrity of the stadium and the safety of workers 
and spectators. These imperfections required immediate attention by the County and H. A. 
Lott, Inc, not the HSA. The importance of this complaint is not the seriousness of potential 
injury or the exact condition of the gondola. It is Hofheinz's supercilious. Not only did he 
neglect to cite any of these so-called imperfections, any problems were the result of the 
County and its contractor. Hofheinz responded in typical fashion of the times: someone else 
caused the problem and therefore should solve it. This seemingly indifference to a potential 
threat further eroded the public's confidence in Hofheinz.^  
The HSA, however, could not rest on the first year success. It still faced a yearly 
$750,000 rent for the next thirty-one years. Continuing to schedule as many diverse events as 
possible every year ensured a steady stream of visitors and their money. But what the HSA 
needed to avoid was increasing its negative publicity. Although Hofheinz could not control 
61 Bailey, "HSA Must Resubmit Valuations," Post, 21 December 1966, sec. 1, p. 1, 2. 
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what reporters wrote about him and the HSA, he could limit the amount of material upon 
which they could consistently draw. For example, Hofheinz's personal feuds with Bob Smith 
and Bud Adams only hurt his declining reputation and that of the HSA. But this was easier 
said than done. It is too easy to blame the Hofheinz's ego and his many public quarrels. He 
was still the same man who rescued the domed stadium idea Ave years ago. He was still the 
same man who staved off impeachment as the mayor of Houston. What really changed was 
American society, and Houston specifically. The optimism evaporated in the face of 
increasing cynicism. Earlier, the people of Houston had viewed Hofheinz's antics as 
charming, the HSA as a benevolent, and the $31 million Astrodome as the testament to the 
insight, ingenuity, and technological advancement of Houston. By 1966, however, those 
same Houstonians had had enough of the odious Hofheinz, the menacing HSA, and the 
flawed Astrodome. The era of optimism was long gone, never to return. In its place, the age 
of cynicism had arrived. 
In less than a year, 3,780,000 individuals visited the Astrodome in one form or 
another. Astros home games tallied 2,539,470. Six University of Houston football contests 
attracted 210,106. From the Astros games to the Houston Boy Scouts, from the evangelical 
crusade of the Rev, Bill Graham to the Ringling Bros, and Bamum and Bailey Circus, just 
about every type of event was available to the people of Houston.^  These numbers confirmed 
that the Astrodome was a bona fide "tourist attraction and business bonanza." The Astros and 
their stadium attracted 2.5 million spectators. In 1964,725,000 fans paid to see the Colts and 
62 Dick Ray craft, "Hofheinz Says Imperfections In Dome Gondola Hazardous," Chronicle, 10 January 1966, 
sec. 1, p. 14. 
63 Dick Stanley, "The Year of the Dome.. .What It Meant to Houston," Chronicle, 2 January 1966, sec. 1, p. 1, 
16; "From Dome to Disneyland, We're Always in the Go," CArwwck, 13 February 1966, "Go Coast '66" 
special section, sec. 1, p. 19. 
330 
925,000 paid to see the Colts in their first season in 1962. The effect the inaugural year of the 
Astrodome had on the local economy was apparent.* 
The HSA sent a survey to 50,000 "out-of-town fans" to determine how much money 
the stadium injected into the local economy. The HSA estimated that one-half of the four 
million visitors came from outside Harris County. The average stadium visitor then spent 
$40, totaling the $80 million infusion. The survey also demonstrated that not all of this 
money went straight to the HSA. For example, motels and hotels benefited from the 
stadium's existence. According to the HSA, 62 percent of these visitors stayed in the hotels 
and motels during their stay. Though hardly scientific, the HSA claimed to have proved its 
economic importance to the city. Seen in another way, the HSA survey was an attempt to 
reverse negative public perception of the stadium. Instead of a malevolent, selfish 
organization, the HSA helped everyone in the city prosper through its existence. Attacking 
the HSA only harmed the city and the county."  ^
N. 7. Tmzgs reporter Robert Lipsyte wrote that the average Houstonian was "hardly 
wild" about the domed stadium. He continued, "the average Houstonian is not really 
impressed." This notion was based on the statistic that fifty-five percent of those in 
attendance for the exhibition games were from outside Harris County and forty percent from 
outside Texas. Hofheinz dismissed this idea by saying, "Your people at home so frequently 
realize last what they have." Although Hofheinz's unflattering picture of locals could be true, 
an additional reason for the "lack" of Houstonian turnout for the exhibition games could be 
the constant press the stadium received. Maybe the locals felt like they had already been 
64 
"Domed Stadium: Spark To City's Economy," U.S. News and World Report, 11 October 1965, pp. 10, 12. 
65 
"Dome Has Put $80 million Into City's Economy," Chronicle, 6 March 1966, sec. 2, p. 1. 
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inside the stadium thanks to the thousands pictures and articles on local television and in the 
newspapers. Or maybe they saw the stadium in its various construction phases during .45s 
games at Colt Stadium. Or maybe they ventured on several sight-seeing excursions to South 
Main. Hofheinz continued with his explanation for the "low" local turnout. "A man who's 
never passed Taxarkana," Hofheinz said, "he thinks for sure there's gotta be something better 
out there than he's got at home." The reason the average Houstonian was not impressed with 
the stadium was the bubbling pessimism taking over society. Robert Lipsyte provided his 
rationale, "Perhaps the lack of enthusiasm was based on the feeling that something was 
foisted on them."66 
But Lipsyte argued that major league baseball was not that important to Hofheinz and 
Smith, but the potential of the stadium to bring conventions and other large gatherings to the 
city. But even more important, Lipsyte continued, was "the empire" they could create seven 
miles south of downtown Houston that contained an amusement park, and industrial park, 
office buildings, and other service businesses. "Eventually they will move the center of 
town" to the Astrodome community.^  
"Curiously, no one knows much about the loyalties and passions of the Houston 
baseball audience, in spite of those enormous attendance figures (of 1965), for it is 
impossible to guess how many of these two million ticket-buyers came to see the Astros and 
how many to see the Astrodome."* (When asked about the Astros or other sporting events, 
Hofheinz always focused on the setting before the teams or sport itself.) Angell gave his 
opinion of baseball inside the Astrodome. "The expensive Houston experiment does not truly 
66 Robert Lipsyte, "Houston Is Hardly Wild About Its Astrodome," N. Y. Times, 11 April 1965, sec. 5, p. 3. 
67 Robert Lipsyte, "Houston Is Hardly Wild About Its Astrodome," N. Y. Times, 11 April 1965, sec. 5, p. 3. 
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affect the players or much alter the sport played down on the field, but I think it does 
violence to baseball—and, incidentally, threatens its own success—through a total 
misunderstanding of the game's old mystery. I do not agree with Judge Hofheinz that a ball 
park is a notable center for socializing or propriety, or that many male spectators will 
continue to And refreshment in returning to a giant living room—complete with manmade 
weather, wall-to-wall carpeting, clean floors, and unrelenting TV shows—that so totally, so 
drearily, resembles the one he has just left. But these complaints are incidental. What matters, 
what appalls, in Houston is the attempt being made there to alter the quality of baseball's 
time." For Angells, he saw baseball as a sport ruled by "rural time-a slow, green time of 
removal and concentration" that suspends every spectator. At best, he contended, the 
Astrodome tried to upset this balance, at worse, it tried to transform it into just another type 
of sterile entertainment. "It seems to me that the Houston impresarios are trying to build a 
following by the distraction and entire control of their audience's attention-aiming at a sort of 
wraparound, programmed environment" of the electronic age. "I do not wish them luck with 
this vulgar venture."* 
The Astrodome, obviously, was not a technology considered noxious or life 
threatening like nuclear power. Like nuclear power, however, the Astrodome incorporated 
established, familiar technology that was supposed to typify the advancement of American 
society, making it better and more aesthetically appealing. And like nuclear power, the 
Astrodome experienced the "individualistic onslaught"™ of the 1960s. This onslaught, the 
death of postwar optimism, cast the Astrodome in a different light than its boosters originally 
68 Roger Angel 1, "The Cool Bubble," New Yorker, 14 May 1966, p. 138. 
* Angell, pp. 140,142. 
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envisioned. They gambled that Houstonians would constantly view the domed stadium as a 
boom, a wealth magnet, a symbol of Houston's greatness of sophistication. What Dome 
boosters could not predict was the alteration in American society during the stadium's 
construction and grand opening. In the new era of limits and finitude, public disillusionment 
with the Astrodome, and its hand maiden Roy Hofheinz, proved a powerful force. The Eighth 
Wonder of the World had become the Astro-doomed stadium. 
70 Alan 1 Marcus and Howard P. Segal, Technology in America: A Brief History (2d ed.), 305. 
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
The idea for the Astrodome, billed as the "Eight Wonder of the World" and the "Taj 
Mahal of Sport," typified thinking of the 1950s and early 1960s. The people of Houston 
viewed their city and that of America as a time of peace and plenty. The future of each was 
seen as bright and infinite. Houston, in particular, experienced unprecedented postwar 
growth. Its population, for instance, jumped to over a million inhabitants at the start of the 
1960s. This placed Houston as the sixth largest city in the United States. A city this 
magnificent demanded a testament or a monument to its majesty. A multiple purpose 
stadium, the Astrodome certified the Bayou City's big league status. Houstonians wanted the 
stadium to be used as an arena to display Houston's postwar growth and commitment to 
science and technology. The stadium was to overcome the criticism that Houston was still a 
"frontier town" and an "Oil town." Viewed in this light, the Astrodome succeeded. For 
example, Billy Sullivan, member of a group that owned the Boston Patriots of the AFL, 
began to formulate plans for a stadium with a sliding roof. In his presentation to writers, 
Sullivan said, "Houston is the most forward city in the country" because of its stadium. "The 
coming of the Houston stadium has made outdoor sports as outdated as the advent of talking 
pictures did to silent pictures."  ^Til Ferdenenzi, sports writer for the Mew fort /oMmaf 
Amerzcon, informed his readers that the Astrodome "makes all other stadiums and arenas 
look like something out of the Stone Age" and this included the most modem ballparks like 
Shea and Dodger Stadiums/ 
1 Gallagher, "Smartest City in Country Is Houston, Says Bostonian Sullivan," Post, 9 August 1965, sec. 4, p. 4. 
2 Quoted in Ray, 316. Ray also lists six written reviews of sports writers who viewed the first game. 
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The HSA could point to the attendance figures to prove its worth. The HSA grossed 
more than $8.5 million during its first year of operating the domed stadium. The eighty-one 
National League baseball games generated $6.2 million, but the HSA paid $765,642 to other 
NL teams and the league. (The six exhibition games made $477,508.) This brought the net to 
a mere $5,925,218. Parking fees totaled $525,481 and concession sales from non-baseball 
events was $131,041. Stadium rentals totaled $610,861 and $110,213 coming from gift shop 
sales/ 
Dick McDowell, Astros ticket manager, said that the demand for baseball tickets for 
the first year surmounted all preseason hopes. "Before the season we figured on an 
attendance of between one and a quarter and one and a half million," said McDowell. At the 
end of May, he continued, "It shows no signs of letting up." McDowell speculated that 
almost one-half (45%) of the attendance came from beyond Harris County with the figure 
climbing to nearly two-thirds (between 65% to 70%) for weekend games. "Let's face it," he 
said, "We're not drawing this many people on the strength of non-contending baseball team." 
McDowell cited the three factors that he attested were responsible for the Astros breaking the 
500,000 attendance mark before June 1, presumably in this order, "the stadium, the 
scoreboard, and the fact the club is giving us some pretty exciting baseball."* 
As the Astros' limped to the conclusion of the first year, the Dome became 
"Houston's first, genuine world-wide tourist attraction." By 31 August 1965,288,886 people 
paid for the $1 guided stadium tour. HSA vice president George Kirksey predicted over half 
a million people would take the tour within the stadium's first year of operation and these 
3 
"Houston Sports Association Takes In Over $8.5 Million During 1965," Post, 5 June 1966, sec. 4, p. 2. 
4 Gallagher, "There's No End in Sight To Crowds at the Domed Stadium," Post, 24 May 1965, sec. 4, p. 3. 
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numbers would only increase each ensuing year. Those who went on the guided tours, 
Kirksey contended, "go back to their hometowns and tell their friends about seeing the 
Astrodome, and they can't find the words to describe it." Stadium booking agent Jack 
O'Connell expected that with more planned events the number of guided tours would 
similarly increase. Kirksey agreed with O'Connell, pointing to the fact that of the 3,000 
guided tourists a day during the month of August, one-half originated from out of state/ 
Since April 15, over 163,000 people toured the Dome according to the tour department. Of 
this 163,000, it claimed, 85% of the visitors originated outside Harris County. "On a typical 
day in June ( 1965) 1,992 visitors came from 41 states and Canada," the HSA reported. Of 
these nearly 2,000 tourists, "only 330 of them were from Texas and a mere three from 
Houston."* 
When Hofheinz became involved with the stadium project, he had been entertaining 
ideas for a large shopping center. Although his mall never materialized, he never truly 
abandoned the concept of an "elaborate entertainment complex." In June 1968, Hofheinz's 
Astroworld theme park opened. Located south of the Astrodome, the amusement park was to 
be another aspect of Hofheinz's Astro-Domain, along with Astrohall and Astro-Lodge. 
Rumors persisted that Hofheinz dreamed up the amusement park to bolster lagging 
attendance (it fell from 2,151,470 in 1965 to 1,872,108 in 1966, and 1,333,962 in 1967). 
Visitors would have another attraction to keep them staying in the Astro-vicinity to spend 
5 Dcxld, "Dome IS First Bona Fide Tourist Attraction Here," Post, 5 September 1965, sec. 1, p. 1, 6. 
6 
"All Roads Lead To Domed Stadium," Post, 27 July 1965, sec. 1, p. 1. As the one-year anniversary 
approached, the HSA surveyed 50,000 visitors to the stadium. According to this unscientific survey, the 
"average visitor" expended about $40 when he came to town for a Dome event. The HSA also estimated that 
over the four million people who attended Dome events, two million lived outside Harris County. Through 
eleven months, 479,337 individuals took the stadium tour; almost half of these (48.15%) resided outside Texas. 
"Dome Has Put $80 Million Into City's Economy," Chronicle, 1 March 1966, sec. 1, p. 16. 
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(heir money/ Historian John M. Findlay argued that one of the motivations behind the 
creation of "magic lands" in the American West was to create "alternatives to downtowns," 
be it Los Angeles or Phoenix. The magic lands (Disneyland, Stanford Industrial Park, Sun 
City, and the Seattle's World's Fair) were responses to rampant growth and chaos, Findlay 
posited, that sought to bring order and legibility to the Western city scape. These downtown 
alternatives, according to Findlay, located several amenities and activities "to one relatively 
cohesive" suburban area. Viewed in this light, Hofheinz envisioned his own alternative to 
downtown Houston, much like Sun City, Arizona. As a planned substitute, Astro-Domain 
contained the similar amenities of downtown Houston, but at one dependable and convenient 
location. This potential threat could make downtown Houston irrelevant to visitors and 
residents alike. This was one reason why Mayor Lewis Cutrer fought so desperately for a 
downtown convention center. But as Findlay also noted, these "magic lands" or "alternatives" 
rarely lived up to the designer's lofty optimism. The Astrodome and the related complex 
never replaced downtown Houston nor fulfilled Hofheinz's promise as a wonder of the 
world/ 
The earliest expectation of Astrodome reflected the optimistic tone of the late 1950s. 
The stadium would bring notoriety, prestige, influence, culture, and meaning to the people of 
Houston. Like other downtown alternatives, the Astrodome's controlled environment forced 
spectators into a world devoid of external influences and problems. Unlike other ballparks, 
the Astrodome eliminated the distractions of wind, heat, and rain. It offered a modem 
improvement over the old standard. Houstonians and visitors could use it as a physical 
7 
"Twombly. "Hofheinz Expanding Astro-Domain," SN, 2 March 1968, pp. 5, 20; Karen Guenthcr, "Judge Roy's 
Playground: A History of Astroworld," East Texas Historical Association 36, no. 2 (1998): 58. 
338 
reference amongst in miles of streets and highways. Just as important, the Astrodome would 
symbolize post-war Houston and be the city's urban landmark. Even though Harris County 
owned the stadium, no one ever called the Astrodome by its true name, the Harris County 
Domed Stadium. Instead, people referred to it as the Houston Astrodome. In this sense, the 
Astrodome did bring Houston the respect and distinction Houstonians thought it deserved/ 
Houston in the mid to late 1960s, however, changed as its optimism gave way to 
pessimism. The Astrodome was "not designed for an era of contraction and limits" and could 
not possibly live up to the hype. The Astrodome did not usher in a new era of baseball. It 
ushered in a new era of something like baseball. Fans were pushed further from the action in 
an effort to make the stadium multi-purpose. Even worse, Hofheinz made the stadium the 
source of entertainment. Spectators came to the stadium not to watch baseball, but to see the 
Astrodome and the spectacle of the scoreboard. Sporting events, concerts, and other venues 
took second billing to the major attraction. Hofheinz asserted that part of his duty was to 
make the stadium a focal point of the action because "Whether you like it or not, you are in 
show business." What the Astros did underneath the dome was no longer traditional baseball. 
Critics claimed that the HSA doctored the playing surface to take advantage of the Astros' 
limited strengths. And the technology incorporated in the Astrodome was viewed differently. 
Astroturf was originally hailed as a great alternative to natural grass. Despite its cost, in the 
long run the turf would pay for itself. In the pessimistic Houston, Astroturf was viewed not as 
beneficial but as a bane. After its installation, skeptics wondered what the turf would do to 
8 Findlay. 284-295. 
'Findlay. 295-299. 
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athletes. Would the synthetic turf increase the number and severity of injuries? But even 
more salient, should the Houston athletes be given a voice in the decision? 
One of the loudest arguments used to bolster pro-stadium arguments was the 
economic boom it would bring to Houston. The HSA confidently predicted the stadium 
would attract tens of millions to Houston and local merchants. But the economic benefits of 
the stadium were hard to determine. Sure the stadium brought new entertainment to Houston 
that were not there before like bullfights, conventions, and circuses. Says Jay Taylor, 
Economic-development manager of the Houston Chamber of Commerce, Jay Taylor 
dismissed the notion that the Astrodome was a financial boom. "I know of almost no case," 
he said, "in which the Astrodome was a factor in a business moving to Houston."10 
This optimism and pride in the Astrodome tuned into resentment and embarrassment. 
One could not mention the Astrodome and not mention Roy Hofheinz. A pugnacious and 
determined man, Hofheinz's actions and words generated negative publicity. After the death 
of his wife, Dene, in 1966, Hofheinz moved into the stadium permanently. The stadium, his 
opponents charged, was built by and for the people of Harris County, not one man. His 
unilateral decision to paint the roof and install Astroturf proved their point. After he usurped 
control of the HSA and booted Bud Adams out as a tenant, Houstonians could only shake 
their head in disbelief and disappointment. In a world of limits, Hofheinz became a menace, a 
self serving tyrant. Hofheinz biographer Edgar W. Ray cited a ffowafo» C&rowc/g article that 
spelled out the opinion of Hofheinz. Hofheinz hoped the Astrodome would be a success for 
he and his family because of their business interests in the city. A monument that originally 
10 Findlay, 301; "The Business of Baseball," Newsweek, 26 April 1965, p. 66; Charles G. Burek, "It's Promoters 
vs. Taxpayers in the Superstadium Games," Fortune, 87 (March 1973): 105. 
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was to signal the status of Houston to the rest of the world had become a symbol of one 
man's desire to leave his mark on the city. 
In 1965, before the stadium was completed, the Reverend Billy Graham toured the 
stadium with Roy Hofheinz. At the end of his visit, Graham said, "This is in truth one of the 
great wonders of the world." Hofheinz eventually took Graham's quote and altered it 
slightly. The revised version had Graham labeling the stadium "The eighth wonder of the 
world." Graham, however, "never claimed he was misquoted."" After a commercial break 
during the first televised baseball in the Astrodome, ABC broadcaster Chris Schenkel said, 
"Welcome back to the Taj Mahal of baseball."  ^These two opinions echoed much of the 
popular belief of the Astrodome. It was an architectural achievement equivalent to the great 
engineering triumphs of past ages like the pyramids, Greek temples, and medieval cathedrals. 
The comparison between the Astrodome and the Taj Mahal, on one level, did not 
seem inappropriate. The Taj Mahal can be viewed as the pinnacle achievement of the Mughal 
dynasty and particularly of one individual Shah Jehan (or Jahan). Museum curator 
Pratapaitya Pal claimed, " To most people around the world the expression 'Taj Mahal' 
means a standard of excellence."" The Astrodome can be seen as the greatest achievement of 
postwar Houston and Roy Hofheinz. Both structures conjured ideas of grandeur, greatness, 
and perfection to those who saw them. Even the inspiration for the structures lingered in the 
air of mystery. According to one story, Hofheinz purportedly received his inspiration from a 
visit to the Roman CoUosseum. Another claimed that a visit with Buckminster Fuller 
11 Gary Cartwrig'nt, "A Barnum Named Hofheinz, A Big Top Called Astrodome," The New York Times 
Magazine, 21 July 1968, p. 11; Marshall Frady, "Hofheinz and the Astrodome," Holiday, 45 (May 1969): 89. 
12 Mickey Herskowitz, "Dome's First Game on TV a Dull One But Leo and Chris," Post, 23 May 1965, sec. 4, 
1,9. 
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convinced Hofheinz that a domed stadium could be constructed. The folklore surrounding the 
Taj contained myths of a European architect, Geronimo Veroneo, who designed the 
structure/* Each structure was conceived to be the focal point of a large complex. The 
Astrodome would be the keystone of Astro-domain, complete with a convention building 
(Astrohall) and an amusement park (Astroworld). The Taj was the main structure of a vast 
garden, complete with reflection pools and a mosque. Both buildings encouraged paler, 
inferior copies. The Superdome in New Orleans, the Pontiac Silverdome (both finished in 
1975), and the Kingdom in Seattle (completed in 1976), for example, all took their stimulus 
from the Astrodome. Northern Indian kingdoms looked to Agra and the Taj for its 
architectural inspiration.15 
But in all its glory, the Taj Mahal was simply a tomb. Shah Jehan commissioned the 
construction of the Crown of the Palace in 1632 (finished in 1648) to honor and celebrate his 
wife Mumtaz Mahal (Exhalted One of the Palace) who died during child birth. Pratapaitya 
Pal wondered how this mausoleum was transformed into a standard of excellence. Few not 
only failed to realize that the Taj Mahal was a tomb, but that it was "a man's perennial quest 
for immortality as well as his love for a woman."'* In Muslim tradition, a woman who died 
during childbirth was revered as a martyr and her tomb a pilgrimage site. The need to 
accommodate pilgrims and other related services necessitated a vast complex. But the tomb 
13 Pratapaditya Pal, "Introduction," in Romance of the Taj Mahal, ed. Pal Pratapaditya (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1989), 11. 
R. Nath, 77# Awnor&zf 71a/ MoM: 77# EvoMion off/# in MugW ArcMecAwe (Bombay: D. B. 
Taraporevala Sons and Company, 1972), 55-56. W. E. Begley argued that Ustad Ahmad Lahori was the chief 
architect for the Taj. See, W. E. Begley and Z. A. Desai, Taj Mahal: The Illuminated Tomb (Seattle: The 
University of Washington Press, 1989), xli-xlv. 
15 Janice Leoshko, "Mausoleum for an Empress," in Romance of the Taj Mahal, eds. Pratapaditya Pal, Janice 
Leoshko, Joseph M Dye, m, and Stephen Maikel, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1989), 84. 
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itself dominates the complex. Similarly, Hofheinz envisioned the stadium commanding a 
large Astro-domain. The Taj was a double-dome. Essentially, a double-dome created 
proportionality within and without the structure." Although the remains of Jahan and his 
beloved are not physically contained entombed in the sarcophagi, this fact in no way takes 
away from the Taj Mahal as a fantastic mausoleum. 
Ironically, Hofheinz's wife Dene died of a brain tumor on 1 December 1966. 
Therefore, the Astrodome could not be interpreted as Hofheinz's tribute to his wife. As 
Houston entered the era of finitude and pessimism, however, the Astrodome could be 
considered as a mausoleum. On the exterior, the glistening white Astrodome appeared to be 
the embodiment of optimism, of exuberance, of majesty. The stadium represented Houston's 
twentieth century achievement of becoming big league, of making it, of attaining greatness. 
But as the ebullience of the late 1950s and early 1960s waned, the view of the Astrodome 
changed to one of pessimism and resentment. Like the Taj Mahal, it was seen just as a giant 
gaudy tomb that revealed the vanity of one man. 
" John Lall, Thy MaW and (Ae GZory qfAfwgW Agra (New Delhi, India: Lustre Press Private Limited, 1982), 
121-122,128-133. 
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